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Abstract 
Rural water policy in the Northern Ghana is failing to meet articulated targets set out 
by donors based on regime targets. The Gusheigu District is considered one of the 
poorest and most remote districts in Ghana. Combined with a semi-arid climate and 
the highest illiteracy rate in Ghana (86%), rural communities within our case study in 
the Gusheigu district receive significant aid in the form of water projects from 
multilateral and bi-lateral donors along with international NGOs. Agents engaged in 
water policy process and its implementation techniques are involved in dynamic 
relationships involving negotiations between formal institutions and customary rule in 
a complex socio-political environment.  
 
By entering the agency-structure debate, the study includes experiences and 
perceptions of agents within formal institutions as well as community members 
engaged in development. Institutional frameworks including laws, acts, and policies 
are placed within a context of decentralized reform and reveal a weak government. At 
the same time, communities engaged in water development projects pursue their own 
strategies and resources to address water uses, needs, and preferences. The study 
analyzes policy implementation through theories of institutions and power, whereby 
questions of legitimacy and representation reveal that current aid is weakening local 
agents to “own” their policy and ultimately development. 
 
Investigating the various relationships and implementing objectives of agents reveals 
that external donors have the ability to pursue their agenda without sanctions or a high 
degree of disruption from the central government. Concepts such as “NGO” and 
“water development” are used as legitimizing tools for donors and their partners to 
legitimize their activities. Several constraints are noted that impede not only policy 
implementation but also contribute to mistrust between the three main categories of 
actors which are the state agents, international donors and communities. The current 
relations are leading towards dual system and to aid dependency. It is argued that 
current donor practices weakening a concept of local ownership, referring to the 
ability of local communities and the local government of shaping and maintaining 
their own water development. 
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We suggest that there are viable local options to water management and allocation 
that exist in Gusheigu that are not reflected in current policy, and that the current 
policy must become flexible. This involves becoming more involved in existing 
community institutions and resources, and understanding broader “needs” of 
communities. Increased political will towards a commitment of decentralization to all 
line ministries and cooperation and coordination which includes local realities can and 
should occur. Aside from policy, it is important that local NGOs stop competing with 
each other and with the district government and begin to understand a role of 
cooperation based on the local socio-political realities of the communities they are 
intending to help.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The relationship between theory and practice, and the unintended “gap” between the 
two is often addressed by better policy and more effective implementation (Mosse, 
2003). Policy is a tool which is accepted by agents in the development arena to 
establish and support frameworks and guide behavior in order to achieve and manage 
overall aims. It is based on certain language and assumptions and relies on 
interpretation from implementing agents to translate it into local practice. This thesis 
investigates interpretations and experiences of a range of agents involved in rural 
water policy implementation in Northern Ghana through complex local interests and 
institutions coexisting with donor-driven formal institutional intentions. This chapter 
includes a general background to development policies in Africa and specifically aid 
in Ghana, introduces the case study region, presents motivations for the study, and 
provides definitions of key concepts. This is then followed by the research question 
and an overview of the study.  
1.1  Development policies in a pluralistic African context 
The state construction in African countries has undergone many changes. Due to 
complex histories of pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial relations among agents 
both within country contexts as well as on a global scale, it has been pointed out that 
current African states reflect many traits of their colonial legacies and that current 
environmental policies reveal a remarkable consistency since colonial times (Leach 
and Mearns, 1996 in Keeley and Scoones, 1:2003). Bierschenk (2002) notes that the 
recurrent recourse to despotic and violent forms of power, the state’s relative lack of 
authority, and systematic reliance on intermediaries to offset weak local 
representatives are traits of these relations. It has also been argued that the appearance 
of the fragile African state, not to mention its existence, is linked more to an 
international system of states than its internal regulatory powers and revenue-
generation (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982, in Bierschenk, 2002).  It is significant to note 
that in many African countries, the institutions and agents involved in economic 
development have moved away from a state-centered arena to a more pluralistic 
network supported by policies of liberalization and decentralization. 
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In the Late 80’s and early 90’s during the Thatcher-Reagan era, privatization of the 
delivery of public goods was considered efficient, beneficial and inevitable in terms of 
politics, economics and institutions. This ideological way of thinking was transferred 
over to the logic of the largest of Development aid institutions, namely the IMF and 
World Bank, who soon had developing countries embark on a road to policy reform 
through privatization of public services (Francis, 2002). It was during this ideological 
developmental paradigm shift which no longer supported the state function, but the 
market and civil society – which led to an unprecedented rise of civil society 
organizations especially in Africa. This shift was stimulated by many factors not 
specifically related to the local level but on a global scale. Indeed, as Maslyukivska 
(1999) argues, there were pressures to form nonprofit organizations from the official 
policy circles. This supported the conservative governments of Ronald Reagan and 
Margaret Thatcher who created support for the voluntary sector, thereby providing a 
central stage to reduce government social spending. 
 
Francis (2002) mentions that firms such as the World Bank, with a foundation of 
liberalized policy, considered public sector ownership of water utilities too costly and 
inefficient. The sale of water utilities and other public enterprises could result in 
quicker resources, thereby providing developing countries capacity to service their 
increasing debt. The shift to the Demand Responsive Approach (DRA) in water and 
sanitation service delivery was based on the premise of cost recovery and the notion 
that if a cost was shifted to the consumer, the consumer then would “value” the 
essence of the resource used and its associated compliments. These notions were then 
based upon the element of sustainability and conservative use of the resource, thereby 
implying a defined form of “ownership.”  
 
In past experience related to personal research and literary reviews there are mixed 
responses to this premise based on a linear model of demand and payment of services. 
If the market based transition approach is accepted or adopted by local agents based 
on the idea of “if I demand it, I’ll have to pay for it, and therefore I own it,” further 
questions arise around “ownership.” What is the demand actually reflecting? How 
does this reflect ownership? And whose interests is this ultimately serving? 
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Aid - The Role of the IMF, World Bank in Ghana 
In the case of Ghana, the IMF and World Bank have exercised tremendous influence 
over the development policies within international and domestic sector reforms. The 
World Bank coordinates an organizing body considered the “Consultive Group” in 
Ghana which, according to the Delegates on the International Fact-Finding Mission 
on Water Sector Reform in Ghana, is an informal organization of all bilateral and 
multilateral creditors and donors in Ghana. This group exercises strong authority in 
determining the policies and projects that will be awarded with the support of 
creditors. Ghana has recently been granted the status of Highly Indebted Poor Country 
(HIPC) with the IMF and World Bank. Eligibility for this debt relief program required 
three years of compliance with the IMF and World Bank expressing motivations to 
exercise macroeconomic and structural adjustment policies. Key characteristics that 
have been initiated for eligibility have been: 
• Cutbacks to reduce budget deficits 
• Privatization 
• De-regulation 
• Trade liberalization 
It is not the scope of this paper to conduct an in-depth study of macro-economic 
reform within the government’s current agenda. Nonetheless, we acknowledge that 
current reform policy within the water and sanitation sector is affecting the urban and 
rural water sectors in Ghana. The general debate is whether the restructuring itself 
will be able to secure the needs of the majority of Ghanaians. Below are the water 
policy reforms reflected in macro water policy applications: 
 
1. ensuring sustainability through increased cost recovery. 
2. improving the efficiency of production and distribution through operation and 
maintenance 
3. increasing cost-effectiveness and promoting pricing guided by demand cost 
related principles 
 
Some examples of implementation tools will be noted later on in the study, more 
specifically in reference to the idea of demand driven concepts to water supply and 
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water management, and how NGOs are translating these macro-economic concepts to 
localized issues when dealing with community involvement.  
 
Based on Ashley and Maxwell (2001), the New Poverty Approach to combine the 
roles of the state and the content of policies is encompassed in five elements, 
providing a structure for rural development practitioners to work within: 1) 
international development targets reflected in the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs); 2) a strategy to reduce poverty, summarized by the World Development 
Report (WDR); 3) Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) as a way to 
operationalize the WDR in country-specific localities; 4) new technologies for 
delivering PRSP, including sector-wide approaches and medium-term expenditure 
frameworks and; 5) results-based evaluation and reward. These strategies and 
structures, albeit very rational and budget conscious, do not necessarily assume that 
the NGO is the proper mechanism to supplement the role of the state.  
 
The mega development aid powers of the world, such as the World Bank, IMF, WTO 
etc… are continuously engaging in a market based conservative approach to 
development which, in a representative civil society sense, launches the debate 
questioning commitments and objectives framing the role of the NGO as an aid 
partner and or an aid provider. In literature it is assumed that the NGO is the closest 
link to the marginalized of the developing world. Yet from this brief introduction, it is 
clear that policy processes are linked to local, national, and international processes, 
and NGOs operate as one link in a complex field comprised of horizontal and vertical 
networks. While the categories of “state,” “civil society,” and “market,” and “local” 
and “national” are useful, this study shows that policy processes and more specifically 
policy implementation cut across these divides.  
 
Introduction to Ghana’s North-South Divide 
The following account provides some background to issues contributing to extended 
poverty in Northern Ghana. Current disparities between the North and South of Ghana 
can be related to numerous reasons including natural resource endowments, socio-
political history, and current development trends (Tsikata and Seini, 2004). The pre-
colonial relationships between the Ashanti kingdom and northern ethnic groups 
established a hierarchy of dominance which still exists today, and which differentiates 
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not only Akan (south) and Mole-Dagbani (North), but also, within the North, the 
kingdoms from the so-called acephalous (king-less) ethnic groups – this 
differentiation being the basis of most violent conflict in the North since 1980. The 
inequality in socioeconomic and spatial development between the North and South 
continued during Ghana’s colonial history where ethnic groups along the coast were 
targets of business, religious, and ultimately development relationships. This resulted 
in the promotion of labor migration to the South which in essence prevented 
government investment in the North and led to a protective attitude towards the 
southern population. This has continued to keep Northerners apart from the 
development which colonialism brought elsewhere (Shepherd et al, 2005). Following 
independence under the rule of Kwame Nkrumah and his vision of national equity, 
some of these disparities were addressed in the form of universalizing free education 
and health care, and creating infrastructures in the North such as roads and towns such 
as Tamale and Bolgatanga.  
 
There is much literature explaining various theories and reasons of the extensive 
poverty- related inequalities found between the northern and southern regions. In the 
World Development report (2006), the regional North/South inequality is noted as 
significant. In the North incomes are 2-4 times lower than any other region in Ghana. 
The report notes that some causes may be of historical reasons do to:  
• Geography -  the lower rainfall, savannah vegetation, and remote and 
inaccessible location of much of the northern region  
 
• Pre-colonial relationship between kingdom and tribes,   
• The colonial dispensation which ensured that northern Ghana was a labor 
reserve for the southern mines and forest economy. 
• Post colonial failure to break the established pattern. 
(World Development Report, 2006) 
1.2  Problem Area and Motivation for study 
Water is life. It is universally acclaimed that water is one of the most important 
resources on the planet. In the end, every being is dependent on it. While water is 
assumed by most people to be a free good, investments are being made in water 
supply and distribution infrastructure to ration or control consumption (Frankel, 
2005:81). 
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In the last decade water and sanitation has received a high level of political support 
and is highlighted in the recently developed Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(GPRS) document. A national policy for community water and sanitation (covering 
rural area and small towns) has been adopted and is being interpreted and translated 
by government agents, private industry and civil society based organizations. This has 
initiated bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors in all regions of Ghana to implement 
several water related projects focusing on all water related issues ranging from 
hygiene awareness to safe water supply for drinking. Despite the increased emphasis 
on reforms pushed by donors and the Ghanaian government within the water and 
sanitation sector, figures of coverage and supply still remain alarmingly low although 
pressure of water use is ever increasing. 
 
Policy implementation is interpreted and translated by agents in the Gusheigu district 
and encounters numerous relationships outside the formal policy arrangement 
involving how agents act within certain structures. Despite water projects, many 
community members continue to fetch water from sources far away and continue to 
suffer from water-related diseases. At the same time, current institutional frameworks 
including local government agencies are resource weak and depend on resource-rich 
donor-funded agents. If the overall stated aim of aid, including water development, is 
assumed to help states, or districts in a decentralized state, and communities become 
more self-reliant and not aid dependent, we begin our research by recognizing broader 
outcomes of current interventions, bringing us closer to discussing such questions as 
“ownership for whom?” and “ownership to what ends?”  
1.3  Research Question 
As addressed in the problem field, we question the dichotomy between policy 
formulation and implementation, and place policy as the link between formally 
sanctioned agents and agents in rural communities.   
How is water policy implementation being interpreted and experienced by 
different agents within rural water development in Northern Ghana and how is 
this supporting “ownership”? 
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The following sub-questions are posed to help us address the main question and 
structure the analysis: 
• How is the current water institutional framework translating water policy? 
 
• How is the role of power shaping interactions between agents? 
 
• How is current water policy supporting, or not supporting, the district “own” 
its water development? 
 
The investigation uses a case study approach in the Gusheigu district of Northern 
Ghana. The study focuses on formal water institutions and their intended frameworks 
as well as how these are actually experienced by local agents including government 
members, local northern partnered NGOs, and rural community members. The 
influence of power relations and the distribution of resources between agents and 
structures are significant in shaping legitimacy and representation involved in 
processes of ownership in water policy implementation.  
1.4  Defining Concepts 
 
The study leans on existing definitions of institutions and agents. Giddens defines 
agents as individuals who are knowledgeable and capable. Agency “concerns events 
of which an individual is the perpetrator, in the sense that the individual could, at any 
phase in a given sequence of conduct, have acted differently” (1984:9). While 
providing a theoretical foundation, we find Clegg’s use of the term more specific in 
that agency may also be organizational and that organizations, under appropriate 
conditions, “may constitute a form of collective agency and…there is no reason to 
make this a second-rate form of agency compared to that of the problematic human 
subject” (1989:188). These agents are intricately related to resisting and forming 
structures and are not understood to be purposeful and rational goal-oriented entities, 
but rather, organizations depend on “subordination of the constitutive individual parts 
of the organization” through power and resistance. In the study, agency is attributed to 
entities such as the DA, NGOs, “communities” and as well as individuals belonging 
within these collectivities.  
 
Structures are understood, “in social analysis, to the structuring properties allowing 
the ‘binding’ of time-space in social systems, the properties which make it possible 
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for discernibly similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time and space 
and which lend them ‘systemic’ form” (Giddens 1984: 17).  
 
Institutions are understood as structures which “are the more enduring features of 
social life” and give “‘solidity’ across time and space” (Giddens 1984: 24). Within the 
study we see the institution as a behavior setting mechanism mostly centered within 
the structural formation of the Ghanaian water sector, specifically the rural water 
supply policy.  Included within the water institutional structure are formal agents, 
regulations, laws and of course the water supply policy. These formal-legal 
institutions, or “formulated rules—those that are given verbal expression as canons of 
law, bureaucratic rules, rules of games and so on—are…codified interpretations of 
rules rather than rules as such” (Giddens, 1984:21). The institution, as we see it, 
formulates and sanctions behavior frameworks which underpin policy formation, and 
is thus used as a policy tool. 
 
Implementing agents, or what Lipsky terms “street-level bureaucrats,” refer to 
“lower-level bureaucrats in an agency who are in direct contact with the persons a 
program is intended to affect” (Mazmanian and Sabatier1989:20). Thus, street-level 
bureaucrats are either collectivities or individuals involved in translating and 
implementing water policy.  
These persons include administrators in the district assembly and also program 
officers and coordinators for local NGOs. We note here that street-level bureaucrats 
are also intended to translate information upwards to the individual’s authoritative 
superiors. 
 
Power is understood as including both agents who are able to resist to domination, 
and structures which constrict and enable action. At this general level, we define 
power based on Giddens to mean transformative capacity or the capacity to achieve 
outcomes. Within the study, we consider the capacity of agents to achieve their 
desired outcomes in terms of water development and the resources (both authoritative 
and allocative) on which they draw. 
 
Suchmann (1995: 574 in Lister, 2003) defines legitimacy as “a generalized perception 
or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
9  
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions.” For 
example, street-level bureaucrats are required to have positive legitimacy from 
communities if their water projects are to be implemented. They also require positive 
legitimacy from their bosses or donors to continue their work.  
 
The investigation adopts a broad definition of ownership to include technical and 
structural perspectives as well as a more nuanced understanding of how agents engage 
with policy. Ownership refers to the “recipient commitment to and capacity for 
design and implementation of policy reform” where capacity refers to “(i) donor 
management; and (ii) policy autonomy and content (referring to the substance of 
national development strategies and policies)” (Ohno, 2005). We also include 
community ownership of water projects in our understanding in order to reflect their 
capacity, where capacity refers to their ability to manage street-level bureaucrats such 
as NGO staff and participate in creating local development plans as well as their 
capacity to maintain and use their water sources. 
 
Representation – We refer representation to an outcome of institutional choice and 
behavior where there is a presence of systematic mechanisms by which society can 
hold decision makers accountable. We see representation as defined by the ability of a 
democratic institution which has the potential power to be responsive to society’s 
needs pertaining to persons in positions of power to transfer these powers in creation 
of institutional change. 
 
Another useful concept in the African context is neo-patrimony. Van De Walle 
(2001, in Smith, 2004) describes the African state as neo-patrimonial, referring to a 
state which presents itself as a rational-legal system with modern bureaucracy 
including written laws and a constitution, but which is “constantly subverted by a 
patrimonial logic, in which officeholders almost systematically appropriate public 
resources for their own uses and political authority is largely based on clientelist 
practices.” In a neo-patrimonial state, political favors are granted based on 
clientelims, or the granting of favors or patronage. 
 
Pratt and Gibbs (2000) identify 3 organizational types of decentralization which are 
Deconcentration, Delegation, and Devolution. Deconcentration is essentially an 
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organizational form of delegating responsibilities and tasks downward into the 
organization itself. Delegation transfers responsibility and authority to sub-structures 
giving power to local representatives. Devolution is the delegation of authority, 
responsibly and structure that is shared vertically and horizontally within and 
associated to autonomous organizations.  
1.5  Chapter Outlines  
Our thesis is comprised of seven chapters. We attempt to summarize to our readers 
some main points in each of the chapters in order to provide the reader with an 
overview of structure and introduction of content. 
 
Chapter Two is the methodology which gives our strategy to how the problem 
identified has been investigated. We outline our case study and apply research 
techniques based on our applied theoretical approach. To end the chapter, we point 
out issues pertaining to validity of the analysis via triangulation and constraints to the 
study itself. 
 
Chapter Three contains our theoretical approach to the study. Here we address the 
definitions and language presented in the problem formulation that is the foundation 
of the thesis. We outline the theoretical approach envisioned as a process involving 
the duality of agency/structure and move into institutions and power relations which 
constitute key foundations to policy implementation approaches. We end the chapter 
with a visual model of how our theoretical relationship of how we tie together our 
presented theories.  
 
Chapter Four is our background to the practical side of the development agenda and 
water issues in Ghana. We provide the descriptive introduction of the case area 
specific to Northern Ghana highlighting trends and issues that characterized today’s 
water supply problems. We link socio-political, cultural, and technical characteristics 
influencing central institutions and agents’ behavior pertaining to water policy 
implementation.   
 
Chapter Five begins the analysis of the thesis from a perspective of practically 
associating water problems in Northern Ghana to the existing technological and socio-
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economic frameworks outlined in the previous chapter. Essentially we intend to give 
voice to the agents within the existing frameworks. We link agents in positions 
interpreting current water supply who are positioned as proactively implementing 
water policy and who are intended to receive the potential benefits of water initiatives. 
Our general motive was to identify problems, constraints, resources, and strategies 
associated with the range of agents identified in the case study. 
 
Chapter Six is our analysis of the problems identified in chapter Five. The first 
section of the chapter includes analysis of agencies within the district water policy 
setting and how their actions and choices are affected by their structural 
environments. Based on theories of representation, institutional choice, and 
legitimacy, it is argued that the current policy environment exists as a system in which 
powerful NGOs are contributing to a dual-system of governance which ultimately 
may impede the district agents, including decision-makers, street-level bureaucrats, 
and communities from owning the current water policy. These relationships are then 
placed in the context of Clegg’s circuit of power framework and offer some 
implications for our concept of ownership. 
 
Chapter Seven is our discussion/conclusion where we summarize the key findings 
from the implementing agents including local government members and NGOs in a 
discussion of ownership and what that means for the people of Northern Ghana. 
Recommendations are provided based on the findings and analysis and further areas 
of research are suggested. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
The aim of this chapter is to address different methodological aspects of the 
investigation, including the choice of research paradigm and its relation to the duality 
of agency/structure, rationale for choosing theories and methods, analysis tools, use of 
case study method, and methods of data collection.   
2.1 Methodological approach to the Research: Two 
paradigms 
Social theories have been used in social sciences to understand the nature of society 
and social change. The two main branches within the social science traditions are 
often referred to as positivism/objectivism and perspectivism/constructivism where, in 
methodological discussions, the former has traditionally been associated with 
quantitative methods while the latter with qualitative ones. The distinction is made by 
Sutton (1993), who notes that positivism is based on one or more of the following 
assumptions: that factuality is a property of the empirical world and not the observer, 
facts are separate from their meaning, hypotheses can be formally tested across 
multiple cases, the generation of law-like statements, and the use of value free 
descriptive language. Traditionally, this framework is the foundation of the natural 
sciences; within the social sciences, researchers who use quantitative methods try to 
emulate the natural sciences and their objectivity (Latour, 2000). Qualitative methods, 
on the other hand, request that social topics should begin with an entirely different 
“scienticity.” Sutton (1993) continues that qualitative research methods often use 
relativist assumptions, interpretivist procedures and verbal representations of data. 
According to Risse (2004) social constructivism is “based on a social ontology which 
insists that human agents do not exist independently from their social environment 
and its collectively shared systems of meaning (‘culture’ in a broad sense).” This is 
contrasted with methodological individualism based on rational choice where “the 
elementary units of social life is the individual human action” (Elster 1989:13 in 
Risse, 2004).  
 
This distinction between the two paradigms blushes the surface of great debates, and 
many theorists find themselves combining aspects of both. Postmodernists and 
subjective phenomenologists who argue that “all knowledge is relative and 
provisional, and science is just another culture-bound worldview” (Wilk, 1996: 3) 
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have been criticized for being overly relative. Few positivist scientists make claims 
that socially constructed reality is unimportant in the social sciences and few ignore 
issues of perception, reality, and meaning gained through quantitative methods 
(Bradley, 1993).  
 
One of the key insights of post-positivist methodology is that it is through theories 
that one comes to know the world (Haig, 1987 in Lauder et al, 2004). Kuhn 
contributed the notion of “paradigms,” referring to perspectives through which people 
view the world that determine which questions are relevant and how to argue (Olsen 
and Pedersen, 2005:141). A paradigm is constituted of value judgments and 
metaphysical suppositions (nature of reality and possibilities of cognition) which 
determine what is held to be true. Thus, the discussion between quantitative and 
qualitative methods is not to make one more valid than the other, but to acknowledge 
that they make different assumptions and thus see the world from different angles, all 
of which are useful and limited. Even within the plurality of theories currently 
revolving in social science circles, one cannot assume that one can explain society in 
all its complexity.  
 
Scharpf notes that frameworks provide a useful ordering system for describing the 
location of, and relationship between, the partial theories (1997:30). Understanding 
policies as the outcomes of intentional actions, leads us to view policy as not merely 
driven by personal impulses or contingent on external factors, but emerges, albeit with 
external constraints, through human intentions. This subjective phenomenon 
influences policy based on the perceived reality and assumptions regarding causal 
relationships to outcomes. We agree with Scharpf that “intentional action…cannot be 
described and explained without reference to the subjective ‘meaning’ that this action 
has for the agent in question” (1997:19). On a broader level, assumptions underlying 
development policies are based on conceptions about what a society looks like and 
what is should be in the development sense. These assumptions, at the same time, are 
often embedded in macro-structures (political, economic, normative, cognitive), and 
policies are complex processes involving “agents” and “structures” that mediate 
relationships between “globalized” policy processes and more localized situations.  
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The investigation undertaken here follows a qualitative methodology due to the 
assumptions that policy is created and maintained through socially constructed 
processes. The view taken is that social agents who interact in environments through 
relationships of power and institutions give meaning to policy. Instead of focusing 
only on specific outcomes, the investigation looks at how policy is translated through 
processes coexisting in a broader environment. Patton (2002) writes that qualitative 
inquiry is appropriate for studying processes because it requires detailed description 
of how people interact with each other; the experience of process typically varies for 
different people so their experiences need to be captured in their own words; process 
is dynamic and fluid so it cannot be summarized fairly on a single rating scale at one 
point in time; and participants’ perceptions are a key process consideration (Patton, 
2002: 159). The present study of policy implementation adopts a multifaceted 
understanding of processes involving formalized activities and outcomes expressed 
within the policy arrangement as well as perceptions, unanticipated interactions, and 
livelihood strategies expressed and observed in the broader policy environment.  
2.2  Structuring Methods: rationale for theories and methods 
Due to the complexity of the problem, the investigation did not begin with rationally 
deducing empirical laws based on a theory and testing it (deduction), nor did it aim to 
generalize about categories, laws or typologies based on observation (induction) (in 
Olsen and Pedersen, 2005:136). Delorme (1999) advises a method of abstraction is 
useful in approaching such subject matter: 
In the study of a phenomenon perceived as complex, for which there exists no 
available substantive theory or model, empirical investigation comes first 
together with abduction and the attempt at theorizing. Hence the priority is 
given to the object of study and to the semantics over the syntax in a first step.  
The exploratory phase in our investigation allowed us to select relevant theories based 
on observation and initial findings. The theories eventually chosen to investigate the 
problem are derived from pluralistic frameworks in order to address both micro and 
macro-level structures while they are not assumed to explain all the complex layers of 
processes involved in policy implementation. 
 
In most policy implementation studies, two perspectives may be applied: one on 
strategic action and one on institutional analysis. Both perspectives offer insight into 
factors shaping implementation processes, yet separately they offer limited 
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understanding. Understanding policies as socially constructed, the factors influencing 
agents’ preferences are not necessarily driven internally, nor are they necessarily 
imposed on them. Judging from the vast amount of literature on policy 
implementation, there are numerous theories and frameworks for studies on policy 
implementation, including Pressman and Wildavsky’s (1973) complex policy process 
and the more recent elaborate syntheses of top-down and bottom-up approaches by 
Mazmanian and Sabatier (1989). O’Toole (1986, in Hill, 2003) notes that over three 
hundred variables have been identified that might affect implementation.   
 
Instead of adopting one of these frameworks, the investigation leans on the 
structuration tradition and studies policy as “being produced, reproduced, 
appropriated, and transformed, and not as fixed structures and rigid entities” (Prasad, 
2005:190). Various general social theorists address the interaction between structures 
and agency, including Giddens, Bourdieau, Archer and Foucault among others. We 
found Giddens’ duality of structure to be most useful as it views structural properties 
of social systems as “both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively 
organize” (Giddens, 25). In applying duality to the study of policy implementation, 
“agent and structure can be distinguished analytically, but, in reality, agent and 
structure presuppose and influence each other in implementation process” (Terpstra 
and Havinga, 2001). The emphasis and combination of both structures and agents was 
found to be well suited for the investigation. Agents are more than passive viewers 
and are considered actively engaged in the production and reproduction of structures, 
which in turn both enable and constrain agents.  
 
While the duality of structure offers a useful foundation, we found that the 
investigation would gain from complementing theoretical dimensions in analyzing the 
nature of relations under investigation. Although power encompasses an important an 
important dimension in Giddens’ duality of structure, we apply Clegg’s circuits of 
power because it provides a more specified manifestation of the power relations 
between formal legal institutions, organizations, and agents, and also accepts that 
there may be “structural constraints which have a more tendential than necessary 
expression in the appropriate standing conditions” (Clegg 1989:147). Applied to the 
case of policy implementation, the framework is useful because it allows the analysis 
to go beyond simplistic A over B relations of power and implies that authority in the 
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policy environment is legitimated by structural and agency aspects which affect the 
interpretation of policy.   
 
Institutional theory is relevant as it underpins the current development rationale and is 
used as a tool for implementation within the policy arrangement. These institutions 
are situated within Clegg’s framework most directly in the obligatory passage points 
(Chapter 3) through which all agents must pass; institutions represent the channels 
through which policy is created, translated, implemented, and re-created, and are 
defined within the case as formal legal structures acting as tools for water policy 
implementation. Institutional theory postulates that institutions are the most effective 
and efficient mechanisms to deliver aid by allowing assets to be codified and by 
creating certain behavioral responses. We chose to include institutional theory based 
on the premise, as supported by Dolsfma and Verburg (2005), that: 
 
1. Individuals, being social animals of necessity, cannot escape institutions. 
The authors make the distinction between individuals who cannot escape the 
institution and makes choices within the setting vs. the individual in an environment 
who creates the ability to shape institutions around them.  
 
2. Institutions never have a script so closed that an agent needs no interpretation 
to act upon them – all institutions allow for multiple interpretations. 
This theoretical concept of the institution intrigued us as we can see how agents in 
Northern Ghana are reacting to or evolving the role of the institution as we write. 
Institutions are immersed in a constant element of change as individuals constantly 
react within their environment.  
2.3 Data Analysis 
In order to focus on specific aspects of power, the study employs legitimacy as a tool 
with which powerful agents maintain their position of authority. Pearce (1997, in 
Lister 2003) suggests that legitimacy relates to the right to represent and the consent 
of the represented, while also being linked to the effectiveness of the organization. 
Clegg’s model offers what we feel a vague conception of these passage points, and 
theories of representation through legal institutions and legitimacy. Within 
decentralization in a democratic context, the issue of representation reveals aspects of 
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effectiveness in implementation that are relevant to current debates within an African 
development context. According to Ribot (2001), “achieving many of the equity, 
efficiency, environment and development benefits of participation is predicated on 
devolving decision-making powers and responsibilities to some individual or body 
representing or within the local community.” If representation is to be spanned across 
space and time, it must be institutionalized, and in the Gusheigu District, this 
institutionalization is occurring through the process of decentralized democracy. By 
focusing on the strong or weak channels of representation, the analysis broadens the 
question of legitimation. 
 
While closely related to representation, the choice of legitimacy adopted veers away 
from the more technical approaches of accountability, representativeness, and 
performance which focus on structures and procedures with the aim of assessing 
whether agents “are” or “are not” legitimate. The theory chosen leans on a broader 
social science tradition and acknowledges that different environments (composed of 
agents and structures) provide different kinds of legitimacy, and asks such questions 
as “legitimate for whom?” and “legitimate to what ends?” (Lister, 2003). We find this 
perspective useful because it acknowledges broader forms of institutions and the 
implications of multiple agents engaged in development work (including NGOs and 
staff, donors, DA members, community members) with individual and collective 
agendas necessitating different kinds of legitimation.  
 
Finally, the emerging analysis is placed in a discussion of policy “ownership” and 
what this actually means for agents in the Gusheigu district. It is the concept of 
ownership which combines the different and divergent aspects and guides the study 
into its conclusions. 
2.4 Case Study Design and Method 
By choosing a case study, micro level actions of individuals can be linked to larger 
social structures and processes where a well-constructed case is both holistic and 
context sensitive (Patton, 2005:447). Yin (1993) states that a main rationale for using 
a case study is when the investigation covers both a phenomenon as well as the 
context in which it is occurring because 1) the context is hypothesized to contain 
important explanatory variables concerning the phenomenon or 2) the boundaries 
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between the context and phenomenon are not evident (Yin, 1993:31). Limitations of 
this method include imprecision (small number cannot lead to generalizations), lack 
of objectivity (the intense focus on one subject creates bias) and rigour, as well as 
some technical challenges such as revealing more variables than data points (Yin, 
2003 and 1993). Nonetheless, the investigation adopts a case study because it strives 
for a more holistic understanding of cultural systems of action, referred to as sets of 
interconnected activities agents are engaged in within a social context (Feagin, Orum, 
and Sjoberg, 990, in Tellis, 1997). According to them, three conditions of when to use 
a case study include 
1. the type of question posed by the researcher 
2. the extent of control an investigator has over behavioral events 
3. the degree of focus on contemporary events 
 
In designing the case study, the unit of analysis is critical because it defines the 
boundaries. This unit can be defined as a system of action rather than an individual or 
group of individuals, and tends to be selective by focusing on one or two issues that 
are fundamental to the investigation (Tellis, 1997). This study used a two-layer case 
method whereby the community setting was layered within the policy arrangement at 
the district level. This method recognizes that larger case units can be built out of 
smaller ones (Patton 2005: 448-449). The process of defining these units will be 
described in the subsequent sections.  
2.5 Ghana Fieldwork 
Logistics 
Our research is a result of familiarizing and involving ourselves with the development 
industry. We have received support through research grants by staying within the 
realm of the water and sanitation sector, a prioritized area of Danida’s development 
efforts via NGOs in Northern Ghana. Ghana is listed as a highly indebted poor 
country and a large recipient of Danish development aid. These were some of the 
criteria which enabled us to receive funding via RUF travel grants, supported by 
Danida and Roskilde University. Additional funding was received from CLIP 
Denmark, via funding by Danida.  
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The data collection took place over three months from February until May, 2006. This 
period was chosen because it was the end of the dry period and water is scarce; it is 
also the lean season in terms of food. It is also the time of year when wells are 
constructed. Although settling within a collaborative sphere with CLIP, we realized 
very early that if we were to conduct a study that corresponds to our interest and aims 
of our theoretical and practical research of significant stakeholders conducting water 
projects in Gusheigu district, we would have to distance ourselves from CLIP.  
 
In Gusheigu district it was important to acknowledge the support of CLIP for our 
research but also try and remain neutral, stating that we are simply conducting a study 
in formal connection via our educational institution. The content of information we 
were searching for would be in connection with a foundation of neutrality and 
unbiased intentions. Trying to create a perception of neutrality is a limitation when 
conducting interviews in small communities or towns where word spreads around 
fast, and where the only reason why “researchers” from the north would be here is 
because of an affiliation with an NGO or governmental agency.  
 
Interpreter 
The point of departure within the communities is the interpreter, as the language, 
context, content, and meaning is filtered through their role. The reliance on an 
interpreter can be seen as both a limitation and advantage to the study. Inevitably, 
they added a degree of distance between the researchers and the people being 
interviewed. At times, this felt beyond the control of the researcher. For example, they 
sometimes translated one sentence questions and statements into prolonged 
explanations in both directions.1 They could shorten, lengthen, interpret, change, and 
distort meanings, remove incongruencies, add cohesiveness and to some degree their 
own opinion and understanding. In order to maintain a level of scientific integrity, it 
was important that they were familiar with the area of inquiry, aware of their role as 
interpreter, knowledgeable of the questions, and sensitive and open to varied 
responses. The interpreter’s knowledge surrounding the topics discussed became vital, 
especially where assumptions were made on both the informants’ and our side 
regarding the others’ knowledge. We learned from them how to show respect in 
                                                 
1
 Some concepts and words along with proverbs in Likpakpaln can be found in Appendix L. 
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greeting different people and behave in general, such as the importance of sharing 
humor and accepting gifts. Before asking some more sensitive or personal questions 
regarding i.e. gender or ethnic issues, we often asked the interpreters for advice in 
how best to approach these. In these ways, they became a gatekeeper to the 
community and allowed us to enter into conversations with people based on the 
respect and trustworthiness given to them by the people, while the interpretation also 
represented an ongoing challenge and learning process. As time went on, their interest 
also increased in the subject and this was reflected in the quality of translation. 
 
Three interpreters aided in the community setting. One was Khadija Issufo who is 
associated with numerous NGOs including CLIP, School for Life, CIFS, and is a 
primary school teacher. She was chosen for practical reasons as she was one of few 
people in the surrounding communities who spoke and understood English 
sufficiently and because it enabled the researchers to stay with her in a community. 
The second interpreter was David Wunzoya who was chosen because Khadija was 
attending a teacher’s training session. He was selected due to his English abilities, his 
status as a sub-chief, and previous experience as an interpreter. Habib was the third 
interpreter and was chosen due to his language skills, knowledge of health and other 
issues, and sensitivity of ethnic relations. He has no official relation to any NGOs and 
provided a more neutral perspective. 
 
 Organization of Research 
It was decided that the fieldwork should be divided between the two researchers based 
on training, interest, and structure of the investigation. One researcher primarily 
gathered data and conducted fieldwork in the community setting, while the other 
researcher primarily identified and interviewed key stakeholders from governmental, 
non-governmental and private agencies within the Gusheigu district and Northern 
region. In part, the division was chosen based on time efficiency in the sense that one 
person could get more involved and knowledgeable in one setting than both trying to 
combine both at the same time. This division was not strict in the sense that some 
interviews and field visits were conducted by both researchers to share knowledge, 
experiences, and maintain a connection between the settings. Nonetheless, due to 
lacking infrastructure such as mobile phone reception or electricity, we were unable to 
communicate at times, and we structured the fieldwork to enable regular exchange of 
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ideas and new knowledge. Thus, the community setting field work was broken into 
shorter one-week intervals. In practice, this division became more problematic than 
anticipated, and in hindsight there could have been more “overlap” of the fieldwork. 
This may have aided the analysis by focusing more on the linkages and less on the 
sometimes overly distinct formal institutional and community settings. 
 
The fieldwork can be divided into three phases: 
• Preparatory Phase (in Denmark)- Selected geographic region and 
development sector. Based on existing knowledge, shaped a broad problem 
area: 
- literature review, document review, qualitative interviews 
 
• Exploratory Phase (in Ghana)- used “open-coding” and inductive methods 
in order to identify stakeholders, design case study, formulate research 
question, identify common themes as tools for analysis, and choose relevant  
theories: 
- Community setting used methods based on participant observation, 
qualitative interviews, key informants, and mapping 
- Formal/institutional setting using participant observation and 
qualitative interviews, key informants, reports and documents 
 
• Case Study Phase- continuing with above and focused on themes of 
representation and legitimacy: 
- Develop methods appropriate to setting. Community setting included 
participant observation, key informants, qualitative interviews, group 
discussions, and mapping. 
-  Formal/Institutional side included key informants, qualitative 
interviews and document review 
2.6 Framing the unit of analysis: the case 
It was during the exploratory phase that the case was designed. This process involved 
making selections in the community setting as well as in the formal/institutional 
setting in such a way that would practically enable us to investigate the linkages in the 
set timeframe.  
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Finding a “unit” in the communities 
Remote communities were selected due to their high level of poverty, lacking modern 
infrastructures, and long distances to marets, schools, and health clinics. They are 
described as marginalized and poor. Having no direct contacts to or access to baseline 
information on the remote communities, the researchers relied on CLIP for entry, 
limiting the research to the Gusheigu district. The initial selection criteria included 
communities which were undergoing a CLIP water project at the time of study. This 
enabled observation of and participation in the social context of water development, 
leading into possible themes for further investigation. The second requirement was 
that there be an interpreter from the community who was well respected and able to 
translate between English and the local language Likpakpaln. Having an interpreter 
from the community made it easier for the researchers to stay in the community and 
adopt a more in-depth ethnographic style of data collection.  
 
After the exploratory phase (1 week), a network of eight communities that are linked 
through social, water, and familial ties were selected as the unit of analysis. A “unit” 
was indeed difficult to establish in the context of the rural communities. Based on 
participant observations and interviews, a single community is not an isolated entity 
and is very much linked to the surrounding communities in multiple aspects, including 
within the context of water and development. The choice between single-case and 
multiple-case was discusses, and it was decided that these communities could be 
combined as a single-case, and that this could provide sufficient data within the time 
limitations. The time frame was a reason for keeping the study case within one area as 
it allowed for the investigation to go more in-depth through building up trust and 
gaining context-specific knowledge. Another reason was that including eight 
communities allowed for the diversity among them to be investigated, such as 
communities without development interventions. Based on the layering case method, 
the communities were placed in the Gusheigu district, providing the second layer of 
the case.  
 
Narrowing the field of stakeholders in the formal/institutional unit 
One of our challenges was to try and identify key stakeholders in our district that are 
conducting relevant project work within the water and sanitation sector. As CLIP is 
one of the key stakeholders in the Gusheigu district, we were able to use some of their 
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knowledge to identify and gain contact information about the location and type of 
work that is initiated. We were able to conduct site visits and attend workshops 
sponsored by CLIP which in turn introduced us to many other district contacts 
especially at the meso, micro governmental levels and village level.  
 
It was the goal of the researchers to conduct interviews at all formal institutional 
levels. The researchers’ priority to search and contact key informants in representation 
of regional to local level bureaucracy had been influenced during the beginning of the 
field study by CLIP with initial contacts. The researchers used these contacts and 
began to build a network of key governmental informants. Key stakeholders included 
the categories from local NGOs and other agencies involved in water sector 
implementation, the state, and the target groups.  
2.7 Methods 
The following methods were used during data collection. This section is mainly based 
on Patton (2005), although we supplement it with other authors where we feel it is 
useful. 
 
Participant observation 
The continuum between observer and full participant is vast, and participant observers 
employ overlapping and multiple data collection strategies (Patton, 2005:265). Denzin 
(1978b:183 in Patton, 2005:265) defines full participant observation as 
“simultaneously (combining) document analysis, interviewing of respondents and 
informants, direct participation and observation, and introspection.” The level of 
participation varied within the context, depending both on the situation and the ability 
of the researcher to participate, where the degree usually fell in the middle of the 
spectrum. According to Spradley (1980), full participant observation requires the 
researcher to enter the field as ignorant of the social setting as possible, following 
what Glaser and Strauss (1967) have called “grounded theory.” This ignorance has 
inspired our exploratory phase of the method in that we entered the fieldwork without 
formalized hypotheses or theories to test. The distinction between the 
“insider/outsider” has been noted by anthropologists such as Franz Boas and Edward 
Sapir, differentiating between the language and nonverbal communication used by the 
people being studied and the language and concepts used by the researcher. Concepts 
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such as “sustainability” or “demand-driven approach” originate outside the rural 
community, and are thus approached with caution in language shaping our questions 
when attempting to understand local perceptions and experiences with water 
development. These concepts are abstracted later, while the original language used by 
the community members for representation and communication is sought. This meant 
that the researchers embarked on a learning process of clarifying and learning 
language by allowing the people to speak in their own concepts.  
 
While a rigorous in-depth analysis on the linguistic meaning was beyond the scope of 
the investigation, it was important to include these perceptions in the interviews. 
Along with translated responses, the researchers relied on facial expressions and hand 
gestures to ascertain emotions and reactions, guiding them in how to proceed. 
Similarly, participation with agents in the policy arrangement and development 
required us to be familiar with these discourses, thereby enabling us to enter these 
organizational cultures as “insiders.” By participating in the office life of CLIP over 
the three months, we gained the trust of the staff, allowing us access to the 
heterogeneity of their perceptions, and it was through observation that gestures, eye 
contact, body positions were noted, giving indications of power relations, trust, 
friendship, etc. 
 
In both these environments we accepted that a “stranger” or “student” would never 
fully enter or be accepted as a member of a community (at all levels), and would 
always remain marginalized (and perhaps distrusted). The role of the researcher in the 
different environments was unclear in the development sector. We encountered what 
De Sardan (2005) refers to as “an invisible negotiation of interest” whereby all 
participants had a strong interest in telling their truth or manipulated information in 
order to protect their interests related to scarce resources. One example was when 
asked about how many NGOs had been involved in one community, a chief only 
mentioned one NGO. Two weeks later, another informant revealed that another NGO 
was involved in constructing wells, which was also confirmed by visits to the site. 
Incomplete and inconsistent knowledge was also encountered with CLIP staff and 
informants in different institutional environments, and rephrasing and probing certain 
areas (while trying not to raise eyebrows) led to both frustrating and invigorating 
experiences. Over time and through engaging in daily life, conversations, and humor, 
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this mistrust became less and both the participants in the settings and we became more 
relaxed with one another. Needless to say, this also placed us in some ethical 
dilemmas and uncomfortable situations in which we questioned our own tactics for 
entry and data collection. For example, during some engaging discussions with 
community members, questions were sometimes raised regarding the help we would 
be able to provide, or promises we could make. People often associated students from 
Denmark investigating an area of development with development itself, a correlation 
which may not be so surprising in an area where NGOs are literally translated as 
“white people coming out to help.” This was a reminder that the label “researcher” 
and “student” is far from neutral and objective in the eyes of many. Yet our attempt 
was to keep the data collection as objective and scientifically transparent and 
replicable as possible within the given limitations. 
 
Qualitative Interviews 
According to Patton (2005:341) “qualitative interviewing begins with the assumption 
that the perspective of others is meaningful, knowable, and able to be made explicit.” 
By investigating perceptions, interviews formed a significant part of our data 
collection. Patton identifies three kinds of qualitative interview approaches: informal 
conversation, interview guide, and standardized open-ended. The study adopted a 
combination of the first two approaches in both the formal institutional environment 
as well as the community environment. The “informal conversation interview,” also 
referred to as “ethnographic interviewing” allowed the maximum flexibility, letting 
conversations to flow naturally without being based on predetermined questions. One 
of the benefits of this method is that the same person may be interviewed repeatedly 
in different situations, allowing for continuation and contextualization of previous 
interviews and for deeper insight into areas of inquiry. Other benefits include the 
opportunity for spontaneity, flexibility, and responsiveness to specific situations 
(Patton, 2005:342-343). Some of the weaknesses of this method include that these 
interviews are susceptible to biased and leading questions, and that it is time 
consuming in both practicing and in compiling and analyzing the data.  By remaining 
in the communities for one-week periods, this method was useful due to time 
available for more informal and relaxed social situations.  
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The “interview guide” approach allowed for a more structured method of collecting 
data. The guides designed for the formal institutional environment and community 
environment differed in content, style, and language in order to reflect the people 
being interviewed and the data being sought (see Appendix A and B). Basic 
questions were drawn up following selected themes which structured the flow of the 
interview. While the focus was predetermined, the researchers were flexible to engage 
in conversations to probe, ask questions, and explore within this subject area (Patton, 
2005:343). This style is more systematic and allows the researcher to stay within the 
realm of all identified themes, thus also saving time. The researcher does not ask 
questions concerning aspects outside the subject area, although themes not included 
may emerge that are important to the person interviewed, providing useful insights. 
Some limitations of this approach are that some data may be out of context because a 
natural flow of conversation is not reached. This may also discourage deeper and 
broader insights. 
 
As noted, a combination of both types of qualitative interviewing was used in 
collecting data in the community environment. The researchers engaged in 
conversational interviews in the evenings, during the hottest time of the day lying on 
the ground in the huts, at the market, while walking between communities, washing, 
cooking, and playing with the children. The people were not necessarily aware that 
these perceptions were a part of the research. These conversations revolved around 
customs, history, development, religion, water usage, and any other questions which 
emerged during the community setting. The topics explored were diverse and 
included more sensitive or personal issues compared with those approached in the 
more structured interviews where the people often watched the researcher write down 
their responses, aware of being “interviewed”.  One of the main limitations was that 
only few people spoke English. The dependence on an interpreter prevented the 
researcher from engaging in more and more kinds of conversations. Another 
limitation was the large amount of data collected. An interview guide helped structure 
the data for analysis by retaining focus on power relations and representation. These 
guides were used in both personal interviews and group interviews and helped in 
gaining an overview of water sources, knowledge, changes in livelihoods, politics, 
power relations, and histories with development.  
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In association with formal governmental informants, conducting interviews with key 
stakeholders in the NGO field gave us a nice perspective of the “on the ground” 
policy translation issues stemming into our analysis tools of legitimacy and 
representation. The researchers used the analysis tools as themes when designing the 
questionnaires to be used in the formal interview process. Complementing the 
researcher’s formal questionnaire process, observation tools were also used to try and 
get an indication of the interviewees’ perceptions of the formal questions asked. Due 
to the sensitive nature of ethnic instability in the region, some questions were 
designed to provoke certain types of answers thus the researcher would be able to 
identify certain characteristics exposed by the interviewee whether it be body 
movements, whispering, and general comfortlessness. Sensitive regional issues 
concerning political and ethnic conflicts surfaced and sometimes the researchers 
decided to build off the previous question and continue with the question or change 
the subject if the interviewee became too uncomfortable. After some time, the 
researchers began to understand certain cultural traits and personalities and began to 
interview each person based on previous experiences and new knowledge basis. This 
in turn dictated the information that was gathered by each interviewee based on the 
researcher’s questions.  
 
Key Informants 
Key informants, according to Patton (2005:321) are people who provide information 
about what has or has not been experienced by the researcher, as well as explanations 
for those events which have been experienced by the researcher. He notes that the 
danger of relying on these is that the researcher becomes limited, selective, and 
biased. They provide perceptions which should be distinguished from the researcher’s 
own observations. After the initial days of becoming acquainted with both the 
Gmanicheri and Dinyogu communities, key informants were selected based on their 
role, position of authority and respect, and knowledge. These individuals provided the 
researchers historical, social, cultural, and geo-physical (among other kinds) 
knowledge, placed information into context, and were sources of continuous 
explanations for events the researchers participated in.  
 
At the formal institutional level, key informants were selected at all formal 
institutional levels within the water sector. Understanding the chain of governance 
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and its formal policy along with informal norms, traditions, customs and how policy is 
translated were a key aspect of understanding the institutional environment. The 
researchers’ priority to search and contact key informants in representation of regional 
to local level bureaucracy had been influenced during the beginning of the field study 
by CLIP with initial contacts. The researchers used these contacts and began to build a 
network of key governmental informants (see Appendix C - key informants).  
 
Group Discussions 
Group discussions are used as a method for gathering data because they represent 
social situations, referring to “the stream of behavior (activities) carried out by people 
(agents) in a particular location (place)” (Spradley 1980:86). This type of situation 
provides an opportunity for participants to discuss among themselves and to argue 
over situations, offering the researcher insight into competing views, the roles and 
relationships of the participants, and the process of consensus. While revealing 
dynamic relationships, limitations of this method include that only those views which 
are publicly accepted will be expressed, and the knowledge obtained will be less 
detailed than from individuals (Burgess 1982:109). This method was chosen in the 
community environment because it allowed the researcher to investigate existing 
social groups and how the various members interacted with each other, in particular 
who was speaking and who was not. It also allowed the researcher a level of 
flexibility to adjust to the local contexts. If interesting points were raised, individual 
interviews could then provide a follow-up. However, once a community was informed 
that the researchers would be coming, groups of mostly men gathered. Many women 
were busy with work and were unable to participate, but it was also observed that men 
and women often partook in different social activities; it was only on certain 
occasions that men and women gathered together. When they did, the men’s opinion 
leader often responded, even if the question was directed at the women. While this 
revealed interesting social and gender dynamics, it also limited knowledge obtained 
from the women. In wanting to create a gender-balanced inquiry, the woman leader 
(Mangazia) was interviewed alone or with other women, separate from the men.  
 
In the formal institutional setting group discussions took place in a casual 
environment about development in general which gives nice pieces of information 
about understanding the localized environment. We feel that this is crucial as 
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Ghanaians enjoy telling stories, and when the environment is relaxed the informal 
discussion can become very informative. This can create a foundation for future 
formal discussions but formal group discussions were not initiated.  
 
Mapping 
A map of the communities was created to include all the sources of water throughout 
the year. The purpose of these maps is to indicate the number and location of wells, 
their seasonal viability, the distances between and heterogeneity of water sources, and 
other knowledge considered important to map by some of the community members 
(such as different types of trees). It is noted that, to our knowledge, no formal maps 
exist of these communities.  
 
Recording the Data 
The methods for documentation included note-taking, tape-recording, and 
photography. The note-taking method was used during and after interviews with both 
formal stakeholders and during interviews in the community. Ethnographic note-
taking was also taken in the communities. Tape-recordings were made of personal 
journal statements to facilitate the documentation of data. Photography was used to 
document the various water sources and knowledge surrounding water. 
 
Triangulation 
Denzin writes that “by combining multiple observers, theories, methods, and data 
sources, (researchers) can hope to overcome the intrinsic bias that comes from single-
method, single-observer, and single-theory studies” (1989c:307, in Patton, 2005:555). 
A method of triangulation incorporates different data collecting methods or diverse 
theories in order to enrich the analysis. The aim is not to prove that one conclusion is 
more “true” than another, but to understand the “inconsistencies in findings across 
different kinds of data (which can be) illuminative and important” (Patton, 2005:556). 
These inconsistencies may reveal issues related to power, trust, social dynamics, and 
perspectives. Patton (2005) lists four types of triangulation: 
1. methods triangulation 
2. triangulation of sources 
3. analyst triangulation 
4. theory/perspective triangulation 
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The methods used in this investigation include types two and three to various degrees. 
The following brief descriptions are based on Patton (2005: 555-562). 
 
Triangulation of sources: 
Comparing observations with interviews; comparing what people say in public with 
what they say in private; checking for the consistency of what people say about the 
same thing over time; comparing the perspectives of people from different points of 
view; checking interviews against program document and other written evidence that 
can corroborate what interview respondents report.  
 
Analyst triangulation: 
Using multiple observers and analysts; reducing the amount of bias that can come 
from a single observer or interviewer and providing means of more directly assessing 
the consistency of data collection. 
2.8 Constraints  
Many of the constraints of the investigation have been discussed throughout this 
chapter. Other constraints include our dependence on CLIP, lacking means of 
communication (mobile phone service, although potentially providing rural areas with 
invaluable communication ability, remained patchy in coverage), reliance on an 
interpreter, and limited time. The period of fieldwork in Ghana extended over three 
months, but more time would have allowed for more depth in knowledge and thus a 
deeper analysis. At the same time, a big constraint was the large amount of data that 
was collected, and the time and effort required to sort through and focus on the 
specific area of interest. 
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Chapter 3: Structuration and Policy implementation  
The duality between agency and structure has been referred to as a central debate in 
defining and understanding the implications of this study. We begin this chapter with 
an  introduction to the basic principles of structuration which are drawn on to 
understand practices in policy implementation based on interpretations, norms, and 
resources, forming the foundation for more specific theories of institutions, policy 
process, power and legitimacy.  
 
Figure 3.1- The Duality of Structure in Policy Implementation  
(Based on Terpstra and Havinga ,2001 after Giddens, 1984: 29)  
  
The structures are composed of three dimensions, which, referring to policy 
implementation, include structure of signification of policy and implementation, 
structure of domination, and structure of legitimating. Rules and resources are 
resultant of the stocks of knowledge embedded in policy language and definition of 
the policy problem, as well as the language of intervention along with the distribution 
of power within the policy implementation system. The structure of legitimation is 
thus closely related to legal institutions based on normative regulation, where rules are 
defined as “…techniques or generalizable procedures applied in the enactment/ 
reproduction of social practices” (Giddens 1984:21).  
 
According to Giddens, structural power refers to legitimization, signification, and 
domination that are present in discourses as well as political, economic, and legal 
institutions of society (Giddens, 1984: 31) spread over time and space. But these 
structures do not act on their own; they are given meaning to and acted upon by 
individuals and collectivities who achieve their desired outcomes by mobilizing their 
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resources. It is noted that the structures of signification are bound up together with 
structures of domination and legitimating and only analytically separable.  
 
This theory of structuration as applied to policy implementation supposes that actions 
of implementing agents are influenced by these three structural dimensions, and these 
agents contribute to producing and reproducing them unknowingly or unintentionally. 
Agents are also capable and knowledgeable, leading them to interpret, adapt, and 
transform these structures. Giddens (1984) refers to the main dimensions of the 
duality of structure as “modalities” which relate agency to structure in that agents 
draw on these modalities in the reproduction of systems of interaction, thereby 
reconstituting their structural properties (Giddens 1984: 28).  
 
In the modality of “interpretive schemes,” implementing agents rely on stocks of 
knowledge which they draw upon during interactions that are not explicit or tacit, and 
which are embedded in deeper structures as well as within legal concepts, formal rules 
and policy categories. “In daily routines, the competent officer shows that he or she 
knows which characteristics of the policy problem are relevant and which types of 
clients deserve more or less attention” (Terpstra and Havinga, 2001). They easily shift 
between language and rules used in the different contexts depending on which their 
clients are through which they make sense of events. In addition, implementing 
practices are also based on personal, political, and ethnic motivations linked to rules 
and structures. In the modality of “norms of policy,” implementing practices are based 
on normative rules which help to justify and even sanction the actions of agents such 
as staff, community members, and government members, and are based on the rights 
and obligations “expected” of them. These normative rules assume that there exists 
symmetry between rights and obligations, and neglects to acknowledge agents as 
knowledgeable and reflexive agents. Finally, the modality of “resources” linked to 
structures of power involves the ability of implementing agents to bring forth 
purposeful change in relations of autonomy and dependence. Giddens notes that 
power is the ability of an agent to create change (from an agent-oriented view) and 
structure to control or command (from the structure-oriented view). Power is 
understood in terms of rules and resources, where “resources…are structured 
properties of social systems, drawn upon and reproduced by knowledgeable agents in 
the course of interaction” (Giddens 1984:15). Through this, power is relational 
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whereby it is created and maintained by both agents and structures; it is rare that one 
agent is entirely powerless while the other one is powerful; furthermore, an agent’s 
power is reduced if the options for action are limited.  
 
While providing an entry-point into the theoretical foundations, the additional sections 
in the chapter provide more specific understandings within this duality of policy 
implementation. 
3.1 Institutions 
We see the importance of the institution as a modality of framing interactions between 
agents or agents within a structured environment. An interest is presented in the way 
in which countries operate within the structured and institutionalized sphere. 
According to Beesen and Bell (2002), agents or agents face different choices or 
constraints regarding the process into which they are incorporated within the existing 
internationally sanctioned systems. The role of the institution is one of the 
determining factors which influence how the interaction between agents is played out. 
It is the interaction between agents within a broadly defined sphere that Dolfsma and 
Verburg (2005) compare both Max Weber and Durkheim in a perspective of 
institutions as an influencer of interactions referring to institutionalization or a type of 
process which defines traits of reformed capitalism in developing countries such as 
Ghana. In relation to our case, we see institutions as a policy design tool intended to 
guide agency interactions and mediate the structural relationship where structural 
forces are designed to shape, rather than wholly determine behaviors and outcomes of 
agents (Beeson and Bell, 2002).  
 
This correctly follows the reform agenda as the process of institutionalization of the 
local society in Ghana is still occurring with the label of the “reform process.” The 
process can be labeled as focusing on “interaction reforms” in that the role of the 
institution is intended to provide guidance for agents’ behavior patterns in a specific 
region and sector such as water. Dolfsma and Verburg (2005) reiterate that the need of 
the institution is to define a shared set of interactions or create social frameworks 
conveying changes of behavior within a continuum of time and space. In figure 3.2, 
Dolfsma and Verburg visually create their example of the agency – institution 
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continuum which, according to the authors, tries to “rationalize” the behavior or 
action of agents within this context.  
 
 
 
 Figure 3.2- The Agency – Institutions Continuum 
(Dolsfma & Verburg, 2005) 
 
The authors see figure 3.2 as an indication of how patterns of action become 
objectified, solidified, congealed or institutionalized as situations at concrete 
moments, and that at the same time, individuals will have an understanding or 
interpretation in mind that will actually bring the person to concrete action in a 
particular situation (Dolfsma and Verburg, 2005) thus defining the agent’s behavior. 
Individual behavior, interdependent and interwoven with behavior of others, 
unintentionally gives rise to structured regularities in processes (Dolsfma and 
Verburg, 2005). Institutions are thought to shape human behavior in relation to, for 
example water resource usage, which essentially creates the informal and formal rules 
typically backed by sanctions of certain kinds (Beeson and Bell, 2002). The Ghana 
Poverty Reduction Strategy itself is a type of structural power which is backed by the 
institutional rules of a global economy sanctioned by economic “core” economies. 
Water objectives, such as those illustrated in the poverty reduction strategy, guide 
behavior in the creation of policy outputs such as the rural supply policy. The 
institutions, including social ones, create legible “communities” which can codify the 
translation of individual into collective undertaking making it visible, analyzable, and 
amenable to intervention and influence (Scott, 1998 in Cleaver, 2001). In 
participatory approaches, institutions are created based on a bureaucratic form, and 
institutional inclusion is ensuring more efficient delivery of development via policy 
process. Here, efficiency is understood in terms of desirable characteristics such as 
responsibility, ownership, cooperation, and collective endeavor (Cleaver, 2001).  
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However, institutions may also become obstacles to development in that they might 
be seen as “conservative” and that “historical inertia and active persuasion often 
ensure that rules and enforcement procedures reflect the preferences of "political 
entrepreneurs" within society” (Baas, 1998) thereby perpetuating the status quo. In 
regions such as Northern Ghana where both formalized and social or “informal” 
institutions exist, importance and recognition is given to the “user groups” and other 
formal institutions which are considered more robust due to their “system of clear 
rules and sanctions against, offenders and public conflict resolution mechanisms” 
(Ostrom 1990 in Cleaver, 2001). ”Informal” agents and institutions involved in 
natural resource management are deemed inferior to modern formal institutions. 
Knudtson and Suzuki (1992, from Appia-Opoku and Mulamootil, 1997) observe that 
“native or indigenous peoples’ views of nature have too often been unjustly viewed as 
somehow inherently simple, primitive, or naive; reflective of an earlier and therefore 
inferior stage in human cultural progress; and beyond this, however poetic or 
endearing, as completely irrelevant to our sophisticated modern needs and times.” It is 
generally noted that traditional forms of managements are “weak” and untransparent.  
 
An influential model is Ostrom’s concept of “crafting” institutions to make these 
“informal” institutions more fit and formalized to reach functional ends. Norms are 
changed by socially embedding the introduced norms through existing social capital. 
The WATSAN committee is such a user group which is crafted onto existing 
structures based on community selection criteria and which is recognized by the state 
and other formal development institutions. This group is assumed to take over 
responsibility of water sources through introduced sanctions, thereby providing more 
robust and legible institutions than the “informal” or traditional ones. From an 
institutional perspective, it is thus through identifying the rules and patterns of 
behavior within a society that constitute the “informal” institutions and by improving 
on those arrangements “which reconcile and/or optimize rationality on the part of 
individuals with rationality on the part of society” (Baas, 1998) that supports 
participatory institutional development leading to institutional inclusion. 
 
Obeng-Asiedu, (2004) notes that water institutions fall in a domain intersected by 
economics, law, and public policy and is also strongly influenced by factors like 
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resource endowment, demography, and science. An institution is conceived in a much 
broader sense than a mere organization. If the institution forms the rules of behavior, 
representatives within the institutions must emerge who have the power and authority 
of interpreting rules in interactions.  This forms interactions within the water policy 
institutional arrangement. An example of a water institution and its internal inter-
linkages can be visually seen below: 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3- Institutional Structure and Linkages (Saleth and Dinar, 1999). 
Figure 3.3 indicates idealized water institutional structure of Law, Policy and 
Administration. The arrows moving from box to box show inter-linkages within the 
institution. We can see that all of the inter-linkages from Law, Policy and 
Administration are the composition of an institution, essentially indicating the 
ingredients. By understanding the internal linkages and dynamics within the water 
institution one can also begin to understand the unbundling mechanisms which 
compose the institution itself. It is important to note that the overall performance of 
the institution in terms of functionality is dependant upon not only the capabilities of 
their individual aspects but also on the strength of structural and functional linkages 
between them (Saleth and Dinar, 2004). The authors note that the linkages between 
the structural and functional components of the institutional features are varied as 
some linkages have direct and immediate effects while others have more diverse and 
limited effects. It is through these channels that societal impacts are valuable for 
developing change in reform design and implementation principles (Saleth and Dinar, 
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2004). The ability to change mechanisms within the institution lies in collective 
behavior patterns. Beeson and Bell (2002) reiterate that the institution is made up of a 
feed-back relationship between the structures and institution itself. This is only 
influenced by the behavior of agents. It is the actions of agents which defines the 
institution. If behavior within the institution becomes a pattern, the behavior itself (in 
its many forms) will become structurally and institutionally entrenched in the current 
capitalistic system which could spell serious implications if the capitalistic model is 
non-functional. This is especially relevant within non- “core” country economies 
where the state is still required to initiate the reform process.  
3.2  Power and Legitimacy 
The role of power is acknowledged to be an important aspect shaping social life from 
interpersonal relations to social structures, and is noted as a crucial part of the policy 
process, where it is also related to the allocation and division of material and 
authoritative resources. Broadly speaking, power has been theorized within the social 
sciences from a resource-base (Weber, Parsons) and a structuralism-base (Foucault, 
Giddens) perspective. Clegg(1989) devises a framework for understanding power 
relations based on three circuits of power, where power is present at each of his 
“modalities” of episodic, dispositional, and facilitative power, but also in the “overall 
flow of action through the circuits of power” (1989:213). The importance of context is 
central to Clegg’s understanding of power relations where the first circuit (episodic) 
reveals simple and overt occurrences of power at the micro-level. This level is placed 
in the context of the second and third levels of the circuit (both macro-level), where 
power is expressed in disposition and facilitative ways.  Power, “viewed episodically, 
may move through circuits in which rules, relations and resources that are constitutive 
of power are translated, fixed and reproduced/transformed” (1989:211). In other 
words, transformation occurs through circuits beyond the day-to-day relations of 
power present in the episodic level. 
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Figure 3.4- Clegg’s Circuit of Power Framework  
(based on Clegg, 1989: 214) 
1) Episodic Power (Causal)  
Episodic power occurs at the first level, encompassing day to day outcomes of power 
relations whether positive or negative. Clegg describes these interactions as “the most 
easily accessible and most visible circuit of power” and as “intermittent exercises of 
power” (1989:187). Outcomes of this level imply intentions which may be in the form 
of language, reasoning, and accounting for action which make reference to 
interpretations of social actions based on social rules (1989: 210). Existing social 
relations constitute the identities of agencies, where the agencies’ causal powers will 
be realized through the organization of standing conditions (1989: 215), leading to 
agent A having power over agent B. Thus, while power observed at this level reveals 
relations between A and B, “it can tell us nothing about the constitutive nature of the 
relational field in which A and B presently are nor how this privileges and handicaps 
them respectively, in relation to those resources that are constituted as powerful” 
(1989: 209). Following Giddens, agents also maintain the ability to “do otherwise,” 
and Clegg notes that power and resistance go hand-in-hand. When viewed 
episodically, resistance may be based on more effective means of utilizing existing 
resources, steering the other agent’s scopes for action, and enrolling other members to 
its cause. The power at this level is affected by the varying control agencies have of 
resources and how these resources are effectively utilized in order to produce 
consequential outcomes. In other words, episodic power is articulated within the fields 
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of force of social and system integration in which dispositional and facilitative power 
are implicated respectively. 
 
2)  Dispositional Power (Social Integration) 
Power will always be inscribed within the contextual rules of institutions which both 
enable and constrain action (Clegg, 1989: 200). While episodic power is initiated by 
an agency, dispositional power structures the agent’s capacity to act. During this 
circuit, rules are fixed and re-fixed and meanings are stabilized through social 
integration (1989: 223). “The rules will not be as static and idealized as in chess or 
some other game but will instead be far more fragile, ambiguous, unclear, dependent 
upon interpretation, and subject either to reproduction or transformation depending on 
the outcome of struggles to keep them the same or to change them this way or that” 
(Clegg, 1989:209). Legitimating of authority is also achieved at this level, “where 
certain positions are attached with the liberty to make interpretations of rules, or 
change the interpretations” (1989: 215). All traffic must pass through these rules and 
form the center of any stabilization or change in the circuitry. The obligatory passage 
points represent the securing of particular interpretations of these rules of membership 
and meaning. 
  
3) Facilitative  power (System Integration)  
Clegg terms this the circuit of system integration which is “concerned with the 
empowerment and disempowerment of agencies’ capacities” and is conceptualized as 
the material conditions of techniques of production and discipline. It is composed of 
disciplinary mechanisms of rewards and punishments. It is through the materiality of 
job design, policy, technology, or environmental contingencies that change is 
possible. Despite everything, changes in power relations have the potential to take 
place. The facilitative circuit “functions as a potent source of resistance to the 
stabilization of existing memberships and meanings by generating new techniques of 
production and new modes of discipline, which, if they are not already present within 
existing rules of practice, have the capacity to transform these” (224). These 
transformations may be endogenous in which changes are incurred as a result of 
episodic power outcomes related to transformations in social rules that fix meaning 
and membership or transformations in the process of innovation of techniques of 
production and discipline (224). Thus, changes in t
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mechanisms have the capacity to empower or disempower agencies at the episodic 
level of the circuit. The changes may also be exogenous in which they are the result of 
environmental contingencies which disturb the fixed fields of force within social or 
system integration.  
 
Obligatory passage points 
The three circuits are connected and interdependent via obligatory passage points 
(OPPs) and act as channels for empowerment or disempowerment. System integration 
is linked to relations of meaning and membership, and has to be fixed on these 
obligatory passage points “if it is to have any effectiveness” (Clegg, 224). “Fixing” is 
achieved through “enrolling” other agencies in such a way that they have to traffic 
through these passage points.  
 
Legitimacy in policy implementation 
More specific aspects of legitimacy pertaining to the case study include regulative, 
and a combination of normative and cognitive legitimacy.  Regulative legitimacy is 
the most overtly expressed form where it reflects legitimacy gained by organizations 
or other implementing agents complying with the district policy or individual 
organizational policy or by “adopting professional and operating norms of major 
institutions” (Jepson, 2005). From a formal institutional perspective, these rules 
include regulative measures such as the formal planning process, user fees, formal 
written applications stemming from communities, and a specific conception of 
ownership. Donors also provide rules by which NGOs and other agencies should 
follow. At the same time, customary rules exist which implementing agencies include 
in their strategies which give them positive legitimacy. In addition to these formal 
institutional and customary rules, Meyer and Scott (1983a:201 in Scott, 1991:170) 
offer a conception of legitimacy including other relevant rules which act on policy 
implementation, including normative and cognitive norms. These refer to the wider 
“societal values,” “taken-for-granted” status within society respectively (Lister, 2003).  
 
In the context of the study, the means by which implementing agents address their 
ends require positive legitimacy from the different environments. The means included 
are that NGOs work independent of the state, work for the social good rather than 
profit, work within a sector that the society believes to be good and useful, and for the 
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good of third parties, where these parties might be such an entity as disadvantaged 
people (Jepson, 2005). For communities, implementing agents rely on legitimating 
through “explaining or justifying the social order in such a way as to make 
institutional arrangements plausible…within a comprehensible, meaningful world” 
(Wuthnow et al, 1984:50, in Scott, 1991: 169). Jepson (2005) suggests that in the 
institutional domain, these two forms of legitimacy may be subservient to regulatory 
legitimacy, but Scott (170) notes that “explanations, justification, and meaningful 
accounts are more likely to be imported from the environment than to be 
manufactured from within.” Returning to Clegg’s model, the circuit affecting the rules 
and norms at the dispositional level also entails legitimizing factors and legitimizing 
tools existing with the structural framework of policy implementation processes.  
3.3 Policy Implementation 
Implementation in the policy process is linked with governance, capacity, and the 
interface between institutional designs and how agents interpret, translate, and 
participate in feed-back loops of policy learning. Onjala (2002) notes that in countries 
where sector needs are well known and clearly defined and information is readily 
available, there usually exists some sort of government response to these needs. One 
of the signs of this responsiveness is the presence of national policies for water and 
sanitation that are intended to spell out national concerns, sector priorities and overall 
goals. Having formal policies assists governments in formulating long-term plans, 
mobilizing domestic resources and approaching international development agencies 
and donors for additional resources. The international organizations, in turn, often 
encourage countries to establish sector policies as a precondition for financial and 
technical support.  
3.3.1  Policy Process: Formulation to Implementation 
Policy process refers then to the complex interactions between different stages in 
policy ranging from its initial formulation or reform issue to 
implementation/evaluation. In Smith (2004) we find Grindle and Thomas’s version of 
the linear policy formulation process (see figure 3.5 below). We will adopt Smith’s 
(2004) linear model as its characteristics provide a theoretical approach to the 
conceptualization of the policy process which includes important cross-cutting issues 
which we will mention later in the chapter. We understand that this linear and logic 
process does not necessarily reflect reality, but it is used by many policy analysts as 
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an entry-point into understanding the relationship between and influences of agents at 
the various stages. Traditionally, the agents at each stage have been complex, but 
dominated by government bureaucracy. Keeley and Scoones define policy to be “co-
constructed across space through particular networks and connections linking global 
and local sites…” (p.3). Structures and agents perform the function of mediating 
across these scales. Recent trends 
 
 
Figure 3.5- The Linear Policy Model,  
( Thomas and Grindle, 1990  in Smith, 2004) 
 
have indicated that a wide range of agents, including civil society and other parallel 
networks at international and local levels, are influencing the different stages (Benner 
et al, 2003 and Pattbert, 2004 in Perkin and Court, 2005). Because of this trend, the 
role of networks outside of the traditional state agents becomes even more interesting. 
The following overview expands on this theoretical linear process in the context of 
institutional inclusion. Smith (2004) via Sutton (1999), regards policy making as a 
problem solving process involving phases which characterizes and separates policy 
from implementation. The following phases include: 
1. Recognizing and defining the nature of the issue to be dealt with 
2. Identifying a possible course of action to deal with the issue 
3. Weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative 
4. Choosing the option that offers the best solution 
5. Implementing the policy 
6. Evaluating the outcome 
   (Smith, 2004) 
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Governments, particularly in developing countries which are resource-poor, are 
increasingly depending on linkages with the private and civil society sector in order to 
implement policy. These multiple agents are able to address issues across sectors with 
the advantages that this network supports sustainability and reach (Perkin and Court, 
2005). Brown (1991, in Perkin and Court, 2005) has described how policies can be 
sustained through furthering awareness about issues, sharing the work, preventing 
duplication of efforts, providing solidarity, mobilizing financial resources, and 
entrenching grassroots participation with long-term frameworks of representation.  
 
Institutional Choice 
Representation, as we see it, exists within Ribot’s (2005) dimension of democracy 
which also includes Citizenship and the Public Domain. According to Ribot, these 
three traits are manifested by a mix of institutions in a localized setting, which are 
interfacing in a domain which is intended to form and be supported by a decentralized 
local government. In actuality, Ribot notes that the mix of institutions and the 
institutional choices they make is in fact undermining the local democratic 
governments and decreasing the space of the public domain in favor for the single 
agent’s agenda.  As in the case of Northern Ghana, international organizations are 
transferring powers to southern partners (in any form such as contracting or 
organizational partnerships), reinforcing relationships which constantly change the 
institutional landscape. Motivations of international organizations and policy makers 
to make choices are based on ideas of political patronage lines and, as Ribot notes, are 
also making institutional choices to consolidate their political base through patronage 
or allocation of goods in exchange for political and economic allegiance. Cognitively 
these choices are in fact embedded in decision makers’ political and ideological 
positions and theoretical orientation. At the same time, organizations such as civil 
society representatives are able to reach communities and aim at grassroots 
participation in the implementation process through their activities, therefore making 
institutional choice debatable.  
 
Policy can reach local communities more effectively using existing community 
networks, but Provan and Mildward (2001, in Perkin and Court, 2005) attest that there 
is not enough evidence to prove this. Policy can also reach local communities through 
Civil society organizations (CSOs), using both national and international resources 
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and avenues. This can be especially useful in countries with resource-poor 
governments where CSOs derive inspiration from a policy gap and existing networks. 
Networks with private sector are also an emerging and potentially useful channel to 
implement policy. 
 
We return to Keeley and Scoones who reiterates that linear models may be too 
segregated and imply cross-cutting themes which must be considered when 
implementing policy. We note that Smith provides four cross-cutting examples within 
the 3 phases listed in the above graph: 
1.   Addressing the dichotomy between policy-making and implementation.  
2. Recognition that the implementation process requires management. Specifically 
regarding consensus building, participation of key stakeholders, conflict resolution, 
compromise, contingency planning, resource mobilization and adaptation.  
3.   The role of interest groups in the policy process.  
Policy practice is concerned specifically with what and who is included. As shown in 
figure 3.6 below, Smith (2004) states that “the style of policy discourse is 
overwhelmingly to talk as though that were not so; but as though the data were 
inclusive, the process rational and the remedy simply knowledge – or research based”. 
 
  Figure 3.6- Interests in the Policy Formulation Process 
 (Keely 1997 in Smith, 2004)  
3.3.2  Owning a Policy? 
Smith’s Fourth Cross Cutting theme refers to ownership of the policy process and 
notes that ownership of policy tends to be drawn away from local and indigenous 
groups to policy experts or outsiders. Reiterated from the above, Smith mentions that 
themes have developed to influence the practical and ideological need for policy 
makers to simplify issues and narrow down options in order to favor policy reform. In 
debating policy reform, critical elements emerge to arguably fulfill requirements to 
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create explicit strategy by policy decision makers to using and developing information 
analysis, they include: 
- Existence of sufficient policy space 
- Effective policy specialists who are able to use analysis and research 
- Ability of policy makers to ensure implementation 
      
   (Smith, 2004) 
The concept of ownership has no single accepted definition. A definition varies 
extensively pending on the discourse in which it is used in. We examine Ohno et al’s 
(2005) working concept of “true ownership” whereby the capacity of a developing 
country to choose from alternative policy prescriptions- even if they are not granted 
by the international aid community, is precisely the point that distinguishes true 
ownership from “nominal ownership”. Boughton and Mourmouras (2002) note that it 
is very difficult to analytically find empirical support for the role of ownership in 
policy implementation because of its dynamic characteristics and fragility. A case 
study such as ours in Ghana relying on subjective data presents a convincing case that 
ownership is crucial for policy implementation. As rightfully implied in the Ghanaian 
context, obstacles to national ownership are caused by domestic divisions owing to 
powerful interest groups inside or outside government and political and electoral 
constraints. This involves possible short-term adverse impacts of reforms on 
vulnerable groups. Boughton and Mourmouras take a macro perspective towards the 
role of ownership implying the need of the IMF and World Bank to carefully take into 
consideration conditionalities of the political atmosphere in separate aid dependant 
countries. The authors assume that pushing through reforms, which includes dialogue, 
negotiation and decisive political leadership, is crucial when including bi-lateral and 
multi-lateral donor influence.  
 
Dimensions of Ownership 
In Ohno et al (2005), three dimensions of ownership is presented as an examination 
within policy discourse which includes: Goal of Aid, Scope of Ownership and 
Creativity of Ideas. We will adopt specifically Ohno’s 2nd dimension referring to the 
Scope of Ownership in context of policy implementation whereby Ohno et al. (2005) , 
attempts to differentiate between the aid relationship and development itself. In doing 
so the authors consider it important to distinguish two types of capacities: 
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1. Donor Management – refers to the capacity to own the relationship with the donor 
community and requires leadership in policy dialogue, coordinating of diverse 
requests, selectively adopting donor advice and handling friction with diplomatic 
grace which is handled administratively by government in charge of aid receipt 
2. Policy Autonomy and Content – requires capacity to identify national development 
goals, set coherent and realistic action plans and timetables, execute and respond 
to unforeseen situations. This requires links between sector management and intra-
sectoral management.   
Ohno et al., (2005) note that there is an urge in the global aid debate to shift from 
conditionality to policy dialogue and to consider such a processes vital to avoid the 
increasing risk of financial dependency degenerating into intellectual aid dependency. 
3.4  Linking Agency Structure to Policy Ownership 
We have perceived that analysis of the agency structure debate as the underpinning of 
our theoretical approach signifies that the debate itself cannot have agency without 
structure – one without the other. In doing so each interaction within the debate 
creates sets of relational characteristics between agents identifying various kinds of 
power relationships within a structured environment (institutions themselves). Policy 
of course is formulated as a device used to manage the establish rules of the game 
created by these interactions.   
AGENCY/STRUCTURE 
 
   
 
 
   
                    POWER                       INSTITUTIONS
           
     
 
 
 
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
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POLICY OWNERSHIP? 
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We cannot state that policy can become implementable unless agents help implement 
policy themselves. To define the time and space in which agency structure debates 
this would entangle us into a spiraling discourse analysis that Giddens or other 
scholars have rightfully claimed.  
 
It is important for us to note that the institution facilitates policy while agents 
essentially implement, but the implementers must acknowledge its importance not 
only to them but to the society in which policy is to be implemented. Therefore, 
inclusion of all agents must occur. In this case inclusion and implementation together 
implies a sense of ownership. If achieving a sense of ownership in policy discourse 
itself, consequently may attribute implementation success to the ownership it itself 
has created.  
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Chapter 4: Ghana Case Area 
This chapter introduces general characteristics of the Northern region including a 
historical relationship between civil society and customary rule in Ghana, and 
background to the case area and its people. Finally, it presents relevant water 
technology based on literature review as well as what local communities are actually 
employing. 
  
Ghana is situated in West Africa, North of the equator, and has a size of 238.537 km2, 
   
 
Map 1: Map of Ghana 
(http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/ghana_pol96.pdf) 
 
approximately 5 times as big as Denmark. There are estimated 19,7 million (2001) 
inhabitants in Ghana and the annual growth of the population is estimated a 2,9%. 
Ghana is a Christian country where around 43% are Christians, 12% are Muslims, and 
38% are practicing traditional religions. The remaining 8% has another or no religion 
(Jespersen 1998). About 90% of the population in the Northern Region is Muslims.2 
The density of the population varies from region to region. The Northern region is 
                                                 
2
 http://www.um.dk/aspfiles/Lande_fakta.asp?land=80 
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populated with 31 inhabitants per square kilometer whereas the central region is 
populated with 116 inhabitants per square kilometer and Greater Accra with 441 
inhabitants per square kilometer (Landestrategi for Ghana, 2004). The average life 
expectancy is 55-60 years (Jespersen 1998:9). The official language is English and out 
of the 22 other recognized languages spoken, only eight of them are official, while 
hundreds of dialects are spoken. There are 75 different recognized ethnic groups in 
Ghana (Landestrategi for Ghana, 2004).  
4.1  Civil Society and Customary Rule 
Civil society in Ghana has always played an important role in maintaining or 
opposing state governance. Before colonization a number of organized social 
formations practiced different kinds of authority ranging between centralized and 
decentralized axes. The policy of indirect rule politicized these authority structures 
whereby District Commissioners worked through traditional leaders, who in turn 
became key intermediaries or “representatives” with access to state revenue (Mohan, 
2002). During colonialism, the only formal civil society organizations were church-
based and run by missionaries, although later a few “proto-nationalist” organizations 
emerged on the scene pressing for greater representation, equality, and later 
independence (Mohan, 2002). Like in other African countries with increasing 
centralized authority, Ghana’s first president Kwame Nkrumah made attempts to both 
contain the authority of the chiefs as well as selectively strengthen key civil society 
actors. Following the PNDC coup, local participation took place via the Revolutionary 
Organs and village development committees established under Nkrumah as 
government “watchdogs.” In their quest for their populist nationalism, the PNDC was 
suspicious of NGOs and entered areas through para-statal and militia-based 
organizations. It was not until the austere measures of the SAP with falling public 
expenditures and the entrenchment of a number of civil servants    that NGOs 
emerged (Mohan, 2002). The divide between the North and South shaped activities of 
the NGOs with a focus on aligning themselves under the SAPs with urban-based 
support for liberalization. As a result of becoming more marginalized, civil society in 
the North has based itself on “service delivery” whereby charity, bilateral and 
multilateral aid is channeled through NGOs to support micro-scale entrepreneurship 
and welfare programs (Mohan, 2002). 
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While civil society is often associated with formal NGOs, traditional authority has 
continued to play an active role in governance and participation, although not without 
past and current conflicts with the state. The institution of chieftaincy is parallel to the 
formal government and includes the National House of Chiefs, the Regional Houses 
of Chiefs, and the traditional Councils and the chieftaincy Tribunals established under 
the 1979 Constitution. Ideally, these groups manage conflict pertaining to traditional 
practices and customary law, and they are not to conflict with state laws. The formal 
government and the institution of chieftaincy have experienced numerous 
confrontations and changes, resulting in the 1992 Constitution, under which chiefs are 
required to be non-partisan (Boafo-Arthur, 2002), although this remains a highly 
contested issue. The recent disputes over the last decades involving the “skin” (or 
throne) of the King of Dagbon is linked to the political party system. This constitution 
also gave them statutory and non-statutory functions (to be found in Appendix D). 
Among non-statutory functions is the mobilization of their people for development 
purposes: “In this capacity, they act as linkages between their communities and 
development agencies including central government departments, local government 
organs, NGOS, diplomatic missions, religious bodies and welfare associations” 
(Donkoh, no date). 
 
A link between the formal and customary forms of governance is theoretically 
facilitated by the District Assembly, the most powerful local level authority in the 
district, which ideally includes representation of all actors including NGOs, 
Governmental agencies and local chiefs. Linking the two forms is intended to create a 
sphere for traditional leaders based on a “chieftaincy model” to unite the population 
under language, symbols, rituals, and shared assumptions.  
 
We acknowledge that in addition to civil society and customary rule, the formal state 
structures and donor-driven agencies are active in the case area. We will address these 
background issues and the formal state’s relationships with civil society and 
customary rule in the chapter 5.  
 
Konkomba and their relation to the Dagomba 
There is inconsistency in literature regarding the Konkomba ethnic group. Some 
sources consider the Konkomba the “indigenous” people of Northern Ghana who 
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were brought under rule by the invading Dagomba tribe from Nigeria. Other sources 
claim that the Konkomba are new settlers (Adam, 2000).  While the Konkomba are 
considered to have no traditional “head” and are often labelled an “acophelagous” 
people where clans are instead based on lineage (Tsikata and Seini, 2004, p.29), other 
sources and key informants add that the Dagomba rulership introduced them to the 
institution of chieftaincy. Regardless of the exact origin, it is generally accepted that 
at some point Konkomba chiefs were appointed in order to collect revenue such as 
labor, food, and later money to be paid to the Dagomba chiefs. Konkombas were 
placed under Dagomba rule whereby all land had to be purchased from the Dagomba. 
In addition, the Konkomba were required to follow Dagomba law in terms of settling 
marital, land, and other disputes. These political and social structures were reaffirmed 
under colonialism, where the British continued supporting Dagomba rule and 
chieftaincy because it “symbolized unity, peace and stability within the traditional 
society” (Oquaye, 2000: 76). Under colonialism, the Northern region was divided 
among the four major ethnic or tribal groups (Mamprusi, Dagomba, Gonja, and 
Nanumba), where approximately sixteen ethnic groups are in the Northern Region, 
including the Konkomba who comprise the second largest ethnic group (Adam, 2000). 
The colonial policy of indirect rule also encouraged the appointment of Konkomba 
sub-chiefs in the Gusheigu area under Dagomba rule.  
 
Conflicts have erupted in the Northern region between the Dagombas, Gonjas, and 
Nanumbas on the one hand and Konkombas on the other, most recently in 1994. Prior 
to the war in 1994, Konkombas were required to send seasonal farm laborers to the 
Dagomba chief, pay annual tribute, and hand over percentages of game or fish that 
had been caught on Dagomba land. The tension escalated when the Konkomba Youth 
Association petitioned the central government for the creation of a Konkomba 
paramountcy, known as Ukpakpabur, in the Northern region based on three principle 
grounds of representation, citizenship, and land (Akwetey, 1996). They used the 
argument that they had no representation on the traditional council, that they were not 
recognized as Ghanaian citizens, and, as “indigenous people,” that their land should 
be restored to them. It is noted that Rawlings, during his 1992 electoral campaign, 
promised the Konkomba to assist them in gaining a paramountcy.  
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Fighting between Dagombas and Konkombas erupted in February 1994 and spread to 
Gusheigu, Yendi, and Mumumba districts. After 18 months of negotiations and 
consultations, peace was restored and an agreement was drawn addressing land tenure 
system, and individual rights and responsibilities. According to key informants, this 
agreements remains unratified and the specific customary laws regarding the 
relationship between the ethnic groups is unclear. Needless to say, the Kokombas 
continue to be under partial Dagomba rule. The land belongs to the Dagomba, local 
Konkomba chiefs are “appointed” by the Dagomba, and the Konkomba have no legal 
customary representation in the National House of Chiefs. 
 
4.2 Introduction to the Gusheigu District and Community 
Setting 
Gusheigu-Karaga and Yendi District have respectively 110,000 and 146,000 
inhabitants. The district was created out of the then Eastern Dagomba Village Council 
in 1988. It is bordered by four other districts in the region, namely Savelugu/Nanton 
to the West, Saboba/Chereponi to the East, East and West Mamprusi to the North, and 
Yendi to the South. The total land area of the district is 5, 796 km² , about one-twelfth 
or 8.3% of the region’s total land area of 70, 384 km². It has a population density of 
22 persons/km². It is the fourth largest district in the Northern Region. The district has 
469 communities, with the capital located in Gusheigu. The climate reflects a typical 
continental climate experienced in northern Ghana. There is a rainy season that lasts 
from May to October; peaking in August and September. There rest of the year is 
virtually dry, with the dry season peaking between February and April. The annual 
rainfall amount is between 900 and 1000 mm per annum. The capital is about 114km 
from the Northern Region capital of Tamale (Gushiegu/Karaga District Assembly, 
2002:13), connected by an unpaved road. 
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Map 2: Gusheigu District  
(http://www.schoolforlife.dk/uk/sfl/tamale.html)  
 
The two dominant ethnic groups living in the two districts are the Dagomba and 
Konkomba, but other ethnic groups also live in the area such as the Mamprusi, Gonja, 
and Nanumba Kingdoms, as well as others from Ghana as well as migrants, 
immigrants, or refugees from the surrounding countries (Issahaku, Natogmah 2004).  
There are also a notable number of Fulani, considered nomadic herds-people from 
Burkina Faso, who mostly live in the rural areas. The Konkomba speak Likpakpaln 
and are divided into clans often named after the ancestral founder who moved away 
from his brothers. While most of the groups have their own language, many of them 
(including many of the Konkomba men in the rural areas) speak limited Dagbani 
which is the official Ghanaian language of the region. English is widely spoken in 
bigger towns and is taught in the formal schools alongside Dagbani, and both are also 
used on the radio. Since many rural communities lack formal schools and means of 
communication are limited, very few individuals understand or speak English.  
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Gmanicheri and surrounding Communities 
The case study setting in the communities area encompasses an area of about 20km2 
linked through ethnic, social, familial, and water ties. The communities are situated 
about 50km from Gusheigu, the capital of the District, and are located in the 
Nawuhugu town area council. They include the central “town” of Gmanicheri, 
Dinyogu, Tandogu, Nachem, Bosum, Gbani, Kukpog, and Kulikpang, where the 
population ranges between 50 and 500. Gmanicheri is connected to a feeder road 
connected to the Nawuhugu-Gusheigu road (see map 3 below). Most of the other 
communities are reached via footpaths which can be traversed by bicycles, donkey 
carts, motorbikes, and cars. These paths, including the unpaved road, are flooded and 
unnavigable in the rainy season, but in the dry season they are well-used and provide 
access to compounds, farms, water pumps, traditional wells, the dam, spiritual areas, 
burial grounds, relieving in the “bush” and reaching the surrounding communities.  
 
The communities are composed primarily of Konkomba ethnic clans, some Fulani, 
and few other ethnic groups such as Ewe and Mossi. The clans in the eight 
communities are listed in Appendix E, and it is noted that out of the eight 
communities, only Gmanicheri is separated into two sections along the clan lines. The 
chief resides in one clan’s section, while the other clan’s section has its own sub-
chief, one Subsia and another elderly man, even though they all fall under the 
Gmanchenda-Naa (Gmanicheri chief). Each community chief is enskinned (whereby a 
higher chief approves the installment) by a chief with higher ranking; the hierarchy of 
Konkomba chiefs in the case area can be found in Appendix F. The men are related 
while the women come from different communities or ethnic groups, but most of 
them identify as Konkomba by marriage as long as they live in the community. If they 
should return to their birthplace, they may identify themselves with their original 
group. Indeed, it is not uncommon for a woman to “divorce” or separate from her 
husband, sometimes due to marital problems between husband and wife, and 
sometimes due to problems between rival wives. 
 
Along with funerals, naming ceremony, weddings, and the fire festival, markets are a 
major part of inter-community socializing, where mostly market women, and some 
men, sell their “petty things” including household items, tools, tobacco, soap, as well 
as foods and drinks, including what is locally grown such as corn, yams, and 
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groundnut, and produced items such as pito (a locally brewed alcoholic drink from 
millet), fufou, and shea butter. Markets are held every 6 days in Gmanicheri, and the 
nearest bigger market is held in Nawuhugu, and the rotating markets include 
Gmanicheri, Nabuli, Gbindily, Dakogu, Nawuhugu/Gusheigu, and Nansuni. The 
market is a place for meeting people, socializing, exchanging news, getting hair done, 
drinking, smoking, listening to the latest Konkomba music, trading, and consuming. 
On these days, children often help with preparations and stay away from school, and 
many women’s weeks or days are organized around preparations for the market 
(brewing pito, sewing clothes, preparing food). It is also the one day in the week that 
requires the most water to be consumed.  
4.3 Water and technology 
In this sub-section we will briefly demonstrate water sources use and technological 
choices used in Gusheigu. As can be seen in the map above, communities fetch water 
from numerous sources including streams, a dam, boreholes, and hand-dug wells. The 
following provides a background on some of these sources.  
 
Topography 
The topography of the land is generally undulating with elevations ranging from 
140m at valley bottoms to 180m at the highest plateaus. Being mostly a watershed of 
main rivers, the district is endowed with many small valleys. Larger valleys can only 
be found towards the periphery of the district at Gaa, Nambrugu, Katani, Sampemo 
and Sampegbiga where the small streams merge into large ones. The size of all 
valleys in the district is estimated at 22,000 acres. Out of this, only about 13% is 
bonded (Gushiegu/Karaga District Assembly, 2002:13). 
 
Rivers and Streams 
There are no major rivers, but tributaries and sub-tributaries of Nasia, Daka, Nabogu 
and Oti ruvers run through the district. Tributaries of the East-West flowing into 
Nasia River include Tile at Saala, Kungani found between Saala and Pulo. These two 
rivers merge to form the Kulibila, which flows between Dibalo and Namburugu. 
Other tributaries of Nasia are Batebuli at Nakundugu, Naporia and Ton. Tributaries of 
Oti include Naakua and Tanga to the east of Gbogu village, Korsa and Kembi at 
Nawuhugu and Wapke at Katanni (Gushiegu/Karaga District Assembly, 2002:13). 
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The main river, Nasia, and the other streams can all be described as intermittent. The 
Nasia only reduces in volume during the long dry season, whereas all the other 
streams dry up completely. In the rainy season however, all the streams increase in 
volume and flood the immediate surrounding land thereby cutting off most 
communities during the periods. Most roads are also rendered un-motorable 
(Gushiegu/Karaga District Assembly, 2002:13). 
  
Water Harvesting 
An important step in choosing water supply technologies is locating a suitable source. 
In Gusheigu, river access and surface water access is limited (particularly in the dry 
season) leaving rainwater harvesting and ground extraction as the main alternatives. A 
water source complimented by other sources must be able to supply enough safe water 
for a community. If the technology allows, and the community agrees, there should be 
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no reason a community should suffer. In the Gusheigu context the purification of 
unsafe water under rural conditions has proven challenging due to either high fluoride 
levels within groundwater extraction or, for example, the guinea worm and other 
bacterial diseases prevalent in surface water extraction. As mentioned, choosing an 
appropriate source of water can be complicated as it depends on many localized 
conditions. This is where the expertise or trust is put in civil society organizations or 
governmental agencies for sufficient safe supply to communities. Below are some key 
points about sources of water: 
  
Rainwater 
Rain is usually pure so water for domestic consumption can be collected from the 
roofs of buildings if they are clean and made of tiles or sheeting. Thatch roofs may not 
be as clean due to collection of dusts and other sources of pollution such as smoke 
from fire etc. However, using rainwater collection as the only source of water 
especially in dry areas such as Gusheigu may be an option during the rainy seasons. If 
there are long periods of drought the size of the storage areas have to be considerably 
large, maybe putting into question cost vs. usefulness. We could assume that 
rainwater is useful if it is the only alternative and no other sources are available.  
  
Groundwater 
Groundwater is surface water or rainwater that has soaked into the ground. It is not 
usually static. Once its downward movement has saturated a soil (or fractured rock), 
the water flows horizontally, often in the same direction as the water on the ground 
surface. Groundwater in general is often the purest source due to its natural filtration 
through sands and other types of soil. A disadvantage of groundwater extraction is 
that it is generally expensive, particularly if it is deep underground. Except in the case 
of natural springs, and artesian boreholes, ground water requires lifting devices such 
as pumps. Ground water extraction is the preferred mode of water collection for 
donors due to its economic rationale within the reform process and its general safe 
characteristics. This is not to say that other sources are less beneficial, but in 
Gusheigu all civil society organizations and governmental agencies practice this from 
of water extraction.  
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Surface water 
In our experience the surface water sources in Gusheigu are generally more likely to 
be contaminated or have the potential of becoming contaminated compared to 
alternatives. Without proper filtration, its use should be avoided as a drinking source 
unless the individual is in complete dire need. This is for several reasons as animal 
and human feces are also located in surrounding areas.  
  
Raising water 
As mentioned, groundwater is the preferred water source in the Gusheigu district. 
Before it is decided to dig a well or construct a borehole, it is necessary to find out as 
much as possible about the groundwater in the area. The best place to site a well or 
borehole is where the water table is nearest to the ground surface. Of course if it is too 
shallow you would risk potential pollution.  
 
Children and young women raising water in Gbani. This pump has two filters attached. 
A characteristic of groundwater sources is that it is near rivers, ponds, springs and in 
low lying areas. Certain types of trees or, in the dry season a richer growth of 
vegetation can be signs that water is nearby. Other technologies include water 
divination and geo-electric resistivity methods to locate water sources. Once it is 
decided that a ground water supply is appropriate, there are technically 5 main 
methods which can be employed to reach it. These are: 
1. Driven tube well 
2. Jetted tube well 
3. Hand augured borehole 
4. Machine drilled borehole 
5. Hand dug well       (Skinner, 2003) 
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In Gusheigu the machine drilled borehole and hand dug wells are the most common. 
All donor supported initiatives in communities within Gusheigu are using these 
methods, although there is a movement to technologically move within the harvesting 
of rain water on a larger scale than the communities are using. At the moment 
communities are using small pots or barrels to collect water or shallow pits/wells that 
are hand dug. Donors are not sanctioning these methods at this time. 
 
Machine drilled borehole 
This is usually the most expensive way of accessing groundwater, particularly if large 
drilling rigs are used. Larger rigs can drill through many meters of rock relatively 
easily, reaching depths of over 100m. This is not common in Gusheigu as most 
boreholes do not exceed 50 meters. In recent years small, simple drilling rigs which 
use a mixture of human and engine power have become available. These have 
considerably reduced the cost of boreholes. Some of these rigs are very portable, 
capable of being placed in the back of a truck and then manhandled into place.  
 
Hand Dug Well 
Hand-dug wells are considerably larger than tube wells or boreholes. These wells 
generally have a higher capacity and are advantageous when the water in the ground 
has a low refill rate. This usually means that plenty of water can be drawn at one time, 
and one must wait until the well fills again over hours, days or a week pending on the 
flow. Another advantage is that the water can be accessed either by a bucket or pump 
which is easier to maintain than pumps fixed to boreholes, although all hand-dug 
wells in the case area also had pumps attached. 
Machine drilled boreholes 
Advantages: 
- Equipment is available for all types of ground to great depths 
- It is very fast  
- Needs few people. The machine does most of the work 
- Can penetrate relatively deep below the water table even loose sandy soil  so the borehole can be 
constructed deep below water table 
Less risk of surface pollutants 
Disadvantages: 
- Needs a sustainable hand pump 
- Only one person at a time can collect water 
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Figure 4.2- Types of Pumps  
(CWSA Operations Manual, 2001) 
- Heavy rigs require the construction of special access roads or degradation of farmers fields 
- Usually much more expensive than a hand dug well 
- Once the piped well is blocked the borehole is rendered useless.  
Hand-Dug Wells 
Advantages: 
- A flexible procedure which can be adapted to a variety of soil conditions as long as the lining 
materials are available. 
- Often only cement, some reinforcement, and locally available materials such as sand and aggregate 
are needed for lining. 
- With the wide well it is easy to adapt to simple water lifting devices, some of which allow more than 
one person to draw water.  
- The well provides a reservoir which is useful for collecting and storing water from ground 
formations which yield water slowly. 
- Relatively inexpensive compared to borehole 
Disadvantages: 
- Uses a lot of bulky and heavy materials for the lining that may need to be transported by larger 
vehicles 
- It needs a dedicated work crew willing to construct for extended days in thick rock and a qualified 
blast team 
- Hand digging cannot easily penetrate hard rock ground 
- Open topped wells may be prone to pollution or bacteria if left open over a longer period of time. 
Hard to administer from neighboring villages.  
- Difficult to go deeper than 20 meters, due to human involvement and health risks. 
Figure 4.1- Comparison of Machine-drilled boreholes and Hand-dug wells 
(Based on Skinner, 2003) 
  
Types of Pumps 
In Ghana, there are four types of pumps that have been approved by the CWSA as a 
standardized mode selection. Although we recognize that there are other donors that 
are not recognizing this standard such as Caritas who use their own pump, a majority 
of the donor community does adhere to this standardization. This then supports the 
supply chain so that in case pumps break down there will be accessible parts located 
somewhere in Northern Ghana. The four 
pumps as seen below are: 
1. Vergnet Pump 
2. India mark 2 Ghana modified pump 
3. Nira pump 
4. Afridev 
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To our knowledge all donor community sponsored agencies are using either the Nira 
pump which is specific to Hand –dug well construction or the India Mark 2 Ghana 
modified pump which is specific to borehole construction. See Appendix G for 
possible alternative water supply in Gusheigu. 
 
Local Technical Knowledge 
The following account of the popular technical knowledge stems from the community 
of Dinyogu where community members shared with the researchers their technical 
knowledge concerning water sources, maintenance, fetching, storage, and treatment.  
 
Sources 
Sources include natural wells, 
traditional wells, hand-dug wells, 
boreholes, stream, the dam, and 
rain harvested from roofs and the 
floor inside huts which allows 
water to flow into a hole. The river 
is around 2km away and has no 
running water during the dry 
season. According to the elders of 
Dinyogu, a traditional well was 
built a long time ago in the riverbed, which retains water during the driest season. 
 
The locations of these wells were chosen by the elders of the community after the 
rainy season when a slight depression was visible in the level of the ground. When 
this area was pounded with a stick, a certain sound indicated that there was water 
below. Another man mentioned certain trees or rocks indicate water sources. After the 
first rains, the rock ground was softened, making it easier to cut through the 
approximately 50 cm layer using an ax.  
 
With the help of a bucket at the end of a rope, men hollowed out large chambers, 
resulting in variously deep and wide hollow underground caverns. The shallowest of 
these wells is around 3 meters deep and 3 meters wide while the largest are around 
Women drawing water from traditional well in riverbed  
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five meters deep and eight meters wide. During the rainy season, the caverns overflow 
with water. The entire surrounding area is under water.  
 
 
    Locating a Source: depression in the ground           Demonstrating how traditional wells are made 
 
These traditional wells are not protected by cement etc and sometimes collapse. There 
is no guarantee that the water is safe to drink.  
 
Maintaining sources 
In order to maintain the wells, after the first rain each year, the men hollow out these 
cavities to expand them and clean out objects that have fallen in, including dead 
animals and sticks. The women clean the surrounding area and clear away debris and 
continue maintaining the wells by organizing themselves into groups and sweeping 
and washing the surface. When the wells are not being used, they are covered with 
branches or large flat rocks to prevent animals, people, and debris from falling in.  
 
 
 
 
Drawing and Fetching Water 
 
As there are many wells in one small area, women draw water from one or two wells 
until they are nearly dry. They then move to the next well, until all of them are dry. At 
       Drawing from a traditional well with stick  
 
       Collapsed traditional well 
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this point the water begins to get murky, but the women continue fetching it for 
various purposes, including drinking. When the communities use the traditional wells, 
the drawing of water is done similarly to the digging out of the wells, using a rope and 
bucket. Water is carried by women on their heads, while boys and sometimes men use 
donkey carts and bicycles, whereby larger containers are filled. Various containers are 
used to carry water from the traditional sources or hand-pump mechanisms to the 
home, including barrels and basins, and women often cover the water while walking 
with either plastic sheets or leaves from a certain tree to protect the water. 
 
                Water Storage 
After the water has been carried back to 
the community it is stored in clay pots 
which are supposed to be covered (but 
often are not). Water for drinking, 
cooking, washing, and bathing is stored 
outside a hut or room. The water contained 
in the pots in the picture on the right is within a compound and originates from the 
dam (left pot) and from a traditional well in a riverbed (right pot). The water is used 
for all purposes.  
 
  Methods of Treatment 
It was amazing to note that treatment techniques used in assessment of the boreholes 
and hand-dug wells were much different than the treatment used in the local dam of 
the case area. In fact the NGOs and DWST do random testing for sulphur and 
fluorides in the wells. The method of treatment shown here (photos next page) is a 
hole used as a filtration device through which water will seep through the dirt and into 
the holes beside the dam itself. If we look closer we can see how dirty the water is. 
Another method is using a filter (introduced by NGOs), but based on observation, this 
was rarely employed. Cooking the water for the preparation of pito is common. 
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4.4 Chapter Summary 
The intention of this chapter was to introduce the Gusheigu district water 
characteristics and its relation to water supply harvesting in rural communities. There 
are several methods being used by the various agents in the district, including those 
adopted by formal implementing agents and those stemming from communities. There 
are disadvantages and advantages to the different methods of technology.  
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Chapter 5: Implementation, Institutions, and Agents 
In Ghana like many other sub- Saharan African countries, many different laws, rules, 
and customs exist according not only to the national laws, but regional, district and 
local laws. Communities engaging with water laws, policies, and programs through 
implementing agents reveal how livelihoods interact with formal structures and 
institutions, and how members in the communities pursue their objectives. This 
chapter is divided into three sections. Section 1 discusses the main findings of the 
formal legal institutional boundaries that are intended to be implemented as state 
intervention. For administrative structure and political structure from the national 
level to local level please move into Appendix H for a visual and contextual read 
regarding statutes, legislations and duties of structures and sub-structures. Section 2 
discusses the main findings from the communities including experiences and concerns 
with development. Section 3 will discuss strategies of community members to pursue 
their objectives, address the concept of ownership, and highlight some cognitive and 
normative models relevant to water development.  
5.1   Section 1: Formal Legal Institutions 
There are two main sources of water law in Ghana: customary and statute law based 
on Riparian colonization of the English nation before independence. Currently in the 
case of Ghana and Gusheigu district, customary rule alongside governmental authority 
are managed as two different mechanisms of governance in consultation with each 
other.  
 
Until the early 1990s the Ghanaian water sector was fragmented and distributed into 
other ministry lines, and the history of water management is scattered in bureaucracy 
and mismanagement. It was after the endorsement of the Dublin Principle in 1992 that 
the government of Ghana engaged upon an integrated water reform process. After a 
completed Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) study in 1996, the 
government now fully promotes the notion of the IWRM. During this process, the 
Water Resources Commission (WRC) was created as the central agency to administer 
water management. 
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Figure 5.1- Formal water sector institutional arrangement 
(modified by researchers) 
 
Previously, water management was distributed to what now consists of the members 
of the Water Resource Commission (see Appendix I for members contained in Act).  
 
Figure 5.2 below will indicate key water-related legal and regulatory events in 
Ghana’s history beginning in Riparian colonial times leading into independence 
through to the present day.  
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Year Water Events 
 
1928 
            •   First development of public water supply systems, operated by the 
hydraulic  division of the Public Works Department. Still under Riparian 
and or Statute law. 
1965 
             • Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation (GWSC) established to be 
responsible for urban and rural water supply. 
 
1986 
             • Removal of operational subsidy on water supply. 
 
1991 
 
 
1993 
 
 
 
 
1994 
 
 
 
 
1996 
 
 
 
1997 
 
 
1998 
 
 
 
1999 
 
 
             •  National Strategy for Community Water and Sanitation is approved. 
 
             • The Community Water and Sanitation Division is created by the Ghana 
Water and Sewerage Corporation to address rural and peri-urban needs and 
implement the National Strategy. 
            • Local Government Act gives the District Assemblies in Ghana the 
empowerment to make decisions to the lowest appropriate level. 
          • The operation of rural and small town water supplies moved from GWSC 
to be community managed. Semi-autonomous Community Water and 
Sanitation Division established to be responsible for facilitating the 
community water supply management. 
 
             • Vision 2020, the government’s long-term development strategy, is 
published. 
 Water Resources Commission Act established. 
 
 
          • Public Utility Regulatory Commission established. 
 
          • The Community Water and Sanitation Agency is to become independent of 
the Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation, assuming responsibility for all 
water systems in communities up to 15,000 in population. 
 
             • GWSC replaced with the publicly owned Ghana Water Company Ltd. 
(GWCL) in urban areas and the Community Water and Sanitation Agency 
(CWSA) in rural areas.  
2003 
 
 
 
2004 
 
 
 
 
2006 
            • Modification of water sector reform restructuring project so that 
management contract option is also available to urban and in small part 
rural water projects. 
 
              • Preparation of a National Water Policy. Third series of the Strategic 
Investment plan for years between 2005-2015 is published and distributed 
in support of the National Community and Water Sanitation Program.  
               Implementation of the CWSA small towns policy is distributed throughout 
the districts. Creation of the 2004 draft water supply policy 
 
              • New draft water policy still in Parliamentary House and waiting to be 
approved in Accra. Intended to compliment the priorities of the GPRS and 
is intended to respond to sub-structure pressures.   
Figure 5.2- Chronology Water Events From 1928 - 2006 
    (Leith, Clark and Soderling Ludvig, 2003;CIDA, Basic 
Human Needs Performance Review,  1998; WaterAid, National Water Assessment,  
2005; Mensah, Kwadwo, 1999) 
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5.1.1 National Acts, Legislations and Laws 
Ghana Water Resource Commission (WRC) 
Allocation of water is related to issues of supply, quality etc. leading to strategic 
planning based on key structures. Identifying water management law, rights and 
regulation has been an evolving process in Ghana since 1996. Prior to the inception of 
the Water Resources Commission Act (Act 522) of 1996 there was no specific water 
management tool that served as a national regulatory body to create and implement a 
national strategy. A revision of the Ghanaian constitution of 1992 resulted in the 
creation of a water resources commission.  Previously water allocation was 
considered under Riparian British common law which was allocated within the 
supervision of the Lands ministry, but meant that other ministries involved in 
agriculture, mining, etc. exercised their own rights over water when issues arose 
within such concerns as land rights (Opoku-Agyemang, 2005). Unlike water, natural 
resources such a raw minerals and timber were vested in the state prior to the 
provision of the constitution (Opoku-Agyemang, 2005). In other words, until the 
Water Resources Commission Act was passed, water was the only major natural 
resource not subject to state ownership.  
 
Water Resources Defined section 37 Act 522: 
“all water flowing from any river, spring, stream or natural lake or part of a swamp 
or in or beneath a watercourse and all underground water but excluding any stagnant 
pan or swamp wholly contained with boundaries of any private land. For purposes of 
the permitting process, water uses may be divided into two, namely uses requiring 
permit; and registrable water users.” 
The water use regulations 2001, LI 1692 provides generally ten main water uses in 
Ghana. Some uses include: 
- Domestic 
- Commercial 
- Municipal 
- Agricultural water uses 
- Power generation 
- Water transportation and water use 
 
The remaining is aquaculture, environmental and recreation use. 
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The WRC is intended to be the sole institution which regulates, co-ordinates, and 
manages water policy in Ghana. The WRC is essentially the governing body that 
coordinates the interests of different government agencies when water use and 
extraction issues arise. There is currently a new water supply policy in parliament 
which is intended to support the previous draft policy of 2004. The WRC objectives 
framing and supporting the draft policy include: 
- Coordinate the water sector with special regard to development agencies and 
the exchange of data between the relevant institutions ( see Appendix I for 
member institutions) 
- Work toward integration of all stakeholders, while respecting traditional 
norms 
- Guarantee access to safe drinking water and sanitation 
- Supervise quality of water  
- Improve cooperation with the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission which 
supervises pricing. 
      
 (GoG draft supply policy, 2004) 
 
Water Resource Commission Legislation reflected in Gusheigu  
The WRC is sanctioned by the legislative authority within Act 522. The Water Supply 
Policy draft itself has very nice objectives and principles but can only be meant as a 
guiding document intended to give influence to stakeholders within the decentralized 
units influenced by donors. By no means is the draft supply policy guided by law or 
has enforceable institutional influence. One of the main institutional concerns is the 
ability of the regions and districts to interpret such objectives reflective in the CWSA 
(WRC implementing authority) small town’s sector policy. Internally the CWSA 
facilitates policy driven objectives which by law is not legally enforceable at a district 
level and left to be interpreted by persons in positions of authority (DCD #15)3. 
According to district planner Al – Hassan Ibrahim (#22), the small towns policy is 
directly reflective of the latest but outdated 2004 Gusheigu district medium term plan. 
The annual work plan is intended to be a practical document which entails key 
                                                 
3
 Please refer to Appendix L for complete interview sources with formal stakeholders. All interviews 
listed in this appendix will be referenced in the text by number. Interviews from the community settings 
can be found in Appendix K and are organized alphabetically under the community names. 
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implementation objectives.  The Gusheigu district is also still working off of the 
annual work plan and budget of 2004. This document is the most recent document to 
be fully published.  
 
Customary Water Rights  
In Gusheigu, customary law principles also form governance procedures whereby the 
traditional Dagomba chief is the ruler or custodian of the land. This aspect of 
authority requires any persons conducting water resource use, extraction, or 
management to inform the chief and or sub-chiefs about activities. Customary rule is 
intended, in a water management perspective, to be considered within the decision 
making process of the commission. The importance of the provision for consulting 
with the traditional authorities is to ensure that the customary concepts of 
management of natural resources are considered prior to the grant or refusal of a water 
right. It is in this consulting stage that the role of traditional water guardians is 
considered. This is particularly interesting in a case area setting where Konkombas are 
under Dagomba customary authority in terms of “custodianship” of the water 
resource, but what this actually means is unclear. Since the Dagomba-Konkomba war, 
changes in the customary law have been accepted by both sides to some degree, but 
have not been officially ratified. According to Konkombas interviewed in the case 
area, their Dagomba rulers have never claimed water rights in terms of refusing 
Konkomba to fetch water or fish in streams.   
 
Water Permits and Registration 
As indicated in the Ghana Water Resource Act, there are categories of water use 
which are exempted from the permitting process but which must be registered prior to 
use. This includes water abstracted by mechanical means and where the abstraction 
level does not exceed five liters per second, or water for subsistence agricultural for 
land areas not exceeding one hectare. The administration of these registered water 
uses is vested in the DAs under section 11 of the District Authority Legislature. An 
application for the registration of a water use is submitted to the DA indicating the 
name and address of the applicant, category and level of the water use, water body or 
system affected and the location of the water use (Opoku-Agyemang, 2005). When 
the assembly is satisfied with the application, it registers the use and issues the 
applicant with a registration number. The DA must then transfer a list of all registered 
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users in the locality to the WRC every quarter (Opoku-Agyemang, 2005).  It is 
mandatory for the CWSA to obtain a copy of lists from all representative districts in 
the Northern Region.  
 
Ownership Rights and Representation 
Section 12 of the Water Resource Commissions Act vests property and control of 
water resources in Ghana to the President of the Republic on behalf of the people. No 
one, including traditional authority, has the right to divert, dam, store, abstract or use 
water resources, construct or maintain works for the use of water resources without 
the authority and permit of the commission. The WRC grants water rights and no one 
has the authority to transfer without the approval of the commission itself. In addition, 
the WRC has the right to terminate or limit a right after it has been granted (GoG – 
WRC Act 512, 1996).  
 
The WRC at the district level is to be represented within the DWST teams through the 
rural water service in connection with the CWSA amongst other agencies. The act 
specifies which agencies and ministries are represented in the commission (see act for 
specific ministries). Keep in mind that this act is clearly represented in Accra but 
examining the cross-sectoral approach at the district level in Gusheigu, reveals that 
“on the ground” capacities and relationship exist not only between ministries and 
agencies but also NGOs.  
 
5.1.2 Water Supply and Implementing Agencies 
Community Water and Sanitation Agency - Act 564 
In the rural sector, guided by act 564, the semi autonomous agency CWSA is the 
national rural water implementing body based on the National Community Water and 
Sanitation Program (now in its phase 2 procedure) which began in 1994 (Mensah, 
1999). Essentially the task of the CWSA is to take over the management and 
distribution of rural supply initiatives from the Ghana Water Company Ltd. when, in 
1994, it was proven that the GWCL had zero internal resources and was failing in its 
effort to provide rural water for the people of Ghana. Decentralized reform was the 
birth and is the current survival mechanism of the Ghana Water Company Ltd. based 
under institutional reform rationale. Reform left no option for rural water to continue 
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its path with the now urban focused Ghana Water Company due to the complete 
poverty of rural citizens and their inability to pay for water.  
 
Today the CWSA’s guiding objective is to design and implement strategies for 
mobilizing resources for the execution of water sanitation projects by private 
participation in the service provision (Obeng-Asiedu, 2004). One of the CWSA’s 
prioritized mandates is to co-ordinate its activities with private contractors to allocate 
boreholes to rural communities and to promote safe water practice and efficient water 
use. The CWSA has regional head offices of which the Northern office is located in 
Tamale and is in turn represented at the district level by the District Water and 
Sanitation Teams (DWST) specifically located in the Gusheigu Township. The 
CWSA is intended to work through the Ministry of Water Works and Housing for 
direction in Accra, implement its policy directives through the DAs, then report to the 
Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (back in Accra) who then is 
supposed to relate back to the Water Resource Commission and the Ministry of Water 
Works and Housing for consultation.  
 
Ghana Water and Sewage Company – Act 1965 
This company used to be the Ghana Water and Sewage Company (GWSC) under the 
Ministry of Works and Housing, but is now a private urban water company called the 
Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL) focusing on water supply in towns and 
cities which is not relevant in our case study because the township of Gusheigu is also 
the responsibility of the CWSA. We note that in Gusheigu District the GWCL is to 
play a small part in the rural supply of water. In the form of rural planning, an initial 
2.5% of the yearly GWCL budget at a regional level is entitled to be distributed to the 
DAs for rural water supply planning projects as one of the conditions of the creation 
of the CWSA for rural and the GWCL for urban supply. In an interview with Nancy 
Cosway (#4) the planning project funds are nowhere to be found and is sitting either 
in a bank account in Accra or in a person’s pocket.  
 
District Assemblies - Local Government Act - 462 
The DAs were established in the early nineties under the line ministry of the Ministry 
of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) to draw up and legally 
disburse development plans for districts. Water sector objectives, amongst them water 
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policy, is completely reliant on the legal decentralized structural policy of the 
MLGRD via National Decentralized Development Policy Objectives. Not less than 
5% of revenues of the GoG allocated to the DAs is intended for political and 
administrative purposes. This is also labeled the DA’s Common Fund, which reflects 
an intergovernmental grant transfer system to be allocated under the Local 
Government Act intended to give all decision making power to the District Assembly 
(Freshwater, 2004). Assemblies are the highest political and administrative authorities 
in the District in coordination with water policy plans and are designed to administer 
and implement sector policy based on objectives.  
 
 
DAs are significant stakeholders in the National Strategy for Rural Water Supply and 
Sanitation to ensure sustainability of project outputs. One of the key roles of the DA is 
to create and support frameworks that are intended to encourage external 
organizations (NGOs, donors, private firms) to invest resources in the local 
geographic area. If we refer to the flow chart (Appendix H) of district to community 
institutions (see role of the town council), Community Action Plans are expected to 
feed, via the Area councils, into the district medium term development plans. Donors 
and the private sector are then expected to draw on initiatives from these community 
plans. The documents are intended to be a guiding document for the community to 
provide a foundation which could be presentable proposals to prospective donors, the 
DAs and of course NGOs. These documents are intended to contain objectives related 
to practical and relevant issues within each unit committee, which in turn represent 
community issues such as better roads, portable water sources, schools, agricultural 
issues and so forth.  
 
The DA is thus designed to promote horizontal and vertical participation, and claims 
to be “a system that builds on indigenous political traditions of local self-government 
that assume the existence of shared ethical and moral values throughout a given 
community” (Owusu, 1992). In effect, DAs should promote local autonomy and raise 
political consciousness and participation, as well as produce local representatives who 
are more responsive to the area, thereby promoting national unity and citizenship. 
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The District Water Sanitation Team (DWST) is a loose form of secretariat that has 
been put in place to see to all issues concerning water and sanitation in the district and 
coordinate its activities on behalf of the assembly. The Team is composed of three 
persons with specialties in the following fields: 
1. Community mobilization 
2. Hygiene and Sanitation 
3. Water Supply and Sanitation 
The role of the DWST is to:  
1. Advise District Assembly on all aspects of water supply and sanitation 
2. Draw district plan of action on water and sanitation 
3. Collect Data (Baseline monitoring) 
4. Assist Regional Water and Sanitation Teams (RWST) to identify and select latrine 
artisans 
5. Assist RWST to train artisans 
6. Verify applications for assistance in improving water supplies 
7. Identify and recommend communities to district management committee 
8. Take over monitoring and support of WatSan committees after phasing out from the 
Public Offices 
9. Provide limited follow-up training for WatSan committees 
10. Promote CWSP 
11. Maintain data on individual projects 
12. Support RWST in implementing school hygiene education and sanitation programmes. 
      
 (GoG, 2004: 4-6) 
Managing contracts and channeling subsidies at the district level is only for latrines 
and for hand dug wells. More complex technologies are handled by the RWST located 
at the regional headquarters, since they demand a wide range of specialists.  
5.1.3 Implementing and Regulatory Institutions 
Although the bodies listed in the previous sub-chapter are located above as a 
legislative body, in the rural water sector they are also implementing bodies which 
coordinate and translate legislative and policy objectives into implementing plans for 
the districts to translate.  
 
Environmental Protection Agency - Act 490 
The role of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is that of a regulatory agency 
which is intended to enforce issues such as water quality regulations, pollution 
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controls pertaining to health and environmental resource issues. It is supposed to 
support the WRC. Of the many key roles, the EPA is concerned with sector 
coordination and cross sectoral coordination. This is due to its mandate to conduct and 
promote investigations, surveys and analysis into environmental matters (Obeng-
Asiedu, 2004). This does not necessarily mean it pertains to water, as there are several 
water disposal issues including deforestation and agricultural matters in Gusheigu 
which also contain environmental concerns.  
 
One of the problems in Gusheigu is manpower. Currently there is only one 
environmental health officer located in the Gusheigu district. In an interview with the 
Environmental Officer, Ben Atim (who noted while shaking his head that his tasks 
involved sectoral and cross-sectoral approaches) openly admitted his main concern is 
within all sectors, but due to financial, physical, and political constraints, he is 
restricted to the township of Gusheigu resulting in very little influence within the rural 
water spectrum (Gusheigu District, #11). One of Ben’s main advocacy issues pertains 
to the open enforcement of policy within both water and environment issues currently 
not being conducted. Ben noted that the EPA in Gusheigu is on the reactive end of 
regulatory enforcement due to constraints listed above. In fact the CWSA is supposed 
to be funding 5.5% of its annual budget to the DWST in co-ordination with the EPA. 
This has not happened, resulting in the DWST relying solely on the allocation of the 
district common fund. Other regulatory agencies include the Public Utilities Resource 
Commission which essentially guides tariff approvals and is entitled to compliment 
the EPA in areas of water quality. This is mostly intended to compliment the EPA in 
urban sector issues.  
 
The National Environmental Action Plan 
The objective of the NEAP is to improve the surrounding living conditions and the 
quality of life for all generations of Ghanaians. It’s aim is to ensure that there is 
reconciliation between economic development and natural resource conservation. It is 
hoped that a high quality environment will become an essential element in Ghana’s 
economic and social development plans (Ghana Environmental Action Plan, Vol. 1: 
1-18 in Mensah, Kwadwo, 1999). As Atim (#11) notes, in a realistic perspective it is 
the role of the Environmental officer to essentially educate not only district employees 
within all sectors about health, sanitation, and water quality issues but also the general 
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public. Atim notes his tasks are limited because it is very difficult to call formal sub-
structures together for meetings as those members are also mostly farmers and local 
community members.  
 
Overview of Implementing Agents in Gusheigu 
Figure 5.3 provides a list of formal actors we encountered in the community water 
setting but we do acknowledge there are other agents in the district conducting 
projects in  communities.  
Figure 5.3a- Water Implementing Agents in Gusheigu 
Implementing 
Agent 
 
Funding 
STATUS 
Primary 
Funding 
Agent 
GPRS 
alignment 
Water 
Water Activities 
in Gusheigu 
Technology 
Used 
CWSA 
Northern 
Region 
Government CIDA funded 
NORWASP 
Project 
Yes Contracting 
Agents  
Boreholes and 
Piped systems. 
Conducted 
HDW 
construction in 
other districts 
CLIP NGO Danida Yes Self Construct Hand Dug 
Wells 
World Vision NGO Cornard Hilton 
Foundation 
Admitted-
ly not in 
the 
Gusheigu 
rural 
water 
sector 
Self Construct Boreholes 
OIC NGO USAID 
 
Yes Self Construct Boreholes 
Japanese 
International 
Development 
Agency 
Government N/A Yes N/A Dam 
Construction 
 
 
Figure 5.3b- Water Implementing Agents in Gusheigu (continued) 
Implementing 
Agent 
Maintenance Community 
contribution 
NGO / State 
Contribution 
CWSA Northern 
Region 
Rely on DWST 
and WATSAN 
5-10% pending 
on project 
70% construction 
costs and rest to 
be provided by 
DA 
CLIP Rely on its own 
appointed 
WATSAN 
5 % pending on 
community’s 
economical 
situation– 
includes labor, 
farm animals etc. 
CLIP provides 
remainder of 
construction costs 
World Vision Rely on its own 
appointed 
WATSAN 
No initial 
contribution 
except for 
materials 
WV provides 
construction costs 
but community 
must pay for 
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pump  
OIC Rely on DWST 
appointed 
WATSAN 
5% contribution 
or commitment 
to food security 
in connection 
with water 
projects 
OIC provides 
construction cost. 
Community must 
pay for pump.  
Japanese 
International 
Development 
Agency 
Japanese built a 
Dam in the 70’s 
as a freshwater  
N/A  N/A 
 
5.1.4  Sector Co-ordination 
Figure 5.4 below illustrates the interaction of what is an idealized institutional 
framework reflective from the national level through to the Gusheigu water sector. 
Interpretation of this graph is the responsibility of the Gusheigu District Coordinating 
Planning Unit which is responsible for the reporting and planning of all district 
activities in Gusheigu. The planning unit is headed by the DCD under the supervision 
of the political entity within the assembly. All line ministries and agencies located in 
Accra are intended to be represented and advocated in the district coordinating 
planning unit. As the DCD notes, members of the planning unit are either not living in 
the Gusheigu township or do not have time to commit to all the planning processes 
required under the district assembly guidelines administered under the MLGRD. 
Therefore if he/she lives in the rural areas or another township, costs for the travel are 
not subsidized due to lack of funds.  
 
In the context of Gusheigu, sector co-ordination as seen in the above graph is virtually 
non-existent at a formalized level. It is somewhat idealized in the sense that there is 
equal influence from all sectors and inter-sectoral co-ordination. Rural water has 
taken a back seat when sector-coordination is concerned in context. Key interviews 
within Gusheigu District and Tamale have noted that due to the such wavering 
resource allocation differences and technical incapacities, rural water is somewhat left 
in the hands of the NGOs to administer on their own. CWSA/CIDA personnel (Salifu, 
#19; Cosway, #4b) admit how their co-ordination with the regional level and 
specifically local level agents is very insufficient. This also is in co-ordination with 
local NGOs. 
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Figure 5.4- Idealized cross-sectoral water coordination in Gusheigu   
(WaterAid, 2005 structure - modified by researchers) 
 
Cosway stated amongst other issues that CIDA has become an implementer along 
with its initial role as an advisor. Sector-coordination is essential but no one has the 
time or resources to fully implement a sector-wide approach. In the researchers’ 
experience communication between DWST members in Gusheigu and authorities in 
Tamale is impeded simply because of resource distribution. “We are experiencing 
lack of co-ordination at many levels – but this is the reality in a developing country” 
(I.B. Basimtale, #15). The DCD implied the realities on the ground in Gusheigu 
remain problems that are rarely represented when the planning process in Accra is 
initiated. He noted several reasons why this occurs pertaining to examples associated 
with intra-sectoral and multi - sectoral perspectives.  
Sector Co-ordination - Policy and Regulation 
Ministry of Water, Works and Housing (MoWH) – Responsible for policy formulation and coordination, for 
soliciting funding from external support agencies (ESA), monitoring activities of the water supply and sanitation sector, and 
advising parliament members in Accra. Driving policy from MoWH in Accra to the District Assembly is the Small Town 
Sector Policy which also focuses on sub-communities and rural households. This is to be translated at the District level in 
Gusheigu. 
Water Resources Commission (WRC) – Regulates water resources uses and licenses water abstraction and 
wastewater discharge. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) – Enforces environmental quality laws, including controls on pollution 
of water resources.  
 Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC)- Examines and approves tariffs for water, electricity and gas 
utility services. District assemblies are supposed to regulate tariffs in community managed small town piped systems and 
rural hand pump water supply systems. 
Ministry of Health – programs within the water and sanitation sector are to be designed in accordance with the 
policies and practices of the Ministry of Health. Ministry of health co-ordinates preventative education regarding water 
born disease thus setting health standards for safe water drinking 
Other Line Ministries –intended to be guided and provide inputs via the WRC stakeholder meetings reflective in the 
DCPU. 
Rural Water 
Community Water and Sanitation Agency – Facilitates 
development of water and sanitation in rural areas and small urban 
towns including promotion of appropriate management models, 
integration of health and hygiene, and capacity building of sector 
practitioners. 
 
District Assemblies – establish District Water and Sanitation Team 
(DWST) to select beneficiary communities, apply for national funds, 
manage implementation and approve tariffs. 
 
Communities- apply to district assemblies for new schemes for which 
they demonstrate their commitment by depositing funds to meet 5% of 
capital costs. 
Establish WatSan’s to set tariffs, maintain accounts and manage day to 
day water points. 
 
NGO- Provide technical assistance and capacity building to community 
management groups  
 
Urban Water 
Ghana Water Company 
Ltd (GWCL) 
Responsible for the provision, 
distribution and management 
of urban water supply. Also 
can contract for boreholes in 
the rural supply. Collects a 
2.5% tariff which is supposed 
to be administered into a rural 
water development plan.  Plans 
for private sector participation 
envisage the operation and 
maintenance of the water 
supply systems being ceded to 
a private operator while 
GWCL continues with sector 
planning and development. 
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From a multi-sectoral perspective, NORWASP project leader Nancy Cosway (#4) 
noted that she hasn’t met with any formal localized donors which include NGOs 
conducting projects in the Northern Region for over a year. In an e-mail response 
from Archie Book, the Director of Development Cooperation (CIDA) he noted that 
there are no formal mechanisms in place to force donors across all sectors to 
collaborate when distributing projects. Book reiterates that a donor forum exists but 
that this is strictly voluntary and mostly used when choosing what districts the bi-
laterals will focus within. This is highly reflective the lower we move into the sub-
structures as forums for communication are strictly voluntary and in some cases non-
existent. Localized donors are supposed to coordinate with the DAs in regards to 
reporting specific actions etc., but coordination in Gusheigu is also limited, if 
initiated, within one sector. There are existing sectoral mechanisms, as mentioned 
previously in the chapter, more specifically geared towards the civil movement.  
 
We will focus on inter-sectoral issues later in the chapter under debates within 
decentralization but it is essential here to note that zero funds are allocated to the DA 
for rural water programs. The CWSA itself is funded 90% by donors and has little 
influence of funding allocation to administer its own programs. Cosway stated that the 
auditor general himself is conducting a study in relation to the viability of the semi-
autonomous agency, implying the future of the CWSA is in debate. This has left 
doubts in management (who know about the audit) about how resources and their own 
jobs will be secured in the future never mind cross-sectoral collaboration.   
5.1.5  Decentralized Advocacy Movement 
In Ghana, there is a national movement (predominantly funded by DANIDA) to start a 
common foundational platform where all NGOs involved in the water sector would be 
able to share a common voice when advocating civil issues to the central government 
or the private sector. This common voice has been coordinated together to form the 
CONIWAS Network. CONIWAS is an abbreviation for the Coalition of NGOs in 
Water and Sanitation. CONIWAS itself holds its head office location in Accra 
representing its nationwide effort which is ideally supposed to have coordinators for 
the Northern, Middle and Southern regions of Ghana. The problem, according to 
Executive Secretary of CONIWAS Mr. Patrick (#3), is that historically there has been 
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very little if any coordination at the National level to monitor the huge number of 
NGOs who have their own approaches/strategies. They are rarely documented or 
coordinated to complement national efforts towards water supply. The absence of a 
clear mechanism for gathering and disseminating localized experiences makes it 
difficult to use field lessons to influence the water sector in general and advocate for 
social change. This situation among others stimulated the interest in forming a 
coalition with a unified voice, capable of mobilizing sector actors for actions that are 
non-confrontational but capable of resolving sector concerns.  
 
As with the trend of single NGOs, CONIWAS is also pursuing decentralized reform. 
The intention is to create active contacts in all regions and districts in Ghana. Of 
course the more localized the concept of decentralized reform the more coverage the 
national umbrella will ideally have for power in voice when issues arise in Accra.  
 
Ideally there is intended to be regional representation whereby a volunteer position at 
the regional level would advocate for/to CONIWAS at the national level while 
facilitating decision making processes at the regional and district level. At this point 
in the Northern Region the contact is an NGO called New Energy who is in the 
business of borehole drilling and urban sanitation. For NGOs drilling boreholes 
provides a major source of income from contracts put to tender by the CWSA, World 
Bank and African Development Bank.  
 
At the local level, NGO networks are quite limited compared to the resources that 
have been spent in trying to co-ordinate this task. CLIP and New Energy have taken 
on a pilot project in the Northern Region and Gusheigu District for approximately the 
last one year called the Water and Sanitation Network (WaSnet). Its intention is to 
gather the local NGOs and private agents conducting work in the local districts and 
create an information sharing network to reduce duplication and try to create a 
sustainable district-wide, projects based, water management network. CLIP has taken 
on this task which is reflected in its official project documents approved by the CLIP 
board in Denmark and DANIDA.  A large part of the network is to help build capacity 
and knowledge sharing with the local government agency as well. The network is 
intended to translate into a type of partnership involving knowledge sharing as well as 
resource exchange such as manpower, vehicles and gasoline. In a visual sense the 
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simplified graph below provides a general basis of the intended program. Ideally the 
approach is bottom-up but general frameworks and resources are conducted in a top-
down process from Accra.  
 
 
Advocacy Manager Mohamad Nashiru (#18) of WaterAid notes that CONIWAS itself 
lacks the competence to hold NGOs accountable for their actions. It is these top down 
processes from Accra that are the problem. CONIWAS is in fact only used as a 
greeting forum to say hello once a year and discuss generalized issues at the 
macro/international level. He notes that when or if CONIWAS itself joins together to 
make a real stand about water issues on the ground for example, in the Northern 
Region of Ghana to the government and donors – you will lose, not only your stand 
but a re-evaluation of your funding may occur. Nashiru notes that NGO’s must focus 
on: 
1. Transparency – (but how?) 
 
2. Accountability – (but to whom?) 
 
3. Empowerment – (to which group?) 
 
Nashiru reiterates – it’s not so easy in today’s development discourse when primary 
funding comes from international governments and connected donors as the priorities 
of donors sometimes outweigh the priorities of the people the aid is intended for.  
5.1.5 Institutional Concerns Impeding Current Policy 
Implementation 
 
Districts Assemblies 
Essentially the status of the Community Action plan for Nawuhugu town council is at 
a very preliminary stage as the data collection to create the framework for an area 
level plan is still being conducted. The DA has promised funding to execute planning 
processes but there has been no response thus far. In fact, there have been members in 
some communities within the case area that have submitted official concerns in the 
REGIONAL 
ADVOCACY 
- Based in 
Tamale 
- Contact / New 
Energy  
CONIWAS 
- Based in Accra 
- National effort  
WaSnet 
- Co-ordinated by 
CLIP in Tamale 
- Contact/District 
Co-ordinator 
Gusheigu 
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past regarding certain water issues within their communities that need attention, 
including the repair of pumps and completion of some wells. The process has stalled 
to this point, although there is always intention to create such plans. In an interview 
with the district planner Al-Hassan Ibrahim (#22), he pulled out several books in hand 
writing showing objectives for area councils to develop community plans in Gusheigu 
district but we could not find a plan for Nawuhugu. Essentially there was no 
knowledge where the objectives were or why they were not in a pile of notebooks 
with the other preliminary objectives, and in fact after interviewing local community 
members and WatSan members, such plans or information were not always asked of 
them.  An interesting note during the observation was when taking a look at the 
objectives within a notebook for other town councils, it was indicated that NGOs were 
expected to implement the stated objectives for most projects, specifically within rural 
water supply. When asked which NGOs were going to provide these services, the 
district planner could not answer because he simply didn’t know. This is also 
reflective in the Gusheigu annual budget and work plan of 2004 which is the latest 
official document in Gusheigu. It was assumed that the NGOs would conduct the 
implementation process.  
 
Essentially community action plans are supposed to be sent and integrated within the 
district planning process which is then to become harmonized into Area Council plans 
and vice versa. None of the town/area councils interviewed or the district planner 
knew when or even if these plans were supposed to be sent back in order to be 
discussed and harmonized. As we enter halfway into the year 2006 the Gusheigu 
district’s most current medium term development plan is from 2004 along with the 
work plan and budget. The process of bureaucracy between NGOs, the DA and 
Communities is far too inefficient and instead of proactive planning, again, all 
localized actors are in a reactive mode and state of confusion. 
 
Town/Area Council  
As noted, the town area council (TAC), which was created in 2005, has never had an 
official development plan. Externally, the TAC receives limited support from the DA. 
The members of many of the town/area councils do not meet for several reasons, 
including that the DA does not pay their sitting and transport allowances. If an issue 
doesn’t reflect the need of their own community they will not attend. This influences 
83  
the ability of members to hire motorbikes (to cover the 20,000-30,000 cedis [= US$ 2-
3] cost of fuel per trip from Nawuhugu to Gusheigu). There were also several 
incidences where members attended meetings that had been cancelled, but since there 
is poor communication infrastructure, no one was notified. Finally, members 
constituting the town councils are supposed to receive an annual allowance which has 
not been paid. For these reasons, in some of the town/area councils, the 
representatives see themselves simply as a title which is served by staff or volunteers 
that constitute a secretariat but in reality has no function.   
 
It is interesting to note that the main problems in the town area identified by the three 
member council and several unit committee members are water problems, education, 
and health. However, at the time of research, the council was receiving support from 
Danida’s TSPS (Transport Support Program Sector) Phase 2 aimed at building road 
networks to help farmers bring foodstuff to markets. The TAC members were about to 
begin a six day workshop the following week intended to raise their awareness 
concerning need for improved roads. According to the secretary Sulemana Inusah 
Dambah, “we’re focusing only on road transport because we’ve been sensitized” 
(#27). The council blames the weak DA for not being able to provide adequate 
resources to support their initial concerns, noting that “the money that was supposed 
to come to the district for support was used to maintain peace” (referring to the 
Dagbon Chieftaincy crisis). At the same time, the DCE acknowledges that he 
advocates for all NGOs to come to the district and sees no problems in letting them do 
what they want in the area. “No borders, no deregulation” (#12). This leaves the 
members in the TAC with little authority to create and implement their own area 
plans. 
 
In addition to these constraints, there was no heightened awareness of the council’s 
responsibilities of deliberating, advocating and responding to the needs and concerns 
of the people within their areas of authority.  This indicates that they are simply on the 
reactive end of the planning process looking down and do not seem to understand 
their roles in planning, coordinating, and monitoring of water development processes 
and projects expected by donor agencies. The members of the town/area councils are 
not conscious of the potential representative power they have. If elected assembly 
members came together to deliberate on issues of concern to their constituents prior to 
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DA meetings, they could theoretically exert tremendous influence on these 
discussions.  Representatives may exert more power if they came together with the 
elected assembly members of neighboring area/town councils to make demands on the 
DA.  
 
Unit Committees/WatSans 
Essentially a committee is established by the town/area council and is in part to 
become a Development and Services Committee whether it is the water sector, 
agriculture etc. Section 34 (1b) of the Decentralization Acts stipulates that “The 
Development and Services Committee shall provide leadership in the selection, 
planning and implementation of community participatory projects.”  In addition, sub-
section (1c) states that it shall “propose development plans for the consideration of the 
urban/town council and eventual submission to the relevant District Assembly.” 
Representatives in Gmanicheri unit committee, for example had mentioned 
submission of several proposals to the town area council including advocating for a 
school, water projects, food security and a health clinic, but after continued research 
the proposals were never addressed by the TAC and actually intended for NGOs.  
 
Twelve years of reform have since passed in the Northern Region and the 
development and services committee exists on paper depending on which NGO or 
government agent you talk to, but is scattered in its practical existence in Gusheigu. 
Under this reform it has taken until 2004 for the Gusheigu and Karaga districts to be 
split. In support of the previous statement - at the time of research, there were no 
formal planning documents or proposals available to the researchers (which is to be 
stored in the District Planners Office) supporting claims about separate unit 
committees plans within town councils to examine in the research area. The 
researchers were told many times that unit committees exist and plans have been 
made but as mentioned no formal planning documents were available. Currently, for 
example, the Nawuhugu town/area council is not performing its complete functional 
roles nor is there an indication that the DA itself has plans to support or build the 
capacity of the unit committees in the town/area councils due to lack of resources and 
general interest.  
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The community planning process is not the only lever of planning for water. The 
NGOs conducting water projects along with CWSA create their own planning 
processes which includes the creation of WatSans according to the needs of a specific 
project. In the Nawuhugu town council there exists up to three different WatSans in 
one community, in fact there is a WatSan for each NGO as well as the DA. When 
asked why different WatSans exist in one community as opposed to one generic 
WatSan, the answer came that each implementing actor had its own criteria for 
WatSans in the community, specifically in implementing the NGO’s projects or 
CWSA awarded boreholes. This included the benefits that came along with the 
projects. An example is some members of communities end up creating their own 
relationships which include “corrupt” practices involving employees in the NGOs to 
speed up maintenance, or influence the planning process for future projects. This is a 
reality in Gusheigu and how the system works. Relationships between NGOs, district 
representatives and communities have led to a dual system of dependence to be 
discussed further in the next chapter. Community representatives realize the role of 
the DA as a governmental body and acknowledge that it is representing the central 
government but also acknowledge that it is the NGOs that are the agents who 
implement projects, thus creating their own element of power and authority. 
Government officials and NGOs interviewed reiterated the acknowledgment of these 
relationships.  
 
Application Process for Projects 
Individual council members and some community members have some experience in 
community action planning regarding sending requests to the DA for projects such as 
boreholes and or hand dug wells. This is also the case when sending or receiving 
advice for a project stimulated by local NGOs. In separate interviews with Patrick 
Opoku (OIC, #16), Nashiru Bawa (CLIP, #5) and O.B. Alhassan (WV, #23), all noted 
that members of their teams who were constructing wells in communities stumble on 
communities without wells. When this occurs they would approach communities for 
projects if they see the need is there. This was confirmed by numerous communities 
who submitted their application directly to the NGO, or multiple NGOs as there are 
different NGOs conducting projects in the same communities, through their own 
network of friends. This is fine as the communities do need water but in taking this 
method of planning the NGOs bypass District planning mechanisms. By doing so, 
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duplication occurs which creates a type of competition between NGOs and NGOs’ 
associations with the DWST. This may seem like a positive step for a community if 
there is duplication, as one of their concerns is to have choices about water sources to 
meet their preferences and needs, and, in case one breaks down, to have an alternative 
source. On the other hand, having two wells in a community means more costs and 
other resources required with maintenance which they might not be able to provide 
without taking away from other livelihood aspects, such as clothing, food, and 
medical expenses.  
 
Political, ethnic and religious affiliations  
Combined with capacity issues in Gusheigu are political affiliations which affect 
choices. In previous interviews (see interviews# 10,11,15,17,23,24) issues of political 
favoritism between allocation of projects based on ethnic, political and religious 
affiliations are very evident in Gusheigu. It is no secret that if you are not affiliated 
with the local government or a religious institution such as World Vision your 
chances of receiving a water project decreases. The environmental health officer took 
a sight tour in the northern part of the district near the East Mamprusi border and to 
his horror he found Konkomba villages completely sick and poor – who had to walk 
7-10 km for water everyday. Down the road there was a Dagomba village with a 
CWSA installed borehole and pump. When asked why the Konkombas do not visit 
this borehole, he mentioned that the Dagomba community charged too much money 
for the Konkombas to use and in the dry season they do not allow any Konkomba 
farmers to visit the pump at all. In an interview with I.B. Basimtale (#15), he admitted 
that the communities have to make partnerships with certain NGOs and the district 
either by giving gifts or votes because they know they have to survive. If they do not 
create these partnerships then the community will fall behind the rest of the district. 
Interesting conflicts occur between communities who have different or perceiving 
different affiliations to political parties such as throwing rocks down the shafts 
boreholes as a type of sabotage.  
 
Religious and ethnic affiliations as noted by Elizabeth Darko (World Vision, #10) are 
the drivers to help implement projects in certain areas that have a more favorable 
environment according to the word of god or to which ethnic group or family you 
belong to. In a comparison she notes that it is easier to work with the Konkomba 
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villages and that WV projects have more limitations in Dagomba villages (considered 
predominantly Muslim-oriented) but WV is proactively trying to find ways to enter 
Dagomba communities. Some villages are easier to enter based on the “key” or 
“person” to enter the door - in some villages it is quite hard to find these people. 
Darko also admits that WV uses development projects to enter the villages. WV 
determines the type of project to use which will be the most effective in that 
community, whether it be a school or water project, etc. Once the project has been 
accepted the word of god is the foundational message used in conversion as the 
project is completed.  
 
According to the DCD (#24), the reality in the Gusheigu district of how political and 
ethnic affiliations influence development is clear in that out of seven secondary 
education schools in the region: 
- 1 school was in a Konkomba inhabited area 
- 6 schools were in the Dagomba inhabited areas 
This was not because of population dispersal per say but due to older sentiments and 
conflicts between Konkombas and Dagombas and the Dagomba-led DA. Feelings 
towards Konkombas today remain bitter. World Vision program officer O.B. 
Alhassan (#22) explains that even though he is a converted Christian originally from 
Gusheigu, there is still lacking trust towards Konkombas as he says you’ll never know 
when they will strike again.  
 
Issues of Decentralization 
Whether the translation of implementation objectives within policy is being reflected 
at the local community level is still debatable as new strategies and mechanisms have 
emerged as will be noted later in the chapter. Essentially, today’s decentralization is a 
top-down process and, in the Gusheigu’s case, rural water lacks resource support in all 
elements of decentralization (financial, human resource, operational etc.) from the 
central government. The CWSA itself is not fully decentralized but semi-autonomous 
to the district level. The three major ministries (Ministry of Health, Ministry of 
Education, and Ministry of Agric.) comprise 60% of Gusheigu’s fiscal budget are also 
not decentralized and are controlled from Accra. This means that local level 
bureaucrats have little if any influence at all in the fiscal decision making process at 
the local level. We can understand the lack of co-ordination between and within 
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sectors, especially when water decisions being managed at the local level involve both 
decentralized and non-decentralized sectors. For example, if there are funds that are 
collected, or for some miracle the common fund arrives, most of the fiscal resources 
are transferred to the three major ministries, leaving little if any funding for the water 
sector.  
 
Since the CWSA isn’t decentralized to the district level, the only way the DA can 
transfer resources to the water sector is if it has collected the funds itself in taxes. It is 
the last priority to redistribute funds sourced locally because, as the DCD noted, the 
assembly itself has a hard time paying its own lighting bills. All local interviews and 
literature examined, especially focused within the district of Gusheigu, noted that 
there is a severe lack of real implementation efforts. This frustration affects the 
actions of local NGOs who have no real vested interest within the political arena in 
Accra and are externally donor driven.  We can understand some of the reasons local 
NGOs are not cooperating with the local level bureaucrats as all NGOs that we have 
experienced are functionally decentralized due to their sector specific focus while 
operating under different donor objectives. We noticed in our interviews that DA 
personnel are concerned about the local well-being of the citizens of Gusheigu to the 
point that it doesn’t affect their own well- being, as some do not belong to or have 
little affiliation with local ethnic groups. Saying this, some members within the 
district do not realize the actual power they hold as manipulation, corruption and 
intimidation are very evident within the bureaucratic levels.  
 
Sub-Summary 
This section has argued that the districts, due to the lack of decentralization, are not 
ready technically and administratively to receive responsibilities included in laws, 
policy, and acts due to the centralized decision-making processes in place. The 
decentralized structures do exist in Gusheigu but are not utilized. It is remarkable how 
the issues presented in this study are well known by agents in the case area and are 
reiterated again and again. This lack of commitment to devolve decision making 
powers to the districts by the central government may be one of the influential reasons 
of complete lack of resource problems we encountered. We note that specifically in 
some sectors, focusing within fiscal, structural, and human decentralization, the de - 
evolution of power and resource simply will not happen in a short period of time. The 
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authoritative figures located in Accra may not be ready to let go of existing decision-
making authority for the obvious reasons mentioned above. At the same time, these 
factors are combined with ethnic, political, religious aspects coexisting within the 
district and influencing motivations, decisions, and actions of agents at all levels, and 
are some of the reasons that institutional strength, and sector co-ordination are 
impeded.  
5.2   Section 2: Community Findings 
While the previous section has highlighted findings within water institutions 
influencing local level implementation, this section discusses the findings from the 
community settling. The section begins with an overview of developmental concerns 
discussed during personal engagements with community members, including issues of 
education and health, representation and politics, customary rule, economics, water 
development and NGO relations. of the aim of this section is to provide the reader 
with specific insight into institutional issues and experiences affecting choices and 
actions of rural people surrounding water development. For elaborations and sources, 
please refer to Appendix J which is organized in alphabetical order according to 
community name. 
5.2.1 Concerns of Development 
Development is referred to as Ininween, literally meaning “your eyes are open.” When 
asked what this means, the chief of Dinyogu said that “development is the changing of 
a place from the olden time of life to a newer generation.” The first form of 
development came in the form of road construction, built by the Germans (around 
WWII) from Gusheigu to Kjerpuni, the unpaved road lying near the community (see 
map 2, chapter 4). According to the elder Bijimba, the next form of development was 
the bicycle, which he first saw when he was 14 years old. In terms of water, the 
Japanese came about thirty years ago and built the dam which is currently the main 
source of water for the surrounding communities. Because farming is the substance of 
their livelihoods, development has had the most significant impact with the 
introduction of farm inputs including chemical pesticides, fertilizers, and tragents. 
Many noted an increase in healthy-looking harvested crops, while others noted that 
the soil has become more infertile resulting in smaller yields, especially of yams. 
Some wondered whether they should stop using chemical fertilizers. The housing 
structures also constitute a part of development, as some households replace the 
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thatched roofs with tin ones, considered better because they do not need to be fixed 
yearly, and because they allow for rain water harvesting. At the same time, the chief 
remarked that “this grass roof, they can easily go to the bush and cut them. But if you 
get a tin roof you have to hire someone to do this, but this one they can do 
themselves.” During the hottest time of day, these huts were avoided due to the build-
up of heat inside. These contradictions are a part of daily life and people have both 
positive and negative experiences and opinions regarding these changes, but 
development on the whole is associated with improvement.  
 
During the interviews and conversations with different community members, 
numerous concerns related to development and specifically water surfaced. The 
following is a reflection on some of the remarks and stories shared by community 
members in their interaction with development.   
 
Education and Health 
It was repeatedly stated that the future of the people is in the hands of their children, 
and that because none of them are educated, they can only hope that their children 
will be. School for Life4 has been present in many of the communities for two years, 
but has left again. In Nachem, the community members have maintained a school for 
primary grade level 2 and 3 (also used as a church on Sundays) after School for Life 
left them, clothed the pupils in the required school uniforms, and, at the time of 
research, were using a volunteer teacher (who was absent on the days the researchers 
were present). When the teacher is absent, the older students teach the younger ones 
what they have learned. At the time of research they were waiting for a formal teacher 
to be sent to them, but there are few incentives for certified teachers to venture into 
these remote areas.  
 
Few children in the eight communities attend schools, and among those who do, very 
few are girls. Reasons for this include the distance required to attend especially from 
the remote villages, the fees to cover school supplies and the uniform, and for girls, 
the housework required of them, including sweeping, washing, helping to cook, and 
fetching water 2-4 times a day. Other reasons noted by some women (as well as some 
                                                 
4
 School for Life is an umbrella program under GV to promote literacy and education in rural poor 
areas in Northern Ghana.  
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men) include that the men do not want educated girls or wives. In recent years more 
children have been attending the Primary and Junior Secondary School schools in 
Nawuhugu. Still, out of the eight communities, only 4-5 adults have some literacy. 
Education was stressed by many as an important key to advocating for themselves. 
According to one woman in Dinyogu, 
 
“If we were to have educated people at the higher level, let’s say at the 
regional level, when the person comes the person will also fight for his own 
people. Now that there are no people who are staying at the national or 
regional level, by the time the help will get to us, those at the top will rather 
push it to the district level they will push it to their own communities and 
settle far and before we will get the help and how you want it to be. That is the 
reason there are no highly educated people.” 
 
Health is another major concern of people in the communities and is closely related to 
water. The most common health problems include diarrhea, malaria, headache, and 
fever, and many acknowledged that people tended to get sick after the first rains when 
people were drinking dirty surface water. Since the introduction of boreholes and the 
guinea worm campaign, the cases of guinea worm have drastically decreased with 
hardly any cases. The communities were educated on identifying the disease, and 
many had knowledge of HIV/AIDS. Yet people suffer from other water-related 
diseases where malaria is the most common and deadly one.   
 
Malnutrition was also a main observed health problem, although it was rarely verbally 
acknowledged, and children often displayed the distended bellies indicating lack of 
protein. According to Makoni Jirjiri, Mangazia of Nachem, “during this season it’s 
hard, we even eat dawa dawa5 and sell it. It takes a lot of work and the food doesn’t 
give much energy.” Malnutrition was especially noted in poorer households. Although 
owning many livestock and fowl, meat is only eaten on special occasions such as 
funerals and the fire festival, and children often receive the meager pieces. The lean 
season is typical of the dry season lasting two to four months, where fresh fruits or 
greens rarely arrive at the weekly market, and are often too expensive to purchase. 
  
                                                 
5
 A tree carrying large pods filled with seeds and sweet yellow powder. The powder is eaten while the 
seeds are processed into a spice for cooking.   
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Gmanicheri is the only community where ten households (out of 34, see Appendix J) 
have health insurance cards, but only half of these are paid. None of the other 
communities have health insurance. Most of the communities rely on local herbs, 
drugs purchased at the markets, and the traditional healers for addressing their 
immediate health problems; for more serious concerns they travel to the health clinic 
in Katani. The distance is far and the cost of fuel too high for many.  
 
Representation and politics 
The issue of representation and its connection to development surfaced in several 
conversations. The four unit committee members in the case area made attempts to 
advocate for schools and a clinic, but, as noted earlier, were unsuccessful at the town 
area council. All communities have a number of chairmen and all have a Mangazia, a 
woman’s leader. In Gmanicheri, there is an unsurpassed number of eight chairmen, 
and these are the main contact people for outside agents such as NGOs. It is 
significant that chairmen hold their positions until they die or decide to quit. Although 
some were installed under JJ Rawlings, they are still considered active chairmen.  
  
“in modern Ghana, without a committee you won’t get development.” Blatirim 
Tiyuniba, chairman of Gbani 
 
“If we get representation, we can also fight for us and get our own rights. The 
person will say no and it won’t happen again. But now there is no way to do 
that, so we are just managing small.” Woman from Dinyogu 
 
“We have no decision to decide for ourselves. At District level, where there 
are executives, there are no Konkomba men. All the departments, there is no 
Konkomba man. And now that we have no representation, whenever they take 
a decision, our decision is not taken.” Issufo Osman  
 
In all communities, the men were the most involved in political parties and the women 
usually voted for their husbands’ party. Both NPP and NDC have supporters in the 
communities. In Gmanicheri, a discussion on political parties among men revealed 
some of the factors contributing to preferences.  
NPP and NDC are the parties. We like NPP because there was a Konkomba 
minister in the NPP regime. We like the NDC because if we don’t vote we 
won’t get what we need. The community party leaders were promised 
bicycles, and the community was promised a school, a tank to sell kerosene, 
and the construction of feeder roads. (but nothing happened) The main factor 
for voting depends on who wins the DCC dispute. If it’s an Abudu, we will 
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vote for NPP, if it’s Andani, we will vote NDC. Why? Because we will all be 
contesting for chieftaincy, and you will want to vote for the right party so that 
the Gushegu chief will enskin you. All of us are waiting to be the next chief, 
even the younger brothers. Other than that, we don’t have a preference for a 
party. 
In Gbani, the dominant party is NDC because it’s the older party. “You don’t get a 
new wife and drop the old wife away.” At the same time, Sikpen Das (chief of Gbani) 
noted that the “NDC and NPP normally come here to campaign. They make empty 
promises, they don’t do anything.” When asked about the platforms of the two parties, 
little was known about them. Preferences were associated with the party which could 
help them the most, but based on experience, both are distrusted, although the NPP is 
generally thought to be doing more now than the previous NDC government. 
 
Customary Rule 
According to customary rule, traditional wells are privately owned and named after 
the founder or descendent of the founder. The owner organizes the maintenance of the 
well. Everyone can use it, but permission from the owner is necessary. One reason for 
this is that if someone were to fall into the well, the owner will have to do the 
necessary ceremonies before the person can be buried. There are sometimes fish in the 
wells (i.e. mudfish) which also live in the rivers. If the user of the well catches the 
fish, he will have to give the better share to the owner: if he catches five, he will give 
three to the owner and keep two. With the introduction of NGO-constructed wells, in 
all communities except Gmanicheri’s CLIP well, the chief continues to “own” the 
well. If the Watsan makes a decision, they should ask the chief (or his advisors) for 
approval. In other words, the chief duplicates what the Watsan is supposed to do. 
Even within the Watsan, it is the most elderly and male person who usually makes the 
decisions. At the same time, the chief of Dinyogu noted the importance of including 
the youth in decision making. According to him, “some of the things I can see is like 
the decision making like this is good now with including the youth. You don’t neglect 
them. You should include them. You shouldn’t be too powerful as a chief in order to 
develop the community more.” In the communities visited, it was noted that the chiefs 
were respected based on the respect they gave to the people in the community.  
 
The community chiefs have little or no voice in the tribal council, except for the chief 
of Nawuhugu who is respected by the chief of Gusheigu (Dagomba, see Appendix F). 
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According to Jala Bampo, who has been chief of Dinyogu for seventy years, he is 
supposed to approach his higher chiefs if there are serious problems in the 
community. But during his period is chief, he has never gone to them.  
 
Economic Concerns 
Income generating activities are closely related to the availability of water.  
 
“If we have enough water they brew pito or make charcoal or make shea butter 
when it’s time to sell.”  
Are you able to save money? 
“No, we can’t get enough to save, but we have been able to contribute to 
things, also for water. It’s the chief who organizes this.” Makoni Jirjiri, 
Mangazia of Nachem  
 
 
Payments for the wells are often a burden. The rules regulating how this money is 
collected varies between communities from the chief paying all of it, to an equal 
payment scheme among compounds, to contributions from the wealthiest households. 
Some acknowledged that the amount the NGOs require is little compared to the cost 
of construction, yet community members often struggle to come up with the 
resources. 
“WV came and drilled a well but it hasn’t been fixed with a pump yet. That 
was in 2005. We haven’t paid and are collecting contributions now for the 
cement. Each compound has an amount to pay, but we don’t think it’s possible 
this year due to funerals, there’s no way to save money. We opened the 
account 6 years ago.” Bosum community member 
 
In a group interview with women from Dinyogu, a woman noted that “it will 
be difficult to develop without education, so education is the most important. 
Micro-credits are the next because development is about money.”  
 
What will you use the money for? 
“We will use it to trade and make a profit to pay back CLIP” 
 
And then? 
“We will use it for clothing ourselves and our children” 
 
On a more philosophical level, Jala Bampo, chief of Dinyogu, expressed some of his 
concern with development and the relationship between paying for something and 
getting it for free, and the importance of retaining farming:  
“If you look at these sandals, unless someone has brought it to me, and I’ve 
gone in for another one, by the same time if I have suffered before I have 
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money to buy this thing, I wouldn’t like it to spoil. But because of it, 
development, I would like us to still maintain the farming. If we are 
developed, we would be able to get money and buy farm inputs and extend our 
farms. But as for the farming, we wouldn’t like to stop it because of 
development.” 
 
5.2.2 Water Accessibility and NGO relations 
Time used to collect differs depending on where the water source is and which source 
is being used by the community. In the dry season the households spend up to several 
hours per day collecting water from sources and may end up walking up to 3 km for a 
water source. Below in figure 5.5, we see the allocation of time spent collecting water 
and the water sources by season from each community within the case area.  
 
Comm- 
unity 
Water 
source 
# of 
water 
sources 
distance 
to 
source 
and 
back 
Constructing 
Agency comments 
Dinyogu 
Traditional 
wells 14 nearby 
Chief, private 
persons 
rainy season 7-8 months, good  
water quality 
 
Nawuhugu 
dam 1 
ca. 2 
hours Japanese dry season 
 HDW/HP 1 nearby CLIP 
good yield, some complaint 
about  
taste, but general satisfaction 
 BH/HP 1 nearby World Vision 
poor yield, runs dry daily during 
dry season 
 BH 2 nearby World Vision 
community has not been able to 
pay  
for cement, so the two BH 
remain  
without pumps 
 
Gmanicheri 
Boreholes 2 2 hours  World Vision 
before the CLIP well, this is 
where they 
 were fetching in the dry season 
as well. 
Bosum BH 1 N/A NORRIP no water found 
 BH 1 nearby World Vision 
hasn't been fitted with a pump 
yet  
because community is unable to 
pay  
for the cement 
 Stream 1 nearby  
sometimes it looks dirty,  
other communities use it 
upstream,  
used during rainy season 
 
Kulikpang 
Borehole 1 2 hours   dry season 
 
Gmanicheri 
Boreholes 2 
2.5 
hours  dry season 
 
Nawuhugu 
dam 1 
2.5 
hours Japanese dry season 
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Kukpog 
Nawuhugu 
dam 1 
1.5 to 2 
hours  Japanese dry season 
 
Stream 
"Kuchorun" 1 
1.5 
hours  rainy season 
 
Gmanicheri 
traditional 
wells 3 .5 hours Gmanicheri rainy season 
Kulikpang 
Stream 
"Lantu" 1 nearby  used in rainy season 
 BH/HP 1 1 hour World Vision 
1 hour wait, other communities 
use it,  
so sometimes not enough 
 
Gmanicheri 
Boreholes 1 2 hours  
World 
Vision, OIC dry season 
 
Nawuhugu 
dam 1 2 hours  Japanese dry season 
Nachem HDW 1 nearby CLIP 
not finished, no one explains 
why 
 BH/HP 1 nearby World Vision 
not enough water in dry season.  
 
 
Natural 
stream well 1 1 hour  dry season 
 
Gmanicheri 
Boreholes 1 1 hour 
World 
Vision, OIC dry season 
 
Stream 
"Binantum" 1 .5 hours  rainy season 
 
Stream 
"Kuchorun" 1   rainy season 
 
Traditional 
wells 
       25-
30 nearby  rainy season 
 Dam 1 ? DA 
full of sand and polluted, not in 
use 
Gbani BH/HP 1 
1 to 1.5 
hours World Vision 
dry season, used by at least two 
other  
communities, they say it's too 
far away 
 
Nawuhugu 
dam 1 1 hour Japanese dry season 
 
traditional 
wells 7 nearby 
Chief, private 
persons rainy season, good quality 
Tandogu HDW/HP 1 nearby CLIP 
poor yield, but seems enough 
for  
small population, too early to 
tell 
 Hole 1 nearby community rainy season 
 
Nawuhugu 
dam 1 2 hours  Japanese dry season 
 BH/HP 1 N/A World Vision 
they applied, but never heard 
from WV 
Gmanicheri HDW/HP 1 nearby CLIP 
yield is small in dry season,  
used only once every two weeks 
 BH/HP  2 
1 to 1.5 
hours World Vision dry season, h 
 BH/HP 1 
1 to 1.5 
hours OIC dry season 
 
Nawuhugu 
dam 1 1 hour Japanese dry season, no waiting time 
 
Natural 
stream well 1 .5 hours  dry season 
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Traditional 
wells 4 nearby 
Private 
persons, chief rainy season 
 
Stream 
"Binantum" 1 .5 hours  rainy season 
Figure 5.5- Community water use 
          (based on 
researchers’ findings compiled from Appendix J ) 
 
In development terms, a Japanese organization built a dam around 30 years ago, after 
which people began to fetch water from this source. This dam ran dry around 2002 
(noted as a year of water crisis) and the communities were desperate for water, at 
which point World Vision arrived and built three boreholes near the riverbed about 30 
minutes away from Gmanicheri, serving between 6 and 10 communities.  
 
Water development is generally viewed as positive development and is associated 
with many changes (see figure 5.6 below).  
Figure 5.6- How did access to water facilities change your life? 
 
If there’s no water in the area, it’s difficult to make building material and fix houses that fall during 
the rainy season. In Nawuhugu, any time you can build houses, but here you can’t  (Bosum) 
 
Before, the women couldn’t go for firewood or go to farming (Bosum) 
 
For the animals, we were bringing animals to Nawuhugu and they would die on the way (Bosum) 
 
When we go to bed, we can think about going to the farm instead of going for water (Bosum) 
 
We used to quarrel with their wives and we used to not come to our husbands at night because of 
water (Bosum) 
 
When our children went to school, their teacher would beat the children if they weren’t bathed and 
had clean clothes (Nachem) 
 
If you’re a farmer, and you don’t get water to get breakfast, you can’t go to farm, or you go later, or 
you go weak. (Nachem) 
 
Before, we wouldn’t go to farm until it rained, now we have finished clearing the land, so we have 
more time to farm. (Nachem) 
 
Development can make Bosum more powerful in the area. It gives us unity and peace. If there’s no 
water you always quarrel with your wife. It’s the men’s responsibility to farm and the women should 
fetch water.” Gbanja Balakum, Bosumbor (chief of Bosum) 
 
No water, no life. Life comes first, and then the other things can follow.” Bosumbor (chief of 
Bosum), Gbanja Balakum 
 
Before, they could get guinea worm or stomach disease (Gbani) 
 
They were carrying their heads, but not carrying their legs (As you’re moving at night, there may be 
dangerous things near the legs) (Gbani) 
 
We were having problems over water because husbands should also fetch water and it would bring 
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fighting with words. I would go and only bring one container at a time, and both of them wouldn’t 
bath or have clean clothes. The woman and the children would bathe, but the husband wouldn’t. 
(Gbani Mangazia)  
 
It has expanded the community. People have moved here from elsewhere because now there’s water 
close by. (Gmanicheri unit committee member) 
 
We are now hoping to get a formal school because without water there can’t be a school. (Gmanicheri 
unit committee member) 
 
Only those who have zinc roofs collect rain, then we also have containers. But we now go to the 
boreholes. During the water problem (dry season) you don’t think of water anymore. You can go to 
work without having to think about it so much. We can now think of things like how to get a school 
and clinic.” Gmanicheri chief, Azindow Jangnang 
 
We used to go at night around midnight to the dam to fetch from the small holes on the edge because 
during the day they were empty. So we would have to go when no one else was going. 
 
Also, now there aren’t as many cases of snake bites from going out at night, so there are fewer trips to 
the hospital, which saves money. 
 
We have been chased away from Gmanicheri boreholes and told that we should first pay. We 
volunteered to pay Kulikpang, but we didn’t want to pay Gmanicheri. It was an insult to ask us to 
pay. If you are reasonable, you will not quarrel. We just stopped going to Gmanicheri. It was only 
one section near the well that asked us to pay. (Bosum) 
 
At the same time, most communities continue to use their traditional water sources, 
including traditional wells, rivers, and the dam, especially in the rainy season. When 
asked whether they would prepare their traditional wells in case there was little water 
in the CLIP well, one man in Dinyogu responded that  
 
“We were doing it, and even this year we had in mind that immediately after 
this thing if we get a chance because we are helping in conveying the sand 
from the well6 they are doing. After doing this, we will go to the traditional 
well and dig more so that if it’s raining and there’s water we will stop using 
one afterwards. We will stop using either this or the traditional one, so if one 
finishes we will go to the other one.” 
 
Other people expressed their relationships with NGOs and choices of water. 
 
“We are still fighting for WV to come and drill closer. I don’t know why they 
drilled so far away. We were fetching from the Nawuhugu dam before, but the 
women are still gone many hours during the day fetching water.” Gbani 
chairman, Blatirim Tiyuniba 
 
“In terms of water, the women use traditional well water for pito. Now that it’s 
the dry season and we usually fetch from borehole, we have reduced because 
the water from the borehole has a scent, like some chemicals. It’s better than at 
first when it was very strong. We will still get water from the holes around the 
dam to  
                                                 
6
 They were helping CLIP construct the well 
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make pito. It’s boiled and strained, and the taste is better.” Nachem’s 
mangazia, Makoni Jirjiri 
 
“They prefer the water from the hand-dug well for brewing pito. This is the 
same water as the stream, Nyenbun (down-water).” Gbanja Balakum, 
Bosumbor (chief of Bosum), speaking of where women fetched water. 
 
“We use borehole water for pito, but sometimes it’s no good. We use water 
from the small holes in the dam to make pito because it won’t spoil their drink. 
We boil the water so the germs inside will die.” Tipaga Koligu, Mangazia 
from Gbani 
 
“The men say that the wife should come to farm, but because of water she 
can’t, he said she refused to come to farm, and it would sometimes lead to 
beating. Women from the same husband can’t defend each other because he 
will think that they’re teaming up against him. Only a woman from another 
husband can defend her.” Amina Mabur, Mangazia from Dinyogu 
 
The interactions observed and inferred from conversations and interviews were 
ambiguous with intimidation and fear on one side and positive experiences on the 
other. In both Nawugu and Gmanicheri the consensus was the community members 
were intimidated by WV due to the aggressive nature of projects entering the 
communities and the sense of “if they do not please then they will be blacklisted 
attitude.” This resulted in an unspoken sentiment that communities who do not abide 
by the formal rules of the game would need to seek their “needs” elsewhere.  
 
Other communities had similar experiences. According to the experience of the 
Kulikpang chief, 
“World Vision first came and drilled three times. This is the fourth time they 
drilled to get, but the community has only paid once. There are two Boreholes, 
but only one has a pump. We can’t force them to come back. We have bank 
account open, but we will wait until they come, hopefully next year. “ 
 
5.3  Section 3: Community Interaction with Water Policy  
   
5.3.1 Strategies for Community Ownership 
Community members incorporate their own practices to complement the weak formal 
structures discussed in Section 1, thereby enabling communities to access and 
influence water development activities. The findings are categorized as selective 
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communication, culture of “giving,” and “friends” who mediate between communities 
and NGOs. 
 
Selective Communication 
When approached by associations or individuals representing potential development 
initiatives, agents within the community strategically hide and reveal existing water 
points. Based on personal experience, some community members denied other NGO 
involvements or were reluctant to show us other wells, whether functioning or not, 
because they assumed that this would make them look less “deserving” of a well. 
Aware of the policy that only communities without any potable water are prioritized, 
it was perceived to be in the community’s interest to conceal simultaneous or 
“duplication” of projects. As mentioned in Chapter 2, language used in the presence 
of the researchers was often formatted to reflect development language. Conflicts with 
NGOs or between community members were also downplayed as it presented 
instability. It is known that NGOs prefer stable “user groups,” and complaining about 
their water “providers” is not in the community’s interest to maintain good relations.  
 
Giving Gifts 
Saa kpa litakpal kan saa gma ku unyuun - You need a stone to kill a bird 
U nii u bun na u ma le ban dot ache - The sick person has to look for the doctor 
 
Participation in community life allowed for the observation of numerous exchanges of 
gifts between members of a household, between households, and between 
communities. During the interview process, we always received gifts such as fowl, 
eggs, and yam as gestures of gratitude, often attached to their wish that we could 
“remember them when you go back home” or “help them” in the future. This practice 
is also used with NGOs and the assemblyman and even through contacts to the DCE 
to obtain wells, speed up processes, or create an obligation to return the favor. In 
Kukpok, the guinea worm eradication chairman Idana Samali noted that “the NPP 
also promised us water, but we have not seen it, have they forgotten us? We have sent 
gifts like yams and guinea fowl, but nothing happened. We also sent elderly to DCE.” 
Lacking currency, and because communities have their assets in their livestock and 
fowl, these gifts are a form of payment, although sometimes the payment is also a 
symbolic 5,000 cedis (ca. US$.50). This symbolic investment is one of the resources 
that communities with development projects have made to pursue their goals. 
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“Friends” or Njo mediating between communities and NGOs 
Communities obtain development through an extensive network of informal relations. 
Communities and individuals take advantage of existing resources such as personal 
contacts with knowledge about development processes and discourse. The exact 
nature of these strategies varies between the communities where some communities 
are closely related and use the same contacts, while others have found ones 
independently. According to Anamoh (#28), some young men in rural areas have 
“adventurous” characters which drive them to explore the surrounding areas and gain 
information concerning the development process. They may return to their community 
and convince the leaders to form the required groups and appoint positions and open 
bank accounts. If they combine this with an existing respectful position in the 
community, they may become the main contact for the NGO, and thus gain further 
respect and status in the community. But there were also incidences where this 
individual was considered arrogant and disrespectful in the community, yet became 
the contact person for some NGOs. In the case area, all communities with water 
projects have “friends”—called Njo-- from Gusheigu who help them gain access to 
information and maintain contacts with the NGOs. These friends are provided with 
gifts expressed in the proverb, “you need a gun to shoot a lion.”  
Figure 5.7- Friends of the communities 
- We have a contact person through Gmanicheri because we are all the same, we are all brothers (Binamop side). This 
friend is between NGOs and the chief. We also have a contact person in Gusheigu, he’s also a friend, and he’s the 
same friend as the one Gmanicheri is using. This friend told us what to do to get development (Dinyogu) 
o Every three months or one month they should contribute money and open a bank account. 
o We should form groups 
- The contact person tells the community to open bank accounts, to build silos and houses for animals so the NGOs will 
be interested in coming to them (Gmanicheri). 
- We have opened bank accounts at ADD for OIC and an account in Gusheigu for CLIP 
- We have a contact in Gmanicheri who is a son of the late husband. He is the one who passes on information regarding 
development, in this case CLIP. He is the link between Tandogu and Gusheigu because he knows someone in Gushegu 
who is his friend. (Tandogu) 
- The friend works in the car-hiring business. Whenever any development comes he comes and tells me what to do, like 
bank accounts or whatever.(Gbani) 
- We heard that WV was in the surrounding communities, so we asked their friend to approach the NGO. The friend 
told them what to do, such as form groups and open bank accounts. We have their own friend, not everyone can have 
the same friend. We went looking for him 7 years ago. Unii ubini tiwan na aa gma tuu,k uwandean ke agan mala (If 
you are sick you have to go to the clinic, but the treater wont be looking for sick person to treat.) (Nachem) 
- Yes, we have friend. He’s the Guinea worm coordinator for Gusheigu sub-district. He’s the one who brought them 
WV. We have applied for a school, toilets, and a clinic, but nothing has happened. We give him guinea fowl, eggs, and 
yams. We need more support from him, we have known him for ten years. So far he’s only given us water.(Kulikpang) 
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- Issufo in Gmanicheri is our contact person. He told us to contribute and open a bank account for the borehole. We 
have a contact person in Gusheigu. He’s a friend, we give gifts like guinea fowl, yams, and eggs. You can’t just go and 
tell someone to help you without giving something in return. We give gifts and he’s opened bank accounts for 
us.(Bosum) 
Instead of focusing on what they lack, communities with projects actually have used 
alternative (or informal) means of obtaining and owning development. These 
resources include the ability to send both written and verbal communications through 
people traveling to Gusheigu and exchanging news and knowledge at social events 
such as markets, funerals, or other social gatherings. In addition, communities 
establish long-term “friendships” with strategic people mediating relationships 
between communities and NGOs or the DA. These “friends” sometimes occupy 
powerful positions in Gusheigu with connections to the DA or other agencies with 
formal recognition. Thus, development has introduced new figures of authority not 
formally recognized, where these “friends” act as the real linkages between the 
communities and NGOs, and sometimes between communities and the District 
Assembly.  
 
5.3.2 “Community Ownership” 
The following findings reveal that community “ownership” encounters numerous 
localized factors which interact on different levels to render institutional design based 
on generic expectations unpredictable. Decision-making surrounding resource use is 
vested in the chief and other local leaders of the community, where users from other 
communities, sections, or ethnic groups are excluded. At the same time, peaceful 
relations are valued and sought through complex social rules. An example of such 
rules is the use of a CLIP well in Gmanicheri which has low yields of water during the 
dry season. Gmanicheri is divided into two sections, where one section has been 
involved with CLIP’s micro-credit scheme since 2000. In 2004, a hand-dug well was 
built by CLIP in the same section without any communications with the chief who 
lives in the other section. Thus, only women from the section close to the well have 
access to it, but even this group has divided itself into two further groups. The well is 
locked and opened every six days (after market day), where each group has access to 
the water every twelve days. These rules reflect local conditions such as low yield, 
close proximity to certain households, and existing ties to CLIP. CLIP staff is not 
aware of these rules, nor are they a reflection of design. In an idealized “community 
ownership,” the entire community has access to the resource and is involved (either 
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directly or through representation in the Watsan) in decision-making, but in this 
example, the chief was excluded and only one section of the community is included. 
 
Due to the close social, economic, and geographic ties between the communities, 
water resource-sharing among communities is common. Depending on the inter-
community ties, women are either granted permission or pay a fee to use the resource 
to the chief who is seen as the “owner.” In some communities, a resource is used by 
up to seven surrounding communities, some of whom have their own wells (which are 
dry) and are excluded from decision-making regarding accessibility of the resource, 
payments, and responsibilities. It was often stated that women from other 
communities were allowed to fetch water from boreholes because “we are all related” 
and “this time they lack water, but next time it might be us.” Several women noted 
that they were allowed to cut the line because of the long distance they had traveled. 
At the same time, some women complained of being chased away from the source, or 
that verbal harassments made by the “owning” community deterred them from 
fetching. In other cases, men sought permission from the chief of the resource-owning 
community to fetch water. These divergent reactions are interwoven with inter-
community and inter-personal relationships and intricately related to power and social 
networks which evade institutional design and concrete conceptions of “community” 
and “ownership.”  
 
Other groups using the water resource include the Fulani who bring their cattle to 
water sources. The Fulani in Gmanicheri water the cattle downstream from the dam 
until the level is too low, at which time they will ask permission to use the borehole in 
Gmanicheri. The Fulani family moved to this community from Burkina Faso three 
years ago along to join other relatives in the area, and have become citizens of Ghana; 
one man interviewed has also voted in the last election. The Fulani have developed 
relationships with “landlords” or key community members who give them permission 
to live on the land in exchange for taking care of cattle and other livestock. While 
incorporated in the local social environment, the Fulani have never been formally 
acknowledged by NGOs nor have they been represented by user groups, even though 
their livelihood dependence on cattle and use of water resources have significant 
impacts on quantity and quality of water, as well as social rules surrounding water 
practices. 
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Authority Ownership  
In terms of authority, while community members are aware that they should “own” 
the well, this concept is dependent on agent perspective for interpretation. From one 
chief’s perspective, the wells belonged to him because he was ultimately responsible 
for delegating tasks and collecting fees. The chief along with his elders are often 
responsible for water-related decisions. In the same community, the wells were also 
said to be owned by the NGOs themselves, and the wells were named after the 
agencies (“CLIP”, “World Vision A”, “World Vision B”, “OIC”) in order to 
differentiate them. In other communities, those households who made the highest 
contributions towards fee payments claim more ownership than households unable to 
contribute, and women from the former households had priority standing in line. 
These overlapping and contradicting conceptions of “ownership” in terms of authority 
indicate that the concept is context dependent.  
 
Capacity Ownership 
Capacity “ownership” can be linked to the ability to make minor repairs based on 
technical (tools and knowledge) and financial capacity. Examples in the communities 
indicated that communities remained dependent on NGOs for fixing the well. The 
following example reveals how an NGO limits a community’s ability to “own” and 
manage the resource. 
In Nawuhugu, the pump broke and the town informed WV. After WV refused 
to 
come, people in the town decided to hire another mechanic to do the repair. 
When World Vision found out about this, they came and seized the tools of the 
other mechanic and the community had to pay for both the lost tools and the 
work done by World Vision. 
 
Similar stories revealed that communities often lack the technical and financial 
capacity to maintain their own boreholes, resulting in a clear dependence on the NGO. 
Boreholes require high levels of technical expertise and expensive tools which 
communities generally lack. This experience was echoed in Gbani, where an 
informant noted that the community “paid for both wells, but one isn’t working. We 
told WV and were told that they would come. We gave them guinea fowl and yams, 
but they said that since we have one working well, they will first see to the ones that 
don’t have any water and then come to us. So now we just wait.” When asked whether 
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anyone had been trained in fixing the pump, he stated that “we were supposed to have 
people trained to fix the well, but they haven’t been trained yet. We don’t know if it 
will cost anything or not.” 
 
The concept of “community ownership” is a problematic concept in that it supposes a 
relatively homogenous group with representation in the user group from all users, 
undermining the diversity, inter-dependence between communities, and relationships 
beyond formal water resource management. Finally, the capacity of communities to 
maintain the wells is poor, and many continue to depend on NGOs for support. By 
undermining these realities, the assumptions of “ownership” maintained in program 
documents are weak representations of actual aspects influencing decision-making 
and effective implementation. 
5.3.3 Models of water development  
Water development assumes different models which are contextually drawn upon by 
agents interacting in implementation depending. The models discussed here include 
water as a need and water as a status, and the models of NGOs. Combined, these 
models provide NGOs aspects of legitimacy towards in different environments of 
interaction.  
 
Water as a Need 
One of the models that policy follows presupposes that water is perceived as an 
identifiable “need” by all community members, and that this will be resolved through 
water projects. This model provides NGOs positive legitimacy from their donor and 
member stakeholder groups and is essential for them to operate. The example of the 
“demand-driven approach” (DDA) assumes it will enable implementing agents 
“address the needs of the people as expressed by the communities” (CLIP, Mid-term 
Review).  
 
There is little doubt that water is the basis of life, but the reality for many 
communities is that they already have sources of water, including traditional wells, 
rivers, and a dam, and that they are likely to continue using these sources even with a 
new source. What is interesting to note is that the water from boreholes is designed to 
only meet drinking needs, while communities use water for many other needs, 
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including washing, bathing, watering animals, and brewing pito. In constructing one 
well near a community, the “needs” are supposedly met, while women and children 
continue to fetch from other sources based on their preferences, distance, and uses. In 
reality, one borehole or hand-dug well has limited impact, especially in the dry season 
when the rates of recharge are slow, and boreholes are often dry. The constructed 
wells do indeed reduce the time to fetch water and ameliorate the efforts somewhat, 
but many members in the communities are unsatisfied with the amount of water 
present in the wells, the distance to the wells,7 as well as taste and color of the 
borehole water. It was noted by several women that they only fetch water from the 
borehole in the rainy season if the source is closer than other sources, and, depending 
on the taste, only for certain uses such as washing and bathing. This dissatisfaction is 
often hidden behind thankfulness, as illustrated by a man in Gmanicheri who stated 
that “beggars can’t be choosers.” As a result, communities optimize their water 
sources by using a combination of all sources, including other communities’ and the 
dam as well as accepting offers by further NGOs to provide more wells.  
 
Water as a Status 
Water development is also strongly linked to symbols of social resources, where 
individuals or communities engaged with NGO projects have more status.  Many 
NGOs and political parties display billboards with signage, affiliating communities 
with powerful organizations (while also providing obvious advertisement.) The status 
of being associated with development projects is also used by politicians and it is 
noted by several community members that water is the most important and significant 
promise made by politicians. Observing the reactions of people to the appearance of 
the large shiny white pick-up trucks displaying NGO signage is one indication of this 
association. Placed in socio-historical contexts in which Konkomba communities, and 
rural communities in general, have often been linked to “backward” and 
“uncivilized,” communities will accept water projects 
even if a village doesn’t really want the project, they will still take it because it 
makes them feel important. If one community has a well, the other community 
will also want one, even if they continue to use their traditional wells. It’s a 
status to them and they brag about it. Sometimes when they are in the city 
(Gusheigu or Tamale) people will make fun of the villages and how they don’t 
                                                 
7
 Although NGOs suggests a certain distance from the community to the well, due to the ecological 
conditions, wells are sometimes placed at further distances near river beds, or near existing traditional 
wells.   
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have any water. The villagers will then be very proud of their wells because it 
represents portable water and they will count the number of wells they have. 
(Khadija Issufo) 
 
Status is also related to stability. In several communities it was noted that 
communities with good leadership were able to organize their people to obtain water 
projects. The only community in the case area without any water project was 
experiencing leadership conflicts, and some people there felt that they would not be 
able to apply for any projects until the problems were resolved. Thus, the model of 
water development stems beyond the notion that communities “need” water for 
survival, but also include pride and status, as well as stability and peace. 
 
Model of NGO  
Each of the three NGOs in the case area is primarily accountable to their own donor 
and follows their own objective, thus making their most important legitimizing 
stakeholder their donor. In addition, they also need to be accepted by the district and 
communities as legitimate agents. It was noted by the School for Life coordinator that 
the DA is a political entity, and that the provision of water should not be linked to 
politics. While water is a tool used by politicians to gain votes, it gives NGOs 
legitimacy for their initial presence and future projects. The label of “NGO” gives 
organizations symbolic leverage as being independent of the ill-trusted local 
government, allowing an NGO with affiliations to a distant “white man’s” world to 
enter. Indeed, the two Konkomba names given to NGOs are Simi Ni Fob, translated as 
“white people who come out to help” and Sumba Aani Fob, “they are on their own.”  
Community members had little idea about the origins or political affiliations of the 
different organizations, except for WV. As noted earlier, WV uses water projects to 
provide an entry point into communities for long-term proselytizing relationships. A 
man from Gbani noted that “World Vision doesn’t follow any party, they do their 
work what god asked them to do.” Another way of distinguishing NGOs from the 
government was made by a man in a community with the proverb, U bor ba ni u li sifi 
ka sifi kau, ke u-wolen jo ki li si fi kan fu li unnim ma. (If a chief promises to give you 
something and never fulfills this promise and the elders can do it, you go the elders 
for it.) This was a reference to the failed promises made by the government to bring 
portable water to rural communities.  These findings indicate that community member 
maintain more trust in NGOs than the local government. The underlying reasons for 
108  
distrust are due to complex factors involving ethnic tensions, unequal distribution of 
resources, and historical relations among others. At the same time, NGOs may take 
advantage of this distrust by entering the environment without any overtly stated ties 
and claiming non-involvement with the local government. Interestingly, “NGO” in 
Dagbani is a subtly derogatory and mocking slang term denoting people who are 
beyond control. According to Asia Fuseini, a local volunteer teacher in Tamale, if 
you’re called an “NGO”  
It’s like being disobedient to your parents, like leaving the house for two or 
three days without your people’s notice. You didn’t tell anyone you are going, 
you just leave. They refer to you as an NGO because you are not under any 
care. These girls who go outside and sleep around they call them NGOs.  
 
Treated with a little humor, NGOs are perceived to be not only separate from 
governmental institutions, but also slightly rebellious.  
5.4 Discussion 
The constraints posed in this chapter have indicated that policy implementation so far 
has not been successful in terms of using formal institutional structures to provide 
water to rural people and have shown, specifically in the DA’s abilities and 
motivations, that the targets outlined in macro specific policy are not emerging as a 
reality.  
 
The above presented issues highlight the role of agents within the formally structured 
institutions and plurality of other environments in Gusheigu, where, according to 
Giddens, agents within the policy arrangement as well as in communities are 
considered both knowledgeable and capable. From an institutional perspective, the 
behavior emerging from street-level bureaucrats is, in part, shaped by the obligatory 
passage points (OPPs) created by those ultimately creating policy: donors. Indeed, 
agents within communities as well as at the district level are aware of certain 
institutional rules and formal language, while also able to incorporate local concepts 
and customs, but find difficulties in meeting the expectations of formal institutions. 
There are four stages of OPPs which are explained in terms of water policy 
implementation: problematization, intéressement, enrolment, and mobilization. 
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Problematization- this stage involves attempts made by agents to posit their solutions 
to the others’ problems as “indispensable.” Donors and development discourse have 
focused on the problem of water scarcity. The link between water development and 
economic development is made in policy, and donors have enrolled the Ghanaian 
government into drafting “solutions” within the policy in accordance with mainstream 
recommendations. The relationship between NGOs and the DA is thus based on the 
DA’s acceptance of the problems and provided solutions being addressed by the 
donors. If the DA is not accepting of these problems or solutions, the donors would 
leave. A similar situation is revealed between NGOs and communities, where 
communities express their objectives but fear that too much pressure placed on NGOs 
might make these agencies leave.  
 
Interéssement- this stage is described as a transaction between three entities because it 
involves one agency “enrolling” or “interesting” another over another agency. In 
other words, donors have enrolled the GoG and the District in adopting the water 
policy over another tool for water development such as alternative forms of policy. 
The institutions the policy has created are assumed to be more interesting or efficient 
than alternative forms, and this stage seeks to achieve membership into policy. 
 
Resistance is evident at this level because communities have identified and are 
pursuing development priorities which are outside the donor objectives, including 
education and clinics, among other dimensions to be discussed in the next chapter. In 
terms of water, communities are also pursuing alternative strategies of obtaining 
development based on their own preferences, needs, and resources.  
 
Members of the DA are motivated by interests that go beyond water institutions, 
including interests based on ethnic and political affiliations, and personal motivations 
including salaries (or lack of). 
 
Enrolment- this process involves “constructing alliances and coalitions between 
memberships and meaning.” Ideally the policy has created structures including laws 
and acts which would guide the district in implementation by building coalitions 
between private and public sector agents. NGOs are supposed to support this 
coalition, but in reality, an NGO such as World Vision is pursuing its own objectives 
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over those laid forth by the DA. Both Coniwas and Wasnet are weak coalitions of 
institutional agents. Another coalition includes the relationship between the Watsan 
committees and the DWST, which holds a limited existence on paper. Finally, 
alliances with membership and meaning are constructed around the concepts of 
“ownership” and “need” which are shared symbols meaning different things 
depending on agent perspective and context. 
 
Mobilization- this refers to the “set of methods that agencies use to ensure that the 
representations of interest which other enrolled agencies make are in fact themselves 
fixed” (Clegg, 1989: 205). The policy has thus far been unsuccessful in becoming 
institutionalized in helping rural communities access water, yet this stage ensures the 
legitimacy of NGOs pursuing their own agendas and ultimately the policy which was 
adopted by the GoG based on donor “advice.”  
 
Placed within Clegg’s framework of power, the water policy can be positioned at the 
level of system integration because it involves connections with people who are 
physically absent (Giddnes, 1989: 28) and includes the material conditions of 
techniques of production and discipline (Clegg). The formal institutions that are 
created by policy are manifested at the level of social integration, referring to 
“systemness on the level of face-to-face interaction” (Giddens, 1989: 28). These 
institutions include administrative acts and laws, implementing agents, and regulatory 
bodies presented in the first section of the chapter as well as specific “rules” such as 
the demand-responsive approach and user fee payment model which are represented 
in Clegg’s OPPs through which all agents must pass in order to implement policy. 
Power is relational, yet the findings indicate that NGOs and donors maintain powerful 
positions vis-à-vis both communities as well as the DA. Since power is implicated in 
the authority of NGOs and donors and is constituted by rules, it is in the interest of 
these powerful agents to discipline the interpretation of the rules. Indeed, according to 
Clegg these rules must be regulated if existing power relations are not to be 
transformed. In other words, powerful agents are unlikely to give up their powerful 
positions. 
 
This chapter has highlighted some of the difficulties of enrolling communities and the 
DA in these OPPs following an analysis of water institutions and community 
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experiences. It was noted that these structures shape, in part, the behavior of 
implementing agents. The power relations between NGOs, the DA, and communities 
are reconstituted and agencies continue to be mobilized to follow policy even if at a 
superficial level. At the same time, a certain level of autonomy or discretion reveals 
itself in agents in implementing policy who “could have acted otherwise” (Giddens, 
1984: 14). In the next chapter, a deeper analysis will focus on a broader conception of 
these OPPs to include the concept of democracy and representation as well as the 
reconstitution of assymetrical power relationships through legitimation. 
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Chapter 6: Institutions and Power Relations  
 
Chapter Overview 
The debate with agency and structure is premised on the notion that agencies have the 
ability to act within and upon institutions, and that in turn, institutions are not fixed 
entities but rather comprised of agencies. The chapter includes analysis of agencies 
within the district water policy setting and how their actions and choices are affected 
by their structural environments. Based on theories of institutional choice and power, 
it is argued that the current policy environment exists as a system in which powerful 
NGOs are contributing to a dual-system of governance which ultimately may impede 
the district agents, including decision-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and 
communities from engaging themselves in implementation.  
 
6.1 Institutional Choices made in the Public Domain remain 
 Debatable  
After examining the issues in Gusheigu in the preceding chapter and noting some of 
the motives of NGOs one has to think what representation and decentralized diffusion 
of powers really mean. In the 
case of CLIP for example, it is 
CLIP’s formal mandate to hand 
over authority of hand dug 
wells to the local chief in the 
community (or representative 
of the chief) via a thumbprint or 
signature if he or she can read 
and/or write (see picture to 
left). This means that the 
community supposedly has no debt to CLIP for construction or future maintenance of 
the well or pump. By doing so, CLIP is providing a customary ownership concept to 
the local community. Aside from the difficulties defining ownership noted in the 
previous chapter, another problem with ownership relates to the continuous inclusion 
of customary authority. According to Ribot (2005), this is fragmenting the forms of 
authority in the district itself because deciding to bypass local political and 
administrative officials delegitimates local authorities in favor of legitimating the 
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alternative authorities. Within the case of the Nawuhugu town council, all 
communities interviewed within the council stated that the NGOs do in fact hold more 
authoritative and allocative power than the DA and, though acknowledging some 
authority by the DA, they associate the NGOs with higher status accompanied by 
power.  
 
The fragmentation is specifically apparent in the WRC act whereby the legislation 
states that it is important to include customary authority in the allocation of water 
resources, while stating that all water resources are in the possession of the president. 
This means that the customary authority is the custodian of the land but not the owner. 
Since there is no official land registration in Ghana’s tenure system, land in Gusheigu 
is left to the traditional and local authorities. The Dagomba chief is the actual 
custodian of the land and the WRC acknowledges this especially when the DWST has 
such weak institutional strength in rural Gusheigu. The problem is that the WRC plans 
to seize the created water rights in all parts of Ghana based on the rationale of reform. 
In other words, while the WRC needs to rely on the customary authority, it plans to 
disempower the same authority in a legalized sense. This then brings us back to the 
role of the NGO. If NGOs continuously grant authority over to the chiefs or 
custodians in the communities by perceiving that they “own” the wells and the WRC 
continuously moves to its plan of seizure, what role is the NGO playing?  
 
Quite frankly an ideal world entails that the common citizen the right to have a voice 
in public affairs based on his or hers authoritative representative in the local or 
national government. In doing so, this would mean that if indeed a voice was heard, 
the works of democracy would be achieved. Ideally, collective representation would 
occur with the presence of many civil society organizations, newly formed 
decentralized units given local decision-making power, and communities with 
increased knowledge of general development objectives and power to be included in 
shaping these objectives. We need to be careful when understanding representation 
and what it actually means.  
6.2  Agency Interactions and Institutional Choice 
A general trend has emerged in Ghana, specifically the Northern region where 
reliance on northern donors such as CIDA and NGOs along with the increase in the 
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promotion of decentralized reforms is decreasing the power of elected and 
administrative representatives. In a quote from the District Chief Executive of the 
Gusheigu district assembly “the more we rely on external NGOs and private 
companies to conduct the workload and leave the less power we retain as a 
government” (#12). This is echoed in the communities where all members 
interviewed see the NGOs as having more power in the sense of resources and 
authority than the DA.  
 
In addition to the obvious asymmetrical resource distribution, another reason why 
NGOs and the donor community maintain more power than the DA is that they are 
time bound when it comes to project related objectives. When classifying time bound 
Darko and Alhassan (#10, #23) infer that the donors of the NGOs are under time 
constraints either from the northern foreign ministries or head offices to complete 
organizational objectives. This then satisfies northern project objectives, whereas the 
DA is also time bound but not to the extent of the foreign donors. In fact the DA is at 
the mercy of foreign donors and to the extent of the central government. As we write 
this paper the DA common fund still has not been received in Gusheigu district which 
was supposed to be transferred in January 2006. In the case of CLIP, Phase three of 
their three phase water sector support program was just initiated and assessments have 
just been completed upon phase two project objectives. Response was mixed due to 
the relatively moderate success of the hand-dug well component of the project in 
relation to the northern office objectives approved by DANIDA. In comparison, the 
DA does not have a phase three in water project development; as mentioned, the 
district is still working off its implementation plan from December of 2004. This is 
admittedly a hindrance to CLIP and World Vision as northern objectives must move 
faster than the administrative and political process in Gusheigu.  
 
Many institutions have been developed (on paper) with the purpose of increasing 
popular participation and empowerment in planning and decision making such as the 
case in Nawuhugu Town Council. Although participation is a key attribute for the 
formation of the community planning process there needs to be the democratic 
characteristics to properly represent communities in doing so. Based on Ribot (2005), 
increased participation may have democratic characteristics bringing a broader cross 
section of the population into decision making – participation is often neither 
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representative nor binding. What makes a political/administrative system 
representative is the presence of systematic mechanisms by which society can hold 
decision makers accountable. In both Gmanicheri and Nawuhugu unit committees 
there was general skepticism towards representatives within the 
political/administrative system. The assemblyman is a part of the communities 
himself, but communities also link the assemblyman to the DA. This poses a problem 
due to the fact that there is an extreme lack of trust between communities and 
members of the DA thereby placing the democratic role of the assemblyman into 
question.  
 
Local representatives, which we include from the national level to local sub-structures 
in Gusheigu, must have the power to be responsive to local peoples’ needs and 
aspirations if democratic institutions are to develop a meaningful role with the local 
community. On paper, structures do exist to fill this void, but in reality the 
development of the institutions as a role in society is questioned. Issues are apparently 
submitted to the DA, and responses are intended to be given in “due process” which 
has no time related definition. Community perceptions have indicated that due process 
can take many months or years; in fact, some communities have been waiting for up 
to two years for proposals to be answered –either yes or no. When questions were 
posed to the communities about advocating their issues to the assembly man, the 
responses given implied that too much advocacy may frustrate or anger the assembly 
man, leading to the possibility of communities being blacklisted from future water 
projects.  
 
What has evolved from the above example is severe mistrust and angst as there are 
also indices of corruption involved in the process. Many communities have indicated 
that when submitting proposals to the assemblyman they also provide items such as 
farm animals and/or money to help stimulate the process. As encountered in two 
villages close to Nawuhugu town council one of the communities paid 400,000 cedis 
(US$40) and guinea fowl to the assemblyman in connection with a proposal for a 
borehole. World Vision soon came afterwards and provided a borehole. Meanwhile 
another community approx. 5km down the road paid fewer resources including farm 
animals and has not heard a response to their proposal.  
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Saying this – it does not mean that other NGOs will not enter communities. Many of 
the communities who have not received water projects have been approached by 
NGOs in other sectors such as food security regarding projects.  For example, in the 
community of Katani a borehole was dug by the DWST via Partnering Organizations 
(contractors) but the borehole was dry, so OIC came and promised that if the 
community focused on a specific objective of securing a manmade food security silos 
they would provide a borehole.  
 
Local southern partnered NGOs and to an extent foreign donors are bypassing the DA 
in regards to resource disbursements.  As Ribot (2005) notes, in decentralized 
governments, international donors are often choosing to avoid the elected local 
government. In a decentralized democracy this would ostensibly be the appropriate 
site for democratic local inclusion in favor of other institutional forms, meaning that 
choice is critical. Problems form within elements of trust, accountability and 
efficiency of distribution as resources have been previously allocated to the Gusheigu 
DA directly from NGOs. Unfortunately, as mentioned previously, the agendas of the 
DA vs. donor vary and direct disbursements are halted which result, as Ribot (2005) 
reiterates, in the deprivation of local elected authorities’ powers being transferred to 
the local arena, while empowering alternative authorities such as local line ministry 
offices, NGOs, customary chiefs and private organizations.  
 
This is confirmed by both the donor community and local communities. In an 
interview with O.B. Alhassan (#23), he acknowledges that NGOs hold more power 
when it comes to implementation of water projects via resources and legitimacy. 
Elizabeth Darko (#10) also confirms the bypassing of local government due to the fact 
that bureaucracy is too slow and WV has to follow its international objectives. Darko 
notes that aligning WV objectives with the DA objectives is not an option at this time. 
Indeed, World Vision has the regulative legitimacy to do this as the GPRS itself states 
the need for Civil Society to strengthen its role with the DAs but nowhere does it say 
that NGOs must legally comply with the district itself.  
 
Chosen institutions are not substantially democratic. Privatization of public goods and 
resources to individuals such as contractors, companies, customary authorities as in 
the handing over ceremonies of wells, water resources etc., or more specifically 
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NGOs, actually diminishes the public domain. The size of the enclosure itself reduces 
the integrative space of democratic interaction. Ribot continues to note that there is no 
space for democracy, or that the space for democracy is shrinking. If powers are 
removed from the hands of representative governments there is no representative 
democracy.  
 
Another problem is that resources including trained and knowledgeable staff and 
knowledge coming from the North are being transferred to partners instead of the 
local government. Highly trained people from the district or Ghana receive higher 
incentives to work for foreign donors than to work on behalf or for the district or for 
alternative local civil society groups. Providing these technical assists to local NGOs 
limits the local government’s ability to learn and adopt skills to more effectively 
manage and administer water policy (Bräutigam, 2004).  
 
Thus, chosen institutions present competition with the democratic local government. 
Within the water sector in Gusheigu CWSA/CIDA, World Vision, CLIP and OIC 
either rely on themselves to conduct water projects such as boreholes/hand-dug wells 
or hire local firms to conduct work. Local NGOs and contractors represent chosen 
institutions who are directly dealing with local populations. This in fact supports the 
current rationale in the way of privatization, thus stimulating further incentives based 
rationale on the one hand, and competing with the power of the local democratic 
domain on the other hand. An example would entail the religious affiliations of World 
Vision who have verbally admitted that it is in their best interest for efficiency reasons 
to support the local Konkombas because they are more open to Christianity than 
Dagombas. This presents a dilemma because only one local population is engaged 
with World Vision’s motives. In an interview with the current District Chief 
Executive (#12), he states that the Konkombas have been very slow in the 
development of “their” society and doesn’t know why “they” have decided not to 
embrace the agenda itself. Konkomba communities in the Nawuhugu TAC and 
communities are relating with NGOs such as World Vision and to an extent CLIP as 
an authoritative figure as opposed to the Dagomba-majority government. While both 
the government and NGOs are pursing their agendas, as a result, NGOs such as World 
Vision are actually bypassing the government’s domain in Gusheigu, and are 
simultaneously possibly increasing the bifurcation between the ethnic groups. The 
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mechanism World Vision is using to bypass the public domain is religion. This in a 
cognitive and normative tool – specifically identifying with the northern partner 
agendas and is viewed as acceptable and provides important aspects of legitimacy. It 
is at this point where we question how policy and NGOs retain their legitimacy in the 
district.  
6.3  Legitimized Power relations 
Clegg’s concept of obligatory passage points (OPPs) provides an understanding of 
how these environments support and legitimize NGOs. In the cases examined, NGOs 
(via their powerful donors) display episodic incidences of power in their relations 
with different levels in the government as well as with their interactions with 
communities. Enrolment is achieved through a system of rewards and punishments 
manifested by incentives given to agents which affect their choices, which are linked 
with legitimizing tools including regulative (such as formal policy), normative and 
cognitive (which reflect knowledge and values in the local environment) dimensions. 
The following analysis focuses on these tools which affect the choices made by 
agencies with specific focus on implementing agents, and their ability to “do 
otherwise.” 
 
Implementing agents are the last link in the policy chain between communities and the 
next higher official, including bosses, politicians, and managers. The issues presented 
in the previous chapter and above have noted some structural constraints affecting the 
behavior of the agents, yet despite this low position in the hierarchy, implementing 
agents retain space for resistance. Terpstra and Havinga (2001) identify three levels of 
relations which influence the power of implementing agents. According to Mechanic 
(1962) and Protas (1969, in Terpstra and Havinga, 2001), managers and bosses 
depend on implementing agents to provide relevant information, resources, and 
clients. This grants agents a certain level of authority and autonomy over their 
relations and communication. Secondly, these agents are required to work with 
horizontal implementing networks of organizations (O’Toole, Hanf and Hupe in 
Terpstra and Havinga, 2001). This, in turn, is dependent on the symbiotic 
interdependencies (or lack thereof) between the organizations. Thirdly, implementing 
agents manage relations with the policy target, who in turn, have the ability to make 
the work of the implementing agents difficult or easy. These three relations are 
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examined more closely in the following section relating to the concept of Giddens’ 
duality of structure involving the structures of legitimacy, domination, and meaning of 
policy (Figure 3.1 in chapter 3).  
 
Based on the legitimacy models and the acknowledgement of multifaceted 
legitimizing environments, NGOs are held accountable by different environments and 
based on different perspectives.  
 
Donor Legitimacy 
As seen with the case of World Vision, their positive legitimacy towards their donors 
rest on normative and cognitive foundations including helping the poor and spreading 
the word of god. OIC and CLIP, while avoiding religious norms, pursue ideological 
models of helping the most vulnerable in order to reduce poverty. All three of them 
rely and depend on the model of water as a need and status for donor legitimacy, 
which includes donor membership support. They are also driven by regulative 
legitimizing factors provided by each donor in the objectives and strategies such as 
being time-bound and adopting a specific hierarchy of knowledge (next section). In 
abiding by these cognitive, normative, and regulative “rules,” their members and 
donors provide them with positive legitimacy to continue their work. Maintaining this 
legitimacy is not always easy, as general pressure to meet donor objectives were heard 
from the three NGOs that we encountered. Specifically, this meant that the staff spent 
little time learning about local environments, engaging with community leaders, and 
ensuring that community members could sustain the sources based on technical, 
financial, social, and cultural factors. This is coupled with the reality that staff 
consists of paid employees who do not necessarily share the same idealism as the 
overall normative development goal, and it is not necessarily in their interest to 
question or doubt their job providers. Needless to say, while the written reports and 
documents indicate to the donors that the NGOs are following the strategies and 
meeting objectives thereby gaining positive legitimation from their Northern partners, 
existing and evolving community livelihoods remain on the periphery of benefiting 
from the serious amount of energy and resources being invested in water provision. 
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Inter-NGO legitimacy 
In terms of horizontal cooperation, in the Gusheigu district CLIP and WV literally 
work side-by-side implementing water projects and, while CLIP superiors at the 
office in Tamale complain about the behavior of World Vision, the implementing 
agents and district staff manage their horizontal relations with professionalism, social 
ties, and necessary co-existence; indeed, their offices in Gusheigu are directly across 
from each other. This ability and behavior of local staff to interpret and translate 
policy and objectives is crucial to higher levels within the NGO structures as it 
enables their administration and implementation to occur without spending much time 
in the rural areas. The actual formal relations or coalitions are superficial as staff at 
higher levels (district, northern partners) rely more on informal social behavior than 
the formally mandated ones among staff from different agencies for their work to be 
done. This, in turn, provides the local staff with a degree of power since it is up to 
them to alter, maintain, or improve coalitions and networks. 
 
The different networks including Coniwas, WaSnet, and WAWI are examples of such 
coalitions. CLIP’s failing efforts at building and strengthening a WaSnet is an 
example of the lacking interest in this cooperation. Partnered NGOs at the local level 
have to contend with limited resources and are more driven to fulfill donor objectives 
than strengthening local horizontal communication and efforts. WV is a part of 
WAWI which is an exclusive group and, according to Sayibu (New Energy, #20), 
WAWI requires the agency to be a certain size. He notes that if you are a certain size, 
it’s to your benefit to collaborate with the DA because you intimidate the DA by using 
wealth as a power mechanism. Sayibu stated that “the higher the synergy is with the 
DA, the more benefit it is to the NGO,” noting that the DA even offered WV office 
space. Such an offer would be harder for an NGO such as New Energy which is 
significantly smaller and weaker than WV. OIC was asked to make a presentation to 
WAWI in order to join, but never heard a response. The WAWI coalition thus 
legitimates its exclusive network by reaffirming and solidifying its power. For several 
reasons (as noted above in 6.2), there are little incentives for WV to participate in the 
Gusheigu district WaSnet coalition. As a consequence of these weak incentives and 
efforts for forming coalitions, a part of the problem in the district stems from the lack 
of symbiotic relationships between the government and NGOs as well as between 
NGOs, resulting in the current situation where agencies having the most resources are 
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able to pursue their objectives efficiently from their donors’ perceptions and 
ultimately unhindered.  
 
Government and community legitimacy 
Through rules embedded in the objectives of their donors, NGOs “enroll” government 
and community agents into their membership by way of their OPPs, where rules are 
fixed to relations of meaning and membership if they are “to have any effectiveness” 
(Clegg, 1989:224). Labeling water as a problem with a certain set of solutions has 
been created by the donors, and NGOs, communities, and district members agree to 
these through means of legitimation.   
 
While the donor legitimating environment is the most important for NGOs to continue 
their work, NGOs also need positive legitimizing environments in the local context of 
their involvement, which in this case involves communities. Implementing agents 
maintain powerful positions through their refusal or willingness to provide water 
resources to communities, as well as in managing the relation. Communities are 
required to fulfill certain prerequisites in order to receive a project, and are at the 
mercy of the implementing agent to be considered ready for the project. Communities 
also wait for staff to return, often providing gifts as incentives, thereby increasing the 
divide in power.  
 
At a broader level, NGOs require positive legitimacy in the community environment 
to sustain their existence which stem outside the formal policy.  Li (1999), in echoing 
Giddens’ notion that agents are knowledgeable, notes that a compromise also assumes 
that the agencies have a degree of conscious knowledge of what is gained and what is 
lost, contributing to the legitimized power of NGOs over communities. We suggest 
that NGOs rely on normative and cognitive legitimizing tools which include the 
symbolic meaning given to the models of water and NGO (Chapter 5) to help sustain 
the water policy at the district and community levels. Hilhorst (2003:7 in Spierenburg, 
2003) notes that distinguishing NGOs between good and bad is less relevant than the 
fact that these “organizations adopt the label of NGO, which is a claim-bearing label, 
stating that the organization is ‘doing good for the development of others.’” By using 
these models to their benefit, NGOs are providing further reasons for community and 
government members to weaken downward accountability, thereby allowing NGOs 
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continue their work without much resistance or complaint on the part of communities 
or district. Communities and district-level members are aware of the financial burden 
associated with water projects and some leaders acknowledge the long-term 
weakening and delegitimizing of the state, yet their relationships to powerful agencies 
provide them with other incentives such as status and power through association. This 
was also found to be the case in Nawuhugu where the council members accepted the 
aid of Danida even though it did not reflect their expressed priorities. If they refused 
this project, they risked having a donor step out.  
 
This reflects other studies in sub-saharan Africa, where, according to Bräutigam 
(2005), political elites have few incentives to change their relationships with NGOs 
(such as refusing their assistance) due to the resources for patronage and numerous 
fringe benefits including expensive vehicles, study tours, and salary increments that 
would not be available to political representatives in low-income countries. Owusu 
(1992) writes that these leaders continue “to advocate, without essential and timely 
modifications to suit local circumstances, Euro-American type constitutions which 
were frequently honored in their breach, albeit calculated to preserve their monopoly 
of political power and leadership.” Leaders, especially those not directly involved in 
community affairs, are concerned more with the immediate benefits, concerns, and 
rules embedded in institutions, and are not embracing long-term perspectives to help 
the people they are supposedly representing. People in powerful positions following 
neo-patrimonial practices are unlikely to create reactions of opposition because it is in 
peoples’ interest to provide support to powerfully-linked groups. 
 
Experts and Credentials 
These incentives are located in Clegg’s facilitative circuit of power relations (system 
integration), which is shaped by disciplinary mechanisms comprised of systems of 
rewards and punishments, also connected to structures of signification and 
legitimation. Clegg uses the term normative isomorphism, proposed by DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983, in Clegg, 1989) to denote “how an innovation, once made, becomes 
widely adopted throughout organizations in a specific field” (Clegg: 227). Normative 
isomorphism can be applied to the institutionalization of rules of practice by which 
NGOs and government members need to abide in order to receive the next round of 
funding or keep their jobs. These rules are explicit in each organization’s rules which 
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are “sustained mainly through the process of professionalization. These processes 
ensure that common networks of discursive practice spread from universities and 
tertiary institutions generally through the organizations that employ professionals, as 
professionally sanctioned rules of practice” (Clegg, 1989: 229). Examples of such 
disciplinary practices are embedded in sanctions supporting career structures and the 
ability of people and agents to advance within them.  
 
A significant factor influencing who has the right to interpret (and ultimately change) 
the policies and strategies involves the hierarchy of knowledge. In this case, the local 
NGO staff has the legitimacy to interpret events to their donors through their reports, 
while paradoxically these interpretations are being shaped by their own interests to 
maintain their job. Professional “local” staff are employed, and indeed, preferred over 
expensive foreign “consultants.” While providing “local” insights and sensitivity 
towards customary rules and history, it has also been argued that “localness” serves to 
legitimize Northern interests being pursued via Southern partners. In reality, these 
bureaucratic organizations are comprised of a hierarchy of assigned roles based on 
qualifications which limits horizontal or vertical learning between organizations and 
among staff. Specific examples of these limitations are addressed below. 
 
Boreholes do not provide “solutions” to the problem of water. According to Nancy 
Cosway from CWSA (#4c), only 36% of the boreholes drilled are successful, and if 
the quality factor (in terms of amount of flow or levels of contamination) is taken 
away, only 44-46% of the boreholes are successful. Similarly, some local staff for 
OIC is aware that technologies other than boreholes might be more effective in this 
area, or that more qualitative livelihood factors should be considered in effective 
implementation, yet they feel that their donors are not interested in changing their 
overall strategy. Anamoh (OIC Program Manager, #28) notes that “we know that in 
one district the success rate of BH is only 20%, but we have to continue drilling 
because that’s what the objectives state. It would be better to drill in places that would 
be effective, it’s a waste of resources otherwise.” Some staff at CLIP were 
knowledgeable about alternative sources of water (including water harvesting during 
the rainy season or gallery filtration systems being implemented in Burkina Faso), but 
claimed that their ideas would not be taken seriously (by their Danish partners as well 
as by the CWSA) because they are not considered technical experts with the 
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appropriate training, and because it was not their role to do so. According to Anamoh 
(#28), “transparency and honestly should be allowed for NGOs. One shouldn’t have 
to hide failures or mistakes, because we learn from every mistake. But we know that if 
the donor hears of this mistake, he might refuse to fund us again.” While openly 
admitting some problems within the organizations, many staff hesitated to express 
their criticism directly towards their donors or partners out of intimidation, 
ambivalence, or self-interest (i.e. job). On the other hand, several have tried but were 
ignored. Anamoh related how he once included a qualitative report to his donors 
which described how people’s lives changed through the introduction of mills. The 
response he got from his donors was that the data could not be entered into the 
database because it could not fit into a five-page report and because it did not consist 
of numbers and figures.  
 
Similarly, water-related knowledge stemming from communities is considered 
inferior and almost irrelevant to knowledge introduced to them through development. 
Existing traditional water sources and the associated knowledge continue to be of vital 
importance. As long as water projects continue to be a supplement to existing sources, 
this knowledge will continue to be relied on. By placing sanctions on the sharing of 
knowledge, important knowledge concerning long-term implications for 
communities’ livelihoods is ignored in order to fit the requirements of NGOs and 
donors. Unfortunately, there is little interest from formal institutions to acknowledge 
this.  
 
At the same time, as noted in the study, this does not mean that there is no capacity 
within the community to express and pursue their own objectives, or that NGO and 
donor objectives are overruling the existing ones. Community members have 
developed their own strategies which undermine the role of the agent on the one hand 
and conceal and interpret their community in a certain positive light on the other hand 
in order to receive projects. This means that communities do share a certain amount of 
power. They know (both expressed and tacit) more about their immediate 
surroundings than implementing agents, local NGOs, or donors combined, and are 
thus in a powerful position to resist or transform intentions coming from the top. By 
altering the water technologies or adopting them under their own set of rules (i.e. 
decision-making, motivations, priorities), they are resisting the rules sanctioned by 
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policy and only adopt those which make sense to them based on their own livelihoods. 
Community objectives coexist with those of NGOs because it is in their interest to do 
so, but these interests are also dependent on larger objectives which are related to 
realms beyond merely water. They   include such aspects as survival, choices, 
preferences, pride, status, respect, norms, and values.  
6.4 Policy Interests:  autonomy or dependency? 
Returning to the government’s role, we note that no clear restrictions exist to 
discipline NGOs to support the water policy. The district government is given 
legitimate regulative authority (on paper), but due to the division of allocative and 
authoritative resources it remains  dependent on NGOs, thereby entering a spiral of 
whereby its authority is weakened which in turn makes it even more dependent on 
donors. Institutional choices made by NGOs and donors create competition with the 
DA and contribute to its limited moves. Donors in this case have more dispositional 
power because “they are at a much greater liberty to make their interpretations of 
rules stick than those for whom the rules of the game allow only a much more limited 
set of moves” (Clegg, 1989: 210). Indeed, the overall “success” of water policy 
implementation is dependent on the interpretation of relationships and events, which 
in turn is affected by the hierarchy of who has a right to interpret. Mosse (2003) notes 
that “whether disciplining or empowering in intent, the operational control which 
bureaucracies or NGOs have over events and practices in development is always 
constrained and often quite limited. What is usually more urgent and more practical is 
control over the interpretation of events” (2003). Thus, while the overall aims of 
donors are to provide water to communities, their control over the interpretation of 
practices allows little space for learning from the environment. As argued above, 
normative isomorphism has contributed to this hierarchy whereby staff cedes its real 
interpretation to fit those of the donors. According to Mohan (2002), attempts were 
made by the Ghanaian government to create a bill which would require all foreign and 
domestic NGOs (defined as non-political) to register with “advisory council of 
politicians who could refuse NGOs the permission to operate.” Gary (1996, in Mohan, 
2002) argues that it was the domestic NGOs that were against the bill, but Gary 
suggests that the more likely explanation is that the large international NGOs 
threatened to leave Ghana if the Bill was passed. Currently, NGOs operate under a 
code of ethics, and the central government “trusts” NGOs to behave in line with its 
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policies, although no regulation is in place to ensure this. The lack of authority 
stemming from the central government and encompasses the district level, where 
there is a clear lack of authoritative and allocative resources vis-à-vis powerful NGOs 
and donors, resulting in the district’s lack of autonomy.  
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Chapter 7: Owning Water? 
Policy implementation represents major shifts in the way agents interact with each 
other in a combined space. Opposition comes from all corners of the localized 
spectrum in and out of water frameworks. Water itself is a difficult resource to 
administer and one has to ask if we are debating the right to own water itself or the 
process in which it is administered? In Gusheigu water is seasonally scarce which 
may or may not be reflected in by the central government its priority of management. 
Although there are formal laws and regulation in place on paper to guide the formal 
process of implementation there does exist a space between the formal arrangements 
existing among agents and realistic water governance applied practically by 
communities.  
 
In our research question, we asked how is water policy implementation being 
interpreted and experienced by different agents in rural water development in 
Northern Ghana and how this is supporting “ownership?” 
 
The implementation process of water policy is affected by the structures of meaning 
of policy and implementation, domination, and legitimation of policy, where these 
structures are in turn shaped and reconstituted by the agencies involved. Focusing on 
the concept of ownership, findings and analysis place the current assumptions of how 
water use could and should be managed by proper community and government 
institutions into question. Implementation involves the active involvement of all 
agents at the national, district, and community levels, and is not limited to a linear 
model of administering a policy decision. The institutions created by upper levels of 
bureaucracy, while claiming to act for the collective good, are actually serving to 
create and reproduce asymmetrical relations of power and authority. Structures 
influencing these institutions limit the ability of rural agents to achieve their 
livelihood goals, while they are also actively pursuing their own motivations through 
power relations of autonomy and dependence, and this interaction is a part of the 
policy itself. This chapter discusses the concept of “policy ownership” in terms of the 
goal of water aid, the scope of ownership including the policy space of autonomy and 
dependency in which interactions between the DA, communities, and NGOs  occur, 
and raises potential ways through which “creativity of ideas” are able to open the 
process of policy implementation to become more inclusive.  
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7.1 Goal of Aid   
Due to the general lack of leadership towards the interests of the poor, incentives 
provided by the central government to local level officials in terms of funds and other 
forms of support are inadequate. In other words, there is little reason for government 
street-level bureaucrats to implement policy, shape it, or otherwise interact with it in 
its intended form. The top-down nature of policy assumes that agents will provide the 
necessary knowledge to create a feed-back of “learning” loop, but agents lack the 
motivation to do so based on power relations and factors influencing legitimation, 
including the presence of powerful NGOs. Since the Gusheigu district is one of the 
poorest districts in Ghana, the DA is unable to generate funds through taxes under 
current fiscal decentralization in order to support itself, even if only partially. As long 
as these local level officials need to fend for themselves, they will be accepting of any 
foreign-based donors and NGOs which are resource powerful and often more reliable 
compared to the central government commitments to its people. Some NGOs are 
providing some administrative and fiscal functions in the Gusheigu district. Links to 
resource sharing is limited but does happen as the CWSA is requiring that all agents 
in the district submit it water plans including each NGO’s data in relation to 
community projects. In doing so, participation in governmental affairs does happen on 
different scales which can be construed as positive or negative. It is the type of 
relationship that is fostered or could be manifested which is questioned.  
 
According to Ohno (2005), the “goal of aid should be based on the strong will and 
commitment of national leaders to build a self-reliant economy.” In a country 
dominated by a dual political party system, politics have spilled over into ethnic and 
religious divides, thereby feeding existing divisions and ultimately creating 
institutionalized behavior which is unlikely to benefit those who are the most 
marginalized. Indeed, democracy in Gusheigu is too recent to claim as a success or 
failure (if such claims can ever be made), yet the current institutional framework 
within the existing socio-political environment is unlikely to create channels for 
marginalized people to be represented, while it is just as likely to support and possibly 
strengthen existing asymmetrical power relations.  
 
The lack of strong leaders in the District who are willing and capable of pursuing self-
reliance through mobilizing district-wide collective behavior is contributing to a 
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continuation of dependence and ultimately subordination of local interests to those 
stemming from the outside. If leaders commit themselves to seeking downward 
representation and more equitable distribution of functioning resources, strong and 
committed leaders will need to focus on bridging divides between ethnic groups, gates 
(clans), and religious groups instead of using these divisions as a platform for gaining 
support. Currently, the leaders in higher authority fail to commit to improving the 
livelihoods of rural people and are unable to bring people together under a common 
belief.  
7.2 Scope of Ownership 
 
Narrow Sectoral Approach  
It is imperative that a focus be concentrated on the relationship between the donor 
community and government if the option of communities owning specific policy 
objectives is to occur. We have noted in chapter 5 and 6 that due to limited resources 
experienced by both the environment ministry and the CWSA, localized 
implementation targets such as education of health issues, borehole maintenance and 
overall project delivery promises are not attained. Currently the Ministry of 
Agriculture has 16 extension officers in Gusheigu visiting the same villages as the one 
officer in the DWST is mandated to visit. Yet there is little if any formal collaboration 
about issues in the villages between these two agencies, why? If officials are entering 
the same villages it is very easy to see if a pump is broken and/or if members of the 
community are traveling 10km to natural springs to collect dirty water filled with 
possible Guinea Worm. Yet communication does not happen and the mandatory visit 
to the communities still does not occur regularly by the DWST members. In several 
interviews with governmental representatives, all acknowledge the important role that 
the ministry of Agriculture could play if an increased concern was to address rural 
water issues in Gusheigu. Unfortunately there exist invisible territorial boundaries 
between ministries even if the individuals live in the township of Gusheigu.  
 
Water policy is too sectoralized. The focus on boreholes as a solution to the water 
problem turns a blind eye on the seasonal dryness of water in these boreholes (and 
hand-dug wells), problems associated with pump breakdowns, and the reliance on 
dam water for daily human and livestock water use. Amazingly, while providing the 
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most reliable source of water to the people in the case area, dams are not considered 
as part of the water sector. Rather, they go under the agricultural sector. As Anamoh 
from OIC expressed, “we are all buried in boreholes,” referring to the inability of 
local staff to see beyond boreholes as the technical solution. Water use should be 
acknowledged as cutting across these sectors and the policy should reflect this non-
sectoralized reality.  
 
 
Ownership is not based on “If I demand- I own” concept 
At the community level we have encountered and identified overlapping and 
contradicting conceptions of ownership, including legal authority (who has the legal 
legitimacy to make the decisions?), other forms of authority (who actually makes the 
decisions), community members (who is included and who is not?), capacity (how is 
the source maintained?), and use (when and under what conditions is the source 
used?) Often multiple conceptions of ownership coexist, while under certain 
circumstances one form dominates others. For example, legal authority of the 
WatSans or the chief is drawn on in interactions with NGOs, while other community 
members might in actuality be making the decisions. The people using the water 
source may include people from the community, or may include many surrounding 
communities. Most communities depend on NGOs to help them maintain broken 
pumps, and continue to sometimes refer to the wells by the name of the NGO. Does a 
community “own” a well it is unable to repair? Does a community still “own” a well 
it is unable to use because it is broken or dry? Raising these questions implies that 
“ownership” is not strictly related to a finger-printed legal document, but depends 
grossly on the immediate local social and physical environment as well as interactions 
with formal implementing agents and larger social structures. These factors, in turn, 
shape the degree of autonomy and dependency in interactions with water institutions 
implementing agents.   
 
The concept of ownership is not linked only to payment of water. The models adopted 
by the district reflect foreign models which are assumed to promote economic 
development. The real world is not divided into sectors. Water policy being 
implemented will confront and interact with economics, laws, historical relations, 
religion, politics, cognitive and normative models all of which constitute different 
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kinds of institutions. In making choices such as payments of water, communities have 
narrowed their options of other areas of investment, such as education and health. 
Acknowledging this, we see that the solution to problems concerning rural water 
development does not only rest on improving policy, but understanding how it 
interacts with local agents and their environments. The policies involving formal 
institutions and implementing agents are not necessarily the most effective tools for 
water development and are likely to remain superficial (on paper) and thus weak.  
 
NGOs in the case area have reinterpreted these policies to facilitate their own 
interactions with communities. All three NGOs acknowledged that communities 
struggled with these payments. While some communities have paid with money or 
animals and foodstuff, others have contributed their labor. NGOs have translated the 
policy of the 5% contribution to reflect their own experiences with alternative 
mechanisms. Thus, the current rationale which demands a user fee should be 
questioned.  While donors are resource rich, people without money should not be 
charged for basic needs such as water and forced to make the choice between water 
and education, food, health, etc.  
 
Policy involves political processes and power 
Based on the analysis, policy implementation is dependent on a political environment 
in which interests of different agents coexist through relations of power. If we return 
to the linear policy model, we confirm that agent’s interests play important roles in 
interpreting and translating policy processes, and specifically implementation. The 
assumption that policy can be improved for more effective implementation is naïve. 
Policy implementation inevitably takes place in a highly politicized environment in 
which multiple overlapping structures and strategies coexist which shape 
interpretation and translation.  
 
Water development in the Gusheigu district is used as a political tool. We understand 
there are many factors involved that surround formal contexts specifically related to 
ethnic divide, religious affiliations and political ties. This is very reflective to those 
individuals who are not native of the Gusheigu area and have little affiliation to local 
religion, or ethnic groups. Such is the case where intimidation is so high especially in 
the district assembly that employees who are from the outside simply do not socialize, 
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or dare to speak there mind. If so, “discipline will be inevitable and you are trapped” 
in Gusheigu.   
 
A political stance is taken when agents express their own agenda based on how they 
see the target population should be organized. The provision of water projects is 
directly linked to politics at the district level, whether politics are understood as 
political parties, ethno-politics, or through NGOs’ own politics. The current structures 
provide water projects based on establishing relationships with powerful agents, and 
are not connected with water as a basic human right. Water is provided in return for 
allegiance, either for political parties, customary patronage, or NGO entrance and 
legitimacy for further projects. Communities and the DA are willing to provide 
allegiance to donor-driven NGOs due to their own political objectives, but in the end 
this raises moral questions concerning the assumptions of current donor-driven water 
aid.  
 
While stating this, it is equally important to acknowledge that agents, including NGOs 
trying to improve local livelihoods, are also inevitably taking a political stance: no 
agent is neutral. If NGOs claim moral high ground to improve the livelihoods of poor 
rural communities in Northern Ghana, they need to be more self-reflexive in terms of 
their short- and long-term relationships with communities as well as the government. 
This study has indicated that reliance on foreign government funding limits the ability 
of NGOs to maximize the resources of local staff which may improve or drastically 
change the current strategies. If they claim the status of NGO (non-governmental), 
then they should make attempts to separate themselves from their foreign donor 
governments, or face the reality that they are an extension of their donor 
government’s politics. If NGOs are unable to operate without the support of foreign 
government backing, they should reconsider their position with awareness of their 
political stance.  
 
Strategies affect implementation and thus policy 
The policy space at the local level includes community members resisting to formal 
procedures and institutions by pursuing their objectives and concerns through existing 
resources and strategies. For example, construction of boreholes in development 
language is strictly drinking water, yet people use water for many other purposes. 
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They will continue to fetch water from existing sources (traditional wells, the dam, 
river, natural wells) because their livelihood is based on survival. Similarly, boreholes 
are designed for single communities, yet people from surrounding communities are 
likely to use it as well, including Fulani herdsmen. “Ownership” is based around 
complex customary rules which are interpreted and translated according to local 
conditions. Meanwhile, policy and state laws decree that ownership should be based 
on the demand-responsive, referring back to “if I demand it, I’ll have to pay for it, 
therefore I own it.” It is assumed that people will take better care of a resource for 
which they have paid. While this may be partially true, their “care” is more associated 
with status of being linked to powerful agents than it is to basing their livelihood on 
“safe potable” water. As argued in chapters 5 and 6, water development is more a 
symbol of power than water as such. Is this the aim of water development?  
 
The informal strategies being pursued by rural agents are an important aspect of 
implementation. They reveal how implementation is actually being interpreted and 
translated. The policy process is composed of a duality of formulation and 
implementation which in reality is composed of intricate relationships of power which 
are not necessarily based on a linear top-down model. Strategies such as neo-
patrimonial practices and “gift-giving” are unintended or un-accounted for in the 
formulation stage, but are nonetheless a part of implementation. Thus, they are 
affecting policy and are unlikely to be addressed by “better policy.” Moreover, these 
strategies are unlikely to disappear and are indeed a part of how things get done.  
  
Sub-Summary 
It is through power relations shaped by both agents and structures through 
institutional behavior and legitimacy that the question of ownership remains far on the 
horizon of agents involved in the water sector. While noted directly through the 
demand-responsive approach based on “user fees” leading to “ownership,” there is 
little consensus of what this actually means or what strategies should be employed to 
support the district or communities to manage their own water development. 
Institutions created to enable representation and participation in development planning 
currently fails to support “ownership.” They were based on northern design and 
experience and introduced into an existing Ghanaian environment composed of strong 
social-political, historical, and cultural institutions coupled with ecological conditions 
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which were not reflected in this design. Assumptions underpinning successful 
implementation include that strong legal institutions can be “crafted” onto existing 
social assets, thereby creating legible and efficient institutions. But the introduced 
institutions reflect too many weaknesses to be able to convince implementing agents 
of their usefulness. Thus, local strategies and institutions should be acknowledged as 
contributing important factors shaping the water policy implementation. 
7.3 Creativity of Ideas 
Dimensions of ownership go beyond the capacity of the district to manage donors and 
achieve autonomy in policy content. Ohno refers to a dimension of “creativity of 
ideas” to signify the ability to “reinterpret relevant elements of exogenous model(s) of 
the development strategy and adapt them to the prevailing conditions.” Thinking 
creatively can involve thinking outside of current dominant rationale, but it can also 
occur within aspects of the rationale by identifying ways of changing behavior 
patterns. Implementation is a process which involves interpretations and uses of the 
policy, and denying the inclusion of certain groups of people and other forms of 
knowledge (including local institutions, referring to institutions that are not formally 
recognized by law or official implementing agents’ strategies) would increase the 
asymmetries regarding access to resources and representation in the policy process 
itself. This involves a more nuanced bottom-up approach which begins with a 
foundation of trust (which is ideally based on intentions of more balanced 
communication and sharing of knowledge) in local agents. It is worth noting the 
process of water development will involve institutional characteristics such as 
corruption and neo-patrimonial practices, and the district and community members 
need to acknowledge these aspects in their own manner first, followed by the support 
of donors. Local communities and district members need to identify and address these 
practices in their own vision of a future. Only through identifying their own aims will 
the district and community members be able to create their own reflective institutions.  
 
Other characteristics influencing institutions involve knowledge concerning social 
relations between and within communities and the DA, and the role of local leaders.. 
As long as local chiefs, Mangazias, and chairmen are holding positions of authority, 
these (or their representatives) are also the people that should be involved in decision-
making regarding future development. NGOs are already channeling through these 
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figures, but these authorities also need to be formally acknowledged and included by 
the DA. The Nawuhugu TAC could hold meetings with these figures which would 
enable each community to participate. The current dual-system of authority is limited 
to the DA (where chiefs are represented), and only includes a limited number of 
communities. By including all local leaders, all communities could be represented.   
 
Bi-lateral donors and NGOs are the agents with the most resources (in terms of 
allocative and authoritative), and hold a potentially powerful position in creating 
change within the current policy. At the community level, NGOs should be aware of 
other development agents in the community and try not to foster competition which is 
currently contributing to dependence. NGOs and their supporters should question their 
own motivations more closely, and gain as much knowledge about their 
interdependent relationships in order to understand a broadened picture of their 
intended and unintended impacts at the community, district, and eventually national 
level. 
 
This leads to the question of how many politically correct (what the donors want to 
hear) projects, research and papers does the development world need? There should 
be a requirement when, for example, NGOs submit their findings to their donors that 
one project document must be politically correct and use the development language, 
and another document uses the experience of more nuanced local realities.. Becoming 
idealistic - this approach should in no way reflect the rejection or acceptance of 
funding but show an element of local reflexivity. This idea may reflect to 
implementing agents the moral and ethical line taken internally between northern and 
southern partners and externally the difference in ideologies between implementing 
agents. This process may give the central government of Ghana a clearer picture of 
each implementing agent’s agenda and compare it to central government priorities.  
 
In our experience implementing agents dispute the general water supply coverage 
indicators in, for example, the Northern Region. The World Bank, NGOs, UN and the 
central government use different indicators as a base approach to project 
implementation. Indicators need to be created and agreed upon by all stakeholders. In 
doing so, this means that all professionals (researchers, academics, practitioners) in 
the water discourse must put their findings into practice when translating their policy 
136  
and research. Too many times, these ideas are not implemented after research has 
been conducted or presented. These professionals must make a contribution in 
practicality and, moreover, move out to the field and swing a hammer or shovel and 
drink water with local community members.  
 
Further Research ideas 
- If the aim of long-term water provision is to be taken seriously, then 
implementing agents should work more closely with rural communities in 
order to share as much technical knowledge as possible. There are likely 
several alternatives to harvesting water which require less technical knowledge 
and expensive tools, such as water storage tanks. Some interviewees have 
noted that the region itself receives enough water (during the rainy season), 
indicating that technologies concerning storage could to be developed. One 
reason why this method is currently not being employed is that it is does not 
require spare parts linking communities and local vendors to the market 
(following current rationale), but this requires further investigation.  
- Involving local researchers, including community members, in improving their 
traditional wells to be more hygienic. Many local technical students in Tamale 
are trained in water technology and could be involved in such research, which 
could also foster contact and collaboration between the ethnic groups.  
- Beginning with questioning our own definitions and assumptions of 
“corruption,” or how customary authority is interacting with legal rights under 
the current reforms.  
- including a case study comparison of policy power analysis between different 
areas in Africa to provide a more macro-level perception.  
- focusing on why certain sectors have decentralized while others have not, and 
what this means to local districts. 
- Developing new theories which are not only based on the rationality of the 
market and state but include “informal” or “traditional” behavior (likely to 
interact and shape policy in African countries, but also in the North).  
- Finally, it has already been argued that communities reaffirm and reconstitute 
policy through power relations. But one could also reflect on how 
communities might be able to affect more macro policy using these informal 
actions leading to unintended consequences. For example, current policies 
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favor the market rationale based on privatization and competition. The 
division between the rich and poor is rapidly increasing in Ghana, where aid 
on a nation-wide scale favors the South in terms of development (for example 
within the agriculture sector), thereby creating labor migration from rural to 
urban areas and from the North to the South. If the current trend continues, 
then people will continue to search for opportunities based on informal 
strategies which, in turn, will have other implications for aid and policies such 
as tightening immigration laws or focusing on urban problems such as 
overpopulation, unemployment or health concerns such as HIV/AIDS. These 
linkages need to be explored more in-depth and over longer time periods.  
  
This study has attempted to address ongoing concerns and debates within 
development in a specifically African context. The amount of aid being “invested” in 
this part of the world is likely to continue as the globe is becoming more and more 
interconnected through migration, trade, travel, internet, etc. The multiple coexisting 
means of communicating, interpreting, and translating strategies and objectives from 
donors and “recipient” communities and districts will necessarily raise further 
questions involving ideals of effectiveness, democracy, morals, justice, and rights, 
among others. 
 
Reflections on Methods 
In hindsight, some methodological changes may have provided further insights into 
the research area. The main limitation as noted in the methodology chapter was the 
amount of time spent in Ghana. In addition, we were also limited with observing 
interactions with water in the dry season, and an interesting study would include this 
seasonal variety. Another interesting study might collaborate with students from 
Tamale’s technical school focusing on water research. Including their technical and 
socio-political knowledge of the region will enable researchers from the outside to be 
more efficient while at the same time raising interest in local students (from different 
ethnic groups) in learning about rural and marginalized areas. This could potentially 
increase dialogue between people within the region leading to more self-sufficiency.  
 
We have also noted research strategies which we would reconsider to apply in a 
similar study. We found it useful and insightful to choose a geographic area with 
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numerous implementing agents as opposed to limiting the study to one single agent 
which is taken out of context. This provided us insight into how communities, 
members of the district, and NGOs behave in different kinds of relationships. An 
additional step in this direction might include a study which includes different sectors 
of development agents, such as agriculture and transportation, as these are in reality 
intertwined in the district and rural communities. Another useful tool was applying 
diverse theories from different disciplines as this added to more challenging debates 
and reflections. 
 
Reflections on Theories 
We have been told many times that completing the perfect social science paper is 
impossible because “there isn’t a perfect approach to social science.” The theories 
we chose to apply to the study have been useful in understanding certain aspects of 
interests, but we acknowledge that in further research other theories would provide 
further knowledge and perspective. The following provides some reflection on 
theories to consider in a similar study.  
 
Elinor Ostrom’s theory of Collective Action could be used to understand informal 
collective behaviors in managing a natural resource from a social and economic 
viewpoing. Agent-oriented approaches based on Long and Long (1992) could be 
useful in that the agent is placed at the entry point of the analysis, where agents are 
seen as social agents, or individuals and groups with agency. It is inspired by a 
phenomenological approach and has made a large contribution to development 
studies. This approach could be incorporated with other theories in a similar study. 
Including theories of governance could provide insights into the many forums within 
formal characteristics of the water sector pending on the stakeholders involved which 
in turn fill the space or “arena” to which the agents are encapsulated. Governing water 
and sanitation inevitably involves governing interests (Ravenborg, 2004). Due to the 
prominence of civil society organizations in the case area, Third Sector approaches 
and theories could also be considered in a similar study. We initially questioned the 
role of the civil society institution and the choices to conform to development 
discourse or to question and try to deconstruct its rational. For many Civil Society 
organizations there are many dilemmas when operating especially as a southern 
partner. Trying to shape policy surrounding global trends in order to try and benefit 
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the localized, marginalized community is a challenge. Other interesting theories worth 
considering include New Institutional Economics, anthropology of development, 
rational and traditional economic theories, and theories of participation. 
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Appendix A:  
Interview Guide: Strategy & Questions for Interviews in Ghana 
 
Method Questions for the formal Institutional Level  
 
Institutions: Topics to cover - 
What Associations and Institutions relate to the water supply system? 
- Level of Participation 
- Vulnerability in the environment 
- Policy, Legislation and Planning  
 
These questions are constructed within the rational of our analysis critieria as stated in 
theory and methods section. 
 
 
NGO’s: Can encompass not only our NGO but related NGO’s in the region 
 CLIP 
1. What are the main water and Sanitation problems in the Northern Region? 
2. What are the main W&S problems in the district we are in? If the person 
knows? 
3. How does the new National Water/Policy strategy address these problems? 
a. What role does the formal sector play within the rule of law when 
backing up the policy? 
b. What role does the local customary law or tradition play? 
c. How much influence did external donors have on the policy?  
d. Why? 
e. Who benefits? 
f. Look for power relations?  
 
4. What has been the strengths and weaknesses of the reformed decentralized 
institutions? 
a. How has the current organizational set-up of CWSA, DST, WatSan’s 
helped? (in relation with efficiency, resource allocation, collaboration). 
Are these institutions stronger now and with the ability to solve 
water&saniation use and allocation problems? How can these problems 
be solved? 
 
5. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the newly formed water supply 
policy? 
6. What changes have been made and why? 
7. How has the policy reached the outlying rural poor of the Northern Region? 
8. How do you think the current policy addresses local conflict, do you think the 
current policy has the capacity to reflect local conflict? If so, how, why 
elaborate… 
9. What kind of conflict is there? 
10. What collaboration was there with other ministries? Elaboration of the policy 
planning process with other ministries….. 
11. How has the relationship with donors in the area facilitated strengths and 
weaknesses? 
12. Is he/she aware of the donors and agencies that are involved in the area? 
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13. What role does participation play in policy planning and implementation 
phases? 
14. What kind of Intersectoral linkages are there within the NGO sphere? 
15. How much influence does the NGO have on the policy making process in 
Ghana? 
16. How has the role of the NGO evolved since the inception of the national water 
policy in 2001? 
17. What are points of improvement that could be elaborated on? 
18. How does different theoretical approaches to projects by NGO’s effect project 
implementation within the current policy? How do NGO’s conducting projects 
in the same region communicate in regards to project implementation? 
19. How does the role of the NGO facilitate this policy and implementation 
process? 
a. Who implemented this strategy? 
b. How was it formed? 
c. Where was the baseline information taken from? 
d. Who conducted it? 
e. How was local traditional groups represented? 
f. Who represented them? 
g. Who were they? 
h. How has the current organizational set-up of CWSA, DWST, WatSan 
etc helped? 
i. How do you link with the Ministry of Local Government and Rural 
Development in terms of regulation, interests and projects? 
j. How is the local community involved in water management? 
k. How are problems regarding lack of data and information, in terms of 
policy formulation and strategy, being addressed 
l. How will you fund the operation, maintenance and expansion of water 
supply systems? 
m. What kind of conflicts arise?...and how can they resolved? 
n. Poverty: Has the project (irrigation) and policy solved (or exacerbated) 
poverty? 
20. What are the criteria of success for the project?/policy? 
21. Do you think the policy will result in sustainable water governance? 
22. If not, then what needs to be done? 
23. If you could review the policy/do the project again, what would you do? 
 
Ministry of Works and Housing 
1. What are the main water and Sanitation problems in the Northern Region? 
2. What are the main W&S problems in the district we are in? If the person 
knows? 
3. How does the new National Water/Policy strategy address these problems? 
a. What role does the formal sector play within the rule of law when 
backing up the policy? 
b. What role does the local customary law or tradition play? 
c. How much influence did external donors have on the policy?  
d. Why? 
e. Who benefits? 
f. Look for power relations?  
 
148  
4. What has been the strengths and weaknesses of the reformed decentralized 
institutions? 
a. How has the current organizational set-up of CWSA, DST, WatSan’s 
helped? (in relation with efficiency, resource allocation, collaboration). 
Are these institutions stronger now and with the ability to solve 
water&saniation use and allocation problems? How can these problems 
be solved? 
 
5. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the newly formed water supply 
policy? 
6. What changes have been made and why? 
7. How has the policy reached the outlying rural poor of the Northern Region? 
8. How do you think the current policy addresses local conflict, do you think the 
current policy has the capacity to reflect local conflict? If so, how, why 
elaborate… 
9. What kind of conflict is there? 
10. What collaboration was there with other ministries? Elaboration of the policy 
planning process with other ministries….. 
11. How has the relationship with donors in the area facilitated strengths and 
weaknesses? 
12. Is he/she aware of the donors and agencies that are involved in the area? 
13. What role does participation play in policy planning and implementation 
phases? 
14. How does the role of the NGO facilitate this policy and implementation 
process? 
a. Who implemented this strategy? 
b. How was it formed? 
c. Where was the baseline information taken from? 
d. Who conducted it? 
e. How was local traditional groups represented? 
f. Who represented them? 
g. Who were they? 
h. Elaborate? 
15. What is the legal sphere the NGO has in Ghanain policy? 
16. How accountable are NGO’s at the national level? 
17. How do you see the evolving role of the private sector increasing in rural 
water supply? 
18. How do you envision the revised policy resulting in sustainable water 
governance? 
19. If not, then what needs to be done? 
20. If you could review the policy in 5 years how can you envision a change in the 
current policy? 
21. Contacts that we could use 
22. Follow up 
 
Ministry of Local Government and Rural Housing 
 
1. What are the main water and Sanitation problems in the Northern Region? 
2. What are the main W&S problems in the district we are in? If the person 
knows? 
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3. How does the new National Water/Policy strategy address these problems? 
a. What role does the formal sector play within the rule of law when 
backing up the policy? 
b. What role does the local customary law or tradition play? 
c. How much influence did external donors have on the policy?  
d. Why? 
e. Who benefits? 
f. Look for power relations?  
 
4. What has been the strengths and weaknesses of the reformed decentralized 
institutions? 
a. How has the current organizational set-up of CWSA, DST, WatSan’s 
helped? (in relation with efficiency, resource allocation, collaboration). 
Are these institutions stronger now and with the ability to solve 
water&saniation use and allocation problems? How can these problems 
be solved? 
 
5. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the newly formed water supply 
policy? 
6. What changes have been made and why? 
7. How has the policy reached the outlying rural poor of the Northern Region? 
8. How do you think the current policy addresses local conflict, do you think the 
current policy has the capacity to reflect local conflict? If so, how, why 
elaborate… 
9. What kind of conflict is there? 
10. What collaboration was there with other ministries? Elaboration of the policy 
planning process with other ministries….. 
11. How has the relationship with donors in the area facilitated strengths and 
weaknesses? 
12. Is he/she aware of the donors and agencies that are involved in the area? 
13. What role does participation play in policy planning and implementation 
phases? 
14. How does the role of the NGO facilitate this policy and implementation 
process? 
a. Who implemented this strategy? 
b. How was it formed? 
c. Where was the baseline information taken from? 
d. Who conducted it? 
e. How was local traditional groups represented? 
f. Who represented them? 
g. Who were they? 
h. Elaborate? 
15. What is the legal sphere the NGO has in Ghanaian policy? 
16. How accountable are NGO’s at the national level? 
17. How do you see the evolving role of the private sector increasing in rural 
water supply? 
18. How do you envision the revised policy resulting in sustainable water 
governance? 
19. If not, then what needs to be done? 
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20. If you could review the policy in 5 years how can you envision a change in the 
current policy? 
21. Contacts that we could use 
22. Follow up 
 
Community Water and Sanitation Agency 
1. What are the main water and Sanitation problems in the Northern Region? 
2. What are the main W&S problems in the district we are in? If the person 
knows? 
3. How does the new National Water/Policy strategy address these problems? 
a. What role does the formal sector play within the rule of law when 
backing up the policy? 
b. What role does the local customary law or tradition play? 
c. How much influence did external donors have on the policy?  
d. Why? 
e. Who benefits? 
f. Look for power relations?  
 
4. What has been the strengths and weaknesses of the reformed decentralized 
institutions? 
a. How has the current organizational set-up of CWSA, DST, WatSan’s 
helped? (in relation with efficiency, resource allocation, collaboration). 
Are these institutions stronger now and with the ability to solve 
water&saniation use and allocation problems? How can these problems 
be solved? 
 
5. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the newly formed water supply 
policy? 
6. What changes have been made and why? 
7. How has the policy reached the outlying rural poor of the Northern Region? 
8. How do you think the current policy addresses local conflict, do you think the 
current policy has the capacity to reflect local conflict? If so, how, why 
elaborate… 
9. What kind of conflict is there? 
10. What collaboration was there with other ministries? Elaboration of the policy 
planning process with other ministries….. 
11. How has the relationship with donors in the area facilitated strengths and 
weaknesses? 
12. Is he/she aware of the donors and agencies that are involved in the area? 
13. What role does participation play in policy planning and implementation 
phases? 
14. How does the role of the NGO facilitate this policy and implementation 
process? 
a. Who implemented this strategy? 
b. How was it formed? 
c. Where was the baseline information taken from? 
d. Who conducted it? 
e. How was local traditional groups represented? 
f. Who represented them? 
g. Who were they? 
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h. How has the current organizational set-up of CWSA, DWST, WatSan 
etc helped? 
i. How do you link with the Ministry of Local Government and Rural 
Development in terms of regulation, interests and projects? 
j. How is the local community involved in water management? 
k. How are problems regarding lack of data and information, in terms of 
policy formulation and strategy, being addressed 
l. How will you fund the operation, maintenance and expansion of water 
supply systems? 
m. What kind of conflicts arise?...and how can they resolved? 
n. Poverty: Has the project (irrigation) and policy solved (or exacerbated) 
poverty? 
15. What are the criteria of success for the project?/policy? 
16. Do you think the policy will result in sustainable water governance? 
17. If not, then what needs to be done? 
18. If you could review the policy/do the project again, what would you do? 
 
Rural Water and Sanitation Teams 
 
24. What are the main water and Sanitation problems in the Northern Region? 
25. What are the main W&S problems in the district we are in? If the person 
knows? 
26. How does the new National Water/Policy strategy address these problems? 
a. What role does the formal sector play within the rule of law when 
backing up the policy? 
b. What role does the local customary law or tradition play? 
c. How much influence did external donors have on the policy?  
d. Why? 
e. Who benefits? 
f. Look for power relations?  
 
27. What has been the strengths and weaknesses of the reformed decentralized 
institutions? 
a. How has the current organizational set-up of CWSA, DST, WatSan’s 
helped? (in relation with efficiency, resource allocation, collaboration). 
Are these institutions stronger now and with the ability to solve 
water&saniation use and allocation problems? How can these problems 
be solved? 
 
28. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the newly formed water supply 
policy? 
29. What changes have been made and why? 
30. How has the policy reached the outlying rural poor of the Northern Region? 
31. How do you think the current policy addresses local conflict, do you think the 
current policy has the capacity to reflect local conflict? If so, how, why 
elaborate… 
32. What kind of conflict is there? 
33. What collaboration was there with other ministries? Elaboration of the policy 
planning process with other ministries….. 
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34. How has the relationship with donors in the area facilitated strengths and 
weaknesses? 
35. Is he/she aware of the donors and agencies that are involved in the area? 
36. What role does participation play in policy planning and implementation 
phases? 
37. How does the role of the NGO facilitate this policy and implementation 
process? 
a. Who implemented this strategy? 
b. How was it formed? 
c. Where was the baseline information taken from? 
d. Who conducted it? 
e. How was local traditional groups represented? 
f. Who represented them? 
g. Who were they? 
h. How has the current organizational set-up of CWSA, DWST, WatSan 
etc helped? 
i. How do you link with the Ministry of Local Government and Rural 
Development in terms of regulation, interests and projects? 
j. How is the local community involved in water management? 
k. How are problems regarding lack of data and information, in terms of 
policy formulation and strategy, being addressed 
l. How will you fund the operation, maintenance and expansion of water 
supply systems? 
m. What kind of conflicts arise?...and how can they resolved? 
n. Poverty: Has the project (irrigation) and policy solved (or exacerbated) 
poverty? 
38. What are the criteria of success for the project?/policy? 
39. Do you think the policy will result in sustainable water governance? 
40. If not, then what needs to be done? 
41. If you could review the policy/do the project again, what would you do? 
 
 
 
District Water and Sanitation Teams (District Assemblies) 
The legal District Assemblies and the Traditional Authority System. 
Continue with similar questions as the DWST and mix with the WatSan 
 
WatSan 
1. General Characteristics? 
 
2. Roles and Responsibilities?  
i. What kind of criteria is set to elect such people? 
 
3. Political Role of the WatSan to the community and to the District Assembly? 
 
4. What kind of Checks and Controls govern the WatSan? 
 
5. Who Supervises?  
 
6. Control and Autonomy? 
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i. How are WatSan’s influence by other WatSan’s in other 
communities? 
ii. How are they influenced by the Traditional leadership? 
 
7. What incentives are there for membership? 
i. Monetary 
ii. Hierarchical 
iii. Physically 
 
8. Transparency of WatSan “official rules” 
i. Financial Transactions – where does the finances come from 
and where do they go? 
ii. Rules for changing of operations – who makes them, why, how, 
what governs the change and from where? 
iii. Can they belong to other decentralized community groups? 
 
9. How do Elected members receive democratic renewal? 
10. What clear lines of authority are there?  
i. Where do they come from?  
ii. How do they get there? 
iii. How does this relate to the organizational structure of the 
traditional institution? 
 
11. How are the Central to local Government Relations in their opinion? 
i. Is the central government able to manipulate local operations? 
ii. Looking at the power balance from the decentralized reform 
process 
 
iii. How are the guidelines set?  
iv. How involved is the Central Government at the local level? 
v. If there is expand and figure out why. This is because 
technically under decentralization there shouldn’t be central 
government influence. 
 
12. How does the WatSan facilitate education and training? 
 
13. Is there contracts with outside agencies such as NGO’s, private other? 
 
14. What kind of power relationship is there between the outside agencies and the 
WatSan?  
 
15. Is there formal contracts that have been made?  
i. Who made them? 
ii. How does the community pay? 
 
16. Who decided in the end to perform these tasks? 
i. Look for tribal links, family relation.  
 
17. Who facilitates community dialogue and participation? 
i. What specific plans are in place  
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ii. Why are they there 
iii. Why these plans 
iv. How do they interrelate functionally with the community 
v. Think, if CLIP administers this, how do they translate this to 
the community?  
vi. Where do they base their theoretical model from? 
vii. Need to expand here… 
 
 
18. What techniques (within W&S) are used and why? 
19. Any more? 
  
 
Knowledge Arena 
- Responsibility of the institution involved in regards to CWSP 
- How do the institutions see the role of the NGO? Where is the NGO seen 
as compared to the framework within the sector 
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Appendix B: Guiding Themes for Communities with project 
 
 
Themes for key informants (chiefs, chairmen, teachers, and group meetings) 
1. Livelihoods 
a. Education, health, income generation, religion, activities 
2. Local Social-Politics 
3. Government relations 
4. Decision-making 
5. Local Development and relations with NGOs 
6. Water 
a. Knowledge, traditions, uses, preferences 
b. Experiences with water development 
c. mapping 
7. Ownership 
 
 
Themes for WATSAN committee members 
1. (possibly same themes as above, plus questions about WATSAN) 
2. On being a WATSAN member 
3. On the Relationship between WATSAN and traditional authority 
4. On the Relationship between WATSAN and NGOs 
5. On Water 
 
Themes for Mangazia (woman leaders) 
1. Role and responsibility 
2. women activities 
3. water roles and preferences 
4. relationship with Watsan, chief, other people 
5. men-woman relations 
6. changes in livelihoods with water 
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Appendix C: Key Informants 
Formal/Institutional Setting 
Donor 
- Canadian International Development Agency 
 
Governmental 
- Ministry of Water, Works and Housing, Accra 
- Community Water and Sanitation Agency, Tamale 
- Ministry of Lands and Agriculture, Tamale 
- Ministry of Environment, Gusheigu 
- District Water and Sanitation Team Leader, Gusheigu 
- District Chief Executive (Political Wing), Gusheigu 
- District Coordinating Chief (Administrative Wing), Gusheigu 
 
NGO externally funded from Ghana 
- World Vision 
- CLIP 
- OIC 
 
NGO or P.O who rely on contracts issued by the CWSA/NORWASP 
- RUDA 
- SUNIDA 
- New Energy 
- Tisungtaba 
 
Community Setting 
Dinyogu 
- Community 
- Chairman of town development committee/traditional herbalist 
- Chief 
- Mangazia 
- Most elderly man 
- Volunteer teacher/church leader 
 
Gmanicheri 
- community 
- chief (Gmanchendanaa) 
- Mangazia 
- Fulani man  
- Unit committee chairman 
- Treasurer for CLIP well 
- Secretary for WV well 
 
Kukpog 
- Community 
- chairman 
 
Bosum 
- Community 
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- chief (Bosumbor) 
- Mangazia 
 
Gbani 
- Community 
- Chief (Sikpen-bor) 
- Town development committee chairman 
- Mangazia 
 
Tandogu 
- Community 
- Mangazia 
- Community  
 
Nachem 
- Community 
- Chief (Nachembor) 
- Mangazia 
- Volunteer teacher 
 
Kulikpang 
- Community 
- chief (Tizeibor) 
- chief (Kokona)  
- Mangazia 
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Appendix D: Traditional Rulers and their statutory and non-statutory functions  
(Donkoh, no date) 
 
In the early phase of the post-colonial era, the role that traditional rulers played in 
local government under the colonial dispensation was terminated in the interest of 
democracy. In the period between 1960 and 1966, chiefs or traditional rulers were 
subjected to central government control through the enactment of such legislation as 
the Chieftaincy Act of 1961 (Act 81). A more liberal phase for the institution was 
entered after 1966 when the first post-colonial government was toppled in a coup 
d’état. A characteristic of this phase was the Chieftaincy Act of 1971 (Act 370). This 
liberal phase was further enhanced by the promulgation of the 1992 Constitution of 
the Fourth Republic that assigned traditional rulers both statutory and non-statutory 
functions. 
 
Statutory Functions: 
The statutory functions among other things are: 
• Collection, refinement, codification and the unification of customary laws. 
• Adjudication in chieftaincy disputes. 
• Compilation of lines of succession to offices in the various traditional areas. 
• Appointment of representations to various government statutory bodies including the 
Council of State, Prisons Council, National and Regional Lands Commissions and 
Regional Co-ordination Councils. Constitutionally too, traditional rulers are barred 
from active partisan politics. 
 
Non-Statutory Functions: 
The non-statutory functions of traditional rulers are derived from their positions as 
moral/natural leaders of their respective communities. As influential members of their 
communities, they undertake the under-listed functions: 
• Settlement of disputes through arbitration. 
• Mobilization of their peoples for development purposes. In this capacity, they act as 
linkages between their communities and development agencies including central 
government departments, local government organs, NGOS, diplomatic missions, 
religious bodies and welfare associations. 
• Use of the agency of annual festivals when traditional rulers mobilize their peoples 
for the purpose of planning and seeking avenues and opportunities for executing 
development projects. 
•At the national level, the traditional rulers have their own representative body known 
as the National House of Chiefs made up of five representatives each from the ten 
regions. The coexistence of the modern and traditional political systems within the 
ambience of constitutional is the basis of Ghana’s parallel system of governance. 
Under the aegis of the constitution, the two systems operate in complementary ways 
that seek to guarantee the fundamental human rights of the citizenry. These include 
the right to move about, own property either individually or corporately, to determine 
who to associate with and above all, the right to live and to do in dignity. 
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Appendix E: Communities in the Case area 
Community Population # of Compounds Clans/Ethnic groups 
Gmanicheri 490 33 & 2 Fulani Binamop, Binaasup/Fulani, Ewe 
Dinyogu 226 19 & 2 Fulani Binamop/Fulani 
Bosum ~300  Binamop 
Gbani ~210 18 & 1 Fulani Binaasup, Nakoblib/Fulani 
Tandogu 55 2 Binaasop 
Kukpog 75  Binamop 
Nachem 273  Jijab, Kpanjib 
Kulikpang 282 11 & 1 Fulani Binamop/Fulani 
 
The “traditional” social structure of the Konkomba is based around clan lineages, but 
according to key informants, the Dagomba rulership introduced them to the institution 
of chieftaincy. It is believed that the Konkomba were primarily interested in farming, 
but due to attacks from surrounding ethnic groups, particularly the Dagombas, they 
began to organize themselves into chiefs and warriors similar to, but less complex 
than, the Dagombas. The hierarchy of chiefs from the case study area is listed in the 
following table, but it is noted that the order and ranking is only most relevant during 
the enskinment of a new chief. The chief of a lower rank appeals and pays tribute to 
the Nasubor-Naa, who then in turn decides who is the best candidate and presents his 
choice to the Gushegu-Naa, who ultimately performs the ceremony to enskin the new 
chief. The Nasubor-Naa has a high level of respect even from the Gushegu-Naa above 
him. When the Gushegu-Naa is enskinned he will travel to Nawuhugu to perform 
certain ceremonies.  
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Appendix F: Konkomba Hierarchy of Chiefs in Case area 
 
 
The chief elders are also referred to as Kpambalib or warriors. All subchiefs have 
warriors and youth chiefs. The first warriors have names and duties as follows: 
1st warrior: Kambor, takes care of chief 
2nd warrior: Achiri, takes care of chief 
3rd warrior: Janfor, takes care of chief’s wives (in case of attack) 
4th warrior: Nachimbur, youth leader 
5th warrior: Kumahi, supports Nachimbur 
The chief’s wivers also have roles. 
1st wife: Pani, the elders and chief consult her 
2nd wife: Pakaba 
last wife: Komlana, brings chief water 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ya-Naa (Dagomba) 
Yendi 
Gushegu-Naa (Dagomba) 
Gushegu 
Nasubor-Naa (K) 
Nawuhugu 
1. Nachembor (K) 
Nachem 
2. Tuzibor 
3. Bundabor 
4. Yalibukbor’Tint
arikbor 
5. Yapalisibor 
6. Sanbikbor 
Gbandan-Naa (D) 
Gbani 
1. Sikpen-bor (K) 
Gbani 
2. Kokonnaa (K) 
Kulikpang 
3. Gmancheda-naa (K) 
Gmanicheri 
4. Tuzibor (K) 
Kulikpang 
5. Gmazibor 
1. Tandogubor 
(K) Tandogu 
2. Nangnabor 
3. Idamabor 
1. Kukpogb
or (K) 
Kukpog 
regent 
Zante-Naa (D) 
Zantili 
1. Busombor 
(K) Busom 
2. Dingobor (K) 
Dinyogu 
3.  Yakazikbor 
(K) 
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Appendix G: Alternatives to Water storage 
 
 
Storage Tanks 
 
     
 (Gould and Nissen Petersen, 1999) 
 
 
                
 (Gould and Nissen Petersen, 1999) 
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 (Nissen-Petersen, 1992) 
Storage in the Home 
 
 
 
Dams and extraction and filtration of filtering water 
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(Schiller and Droste, 1982) 
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 (Nissen-Petersen, 1984) 
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Appendix H: Formal Water stakeholder 
 
Formal Water Sector Stakeholder Arena 
 
This appendix will give a breakdown of the formal institutional mapping and 
stakeholder description at a national, regional and local perspective. During the course 
of our research it has been difficult to narrow down which actors are directly involved 
in water management in the Gusheigu district as, in the Ghanaian context, all actors 
from different ministries and non-governmental organizations are inter-related. 
Problems associated to issues in the Gusheigu district stem not only from the district 
or village level but are connected in some way at the regional level and in part at the 
national level. Therefore we have felt it necessary to indicate all stakeholders that 
encompass the water paradigm from the donor development discourse to the formal 
public water policy sector affecting all Ghanaians, trying to stem outside of the 
paradigm itself. We note that it is not the scope of the study to entrench ourselves into 
every stakeholders objectives issues etc… but we do recognize the importance of 
influence at all levels hence our list of interviews and research has been located at all 
level here in Ghana and in Denmark. To begin the chapter, the visual stakeholder 
analysis will give the reader the ability to understand the main players at the macro 
level. The chapter will continue to more regional perspectives and move into the 
micro arena more specific to the case involved.  
 
Donor support in Northern Ghana 
 
Danida 
Danish international development assistance (DANIDA) formerly the Danish 
Cooperation for Environment and Development (DANCED) is the Danish 
government’s international development agency. Danida is promoting sustainable 
development in regards to economic rational, society and environment in the 
developing world through poverty-orientated economic grows for poverty reduction 
now and in the future in addition to Danida being an integral point in the Danish 
foreign policy. The Danish development assistance is supervised by the Minister of 
Development. 
 
DANIDA’s development policies in General 
 
Water and Sanitation is one of the five sectors that Danida puts emphasis on their 
development work in the corresponding programme countries which consists of 15 
countries in 4 continents. As diverse the countries are geographically so are they in 
terms of overall development, capacity, access to safe water and sanitation. The 
programme countries in Asia have in general higher levels of access than their 
corresponding African countries. Thus policies and objectives have to be adapted to 
each country depending on its current status within the sector to fit the aims and goals 
of individual projects and programmes.  
 
Programme objectives are in accordance with national and DANIDA sector policies. 
Since the inception of the GPRS in 2002 most bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors, such 
as DANIDA, have promoted recognition of the GPRS framework and thus influences 
sector wide donor programmes and objectives.  
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The objectives of DANIDA via the GPRS, in the water and sanitation sector that are 
related to current CLIP activities are the following: 
- Access to safe drinking water.  
- Adequate sanitary facilities for lowering infant and child mortality rates 
associated with poverty. 
- The economic potential of productive uses of water.  
 (DANIDA, 2004) 
 
In order to reach these objectives water supply, sanitation and hygiene are considered 
mutually important. Targets have been established within the objectives noting: 
- The proportion of households with access to safe drinking water increased by 
15% in 2008 for the sector. 
- The proportion of the population with access to appropriate sanitary facilities 
increased by 40%. 
- The majority of schools in the districts provided with latrines, hand washing 
facilities and hygiene education by 2008. 
- Proportion of poor farmers with access to small-scale productive water 
increased by 15% by 2008. 
(DANIDA, 2004) 
 
We understand the interrelation of water, sanitation and hygiene but have initially 
focused on water supply due to the fact that the sector in general focus’s on a broad 
range of issues.  
 
Noting the above DANIDA funded projects in the Northern Region of Ghana are not 
as influencial as in the Southern Region where DANIDA has been directly funding 
regional governetments under its water and sanitation sector support  programme 
(WSSPS). In the Northern Region indirect funding via NGO’s, such as CLIP, CARE, 
IBIS have influencial coverage.  
 
We must note though that while it is very interesting understanding DANIDA’s role 
in Ghana the Main donor in the Northern Region has traditionally been the Canadian 
International Development Agency. We note that it is important to understand that on 
the ground, development agents, brokers, or donors via direct project work or indirect 
consultation result in establishing types of relationships with each other that inter-
relate policy objectives and developmental goals. Canada’s contribution to the water 
sector in the Northern Region amounted to double of Denmark’s direct contribution at 
approximately 55 million US dollars in 2001.  
 
CIDA  
 
CIDA’s programming has extended into all regions of Ghana, although Canada has 
been most active and has deepest involvement in the north.  
The Canadian Governments primary desired impacts as noted in the Programming 
Framework for Ghana 2005 (2000) include: 
- Work with communities, villages and small towns to support borehole drilling 
and handpump installation, rehabilitation of peri-urban systems, 
- Health and Hygiene education 
- Local maintenance training, community management structures. 
- Participation of women  
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- Water resource collaboration with the private sector and support to the 
national rural water strategy. 
 
So while CLIP and DANIDA have formal relations in the North it is CIDA who is 
framing the Regional Rational, focusing within capacity building and water sector 
decentralization. This inherently begins the interesting inter-relationship between 
alignment of donor objectives and priorities of NGOs receiving funding to work under 
another bi-lateral donors framework. It is interesting to note the inter-relationship of 
bi-lateral priorities. Canada has embraced the GPRS strategy as has Denmark and 
both are committed to working under the market rational agreed upon by the GoG and 
the World Bank. We must remember that each donor and NGO has its own objectives 
and priorities to accomplish whether the objectives set are tangible or intangible. 
 
Introduction to the NORWASP project 
 
In coincidence, we have personally witnessed competing priorities especially in 
allocation of resources such as funding, and technical implementation. For example, 
in the allocation of Borehole drilling and hand-dug wells, each stakeholder has its 
objectives which inturn are set objectives agreed upon by its funding agents, for 
example CLIP and DANIDA. In Northern Ghana CIDA has created objectives to 
determine amount of boreholes and hand-dug wells to be allocated and implemented. 
In doing so, the Local government beneficiary awards contracts to local partners who 
have bid on tenders to construct, which in turn when the tenders have been awarded 
have the right of priority to the number of wells, this then leaves the NGO not bidding 
on contracts to wait until the contracts have been awarded by the CIDA funded local 
government to receive its policy based number of boreholes. In this circumstance 
there is not enough boreholes officially to be awarded that would sufficiently cover 
objectives set by DANIDA in funding to CLIP. This leads then to NGO basically 
adhering to its donors objectives and bypassing the local governments allocative 
process.  This amongst other interesting dichotomies will be discussed later in the 
thesis as there is an inherent spiral effect of lack of co-ordination not only at the local 
level but still existing on the bi-lateral and national level.  
 
NATIONAL LEVEL 
 
At the national level, in a formal sense, two methods of organization will be 
introduced. The first will be a national movement to organize NGO collaboration in 
all regions of Ghana and is intended to be an umbrella organization to more regional 
and localized NGO networks. This movement has collectively been named Coalition 
of NGOs in Water and Sanitation (CONIWAS). The second method of organization is 
the role of the central government at the national level in regards to water 
management policy and issues.  
 
CONIWAS  
In Ghana, there is a national movement (funded by DANIDA) to start a common 
foundational platform where all NGO’s involved in the water sector would be able to 
share a common voice when advocating civil issues to the central government or the 
private sector. This common voice has been coordinated together to form the 
CONIWAS Network. CONIWAS is an abbreviation for the Coalition of NGO’s in 
Water and Sanitation.  
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It is well documented that NGO’s have been part of the Ghanaian development 
paradigm for many years, for example, GV itself has been in Ghana since 1975.  
CONIWAS itself holds its head office location in Accra representing its nationwide 
effort, which, ideally, is supposed to have coordinators for the Northern, Middle and 
Southern Zones.  
 
The problem, according to Executive Secretary of CONIWAS Patrick????, 
historically there has been very little if any coordination at the National level to 
monitor the huge number of NGO’s who have their own location 
approaches/strategies which have been virtually impossible to track. Their (NGO) is 
rarely documented nor coordinated as complementary to national efforts. The absence 
of a clear mechanism for gathering and disseminating localized experiences makes it 
difficult to use field lessons to influence the water sector in general and advocate for 
social change. This situation among others stimulated the interest in forming a 
coalition with a unified voice, capable of mobilizing sector actors for actions that are 
non-confrontational but capable of resolving sector concerns.  
 
CONIWAS Partners at the Bi-lateral and Multi-lateral level 
In our interview with Patrick, he seemed very proud of the fact that there were many 
international donors that are considered partners associated to CONIWAS. The major 
donors include:  
• The Commonwealth Association  
• DANIDA (who directly contributes the most resources to CONIWAS) 
• CIDA  
• European Union  
• WaterAid Ghana 
• UNICEF 
 
It is the intention of the donors mentioned above in collaboration with relevant 
governmental ministries such as the Ministry of Water, Works and Housing and 
Ministry of Local Government and Rural Housing. Together with a comprehensive 
diologue between Government, Donors and CONIWAS, Patrick feels relevant issues 
representing local peoples would then have an entity to advocate at the national level.  
 
CONIWAS Membership 
Subscription of CONIWAS membership is optional. Being a member of CONIWAS 
does not imply that the body itself has any legally binding affliation within the 
Ghanaian form of law. Membership is comprised of a two tiered system which is 
geared to compliment the larger NGOs and the CBO’s or smaller organizations.  
• Tier 1: begins with a fee of 1million cedis and is designed for larger NGOs, 
most of which have external donors from each’s country base. 
• Tier 2: Do not have a value for this type of membership as it may be based on 
the size and ability of the NGO to pay. 
 
The concept of membership is, as mentioned, to formulate a voice for all NGOs in 
Ghana but is also supposed to encompass its own anonymity. We questioned Patrick 
about DANIDA’s role in funding a majority of CONIWAS. He mentioned that the 
concept itself is fine and looks forward to the day that CONIWAS can be self 
sufficient based on the dues from the members. Patrick notes that although 
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CONIWAS is supposed to be independent there still are financial objectives that are 
to met in association with DANIDA.  
 
National Formal Sector 
The Ghana water and sanitation sector is characterized by a wide range of sector 
actors with potentially confusing and conflicting roles. From 2002 till current for 
example the Community Water and Sanitation Agency identified funding streams 
from 15 different agencies and organizations. These stem from bi-lateral donors to 
resources provide by NGO at the local level and different government ministries that 
have intertwined policy when dealing with resource management in Ghana.  
 
Government 
The CWSP advocates, low cost and low maintenance technologies, with emphasis on 
the role of women and gender issues, need for private sector involvement and need to 
combine water, sanitation and health issues. The vision underlines decentralization 
and a democratic aspect with decision-making to the lowest appropriate level (Danida 
1996:1-1). 
 
The Government of Ghana established, under the Ministry of Works and Housing, the 
Community Water and Sanitation Division (CWSD), which in 1999 as a part of the 
privatization process was changed to an autonomous unit; Community Water and 
Sanitation Agency (CWSA) for national level coordination of Community Water 
Management and to facilitate the management of community/rural water supplies 
(GoG-Water Supply Policy, 2004). The Ministry of Works and Housing is to set and 
revise Water and Sanitation Sector Policies upon recommendations made by the 
CWSA. 
 
The former community water and sanitation division  was previously operating under 
the Ghana Water and Sewage Corporation (GWSC) and is now set to facilitate the 
implementation of its own semi-autonomous national strategy. GWSC is now called 
Ghana Water Company Ltd (GWCL) and is strictly concentrating within the urban 
supply of water. CWSA and GWCL have divided their field of work into rural and 
urban water supply respectively. 
 
In Ghana the existing institutional framework is somewhat confusing and intertwined 
as mentioned above. Based on our research the graph below may clearly identify the 
links between government agents and policy development at the national level to 
localized level. 
 
REGIONAL LEVEL 
Regional Water and Sanitation Team 
The Regional Water and Sanitation Team (RWST), located at the regional 
administration, is responsible for the overall coordination, planning and budgeting 
activities of the programme in the region. The team is set to assist and support district 
assemblies in implementing the programme. It is expected to provide training, funds, 
technical expertise and contract consultants and public organizations to build the 
capacities of the assemblies. The team is also set to assist activities that are focused on 
capacity building for public organizations. It could be the training institutions that 
design materials or private firms, etc we will have to find out when we get there.  
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The ministry of Local Government and Rural Development coordinate the 
decentralization process in Ghana. The capacity of decentralization itself is supposed 
to be main responsibility of this ministry but in a practical sense there are many other 
governmental and non-governmental stakeholders that have taken on this task. Co-
ordination is to lay between the districts and the central government. 
 
Community Water and Sanitation Agency (http://www.cwsagh.org/) 
The former Community Water division used to be a semi autonomous division under 
the former Ghana Water and Sewage Corporation, but is now an autonomous private 
organization. Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA) is placed at a 
regional level and is set to facilitate the implementation of Community water and 
sanitation programme. The main task is to support and monitor the districts water and 
Sanitation Teams (DWST), NGOs and GOs. NGOs working in rural areas in the 
Water and Sanitation sector are required to cooperate with the CWSA and have one of 
the staff of the CWSA as a board member in their local NGO. The CWSA is in each 
region headed by a Regional Coordinator with seven professional staff members 
covering the following areas: Water and Sanitation Engineering, Management 
Information, Accounting, and Hydro Geology. 
 
The NGOs and the DAs in each region meets four times a year to review the 
development on the water sector. The meetings are organized by the (CWSA). The 
meeting has a political character and among the participants is the Northern Regional 
Minister or his deputy. 
 
Ghana Water Company Ltd. 
This company used to be the Ghana Water and Sanitation Corporation under the 
Ministry of Works and Housing, but is now a private company focusing on urban 
water supply in towns and cities which is not relevant in our case study (maybe). 
 
 
Training Institutions 
In Ghana there are some institutions offering training on topics of water, sanitation 
and health and are important elements of the CWSP. Some of the institutions listed: 
TREND, School of Hygiene, Ho Polytechnic, Institute for Adult Education, Northern 
Institute of Development Studies, Ghana Education Services, and the Small Business 
Development Unit (SBDU). Some of these might not operate on a national scale, but 
is part of the national strategy. We will list more possible agencies once we arrive 
back from Ghana. 
 
DISTRICT LEVEL 
The district assemblies (DAs) were established in the late eighties by the Government 
to draw up development plans for the district. The information provided below was 
gathered from personal observation and an interview with I.B. Coleman (D.C.D.) The 
assemblies are gradually playing a more crucial role in the decentralized policies of 
the Government. The DAs are significant stakeholders in the National Strategy for 
Rural Water Supply and Sanitation to ensure sustainability of project outputs. 
 
There are two political institutional structures that are prevalent in the district: The 
legal District Assemblies and the Traditional Authority System. The Yendi & 
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Gusheigu-Karaga’s Assembly is the highest of political, administrative and planning 
authority in the district.  
 
The DAs have made frameworks that have encouraged other organizations to make 
projects in the area. Not less than 5% of revenues of the GoG are allocated to the DAs 
for development through the district assembly’s common fund, an intergovernmental 
grant transfer system (Danida 1996:1-3) 
 
The DWST is a secretariat that has been put in place to see to all issues concerning 
water and sanitation in the district and coordinate its activities on behalf of the 
assembly. The Team is composed of three persons with specialties in the following 
fields: 
 1). Community mobilization 
 2). Hygiene and Sanitation 
 3). Water Supply and Sanitation 
The role of the DWST (GoG, 2004: 4-6) 
13. Advise District Assembly on all aspects of water supply and sanitation 
14. Draw district plan of action on water and sanitation 
15. Collect Data (Baseline monitoring) 
16. Assist RWST to identify and select latrine artisans 
17. Assist RWST to train artisans 
18. Verify applications for assistance in improving water supplies 
19. Identify and recommend communities to district management committee 
20. Take over monitoring and support of WatSan committees after phasing out 
from the Public Offices 
21. Provide limited follow-up training for WatSan committees 
22. Promote CWSP 
23. Maintain data on individual projects 
24. Support RWST in implementing school hygiene education and sanitation 
programmes. 
 
At district level the contract managing and subsidy channeling is only for latrines and 
for hand dug wells. More complex technologies are handled by the RWST since they 
are too complex and demand a wide range of specialists. 
 
GUSHEIGU DISTRICT ASSEMBLY 
 
Inter-relationship between the Political and Administrative Wings of the Gusheigu 
District Assembly 
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DCPU – District Coordinating Planning Unit 
 
District Assembly – The D.A. in the Gusheigu district is comprised of 18 elected 
members from the Gusheigu district and 10 appointed members designated from the 
head of government in Accra. The D.A. has a presiding member who chairs all 
meetings and sits to create agenda etc… The D.A. selects the presiding member who 
has a 2 year office position. After the two years he can attest for another two years 
which then must be voted on by the D.A. itself.  
 
Executive Committee – Responsible for the day to day running of the District 
Assembly. Implied as the administrative support of the Appointed and Voted 
members. The members of the District Assembly generally have other jobs such as 
farming etc… the E.C. is the formal representation of the D.A. 
 
Sub-committee- Made up of assembly members. There are 6 ministerial 
representative bodies in the sub-committee. They are: 
1. Education sub-committee 
2. Finance and Administration sub-committee 
3. Economic Development Planning sub-committee 
4. Works sub-committee 
5. Justice and Security sub-committee 
6. Social Services sub-committee 
 
These representatives conduct studies and create reports in representation of each’s 
sector. The reports are submitted to the district assembly for review of certain issues 
in the district itself. There are 28 members total in the Sub-committee. They are 
District Assembly 
Exectutive Commitee 
District Chief Executive  
District Co-ordinating Director 
Sub - 
Commitee 
DCPU 
Planning 
Department 
Budget 
Department 
Assitant’s 
Office 
Finance 
Department 
Works 
Department 
- 1/3 politically 
appointed 
 
 
 
 
Politically 
Appointed 
Administration 
Hired by central 
Government.  
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represented by the 10 appointed politicians and the 18 elected members. Sub 
committee reports will be made and handed into the D.A.. Each sub-committee will 
compile reports and discuss issues during meeting with the E.C. and submit issues to 
the D.A.. Note these are all the same people! 
The E.C. reports from the sub-committee is presented to D.A. for discussion and 
approval. 
 
District Chief Executive – The chairman of the executive committee. This is an 
appointed full-time position by the president of the country. When the Executive 
Committee makes a decision the DCE administers this report and reports back to the 
E.C. about implementation issues and the progress of the ie.. project in hand. 
 
District Coordinating Director – The head of all decentralized departments in an 
administrative capacity. This person directly reports to the District Chief Executive. 
His role is as a representative of the administrative wing at the district level.  
 
District Planning and Coordination Unit – This unit is made up of representatives 
of all the decentralized departments and its task is similar as the Sub-committees but 
at a localized level and within direct administrative tasks. The D.C.D. is the chairman 
of the unit and guides meetings and sets agenda’s which are initiated from above.  For 
example the unit would outline and perform complete analysis of the DWST within 
the works department. This meaning forming budgets, timelines, operations etc… 
This then would be compiled in a report within the DPCU and ís submitted to the 
District Coordinating Director. He then would submit this to the D.C.E. 
The complete representation within the Unit is as follows: 
 
       Member Role of Member 
1. District Coordinating Director   Chairman 
2. District Planning Officer   Secretary 
3. District Budget Officer   Member 
4. District Finance Officer   Member 
5. District Agricultural Officer   Member 
6. District Education Officer   Member 
7. District Health Officer   Member 
8. District Community Develop. Officer  Member 
9. District Social Welfare Officer  Member 
10. Head of Works Department   Member 
 
There is a secretariat that runs the day to day issues that arise which comprises of two 
planning officers, budget officer, a secretariat and the District Coordinating Director.  
 
District Level Common Funds 
Constitutionally the government of Ghana is required to allocate 5% of its total 
revenue through the District Assembly common fund for district assemblies 
development expenditures. 
The district assemblies prepare their own budgets which largely take care of 
anticipated government transfers and other external revenue coming from donors etc.. 
As of this year the common fund is supposed to be raised to 7.5% due to the  The 
common fund is supposed to support all sectors in the D.A. more specifically sectors 
which entail basic social service such as water, health, infrastructure etc.. 
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There are five criteria which the government uses to calculate the common fund based 
on: 
o Need – poor is supposed to get more 
o Equalizer factor – before start people get equal amount 
o Responsive factor – generate more you get more 
o Service Pressure – Based on population, sparsley populated get less 
o Contingency factor – for emergencies  
 
Once the government has calculated these five criteria the funds are to be released to 
the D.A. 
 
Town Area Council and Unit Committees 
 
In the Gusheigu District, there are _ town councils which are intended to represent the 
unit committees within the District Assembly. The concept of the Town Area 
Councils (TAC) is to become the extended wing of the District Assembly but in a 
closer localized setting. TAC’s primary functions include: 
- Prepare and execute plans for provision of improved water supply and 
sanitation facilities. 
- Mobilise funds to pay the share of the capital cost contribution and 
take up all operations and maintenance costs 
- Set tariffs 
- Set application procedures, connection and re-connection fees 
- Build the requisite capacity to ensure sustainability of facilities 
provided 
- Maintain financial records for O&M and provide records to the District 
Assembly and CWSA for inspection 
- Audit financial records internally 
- To present reports on management of water supply system twice yearly 
to the communites or towns it represents 
- To facilitate sanitation and hygiene education activities in the towns 
 
                        
(GoG, 2004) 
 
The town area councils are meant to be the realistic link between the District 
Assembly  and the communities. Generally at this level there is a big distinction 
between the educated and literate members of the communities and the members of 
the communities who may not have a formal education but may hold another kind of 
power status at the local level. According to Nashiru Bawa (interview 29th of March-
06) the town area council level of the formal system is a crucial link and must be a 
priority to form if the local decentralization process is to succeed. Without the 
capacity of the town councils translation of priorities in a formal sense is very 
difficult. A visual description is seen below. 
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The indication of arrows is to imply that information is transferred and interpreted 
from the unit committees to the District Assembly. It is implied that when policy or 
official process is to be handed down to the community level, for example, at the 
national, regional or district level the information would be disseminated via these 
channels to the community WatSan’s and translated to the community itself. The 
organization structure within the Area  Town Council is as follows: 
 
  
 
The Unit Committee 
If we think about a geographical area, and observe that there are 5 communities within 
one kilometer of each other, this would comprise one Unit committee. Each unit 
committee is to be comprised of 10-12 people who are to represent each of the Water 
and Sanitation teams that have been selected to represent each community formally in 
regards to water issues. 
Chairman 
Secretary 
Treasurer 
- Chosen by the Unit Committee under the guidlines of the 
District Assembly (literate, business minded, fluent in 
english) 
- Ideally supposed to be a paid position 
- Represents an administrative voice to the D.A. 
 
 
- Chosen by the Unit Committees.  
- Has the ability to take over the Chairmans position at any 
time 
- Assists the chairman in administration issues 
 
 
- Must be mathematically sound 
- Monitors all finances generated by the Unit Committees 
- Reports to the Chairman about accountancy matters  
          District Assembly 
Area/ Town Council Area/ Town Council Area/ Town Council 
Unit  
Com. 
Unit  
Com 
Unit  
Com 
Unit  
Com 
Unit  
Com 
Unit  
Com 
Communities 
Community WatSan’s  Community WatSan’s 
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WatSan’s 
According to the descriptive criteria describes as the duties of the Area Town Council, 
the role of the WatSan is quite similar except for its function is at a community level 
therefore the tasks above are considered but are translated much differently. There are 
to be 9 members of a WatSan which is to comprise 5 women and 4 men. This falls in 
line with the GPRS and the Gender empowerment criteria set within the Millenium 
Development Goals.  
 
Localized Partner Organizations  
Based on demand within the district the CWSA and CIDA issue contracts in the 
Gusheigu district based on community lists that are compiled by the D.A. for 
communities who are in a basic water access crisis. Partner Organizations (P.O.) bid 
for contracts or tenders to construct borehole wells for communities that have been 
selected for drilling via the application process. NGOs also have a similar formula for 
community selection criteria but according to interviews with all the NGOs in 
Gushiegu are not contracting local partner organizations. The NGOs are conducting 
the work within their own capacity.  
The Partnering Organizations who are conducting borehole activities in Gusheigu 
district are:  
Partner Organizations: 
- RUDA 
- SUNIDA 
- New Energy 
- Tistangtua 
 
All of the above P.O.’s are localized in nature and have either a head office in tamale 
or in the Gusheigu township. When tenders are publicized by the district and CWSA it 
is generally these four P.O.’s who are bidding on the contracts. There are some 
instances whereby an external contractor has come but it is very seldom due to 
localized issues in the region and the cost to move drilling machines from outside the 
region to the drill point may not make the contract worth bidding on. 
 
OVERVIEW 
Below is a brief overview of the main stakholders involved in the water and saniation 
sector specifically located in the northern region of Ghana and conducting work in the 
Gushiegu district. 
 
International Donor funded organizations with water projects in Gusheigu: 
- NORWASP – Northern Region Water and Supply Project funded by CIDA 
(Canadian International Development Agency) 
- DISCAP – District Area Capacity building project, although almost completed 
if not already. Funded by CIDA 
 
 
International NGOs conducting water and sanitation projects in the area consist of: 
- OIC ( funded by the Carter foundation and USaid). 
- World Vision (many donating partners from around the world but water 
projects   are funded by the Cornard Hilton Foundation). 
- CLIP (Funded by Danida, Denmark) 
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Regional governmental partner  
- CWSA – Community Water and Sanitation Agency – Government of Ghana. 
 
Major political parties in the region 
- N.P.P. – National Peoples Party (Current party in power both in Accra and the 
Northern Region. 
- N.D.C. – National Democratic Committee  
 
Main stakeholder in Gusheigu District 
- District Assembly 
- DWST 
- Local Partnering Organizations 
- Community WatSan 
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Appendix I: Water Resource Commission Act, 1996 
 
THE FIVE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SECOND 
ACT 
OF THE PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC 
OF GHANA 
ENTITLED 
WATER RESOURCES COMMISSION ACT, 1996 
An Act to establish a Water Resources Commission, to provide for its composition and 
functions on the regulation and management of the utilisation of water resources in Ghana 
and for related matters. 
DATE OF ASSENT:30th December, 1996 
BE IT ENACTED BY PARLIAMENT as follows-- 
PART I-ESTABLISHMENT AND FUNCTIONS OF THE WATER 
RESOURCES COMMISSION 
Establishment of Water Resources Commission. 
1. (1) There is established by this Act a Water Resources Commission 
referred to in this Act as "the Commission". 
(2) The Commission shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a 
common seal and may sue and be sued in its corporate name. 
(3) The Commission may for and in connection with the discharge of its functions 
purchase, hold, manage or dispose of any movable or immovable property and may enter into 
such contracts and transactions as may be reasonably related to its functions. 
Functions of the Commission. 
2. (1) The Commission shall be responsible for the regulation and 
management of the utilisation of water resources, and for the co-ordination of any policy in 
relation to them. 
(2) Without prejudice to subsection (1) of this section, the Commission shall- 
(a) propose comprehensive plans for the utilisation, conservation, development 
and improvement  of water resources; 
(b) initiate, control and co-ordinate activities connected with the development 
and utilisation of water resources; 
(c) grant water rights; 
(d) collect, collate, store and disseminate data or information on water resources 
in Ghana; 
(e) require water user agencies to undertake scientific investigations, experiments 
or research into water resources in Ghana; 
(f) monitor and evaluate programmes for the operation and maintenance of water 
resources; 
(g) advise the Government on any matter likely to have adverse effect on the 
water resources of Ghana; 
(h) advise pollution control agencies in Ghana on matters concerning the 
management and control of pollution of water resources; and 
(i)  perform such other functions as are incidental to the foregoing 
PART II-COMPOSITION OF COMMISSION AND  
RELATED PROVISIONS 
Composition of the Commission. 
3. (1) The Commission shall consist of- 
(a) a Chairman who shall not be a Minister or a Deputy Minister; 
(b) one person representing each of the following- 
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    (i) the Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation; 
   (ii) Organisations producing potable water ; 
  (iii) the Hydrology Department of the Ministry of Work and 
housing ; 
  (iv) the Volta River Authority; 
  (v) the Irrigation   Development Authority; 
  (vi) the Water Resources Research Institute ; 
 (vii) the Meteorological Service; 
(viii) the Environmental Protection Agency ; 
  (ix) the Forestry Commission ;and  
   (x) the Minerals Commission;   
(c) the Executive Secretary appointed under section 9 of this Act; 
(d)  a chief; and 
(e)  two other persons at least one of whom shall be a woman 
(2)  The members of the Commission shall be appointed by the President acting in 
consultation with the Council of State. 
Tenure of office of members. 
4. (1)  A member of the Commission other than an ex-officio member 
shall hold office for a period of three years and shall be eligible on the expiration of his term 
of office for re-appointment. 
(2)  A member of the Commission other than an ex-officio member may at any 
time by notice in writing to the President resign his office. 
(3)  A member who is absent from three consecutive meetings of the Commission 
without sufficient cause shall cease to be a member. 
(4)  The President may in writing remove a member for stated reasons. 
Filling of vacancies. 
5. (1) When a member of the Commission other than an ex-officio 
member is incapacitated by illness or any other cause from performing the functions of his 
office for more than twelve months, the President may acting in consultation with the 
appropriate institution appoint another person to perform the functions of the member until 
the member is able to resume the performance of his duties. 
(2) Where a person is appointed to fill a vacancy he shall hold office for the 
remainder of the term of the previous member and shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, 
be eligible for re-appointment. 
Meetings of Commission. 
6. (1) The Commission shall ordinarily meet for the dispatch of 
business at such times and at such places as the Chairman may determine, but shall meet at 
least once every three months. 
(2) The Chairman may, at the request in writing of not less than one-third of the 
members of the Commission, convene a special meeting of the Commission. 
(3) At every meeting of the Commission the Chairman shall preside and in his 
absence a member elected by the members present from among their number shall preside. 
(4) The quorum at a meeting of the Commission shall be seven members. 
(5) the Commission may co-opt any person to attend any of its meetings except 
that no co-opted person shall vote at the meeting. 
(6) Questions proposed at meetings of the Commission shall be determined by a 
majority of the votes of the members present and voting and where the votes are equal the 
Chairman or the member presiding shall have a casting vote. 
(7) No act or proceeding of the Commission shall be invalidated by a vacancy 
among its members or a defect in the appointment or qualification of a member. 
(8) Subject to the provisions of this section, the commission shall regulate the 
procedure for its meetings. 
Commission to appoint committees. 
7. The Commission may for the discharge of its functions appoint committees 
comprising members, or non-members or both and may assign to them such functions as the 
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Commission may determine except that a committee composed entirely of non-members may 
only advise the Commission 
Allowances for members of the Commission and committees. 
8. Members of the Commission and members of committees appointed by the 
Commission shall be paid such allowances as may be determined by the Minister responsible 
for Finance. 
Executive Secretary to the Commission. 
9. (1) The President acting in accordance with the advice of the 
Commission given in consultation with the Public Services Commission shall appoint an 
officer to be designated the Executive Secretary to the Commission. 
(2) The Executive Secretary shall under the general supervision and direction of 
the Commission, be responsible for the day to day management and administration of the 
Commission. 
(3) The Executive Secretary shall be the secretary to the Commission and shall in 
consultation with the Chairman arrange the business and cause to be recorded and kept 
minutes of the Commission. 
(4) The Executive Secretary shall perform such other functions as the Commission 
may assign to him. 
Other staff of the Commission. 
10. (1) There shall be appointed by the President acting in accordance 
with the advice of the Commission given in consultation with the Public Service Commission, 
such officers as the Commission may require for the effective discharge of its functions under 
this Act. 
(2) Other public officers may be transferred or seconded to the Commission or 
may otherwise give assistance to the Commission. 
Delegation of power of appointment. 
11. The President may subject to such conditions as he may think fit, delegate his 
power of appointment under sections 9 (1) and 10 (1) by directions in writing to the 
Commission or to a member of the Commission or to any public officer. 
PART III-REGULATION OF USE OF WATER RESOURCES 
Public water vested in President. 
12. The property in and control of all water resources is vested in the President on 
behalf of, and in trust for the people of Ghana. 
Prohibition of use of water without authority. 
13. (1) No person shall- 
(a) divert, dam, store, abstract or use water resources; or 
(b) construct or maintain any works for the use of water resources 
except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. 
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section shall prevent the use of water 
resources for the purpose of fighting fires. 
Use of water resources for domestic purposes. 
14. (1) A person who has lawful access to water resources may abstract 
and use such water for domestic purposes. 
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) shall authorise the construction of any works for the 
purpose of abstracting water resources. 
Enforcement notice. 
15. (1) Where it appears to the Commission that the use of water 
resources for any purpose at any place poses a serious threat to the environment or to public 
health, the Commission may serve on the user of the water resources, an enforcement notice 
requiring him to take such steps as the Commission thinks necessary to prevent or stop the 
activities. 
(2) An enforcement notice shall specify- 
(a)  the offending activity; 
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(b)  the steps required to be taken; and 
(c)  the time within which the steps shall be taken. 
(3) The Commission may in an enforcement notice direct the immediate cessation 
of the offending activity where it considers that the circumstances so demand. 
(4) Any person who acts contrary to an enforcement notice issued under this 
section commits an offence and is liable, on summary conviction, to a fine of not less than 
$200,000.00 or exceeding 2 million cedis and in default to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding one year or to both; and in the case of a continuing offence to a further fine not 
exceeding $100,000.00 for each day that the offence continues after conviction. 
Grant of water right. 
16. (1) Any person may apply to the Commission in writing for the 
grant of water right. 
(2) The Commission shall on receipt of an application make such investigations as 
it considers necessary including consultations with the inhabitants of the area of the water 
resources concerned. 
(3) The Commission shall publish in the Gazette notice of an application and the 
area in respect of which the application is made. 
(4) A person who claims that his interest will be affected by the grant of water 
right may notify the Commission within three months of the notice in the Gazette of his 
objection to the grant of the water right and shall specify the grounds of the objection. 
(5) The Commission shall consider the objections made in respect of it and shall 
after consultation with such persons and authorities as it may consider necessary, determine 
whether the water right shall be granted. 
(6) Where the Commission is satisfied that the water right shall be granted, it shall 
so grant the right. 
(7) The Commission may grant water right subject to such conditions as shall be 
specified in the document for the grant. 
(8) A grant of water right shall be subject to ratification by Parliament. 
(9) Parliament may by resolution supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds 
of all the members of Parliament exempt from the provisions of subsection (8) of this section 
such class of water right as it shall so resolve. 
Prohibition of transfer of water right. 
17. No water right granted under this Act shall be transferred without the written 
approval of the Commission. 
Creation of statutory wayleaves and easement. 
18. Where the grant of any water right is to a statutory corporation or any other 
public body whose use of the water right enures to the benefit of the public, the provisions of 
the Lands (Statutory Wayleaves) Act, 1963 (Act 186) shall apply for the creation of any right 
of way or other similar right for the purpose of enabling the works related to the water rights 
to be implemented. 
Suspension or variation of water right. 
19. (1) Where water right has been granted and the Commission is of 
the opinion that the water resource in any area is insufficient or is likely to become 
insufficient as a result of the grant, it may by notice in writing to the holder of the water right 
in that area, suspend or vary any right to abstract or use the water resource in that area, for 
such period as the Commission considers necessary. 
(2) Where a notice has been issued under subsection (1) the water right shall cease 
for the period of the suspension or shall be exercisable only as so varied. 
Termination or limitation of right where water is required for public purpose. 
20. (1) Subject to section 21 where the Commission is satisfied that 
water resources are required for a public purpose it may by notice in writing addressed to the 
holder of a water right, terminate or limit that right on the grounds that the water is required 
for public purpose, and the right shall cease or shall be exercisable only as so limited. 
(2) A declaration in writing by the Commission that water resources are required 
for a public purpose shall be conclusive evidence of that fact. 
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Compensation on suspension or cancellation of water right. 
21. The holder of a water right shall be entitled to receive such compensation as 
may be reasonable in the circumstances in respect of the loss resulting from the termination or 
limitation of the right he holds and in the absence of the agreement the court shall determine 
the amount of such compensation. 
Water right to be terminated for breach of condition. 
22. (1) Where the holder of the water right- 
(a) fails to comply with any condition of the grantexpress or 
implied or; 
(b) has abstracted or used water resources for a purpose not 
authorised by the grant, 
the Commission may by notice in writing addressed to the holder 
require him to remedy the default within such period as shall be 
specified in the notice. 
(2) If the holder fails or neglects to remedy the default within the period specified 
the Commission may terminate the water right and inform the holder accordingly in writing. 
Termination or limitation for non-use. 
23. Where at any time the Commission has reason to believe that the holder of 
water right has not, during the preceding two years, made full beneficial use of that right, it 
may after giving the holder of the right opportunity of making representations to the 
Commission, by notice in writing addressed to the holder and having regard to the investment 
in capital works and the long term national interest involved in the undertaking concerned- 
(a) terminate the right; or 
(b) limit or modify in such respects as it may specify the right. 
Pollution of water. 
24. (1) A person who, except in accordance with the provisions of this 
Act or with the approval of the Environmental Protection Agency- 
(a) interferes with or alters the flow of; or 
(b) pollutes or fouls 
any water resource beyond such level as the Environmental Protection Agency may prescribe, 
commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $5 million or to a term 
of imprisonment not exceeding two years or to both. 
PART IV-FINANCIAL AND MISCELLANEOUS PROVISION 
Funds of Commission. 
25. The funds of the Commission shall include- 
(a) Government subvention; 
(b) any loans granted to the Commission; 
(c) any monies accruing to the Commission in the course of the 
performance of its functions under this Act or any other enactment; 
(d) gifts; and 
(e) monies from any other source. 
Accounts and audit. 
26. (1) The Commission shall keep books of account and proper 
records in relation to them and the account books and records of the Commission shall be in a 
form approved by the Auditor-General. 
(2) The books and accounts of the Commission shall be audited annually by the 
Auditor-General or an auditor appointed by him within three months of the end of the 
immediately preceding financial year. 
(3) The financial year of the Commission shall be the same as the financial year of 
the Government. 
Annual Report. 
27. (1) The Commission shall, as soon as possible after the expiration 
of each financial year but within six months after the termination of the year, submit to the 
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Minister an annual report dealing generally with the activities and the operations of the 
Commission within that year which shall include- 
(a) a copy of the audited accounts of the Commission together with the 
Auditor-General's report on it; and 
(b) such other information as the Minister may require. 
(2) The Minister shall within two months after receiving the annual report of the 
Commission submit the report to Parliament with such statement as he may consider 
necessary. 
Power to obtain information. 
28. The Commission may for the proper and efficient performance of its functions 
request information from a person who shall, subject to any other law, comply with the 
request. 
Power to inspect works, etc. 
29. (1) The Commission may in consultation with the relevant District 
Assembly at any reasonable time enter upon any land to inspect works constructed or under 
construction there and may ascertain or cause to be ascertained the amount of water abstracted 
or capable of being abstracted by means of the works. 
(2) No person shall obstruct the Commission in the performance of its functions 
under subsection (1) of this section. 
(3) If in the opinion of the Commission any works have been constructed, 
maintained or used or is being so constructed as to constitute a danger to life, health, property 
or damage to the natural resources of the area, it may require a person for the time being 
enjoying the benefit of those works to demolish or to change the use of the works in such 
manner as the Commission considers necessary. 
(4) For the purpose of this section the Commission may by notice in writing 
suspend any water right until it is satisfied that such requirements have been fulfilled. 
Power to require demolition of unlawful works. 
30. (1) The Commission may on the advice of a District Assembly by 
notice in writing require a person- 
(a) who has constructed or extended, or caused to be constructed or 
extended any works contrary to any conditions under which the 
person was required or authorised to effect the construction or 
extension; or 
(b) whose water right in respect of which any works in existence have 
been terminated under the provisions of this Act or has otherwise 
come to an end, 
to modify, demolish or destroy the works within such period not being less than thirty days, as 
may be specified in the notice. 
(2) Where a person fails to comply with a notice served on him under subsection 
(1), the Commission may cause the works to be modified, demolished or destroyed and 
recover the cost of the modification, demolition or destruction from the person in default by 
civil suit. 
Minister to declare controlled area. 
31. Where the Minister is satisfied that special measures are necessary for the protection 
of water resources in or derived from any area, he may by executive instrument declare that 
area or any part of that area, to be a protected catchment area.  
 
 
Schemes for development of water resources in protected areas. 
32. (1) Where an area has been declared a protected catchment area the 
Commission may in consultation with the National Development Planning Commission and 
the District Assembly of the protected catchment area, establish a comprehensive scheme for 
the development of the water resources of that area. 
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(2) For the purpose of establishing a comprehensive scheme, the Commission 
may, after giving the holder an opportunity for making representations in respect of any 
subsisting right within the area- 
(a) declare the right terminated; 
(b) declare the right limited or modified in such respect as may be 
specified by the  Commission; or 
(c) grant the holder a new water right upon such terms and conditions as 
it considers fit; 
except that the holder shall be entitled to receive compensation in respect of any loss resulting 
from the termination or limitation of the right. 
(3) The Commission may cause to be constructed and maintained such works as 
may be expedient for the better protection of land and water resources within a protected 
catchment area. 
(4) The Minister on the recommendations of the Commission and with the 
approval of Cabinet may levy such charges as may be prescribed upon the beneficiaries of any 
comprehensive scheme within a protected catchment area in order to defray expenses of the 
construction or maintenance of such works or both. 
Declaration of water emergency. 
33. (1) Where the Minister, after consultation with the District 
Assembly of any area, is satisfied that because of drought or because of an accident or any 
unforseen circumstances, a serious deficiency of water for essential domestic purposes exists 
or is threatened in any area, he may by notice in the Gazette declare that a water emergency 
exists in the area concerned. 
(2) The Minister may after a declaration of water emergency, permit any person 
who has supply of water in excess of his domestic purposes to supply water to the area 
affected or to any other person, for such period as he shall specify from the excess quantity of 
water. 
Penalty for offences. 
34.  A person who- 
(a) diverts, dams, stores, abstracts or uses water resources contrary to 
section 13 (1) (a); 
(b) constructs or maintains any works for the use of water resources 
contrary to section 13 (1) (b); 
(c) does not comply with a request made under section 29; 
(d) obstructs the Commission in the performance of its functions under 
section 30 (1); or 
(d) does not comply with the directives given by the Minister under section 
33 (2) 
commits an offence and is liable, on conviction, to a fine not exceeding $2 million or 3 years 
imprisonment or to both. 
Regulations. 
35. (1) The Commission may by legislative instrument make 
regulations-- 
(a) for preserving existing uses of public water; 
(b) for controlling any change in the course, current or cross-current of any 
contained surface water in order to obtain the most beneficial use of the 
water; 
(c) relating to the declaration of water emergencies; 
(d) for regulating the use of contained water and ground water; 
(e) for the carrying out of investigations in respect of any function of the 
Commission; 
(f) for the protection of watersheds; 
(g) for the granting of permits to discharge waste into water bodies; 
(h) for prescribing the acceptable levels of pollution; 
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(i) to regulate or prohibit the doing of any act by any person in a protected 
catchment area; 
(j) for the levying of charges under this Act; and 
(i) generally for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Act. 
(2) An instrument under subsection (1) of this section shall be issued under the 
hand of the Chairman of the Commission. 
Transitional provisions. 
36. (1) Where a person claims an existing right of access to any water 
resource that person shall, within twelve months from the coming into force of this Act notify 
the Commission of that right. 
(2) The Commission shall on receipt of the notification conduct such 
investigations as it considers necessary, and where it is satisfied that right exists in relation to 
the person it may take such action as it considers appropriate. 
Interpretation. 
37. In this Act unless the context otherwise requires-- 
"beneficial use" means the use of water including the method of diversion, 
storage, transportation and application of  the water which is 
reasonable and consistent with the public interest, including 
domestic, energy, agricultural, commercial, industrial, 
municipal, navigational and recreational use; 
"contained water" means underground streams, water upon the surface of 
the earth in bounds created naturally or artificially and the 
sub-flow of the water; 
"Court" means the High Court; 
"existing right" means any right to water resources-- 
(a) which on the coming into force of this Act has 
been lawfully acquired, is possessed  by 
and is being beneficially used by any person; or 
(b) lawfully acquired by any person before the coming 
into force of this Act for the purpose of supplying 
water to the public; 
"holder" means a person who has been granted water right under this Act; 
"Minister" means the Minister responsible for Works and Housing; 
"protected catchment area" means any area declared by the Minister to be 
preserved for the protection of water resources in or derived 
from the area; 
"works" includes any construction or activity for or related to use of water 
resources; 
"water resources" means all water flowing over the surface of the ground or 
contained in or flowing from any river, spring, stream or 
natural lake or part of a swamp or in or beneath a 
watercourse and all underground water but excluding any 
stagnant pan or swamp wholly contained within the 
boundaries of any private land. 
Repeal. 
38. Parts III of the Rivers Ordinance (Cap 226) is hereby repeated.  
Date of Gazette notification: 31st December.1996 
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Appendix J : Community Survey (in alphabetical order) 
 
Bosum 
Community meeting 30/03/06 
Gbanja Balakum , Bosumbor, chief 18/04/06 
Amina Tia, Mangazia 18/04/06 
 
Population: about 300 
No. of compounds: unknown 
No. of clans and names: one Binamop 
Rep. to town council: no 
Education: some go to SfL in Dinyogu, some go to Nawuhugu formal school. 10 boys 
and no girls attend classes. The reason for this is that some women only have one girl.  
* note at end. 
Last case of Guinea worm: 9 years of more 
Other health problems: diarrhea, pulling fever (convulsion related to Malaria) 
No. of people with health insurance: none 
No. of latrines: none 
Overview of wells: NORRIP was digging in 2004 but there was no water. Some 
community members came to Gmanicheri to write an application, but haven’t 
followed through with it yet. WV came and drilled a well but it hasn’t been 
fixed with a pump yet. That was in 2005. They haven’t paid and are collecting 
contributions now for the cement. Each compound has an amount to pay, but 
they don’t think it’s possible this year due to funerals, there’s no way to save 
money. They opened the account 6 years ago. They asked me if it was possible 
to take out money (about 1 million) to pay for the cement. I told them I didn’t 
know and suggested they ask WV. 
No. of traditional wells: none 
Water sources 
Rainy season: there is a river nearby. The color looks nice, but they don’t 
know what’s inside. They don’t think they fall sick from it. 
Dry season: Kulikpang, before at Nawuhugu. It takes about 2 hours there and 
back, and 2 and a half hour to Nawuhugu there and back. 
Payment of wells: none so far 
Politics 
All adults vote (but women follow men, and men follow their leaders) 
Political parties: NPP, PNC, NDC, but NPP and NDC are the biggest 
Reasons: All of them came to campaign, but after voting they haven’t seen them 
again. They emphasized water problems and said that if they win they will 
help with water, but no one came. But they don’t have time for politics, they 
don’t care strongly, they listen to all the politicians when they come. 
NGOs: They applied for WV well through DCE but say it’s because of WV, not DA 
that they got the well. They trust NGOs more because the government 
promises, but doesn’t fulfill, NGOs fulfill (but they only have the example of 
WV).  
Priorities: Water, school, micro-credit, clinic, but they need “minor things” like water 
before school and clinic. 
Later Khadija told me that the reason some of the girls didn’t go to school was 
because of betrothal. During this question she encouraged the women to stop giving 
187  
their daughters away. Girls who got married at a young age don’t go to school. If 
they’re already promised it’s too late. 
 
Interview with Bosumbor, Gbanja Balakum 
 
There are 2 chairmen in Bosum, one development chairman who is the same as SfL, 
and one WV chairman. The Mangazia was picked during the guinea worm time. 
 
Issufo in Gmanicheri is their contact person. He told them to contribute and open a 
bank account for the borehole. The chief selected and appointed chairman. Their plans 
are to get the water problems fixed first, and then to apply for a school. 
 
No water, no life. Life comes first, and then the other things can follow. 
 
How was the location picked for the WV well? 
The first time, WV asked the community to pick the place, and they drilled but there 
was no water. The second time WV picked, but they haven’t fixed a head on the hole 
yet. So there’s no water. 
 
They fetch in Kulikpang, but since they are the same clan, they don’t have to pay. 
They were first using the Nawuhugu dam, but the chief of Kulikpang told them not to 
worry, and that they should come to their borehole. They also send cattle to the dam, 
but they don’t drink from it. 
 
They prefer the water from the hand-dug well for brewing pito. This is the same water 
as the stream, Nyenbun (down-water). 
 
They have been chased away from Gmanicheri boreholes and told that they should 
first pay. They volunteered to Kulikpang, but they didn’t want to pay Gmanicheri. It 
was an insult to ask them to pay. If you are reasonable, you will not quarrel. They just 
stopped going to Gmanicheri. It was only one section near the wall that asked them to 
pay. 
 
What have been some of the changes since going to the well in Kulikpang? 
• The time the women saved they could go to the farm 
• To go so far for water, the animals might die, so it reduced the death of 
animals 
• If there’s no water in the area, it’s difficult to make building material and fix 
houses that fall during the rainy season. In Nawuhugu, any time you can build 
houses, but here you can’t. 
• It can also happen that a snake will bite the woman in the night while they 
fetch water at 4 or 5 in the morning. 
 
What kind of development do you imagine in the future? 
Development can make Bosum more powerful in the area. It gives them unity and 
peace. If there’s no water you always quarrel with your wife. It’s the men’s 
responsibility to farm and the women should fetch water. 
 
They can’t collect rainwater from roofs because there’s no zinc in the community. 
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They have a contact person in Gusheigu. He’s a friend, they give gifts like guinea 
fowl, yams, and eggs. You can’t just go and tell someone to help you without giving 
something in return. They give gifts and they’ve opened bank accounts for them. 
 
Do NGOs give without wanting something in return? 
NGOs have a lot to give, they are powerful. 
 
Why are NGOs giving? 
Because it’s a gift of god. 
 
What do you mean? 
That’s what WV said when they came here, it’s a gift of god.  
 
Are they talking about Christianity? 
Yes, they talk about Christianity when they’re here and say that the well is a gift from 
god. 
 
Interview with Mangazia, Amina Tia, 18/04/06 
She’s been the guinea worm Mangazia for the past 10 years. The chief chose her to be 
Mangazia and the other women accepted it. 
 
What kinds of meetings does she go to? 
Guinea worm, she would tell them how to filter water and then when SfL was here 
she should tell the women to send their children. 
 
There are no cases of women being beaten over anything. There is never beating. The 
interpreter tells me that she’s defending the men, she even says they never quarrel. 
 
Did the women tell the men to apply for the well? 
Yes, the women asked them men. 
 
What are some of the differences in your life since having the well? 
• If they find drinking water here, all the children, especially the girls can go to 
school. 
• After getting water they can get time to farm and help their husbands. 
 
If you are able to save money, what would you spend it on? 
She would save it in the bank. 
 
If you decided the spend it, what is the most important thing to buy? 
Zinc for the room, grinding mill, and a lorry. 
 
She says because they have no water they can’t farm properly, so they don’t have 
money for zinc roof. 
 
Dinyogu 
Community Meeting 
Bijimba, chairman 
Mada Mol, chairman of town development committee and herbalist and elder to the 
chief 
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Amina Mabur, Mangazia 
Jala Bampo, chief of Dinyogu 
Group discussion with women 
 
Population: 226 
No. of compounds: 19 
No. of clans and names: Fulani 
Rep. to town council: 1 unit committee member (Moses) 
Education: School for Life 
Religion: Mostly traditionalists, some 35 Christians 
Last case of Guinea worm: 2 years 
No. of people with health insurance: none 
No. of latrines: none 
Overview of wells: 
CLIP well just constructed. Water amount seems good in dry season, but only 
time will tell. World Vision built a well in 2002 
No. of traditional wells: 14 
Water sources 
Rainy season: traditional wells 
Dry season: Gmanicheri wells, Nawuhugu dam 
Politics 
Political parties: NPP majority, but some NDC because they are old party members 
Priorities: education 
 
Interview with Bijimba, 11/02/2006 
Most elderly person, chairman 
 
What is the history of this community?  
Dinyogu means the chief of the tree 
 
More than one hundred years ago, my grandfather came alone with his wives from a 
nearby house. There was a big tree, so he became the chief of the tree. The place was 
interesting because it was quiet and peaceful, so four brothers came to join the 
grandfather. All people in the community are descended from these brothers. 
 
What is the history of development (Ininween)  in this community? 
A man came from Germany and constructed a road from Gusheigu to Kjerpuni.  
My grandfather was 14 when the first bicycle came. 
Sending children to school (School for Life) was a big change. Educating children is 
very important. Even if the children leave afterwards, it will benefit us somehow. 
They (the children) will come and visit and share their experiences and knowledge 
with the community. Nonetheless, we would like to stay here and have development 
come to us rather than move to a nearby city. We like this place because this is our 
home. It’s peaceful and we’re not encountering any problems. We don’t want to leave 
it to more developed places. We want development and churches. If development 
comes in, some traditions will go away. Some problems will also come. 
 
The people coming in from development respect their culture and tradition. Just as 
you came here and greeted us according to our tradition, so do other strangers come 
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and respect us. No one has disrespected us ever. When World Vision came, they 
asked about our thoughts before bringing in their views. 
 
What is the history of water? 
There was a stream nearby so we started digging local water holes, but the stream is 
now dry. We then started drinking water from natural wells. Later the Japanese came 
and built a well. Now, we use the traditional wells until they are dry, after which we 
go to the borehole (in Gmanicheri). 
 
Are there any health problems associated with water? 
Guinea work has almost been eradicated. Since 1997 there have only been two or 
three times. 
 
How was this treated? 
We used to go to the local healer for treatment, they are respected. 
Each community has a guinea worm volunteer 
 
Was the local healer included in the eradication program? 
The local healer was not included in the eradication program. 
 
Water Rights 
Land Rights are obtained from the chief. Animal rights are also obtained from the 
chief. Water rights are shared, except if it’s a river, then the river is under the chief. 
The well belongs to everyone. If a community far away has no water, they can come 
and fetch water for no charge. 
 
Chiefs 
The power of the chief is no longer so strong, only the wise ones stay strong. The way 
they are now is OK. Formerly, they were too strong. In the past, the Chief of Gushegu 
never married, he just took wives. So if you liked one of those you would just 
disappear and be killed. During British times, this stopped, which was a good thing. 
 
Because of development, everyone is using money. It’s all about money. But World 
Vision doesn’t charge. CLIP hardly charges. 
 
CLIP 
They saw that CLIP had come to Gmanicheri, so they wrote an application through 
the District Assembly to CLIP. The same day as they wrote the application they 
picked the WATSAN. The Chief and the elders picked the WATSAN. 
 
After the interview, Bijimba gave us a guinea fowl and six yams in gratitude for us 
being interested in their culture.  
 
 
Interview with Jala Bampo- Chief of Dinyogu 13/02/06 
 
What is your role in the village as chief? 
My role here in the fist place is that I have the right over the land, and when the 
community started there were few, but on and off, their own children started 
separating into their own compounds and if the child is going to build his own house, 
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the child will come and consult me, this is what I want to, come and direct us, mark it 
for us, mark it for them, so that they will start building. ask the chief to mark it for 
them, direct us. started building their own house.  
 
But in a situation where there is a stranger, a pure stranger to come and build, they 
will bring the stranger for consultation for the first place, what he likes and what he 
doesn’t like and they will start the building. And if there’s a stranger who comes to 
visit them, they normally bring the stranger to come and see the chief. If there’s a 
petty petty problem between the community, they can come to me and councel. 
 
Do you have a council of elders that help you do this? 
No, he’s the elder of the whole clan. But this chief has an assistant and his name is 
Wulana, and he helps in advising. 
 
What sort of problems does he help solve? 
The sort of problems he solves are that they do come to him to summon each other in 
the sense that they are related, all those they are his junior brothers and sons. If it 
happens that they others come here every four days to greet him, others come here 
every day. So if someone is having his personal problem, he can sit here and consult 
with other subchiefs or elders. But it isn’t that they normally solve each other’s 
problems and for him to judge. 
 
How long has he been chief? 
Seventy years now. 
 
How has his role of chief changed over the last twenty years? 
Not much has changed in my role, but the community size has increased. 
 
I’ve heard about the parallel system of chiefs and that chiefs are recognized by the 
government. How is he recognized by the government? 
His recognition is that if it happens that the Ghanaian government wants to do 
something here, the first thing they will do is come here and introduce themselves to 
him. 
 
If he sees a problem in the community, is he able to go to the government to voice this 
problem? 
There are some people, if he is not able to solve a problem here he can proceed to 
those people to those people who enskin him, the higher chiefs. But during his stay up 
until now he has never encountered a problem which he has not been able to solve. He 
has never gone to the higher chiefs for the seventy years for help. 
 
What does he see as development? 
From his point of view, development is the changing of a place from the olden time of 
life to a newer generation. Some of the things he can see is like the decision making 
like this is good now with including the youth. You don’t neglect them. You should 
include them. You shouldn’t be too powerful as a chief in order to develop the 
community more. That’s his understanding of development. 
 
Does he see that development helps with some problems? 
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Development is really improving the community. Because of development of water 
they were moving from here and they couldn’t get water to a long process. But 
because of development World Vision came in, they applied, World Vision came in, 
gave them water…. 
 
To their community as well? 
Yes. 
 
 
Where is it? 
Around this side 
 
Is it working? 
They did, but that there’s no water at this time. They loose much time in getting 
water, and there’s no water, so all their women have directed their course to our 
community. So because of development there’s a church and a school as well. So to 
him, development is good and is improving the community. 
 
But this WV well is not working? 
No 
 
In the rainy season? 
Yes, only in the rainy season. 
 
Is it a borehole? 
Yes 
 
What are some things he doesn’t want to have changed in Dinyogu? 
They are farmers, they are farmers, their grandfathers are farmers. So they would like 
to stay farmers. 
 
And the houses? 
If he gets money, or his children get money, the structures will look different, like the 
one in our yard.  
 
Isn’t that the hot one? 
No 
 
But his grass roof, they can easily go to the bush and cut them. But if you get a tin 
roof you have to hire someone to do this, but this one they can do themselves. 
 
What is the biggest problem in the Dinyogu? 
The biggest problem is the water problem, this community has the particular problem 
with water. 
 
What will he do if development begins to change things that he values? 
He is afraid of your question. Now, if the farming is no more, and the other point is 
the rearing of domestic animals like this goat, if they are no more doing it, even if 
there is development the place is developed, how do you think the situation, they will 
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start getting bad people in there. With all the development, if you have not worked 
hard for something, you will look at it as valueless.  
 
What do you mean? 
If you look at these sandals, unless someone has brought it to me, and I’ve gone in for 
another one, by the same time if I have suffered before I have money to buy this thing, 
I wouldn’t like it to spoil. But because of it, development, he would like them to still 
maintain the farming. If they are developed, they would be able to get money and buy 
farm inputs and extend their farms. But as for the farming, they wouldn’t like to stop 
it because of development. 
 
So he can see that there can also be some bad things coming in with development? 
Development has problems too. In the sense that he’s taking himself as an example. 
His father was using (poles?) holes to farm. And now they are using tractors to plow 
which turns the land upwards and most of the manure goes down, and if you should 
farm corn now, you can’t get anything. The land is losing fertility because they are 
using chemicals every year, and that chemical is because of development. 
 
They are using chemicals? 
Yes, fertilizers. At first they didn’t know what is fertilizer. And fertilizers came 
because of development. If not for development, they wouldn’t have known. And now 
they were using cow dung and the feces of animals. They spread in the farms. Now 
the children who are taking care of those animals are now in school because of 
development and they have to give the animals to the Fulani people. So that’s part of 
the problems. If it wasn’t because of development, they wouldn’t give the animals to 
the Fulani and the children are going to school. So it’s one of the problems. 
 
If a development NGO came to the village, and they came to talk to him, would he 
ever say no, he doesn’t like what it could do? 
He wouldn’t say no. He would receive them listen to what they have to say, but that 
he would never say no. 
 
Would he ever listen to what they and consult with the community and look at it 
critically and ask for some changes, or would he just accept whatever comes? 
He has never said no, but if an NGO comes here he will look at the problem critically, 
and the most important problem they should tackle first. You know, a community 
can’t develop at once in one day, so when an NGO comes he will listen to them, tell 
them their problems, when they can afford, he will also listen to them. But he hopes 
that their most important problems will be developed first. Through their conversation 
they will know what they can do. 
 
When CLIP came, did they approach him first?  
You know that CLIP is dealing with women…. 
 
No, the well. 
The hand-dug pump they are yet to have, he knows that because of development, the 
eldest sat down and picked their decision and came and informed him. They said, 
chief, from our point of view, this is our problem, and it wasn’t long before they came 
to this community to see how the hand-pump was started. 
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Did CLIP talk with him directly? 
The eldest sat down and just informed him 
 
When CLIP came, did they talk to him? 
(long dialogue back and forth) 
As the CLIP people came to the community, they didn’t come here, but the micro-
credit they are looking for, they came to the chief. And all of it is CLIP. The micro-
credit came before these people, the hand-dug well is a new one.  
 
Does he know about the WATSAN committee? 
No, he doesn’t know 
 
Was he involved in choosing the committee? 
No, he wasn’t involved 
 
What does he think are the motivations for CLIP to build wells? 
Even though CLIP is coming to help, but he can’t tell why. Because he’s old. He 
doesn’t know. 
 
Does he think CLIP wants something in return? 
What CLIP will get from this community, even though they have paid some little 
money, but it can’t be the amount that they pay on the well. So he’s saying that it’s 
only God who can pay for the amount of the well. It’s a help. CLIP doesn’t charge 
them, only 600,000 for the cement and other things. Their reward is in heaven.  
 
Does he know about the notion of friendship? 
He doesn’t know. 
 
Just to clarify, is the Kokomba chief included in the house of chiefs? Do they meet? 
The only chief he thinks will be among the national house of chiefs maybe the saboga 
chief, that place is the head of the Kokomba chief.  
 
Does he ever meet with him? 
No, he has never met him before 
 
Does he meet with other chiefs? 
If they are to meet, there’s another chief here, another community, and it’s happened 
that because they are related and are all the same they do sit down and discuss some 
problems. 
 
Do they sit down and discuss water problems? 
The water problem is a general problem, so whenever they meet they discuss those 
sorts of things. 
 
Do they come up with a strategy to solve these problems? 
The strategy they use is sometimes some people will be having a meeting in 
Nawuhugu and they sit down and look at their problems already, they release it as 
problems as their own so the district assembly will tackle it as their own. 
 
Did this water problem ever come up? 
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At that side there is a zonal assembly man, so if they go to that place and give out 
their views. Some will say that they need schools, others will say that they need water. 
So the DA will go to the GS office (Ghana Education office), and they can easily 
come up and take the water or class problem and go to this place and say they need 
water. Apart from the NGOs, most of their problems they pass through the DA. 
 
Is this working with the DA? 
It’s working 
 
But the water here, none of them have gone through the DA. 
Yes, here the water here, there’s one problem. The DA itself does not have enough 
money. They only write proposals to WV and approve it. The communities which 
need help they will be going to this community. 
 
Does he trust the NGOs and DA equally? 
He believes the NGOs more than the DA. When an NGO says this they will stand by 
their word. But the DA will do this and then go sit. So he trusts the NGO more than 
the government.  
 
As you came here, do you have a different help for the community or have you come 
here just for your study and will you just go back to your school? 
 
I hope this community finds water is able to enough water and that people will not 
have to travel great distances to fetch water. So I will try to help. 
 
Thank you. 
 
He presents yams and eggs.  
 
Group discussion with women 23/02/06 Dinyogu 
 
Role and work of women 
They are to cook as a woman. They cook for the family and take care of the children. 
 
And what about the role of men? 
The men are supposed to farm to feed the family. 
 
If one of them would work to bring in money, would it be the role of men or women? 
To her expectation, she thinks that it’s good that the man looks for money first and 
then the woman will benefit from that. 
 
Among the children, what are some of the things that boys have to do and what are 
some of the things that girls have to do? 
The boys go outside when day breaks, let out the fowls, and other animals. And 
during the rainy season they accompany the fathers to the farm. During the dry season 
they go in to cut the crass and rafters for the roofing of the houses. If they are building 
in some places they go and help. And where there are water problems, they help with 
fetching water with bicycles or donkeys. And in places where there are no Fulani 
people, the boys go and take care of the cattle. (But here there are Fulani, so they take 
care of the cattle) 
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The girls when they wake up in the morning, they sweep the yard, wash dishes, then 
go for water. Others who can cook will help on the cooking side. Others go for 
firewood. 
 
Economic activities 
Like the way I was selling in the market, after the market day they start preparing for 
the next market. Their main business is the brewing of pito. At the market day they 
buy pito and the following day they soak it. The following day they let it stand in the 
sun and ferment. Then they lay it out to dry.  
For one day after drying they send it to the grinding mill and grind it. 
By the time they start from the market to the sixth day, they will have the pito. There 
are others who sell shea butter and others who cook rice. Some men sell soap, petty 
things (batteries, nails, torches) , and others sell cigarettes, and some sell real 
tobacco. 
The women sell more than the men. The men who sell are not many. 
After harvesting, the men sell more than the women. If the man is going to sell, he can 
decide to sell in bulk. The men are mainly farmers. So the woman cannot get plenty 
foodstuff to sell unless they have plenty money to buy things. The men also give them 
something small to encourage them. When the women are in need of small money, 
they just go fetch money and buy their things. The men earn more money. 
 
Do they wish the men would also sell at the market now? 
They wish the man would now sell at the market 
 
Why don’t they? 
The woman want the question to go to the men 
 
The men here they are mainly farmers, and that’s what they use for feeding, shelter 
and other things. If they start to sell things in the market, some of them will feel lazy 
and it will come to a time when they don’t even want to go farm. It will bring their 
farming system down. They would spend most of their time at the farm. 
 
With the money earned at the market, is this shared with the men? 
She’s saying that sometimes mostly the men give parts of their money they earn to the 
women. What they are doing in the market, they don’t earn so much, they buy 
ingredients and go for grinding and other uses for the whole family. But it is not 
common for men to give money to the women. But in times when they see that the 
women are suffering and don’t have enough money, the men will give some out. 
 
What do the men do with their money? 
The women only buy ingredients (salt, dried fish, magi cubes, kerosene), but the men 
are the ones feeding the family (with staples such as corn, guinea corn, yams).  
 
(the men respond) They don’t divide in the sense that some women cannot keep 
money for a long time. The time might come and you have money and you divide it. It 
may happen that she will misuse it. When you need it, the money is not to be found. 
So it is better that the man keeps it. 
 
Do the women agree with this? 
197  
They agree 
 
Are you saying this because the men are here? 
It’s not because the men are present 
 
What do men spend money on? 
They already told you that they use part of the farm products to feed the family. If 
they know that it’s not plenty, they can buy a goat to rear, and if they need to feed the 
family they can catch it. If they need money now, they can easily take a bag and go 
sell. They use tractors to farm, so they also buy this thing. If you cannot weed the 
whole farm, you get hired labour to come and weed.  
 
Do they buy bicycles? 
That is for the men 
  
Do the women ride them as well? 
(men answer)They ride. 
 
What prevents the women from using the bicycle? 
(men answer) Some don’t know how to ride, others don’t know how to use it to carry 
a load. 
 
Would they like to use the bicycles to fetch the water? 
(women) They would like to.  
Yes, they would like to 
 
And why can’t they? 
(laughter) Because they are many, they move together in groups, if they ride bicycles, 
not all of them can ride on a bicycle. They like to move together. 
 
Do you like moving this long distance? 
They didn’t like to move to those far places.  
 
But if the well is so close, they won’t be able to move together. 
(laughter) That if the water is closer, they will move together to go for firewood. 
 
So we should keep the firewood far away in the bush. 
About the firewood, as they continue farming, very soon it will get to one mile, at the 
end they will get to the end of the farm, they cut their firewood and get back. 
 
Religion 
How many people in this community consider themselves Christians and how many 
consider themselves traditionalists? 
35 people are Christians.  
 
Who is the pastor? 
Inusa and James are the leaders in the church. They are not pastors. They only lead 
the people in the rules and relations in being a Christian and how to worship god. 
 
Since when? 
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Since 1998. 
 
Is that when the church was built? 
2002 
 
Who built it? 
Americans. A white lady came from America, came from Tamale. The African 
Church and then they extended it to them. They are Americans who helped them. 
 
Were there Christians here before? 
Lutheran church was opened at Nawurugu. And they normally moved there. There 
were only three or four. So they were lucky that they came and opened the church for 
them which is African church, no Lutheran church. There was no church here before, 
but they were Christians. 
 
Since when? 
Since 1995. They became Christians in 1995, and the church came here (to Nawuhgu) 
in 1998. 
 
Is it difficult sometimes that Gmanicheri is mostly Muslim? 
It is not difficult. He will take himself and this gentleman as an example. They are all 
brothers. He can decide to be a Christian, his brother can decide to be a Muslim, it’s 
all the same God, so there is no problem. 
 
Do they think that there is problem with the Dagombas? 
At first there was conflict between them, but now there is no problem. 
 
Do they feel that the state is supporting them in terms of development as much as the 
Dagombas? 
The state normally helps the Dagombas more than the Kokombas. If they are to get 
help, the secret secret help they have done it and they are gone.  
 
Why? 
They have no leader. They are not developed, and they have no leader to be highly 
educated. If help is coming, they push their help to their own people. By the time they 
realize it it has passed and gone and they will tell you to wait for next time. If they 
were to have educated people at the higher level, let’s say at the regional level, when 
the person comes the person will also fight for his own people. Now that there are no 
people who are staying at the national or regional level, by the time the help will get 
to them, those at the top will rather push it to the district level they will push it to their 
own communities and settle far and before they will get the help and how you want it 
to be. That is the reason there are no highly educated people. 
 
In the future, do you hope there will be some representation? 
They hope in the near future, if they get educated people they will also get 
development. In the sense that now, if you can get somebody to fight for you, you will 
get it. If they have leaders now, they can also fight for them. 
 
Even if there is representation, is it true that by law the Kokomba are occupying 
Dagomba land? 
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It’s true. 
 
How do they feel, even if they had representation, how would it affect the land rights? 
If they get representation, they can also fight for them and get their own rights. The 
person will say no and it won’t happen again. But now there is no way to do that, so 
they are just managing small. 
 
Do they have to pay the Dagombas? 
They don’t pay anymore. At first they were using the name Dagbon territory. So that 
name Dagbon they were using that to say that the whole of the Dagbon territory that 
they are owning it. At the end of farming they had to go and present to the chief. In 
the farming season they would go and farm for the chief. At the end of the year they 
would send food to the chief (Dagbon). Then, even if he wants grass or rafters, he 
would just send, just go and take these people, and send, my room is leaking, I need 
this and this to roof it, within the twinkle of the eye they would send anything. But 
now they say no, they refuse, we won’t be slaves again. They are no more doing it. By 
the end of the chietaincy side, these people enskin, they go to these people to do it. 
 
Was the local chief here enskinned by the Dagbon? 
At first, the Dagombas were enskinning them, and now some particular communities 
that the Dagombas enskin, but the small small chiefs, when someone settles into a 
place five or six houses to be enskinned as a chief, the people who were owning the 
land, the chief of that community was enskinned but the old old communities who 
were there, if that person dies, the Dagomba will enskin. 
 
What about the community here? 
He was enskinned by the Dagombas. That was the olden time they are talking of. But 
now he is still alive so they don’t know the near future what will happen. 
 
And if he dies, what will happen? 
If he dies, and they perform the funeral, the next person who will be enskinned will be 
enskinned by the Dagombas. And now it’s respect and in a polite way. It’s not like the 
olden time when if you like it or not this person must be the chief. And they hope that 
very soon they will stop and so they can do it themselves. 
 
How do the Dagomba choose who will be chief? 
If he dies, and they perform the funeral and they are now to enskin, so many people 
may come out and contest. One can say that my father has ever been chief of this 
place, so I would like to be, the other one will say my grandfather has ever been a 
chief I would like to take over. Another might say that I am an elderly person under 
the chief who died. But mostly they spend most money, so they contest that way 
through money and they will pick one. 
 
So they give money to the Dagomba? 
Yes, they pay money. But there are communities, all the community will send the 
delegation to the Dagomba to say that this is the person we would like to be chief. 
 
What about the different households here? Are there households that have different 
wealth and respect? 
That the respect is the same, but the wealth is different. 
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What makes someone poorer? 
One is sickness. And the other one is if not now they baptize and become Christians, 
and the other one is drinking. You can drink, they are farmers, they normally earn 
your money from farming. You can drink too much and even not go to the farm for 
anything. At the end of the year you realize that your wealth is coming down and you 
become poorer and poorer. And sickness can also attack you and prevent you from 
work. And if you don’t work you will also not get. So to him he looks at the two 
things. 
 
Are poverty and respect connected? 
They respect each other very well. 
 
Are there some households that have more respect than others? If so, why? 
The level of respect is the same. They are all the same people. They are all the same 
tribe, the same family, the same clan. So the respect is the same. The way this house 
will respect the elderly, and the children, the same people here will respect those 
people at the other houses. The way you respect yourself, respect your friends. 
 
Are there any really honorable people here and what makes them honorable? 
If you want to be respected, you respect yourself first. The honorable people, through 
their appearance, their respect they give to others, the rules they follow, their rights, 
what they expect of them they do and what they do to strangers, that’s what makes 
them honorable. 
 
Is there one person in the community who has the most respect? 
They are there. Some people respect them the highest. 
 
Why? What makes a person really respectable? 
The reason is that they respect the eldest mostly, more than the younger. There is a 
saying in the bible, respect your mother, your father, and those that are older than you. 
So they use that, respect the elderly in every way. 
 
Who is the oldest person here? 
The chief we went to, he is the oldest among the community. He is also the uncle to 
them, he’s not their brother, and at the same time luckily he is the chief, so they 
respect him the most. 
 
And what of the women? 
(women answer) 
They have somebody who is the oldest among them? 
 
And is she the most respected? 
She is respected because of the old age 
 
If a woman has no children, is she still respected? 
They respect her 
 
If this well turns out to have as much water as in Gmanicheri where people can only 
fetch water once every two weeks, will they be satisfied or disappointed? 
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That if it comes that the water is like the Gmanicheri one, they won’t be disappointed, 
they know that’s the end of the water, it’s not the CLIP people haven’t done well. 
They won’t be disappointed. 
 
Are they expecting this? 
They don’t expect it that it should be that way. But if unfortunately it is that way, it’s 
not a problem, they will manage. 
 
Are they preparing their traditional wells just in case the water is not enough? 
They were doing it, and even this year they had in mind that immediately after this 
thing if they get a chance because they are helping in conveying the sand from the 
well they are doing. After doing this, they will go to the traditional well and dig more 
so that if it’s raining and there’s water they will stop using one afterwards. They will 
stop using either this or the traditional one, so if one finishes they will go to the other 
one. They themselves have been thinking of it. 
 
Do they think the WV well will  also be fixed? 
It will be fixed. It will come from them 
 
Do they still have to pay for something? Buy the sand? 
They will pay something. They will buy the sand and cement and they will come and 
build the concrete, that man may help them. 
 
I hope they have water from all sources. One thing I’ve learned here is that one well 
is not enough for the whole community. And it seems that sometimes people from the 
outside may think that one well is enough and all problems are solved, but it doesn’t 
seem like that.  
To them, they see it that way. But if they are begging someone give me this, the 
quantity the person gives you that’s what you take. Even three if they get, they can 
pay for it provided that CLIP or any NGO is giving. So they have no say. They have 
only applied to be helped, and if they come and only give them one well, they can’t 
say anything, they will accept. 
 
Thank you all for your time in answering your questions and being so patient. Do they 
have any questions for me? 
He’s saying that he’s making a suggestion, it’s not a question. The way you came here 
for the past one week and you are going tomorrow, they are happy because you 
started a project here, and that if you go back to Denmark, you are now part of them 
as a person of Dynogu, and if you can help them get more development for their 
community so that this relationship can move forward, so that when you get to 
Denmark you will not forget them. 
 
I will never forget them. 
He is asking a question that he would like to know the difference to see whether the 
way we are suffering, was life like that in the olden times or are whites born not to 
suffer? 
 
What do you mean by olden times? 
In the past, maybe one hundred years ago 
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What do you mean by  suffering?  (from previous conversation) 
Lack of proper roofs, education, not enough water, no proper roads, no electricity) 
 
I don’t think there’s less suffering, maybe different kind of suffering. We don’t suffer 
from water in the same way, but we suffer from being greedy and selfish and lonely. 
It’s very different, but I also see the joy and togetherness here which is sometimes 
lacking in the white man’s world. 
 
Chairman with town development committee, Mada Mol 18/04/06 
He is also the herbalist chairman, and holds an official Ghana traditional healer 
certificate. He holds high respect in the area for being a juju healer. He is chairman 
for life or until he’s tool old and someone else takes over. If he wants something for 
the community, he would go to assemblyman to apply or advocate. 
 
Other chairmen in the community include WV, CLIP, NPP, NDC 
 
They have a contact person through Gmanicheri because they are all the same, they 
are all brothers (Binamop side). This friend is between NGOs and the chief. 
 
They also have a contact person in Gushegu, he’s also a friend, and he’s the same 
friend as the one Gmanicheri is using. This friend told them what to do to get 
development 
• Every three months or one month they should contribute money and open a 
bank account. 
• They should form groups 
What are the changes in their lives since having the well? 
• Before, the distance was far from the dam. If they couldn’t carry it all 
themselves, they would have to pay 10,000 to small boys to bring the water 
with a donkey. Now they don’t have to pay for it anymore. 
• Having the water closer helps them have more time at the farm. 
 
Did they have to pay to fetch water from Kulikpang before? 
Every woman paid 2,000 for a bucket per month. 
 
The old traditional wells have names, but not all. They are all owned by the chief. The 
Bat-well is named after bats because there were many bats inside. 
 
The whole community owns the CLIP well, but the chief will organize the community 
to collect money. 
 
How is the well? (It was built recently) 
From morning to noon there is water, but then they have to wait until evening time 
again. 
 
Interview with Mangazia, Amina Mabur 18/04/06 
 
She has been the Mangazia for 5 years now. The community chose her as the 
women’s leader. You see, everyone has a women’s leader, so they thought it was 
important to have a leader to pass their opinions on. She was picked during the guinea 
worm eradication program. 
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The women were suffering more than the men because of water. They told the men 
they should try to get water so they could bathe their children and cook.  
 
Were the women ever chased away from water sources? 
At Nawuhugu dam, no. But at Kulikpang borehold they had to pay 2,000 each. If 
you’re more than one person in a room it’s 2,000 each. 
 
What are the changes in your life since having the well? 
• From morning to this time, you wouldn’t see the women. We would spend the 
whole day fetching water. Now, we can go to the farm and look for firewood. 
 
What are the differences between the dam and well water? 
The dam water is dirty, the well water is clean. 
 
Which do you prefer for brewing pito? 
The borehole is manageable, but it’s not sweet like the hand-dug well or dam-water.  
 
Where do you fetch to make pito? 
(hesitates) The small holes near the dam. We boil it to kill the germs. 
 
I ask about collecting rainwater, and she’s afraid to answer that she will also use it 
because they also have a hand-dug well. After telling her that there is no right or 
wrong answer, she says that yes, they collect rainwater. 
 
Did the water problem cause conflict between the men and women? 
(laughs) yes, the men way that the wife should come to farm, but because of water she 
can’t, he said she refused to come to farm, and it would sometimes lead to beating. 
Women from the same husband can’t defend each other because he will think that 
they’re teaming up against him. Only a woman from another husband can defend her.  
 
Does this happen often? 
It happens often. But now that they have water, she hopes it won’t happen so often. 
 
We talk some about micro-credits. She asks if it’s possible for me to help them get 
this. I tell her I’m a student and am not attached to any organization, but that if she 
wants this for her community, that she can apply through an NGO or assemblyman.  
 
Notes: World Vision well in Dinyogu was built in 2002 where the cost of the sea sand 
and cement amounted to 2.1 million. The community elders decided that the amount 
of water was not sufficient to meet the community’s needs, leading to community 
members sending someone to ask World Vision to drill more wells. In September 
2005 World Vision returned and drilled two more holes. The community was asked to 
purchase both sea sand and cement, amounting to 6 million (3 million per well, the 
price has gone up in the meantime). So far, they have only been able to pay 4.6 
million, but hope that World Vision will come to build at least one.  
 
The current well supplies water only in the afternoon, needing to refill in between and 
is not able to provide sufficient water for all households. 
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Gbani 
Blatirim Tiyuniba, chairman  
Tipaga Koligu, Mangazia  
Sikpen das, chief 
 
The sun has set. About 10 people in compound, all adults. The speaker is the chief, 
Sikpen das 
 
Population: 
No. of compounds: 18 and 1 Fulani 
No. of clans and names: 2 Binsup Bin and Nakoblib 
Rep. to town council: they stood for unit committee, but didn’t win 
Education: Nawuhugu school 12 children (4 girls, 8 boys), no SfL, but there is non-
formal education in Dagbani. 
Last case of Guinea worm: 4 years ago 
Other health problems: diarrhea, fever, waist pains, stomach pains, coughing 
No. of people with health insurance: no 
No. of latrines: no 
Overview of wells: There is a WV borehole 2 miles away and it takes about 30 
minutes to go there. It was built in 2003 and cost 4.5 million. They paid through 
contributions, ladies had to give and young boys and married men. It was difficult to 
raise the money and it took about one year. They applied to WV. They sent someone 
to Gusheigu, but first WV came to the community. It is also used by Zanso and 
Bandiyan communities. There is no real conflict, but he collects small money from 
them when it spoils so he can fix it. 
No. of traditional wells: 7, the water is good in the rainy season 
Ownership of wells: chief, so he can look after it 
Water sources 
Rainy season: traditional wells 
Dry season: Nawuhugu dam and WV borehole 
Politics 
The dominant party is NDC because it’s an old party. NPP is a new party. “You don’t 
get a new wife and drop the old wife away.” NDC and NPP normally come here to 
campaign. They make empty promises, they don’t do anything. They promised 
bicycles, motto, tin for roofing, some even promised clothing if they voted. Both 
parties promised these things. World Vision doesn’t follow any party, they do their 
work what god asked them to do. The government has no role here, hasn’t done 
anything. Why? Because they are not educated, the government is not aware of them 
Priorities: hospital, roads, electricity, hand-dug well (because the borehole is too far 
away) and credit facilities. 
 
Note on community 
It was only the chief speaking. 
 
Interview with chairman, Blatirim Tiyuniba, 19/04/06 
The three chairmen include the town development committee, WV, SfL, NPP (all the 
same person), Guinea Worm, and NDC. 
 
(When mentioning the party chairmen, he’s worried that we’re from the NDC, and 
that this might be a problem for him. It’s clarified that we’re non-partisan) 
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Under Rawlings he was selected chairman. They wanted to get development under 
Rawlings, and it was through his government that SfL came, but then they packed 
their things away and left. They are still struggling. 
 
What is his role as chairman in the community? 
Peace and development 
 
He goes to the chairman of Nawuhugu. There’s no unit committee here, but he 
represents Gbani to the assemblyman. He is chairman for life or until he’s too tired. 
 
If an NGO comes to Gbani, they will come to him. Traditionally, there was no 
chairman, in modern Ghana, without a committee you won’t get development. They 
weren’t educated before. Before, they weren’t trying to bring education in, now they 
are. 
 
They have a contact in Gushegu, and he does to him directly without the 
assemblyman. He’s a friend and he knows the assemblymen there.  
 
Do you give him gifts for being your friend? 
Saa kpa litakpal kan saa gma ku unyuun. 
(You can’t just go with bare hands and kill a bird, you bring a stone to kill a bird.) 
Either you go with guinea fowl or eggs. 
 
Whenever any development comes he comes and tells him what to do, like bank 
accounts or whatever. The friend works in the car-hiring business. He was first 
staying in Nawuhugu, that’s where they became friends. Whenever he needs 
something, he informs his friend. 
 
How was the location of the well picked? 
They are still fighting for WV to come and drill closer. He doesn’t know why they 
drilled so far away. They were fetching from the Nawuhugu dam before, but the 
women are still gone many hours during the day fetching water. 
 
What are the changes in your life since having the well? 
• Before, they could get guinea worm or stomach disease 
• They used to wake up early at night and fetch, but not anymore 
• They were carrying their heads, but not carrying their legs (As you’re moving 
at night, there may be dangerous things near the legs) 
 
Who owns the wells? 
The elderly person here owns the traditional wells (6). He mobilizes them for 
communal labour.  
 
Who owns the WV well? 
It’s for the community, but the chief takes responsibility. They come to him and ask.  
 
What happens if the well breaks? 
They were supposed to have people trained to fix the well, but they haven’t been 
trained yet. They don’t know if it will cost anything or not. 
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Are there other communities using the well? 
Only Gbani people are fetching 
 
They paid for both wells, but one isn’t working. They told WV and were told that they 
would come. They gave them guinea fowl and yams, but they said that since they 
have one working well, they will first see to the ones that don’t have any water and 
then come to them. So now they just wait. 
 
Interview with Mangazia Tipaga Koligu 19/04/06 
They were looking for a borehole, so the chief and elders met and selected her to be 
the Mangazia. She was selected two years ago, but there was another one but her 
husband migrated, so she took over. 
 
Their contact person told them to form this troup. 
 
What are some of the changes in your life since having the borehole? 
• Before they were getting guinea worm and germs causing stomach problems. 
A lot of this has stopped. Animals that would go to the dam would urinate and 
defecate. They don’t go to the dam anymore. 
• It was far before and they have to sit down and wait for the water to come 
back in the small holes around the dam. 
 
Were there problems between women and men before? 
They were having problems over water because they said husbands should also fetch 
water and it would bring fighting with words. She would go and only bring one 
container at a time, and both of them wouldn’t bath or have clean clothes. She and the 
children would bath, but the husband wouldn’t. 
 
In the rainy season where do they fetch water? 
They use borehole water for pito, but sometimes it’s no good. They use water from 
the small holes in the dam to make pito because it won’t spoil their drink. They boil 
the water so the germs inside will die. 
 
They are the only ones using the borehole, but it takes time because they all have to 
wait. 
 
Are there food problems here? 
The land is no more fertile, so they don’t grow much food anymore. The tractor turns 
the land every year and the soil is therefore less fertile. 
 
Why do you still use the tractor? 
The woman doesn’t know why the men continue it. But she knows it’s because they 
continuously use the same land without allowing it to fallow like they used to. 
 
She asks if it’s possible to get a hand-dug well so she can brew pito with good water. I 
told her that she would have to write an application either through an NGO, her 
contact person, or assemblyman. 
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(We talk for a bit about food and meat. Many of the children around look 
malnourished, more than in other communities. Not everyone owns animals, but those 
who do, they only eat cows, sheep, and goats during naming ceremony, weddings, 
funerals, and the fire festival. Also, if it’s not raining, you have a sacrifice some 
animals and beg and pray. It’s taboo to eat animals without a ceremony or reason. 
Nothing bad will happen if you eat a big animal, but it’s good to always have plenty. 
You can eat fowls at any time, but usually for an occasion like receiving guests. They 
have their savings in cattle.) 
 
Gmanicheri 
Issufou, Binamop clan side 
Yakubou Munyiba, Binasup side, with unit committee chairman 
Azindow Jangnang, Gmanchedanaa, chief of Gmanicheri,  
Fati Jakpugil, Magazia  
Fataw Ali, a Fulani man and his family 
 
Binamop group meeting, 03/04/06 (about 30 people, mostly men present) 
 
It was the opinion leader Issufou who answered most of the questions. 
 
Population: 490 
No. of compounds: 33 
No. of clans and names: 4 clans Binamop, Binasup, Fulanis, Ewe, (Ashanti traders) 
Rep. to town council: 4 unit committee members (but nothing has happened yet) 
Education: 50 children (roughly 30 boys and 20 girls) 
Religion: Islam, Christianity, and traditionalists (mostly traditionalists) 
Last case of Guinea worm: 6 years ago 
Other health problems: fever, coughing, diarrhea, convulsion, waist pains, rashes, 
madness (3) 
No. of people with health insurance: 10 households (but it was noted later that only 
half of these had paid the fees of 70,000 per person) 
No. of latrines: 5, but none are completed 
Overview of wells: 2 hand-dug wells, one CLIP and one from the 1960’s, no one 
remembers who built it. In the dry season it has no water. There are three boreholes, 
two from WV and one from OIC. The WV cost 6 million for the two built in 
2002/2003. OIC borehole cost 2.5 million and was built in 2005. The WV pump broke 
and they couldn’t get their own spanners so they had to hire WV to fix it. They belong 
to the community. OIC and WV have the same WATSAN. OIC followed the 
procedure of WV. They applied for WV and OIC through the DA. Communities who 
use these wells include Kukpog, Nayarag, Tadogu, Bosum. It’s a problem that the 
others are using the boreholes, but they can’t do anything. They have asked 
permission. The dam is about 1 hour to go and come.  
No. of traditional wells: 4 
Water sources 
Rainy season: boreholes, CLIP well 
Dry season: Nawuhugu dam, traditional wells, CLIP (once every two weeks), 
WV and OIC boreholes. 
Politics 
Every adult votes. NPP and NDC are the parties. They like NPP because there was a 
Konkomba minister in the NPP regime. They like the NDC because if they don’t vote 
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they won’t get what they need. The community party leaders were promised bicycles, 
and the community was promised a school, a tank to sell kerosene, and the 
construction of feeder roads. The main factor for voting depends on who wins the 
DCC dispute. If it’s an Abudu, they will vote for NPP, if it’s Andani, they will vote 
NDC. Why? Because they will all be contesting for chieftaincy, and you will want to 
vote for the right party so that the Gushegu chief will enskin you. All of them are 
waiting to be the next chief, even the younger brothers. Other than that, they don’t 
have a preference for a party. 
 
CIFS just started in Gmanicheri. They are coming to develop the community for six 
years. They won’t give cash, but will do something that will last. SCOPE also came 
and did a three day workshop on violence against women and youth. It’s still a 
problem here. 
Priorities 
School for the children, health clinic, mosque, church 
 
Interview with Binasup clan side: Yakubou Munyiba, unit committee chairman, 
19/04/06 
 
His parents asked him to contest for unit committee member, so he did, this is his 4th 
year. He sees his role ensure that the town can develop and to maintain peace. 
Decisions are made with the chief, where they sit together with the elders and decide 
what to do. 
 
There is a chairman for CLIP, WV, OIC, development committee, NDC, NPP, unit 
committee (8) 
 
The town development committee was like the police under JJ. They would arrest you 
and charge you in court. Before democracy, when JJ was head of state under military 
rule. The committee still exists, especially in communities that have no unit 
committee. They aren’t represented in the town area council, but many chairmen from 
the committee still feel responsible for the town, and know the assemblyman and will 
go to him if there’s a problem. 
 
When World Vision came, they were introduced to the chief.  
How did they invite WV to come? 
They sent them an application through a contact person in Gusheigu. He’s a friend, 
and helped them get WV, CLIP, and School for Life.  
 
On the WV well: it’s still not fixed. They met with the officer and told him it was 
broken. He says that WV is a helper, and the community hasn’t given them anything.  
Is World Vision powerful? Yes, World Vision is very powerful. 
 
The wells don’t have names. 
 
Strategies for development 
OIC promised animals, so they build houses (for the animals) and silos, so now they 
are prepared for OIC to come. 
 
What are they doing to get these projects? 
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Unii ubini tiwan na aa gma tuuk uwandan ke wgan mala 
“If you are a beggar you have no choice” 
Also explained as if someone is giving you something, then you can’t force them 
quick quick until the time they say it’s ready. 
 
They have opened bank accounts at ADD for OIC and an account in Gushegu for 
CLIP. 
 
The contact person tells the community to open bank accounts, to build silos and 
houses for animals so the NGOs will be interested in coming to them. 
 
What are the changes in their lives from having the wells? 
• It has expanded the community. People have moved here from elsewhere 
because now there’s water closeby. 
• They are now hoping to get a formal school because without water there can’t 
be a school. 
 
Why is Gmanicheri so successful in bringing NGOs here? 
NGOs come here because there’s peace. Everyone is fighting for your own place, they 
are not like the assemblymen who are supposed to fight for the whole area. 
 
%%If you tell someone to keep a book for you, and you do, and they come back and 
see that you’ve kept it well, they will come and give you more books. 
 
In other words, if you show the NGOs that you are maintaining the things they gave 
you well, they will come back and give you more. So it’s important to give them a 
positive image. 
 
Do you cover things up to make this image? 
No, no, no. (But he wouldn’t tell me anyway) 
 
Interview with Issufu 
 
I wanted to know about the Kokomba traditional authority structure and how the 
chieftaincy works. 
 
We only as Kokombas here, we have no our own chiefs apart from….it was only the 
Dagombas that come and appoint a chief. Let’s say in Gmanicheri here if the chief is 
not there, it is only the Dagombas who come out say who is going to be chief  and 
appoint the person here. 
 
So the Kokombas don’t decide? 
Yes, we look at the way were as seing it now 
No, we are sitting here as under slavery 
 
Under the Dagombas? 
 
Yes 
 
So traditionally there are no Kokomba chiefs? 
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Yes, there are Kokomba chiefs but they are small small chiefs. 
 
You see, if you look at Gmanicheri, someone from Gushegu decided who should be 
the chief, and whenever there is a problem and they’re going to solve the problem, 
something which is serious they send the problem to the chief in Gushegu to solve the 
person. 
 Is it someone they know? 
Yes 
Sometimes they put their own person as chief, sometimes even a Dagomba 
In Gmanicheri, we have decided that we don’t want any other tribe to be our chief, we 
had one once  
 
The chief is an appointed position by the Dagombas. 
 
They only look for money 
What do you mean? 
If you look for someone to be chief, it’s the person who has the most money who will 
become chief 
 
They are all the same 
The Dinyogu’s chief’s father was not chief? 
 
If this one dies, there will be competition. Those who bribe the most money. 
 
They are still respected, whether you like him or not, you must give respect to him. 
 
How do you give him respect? 
When you go there and you go to greet him, you squat and remove your slippers. It’s 
a sign of respect. When you come and greet the chief you have to do this thing, the 
clapping, it’s a sign of respect. 
 
When you go to the chief, you have to give a small gift to the chief 
 
Is there a yearly fee? 
 
Some time ago we were paying every harvest some food to the chief of the 
Dagombas. Now they have stopped this. When the chief is going to farm, he will 
come around to every household to bring one person each to go to the Dagomba chief 
and farm for them. And the food would go to the chief of the guinea corn. When you 
harvest guinea corn, you harvest and give some to the chief. 
 
And then at some point we didn’t want to do it, so it led to some competition. 
 
Did this lead to the D-K war? 
 
During this war, if a Dagomba man sees a Kokomba man you chase him. 
 
How do you know? 
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Whenever you see that person, you move towards that person and you ask him in 
Kokomba which clan he comes from and you try to interview him about the clan. 
 
What was the fight about? 
A black guinea fowl. 
 
A K man and D man were bargaining to buy a black fowl for their juju. So when they 
were bargaining, it came to a time that a K man bought the guinea fowl and the D said 
he wanted to buy the guinea fowl, so he must collect the guinea fowl. So it came to a 
fight. They exchanged …. And when a Kokomba man’s finger, this one, enters the D 
man’s mouth, he bites it and cut it off. When he cut it off he took it to the house and 
put it on a stick saying he was selling the meat of Kokomba. When he took it and said 
that they were selling Kokomba man’s meat. The son of the K saw that and was not 
happy. D man he went to the farm and didn’t know there was a confusion and that K 
man’s son  took a gun and followed him to the farm, so when he was at the farm he 
fired K man, when he fired him he killed him and said he has come to pay for his 
father. So the D who were at the farm they ran away. And when they ran away they 
mobilized. They came to K and when they came to K and those that came to that 
place they destroyed them. And the fighting started in Nunumba district, we didn’t 
know that it would extend to this place, but it came to the point that D wanted to drive 
all K out of Ghana. So whenever they see a K man or see you as a K man, you have to 
run away. This community here didn’t run, but they didn’t stay in the houses, they 
were hiding in the bush for three months. Also in Dinyogu. 
 
The Ghana police force came and protected both. 
 
Who were they protecting? 
They were protecting both. 
 
Peace was very good, but some Kokombas were still in the bush, some of them would 
still go to a different place. It was only in Mamrusi where the fighting was not there. 
The fighting was in Gushegu, Yendi, Mumumba, all where there were Kokombas. 
The chiefs were able to maintain the peace afterwards.  
 
How? 
They said that if it came to the time when you go out, they will never see you with a 
gun. If they see a gun, they will collect it. There were no guns, so there was no more 
fighting. 
 
Who was supplying the guns? 
(laughter) You can buy the guns at the market, even today. But if you are a stranger, 
you will never see it.  
 
There must have been plenty of guns during the war. But you don’t know who was 
making the guns? 
Some of them came from USA. You see some of them AK47 and so many other 
things, machine guns, the big big ones they were mounting on lorries, they were using 
that one. . 
 
Did many people die? 
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So many communities. They would go to communities and condemn the whole 
community. Look, someplace, you go there you would see people lying there like 
fowls.  
 
Why do you say now it’s like slavery between Dagombas and Kokombas? 
We have no decision to decide for ourselves. At District level, where there are 
executives, there are no Kokomba men. All the department, there is no K man. And 
now that we have no representation , whenever they take a decision, our decision is 
not taken. 
 
Is it true that the Kokomba don’t own the land? 
Yes, they decide on who to be the chief. As they decide who should be the chief, it 
means that the land belongs to them. But if you look at the history, the land belongs to 
us. But now, that the land belongs to them, you know, the Dagombas come from lake 
Chad. You know, the place in Nigeria. When they came out and were there, as they 
were there like this, most of them were traders. And as they were traders, our people 
were mostly farmers. 
 
When the Dagombas came in, as they didn’t know some thing as chieftaincy. So they 
came and said now we want to be the chief of this place, and we said we were not 
interested in chieftaincy. So if you want to be chief you can be chief. If not nowadays, 
we were not interested in chieftaincy. We only look at when you have plenty food to 
eat, you are the chief. But when it came to a time all these things like Western 
education, it became a problem. And Dagombas came in and were making things this 
way.  
 
So Kokombas had no traditional chiefs in the past? 
Yes 
 
Is development favoring affecting or influencing Kokombas and Dagombas 
differently? Is it faoring some people over others? 
It favors some people, but if you look at this place, it only favors Dagombas. Look at 
the whole district, Gushegu district. The population in this area is the same. There is 
no K community with lights. There is no K community where you see something like 
a proper school. There are only four formal schools we can boast. And if you look at 
K communities JSS, we have only one. So people move here about 20 miles 30 miles 
to attend school, Gushegu is 15, and Naregu, which is about 45 miles, and Sawaga 
about 100 miles, so the people go there and stay there to learn. 
 
Is there a strategy in the government to focus on the Dagombas? 
Yes 
 
Do you think NGOs are creating some balance? 
When NGOs come, they come first to the Dagombas. You only hear of NGOs but 
they don’t come around to this place. Sometimes you only hear the NGOs….more 
 
What about World Vision? 
World Vision and CLIP work around here, but none other. 
 
Why? 
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Those  who are working at that place, most of them are not Dagombas. Most of the 
World Vision people working, they are not Dagombas. If they work, there would be 
discrimination. 
 
But with CLIP there has never been a problem. 
 
Do you think the division will increase? 
No, it will not increase, but we are also attending school, and we will try to narrow the 
gap between us. When we grow and go to higher schools, we can go and develop this 
place. 
 
Does religion play a role in making the differences between D and K? 
Yes, that one is true. If you are a muslim, and the other person is a muslim, then you 
are a brother.  
 
Most K are Christians, and many are traditional. 
Most of D are Muslims 
 
The government is not using religion, it is only representatives.  
Would the government favor a Muslim K community? 
Yes. Whenever you have something like a gathering, we are invited to come and 
participate. Whenever they are going to participate in the district chief executive with 
the party members, they are invited. But I have never been, there are some people 
who have been. 
 
What role do missionaries play in development? 
Schools. In Nawuhugu, the roman catholics built the school. The primary school is 
primary school, built by missionaries. 
 
Do you think WV has a religions motivation? 
Sometimes they organize children and give them uniform and they take some of the 
teachers and give them a solar lamp so they can go a read. And WV supports with 
things like bicycles, so WV supports both education and religion.  
 
Do you think they start with water and then build schools? 
 
What do you think the mission of CLIP is? 
They have come to develop those who are in the rural areas. When CLIP came here, 
they were beginning with micro- 
 
Why do you think CLIP does projects? 
I cannot explain that one 
 
If you sell the food when the price is low, when the price goes high, then you give 
back the money 
 
What does CLIP want in return? 
They don’t want anything. The interest is only maybe 5000. It’s non-profit making. 
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Traditional religion 
I don’t know much about it. You see some people they worship trees. Some people 
worship stones. You see some people make some sand and mould it and worship it. 
And some people worship animals like crocodiles. 
 
What is the role of water in traditional religion? 
Rain is important. If there is no water, you cannot worship. Whenever you go to 
worship, you normally pour water like this. So if there’s no water, you can’t do it. 
 
Do some people ever try to make rain come? 
(laughter) yes 
 
And does it work? 
Yes 
 
And why don’t they do it now? 
It only works when they are expecting the rain to come. But there are some people, 
but the rain will only drop small.  
 
Have you seen this? 
Yes, I’ve seen this 
 
At the funeral we went to last week, it rained. 
 
We have even one man in Gmanicheri here who can make rain to come. He’s 
something like a Subsia, he can foresee your future. 
 
Do many people go to him? 
Many people 
 
Have you been to him? 
It’s many years. Maybe four years ago. 
 
Do you think the method of the diviner works? 
Sometimes it works and sometimes it doesn’t work 
 
Are there local people who are diviners? 
Yes 
 
Do they go out and find water? 
If you want them to go out and find water you can ask them. Sometimes it’s a 
tradition. If it’s your father who has been doing this, he teaches you how to do this. 
 
If I wanted to, could I meet one? 
When you go to somebody, if he tells you the secret, you will take it. 
 
But if the community needs water, wouldn’t someone go to him and find water? 
Someone will go to him and bring fowls and he will make cut a stick and kill the fowl. 
You see sometimes when you hear the rain, the sound of the thunder.  
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A diviner sometimes they use leaves and some stones to identify where water is. 
When you see some particular tree it means that at that particular place there should 
be water. And some people use stones to know where the water is. They find water for 
themselves. Sometimes they share it with the community. 
 
What about the WATSAN committee,  
The whole community will meet and decide what to do. 
 
Does the chief come as well? 
Yes, when we meet we go to his house 
 
Both men, women, and children come 
 
Do the women have time? 
Yes. 
 
I’ve heard that sometimes women don’t come to these WATSAN meetings. Is that 
true? 
 
No, they come. 
 
Interview with Gmanchedanaa, chief of Gmanicheri, Azindow Jangnang 
18/04/06 
 
He appoints the chairmen. When NGOs come they usually come to him first and he 
tells them which chairman to go talk with. The DA send the NGOs, but sometimes the 
contact person in Gushegu sends NGOs. There is also a unit committee member here 
and he is part of Nadmo, the national (but I think he means natural) disaster 
management organization. He is responsible for reporting any national disasters to the 
DA and is paid for doing so. It’s a political appointment. He is the contact for 
Tandogu and is between the community and the DA.  
 
When NGOs come, he knows that they should have groups. So sometimes when they 
come they are happy to see that there are already groups.  
 
Gmanicheri is better than other communities because they have a market and are even 
further ahead than Nawuhugu on the water side. Because of the market they can sell 
whatever they have without suffering to go carry their things far to different places to 
sell it. 
 
On the issue of water, people come here to beg for water, they themselves don’t have 
to beg. They have never turned anyone away. When people come to get, the chief 
allows them to take without any payment.  
 
Do you accept gifts? 
Sometimes.  
 
Does it make them feel powerful? 
Yes, he says Gmanicheri receives respect because of the well, but again he denies 
sending people away from the water. 
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What are some of the changes from having the well nearby? 
• They used to go at night around midnight to the dam to fetch from the small 
holes on the edge because during the day they were empty. So they would 
have to go when no one else was going. 
• Also, now there aren’t as many cases of snake bites from going out at night, so 
there are fewer trips to the hospital, which saves money. 
• Animals weren’t getting enough water before, so some animals were dying. 
 
The animals go in the afternoon to drink from the borehole. 
 
In the rainy season, where do you collect rain? 
Only those who have zinc roofs collect rain, then we also have containers. But we 
now go to the boreholes. During the water problem (dry season) you don’t think of 
water anymore. You can go to work without having to think about it so much. We can 
now think of things like how to get a school and clinic. 
 
What are the names of the boreholes? 
WV A, WV B, and OIC. The chief and elders named them. 
 
WV knows there is a problem with the WV A well, but won’t come. 
 
Do NGOs want something in return? 
World Vision says it’s a gift from god. They should therefore pray to god and become 
Christian. 
 
Are you Christian here? 
Yes, some of us.  
 
Are there more Christians on this side than the other side? 
Yes, over there they are Muslims, but we are all the same. 
 
Who is responsible over the wells? 
The chiefs, except for the CLIP well on the other side. CLIP didn’t come to the chief 
before they started digging, he doesn’t know why. Because of this, he doesn’t feel like 
he owns it. 
 
Was that disrespectful? 
He doesn’t know if it was out of disrespect or not, but they wanted to have water near 
them over there. He’s the chief of all of them, and sees them as all the same. 
 
Why is there a difference with development? 
This side also had micro-credit loans with CLIP, but they were rejected after a while, 
so when the water came, they went to the other side too. (The other side is in phase 3 
of the loans and the men applied for the pilot micro-credit). CLIP came through SfL 
and the SfL facilitator became the secretary for the micro-credits loans. When they 
were rejected on this side they were afraid to say anything. The chief didn’t want to 
cause any trouble among his people so he didn’t ask CLIP. He doesn’t bring it up 
anymore with the other group. 
 
217  
If you see division, it means there’s poverty, but if you see unity, then there’s 
richness. So you see that we are not unified, so there’s still poverty here and we need 
support to keep peace. 
 
Interview with Gmanicheri Mangazia, Fati Jakpugil, 18/04/06 
She has been mangazia for four years. The chief and elders selected her just for this 
section. They were concerned about water problems and thought I was good to have a 
women’s leader. 
 
What do the women talk about during these meetings?  
It’s mainly for development. We talk about water, micro-credits. They don’t meet 
regularly to discuss these things, but see each other every day, so of course they talk 
about other things too. But if they decide on something, they will tell the men and the 
men will try to succeed. 
 
Were there any problems between the men and women over water before? 
There were problems because you have to fetch water for all your children and your 
husband, and if you didn’t you might be beaten. You will tell the truth but the man 
won’t understand you and think you are refusing. On the food side the man won’t give 
the woman food to feed the children so this can lead to quarrel. A woman cannot 
oppose or force a husband, you have to beg.  
 
What are some of the changes in your life since having the wells? 
• It has reduced the beating 
• They are now helping their husbands with the farm 
• They can get enough firewood for themselves for the rainy season 
 
When you brew pito, what kind of water do you use? 
They use borehole water. The natural well you have to clear, the men have to take 
care of it, but now with the borehole they don’t use it as much, it’s not as big. 
 
When asked about chasing people from other communities away, she denies it. They 
don’t have to pay anything or give gifts, but she can’t be sure because she’s not the 
chief. 
 
Does she or the other women here go to the CLIP well? 
No, it’s only for the other side. She doesn’t know why, it’s for them over there. 
 
Why do you think the other side of Gmanicheri received their own well? 
She doesn’t know. She heard it was because they had good relations with CLIP. They 
don’t complain though because they are all the same family, and even if they are 
different clans, their husbands are uncles to each other. Also, the well over there has 
little water in the dry season, she sees the women from over there fetching from the 
boreholes every day. 
 
Do they have to beg you to use the borehole here? 
No (laughs). We all share it.  
 
Do you see some tension between the two sides? 
She denies tension.  
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Interview with Fataw Ali, a Fulani man living in Gmanicheri 18/04/06 
We are accompanied to his huts by his “landloard,” a man from Gmanicheri who has 
given the Fulani man his cattle to take care of.  
 
How long has he been here? 
This is the third year. He came here from Burkina Faso because he had family nearby 
here. His son came down with the cattle while he and his wives and children took a 
lorry. He has about 75 cattle that he’s taking care of. They belong to 13 different 
people. He is able to keep the ones born under his care. 
 
Where do they fetch drinking water? 
From the borehole. 
 
And where do the cattle drink? 
At first from the dam water, but not it’s no longer plenty. In case the dam dries up he 
can get water from the borehole, but he will wait until he’s told to do so. 
 
Has he had any interaction with NGOs or development agents? 
None 
 
What is his relationship with the chief? 
They exchange gifts. It’s out of respect for giving him and his family the opportunity 
for staying here. They are respected in the community because he’s taking care of 
their cattle. There are no payments. 
 
Have there ever been some conflicts between you and your landlords? 
He heard there was a Konkomba-Fulani conflict over water in another district because 
the Fulani were taking water without permission.  
(He asks me if I’ve heard what happened and if it’s over, or if it’s coming closer. He 
seems worried. This is the first time I’ve heard of it, but my translator tells him he 
thinks it was a small conflict a month ago and that it’s over now.) 
 
Has he seen conflict over water before? 
Many times. Water is always giving problems. The cattle also cause problems because 
they eat foodstuff and after some time they get sacked. They (as Fulani) are like 
women in a compound. If the husband says she has to leave, she has to pack up and 
go.  
(His landlord is sitting next to him the whole time, and it is clear that the landlord is 
protecting him on the one hand, and ensuring that he doesn’t say the wrong things on 
the other hand.) 
 
Have you noticed any division in Gmanicheri over water or other things? 
No. He doesn’t get involved in the community problems. If there are problems, he 
doesn’t see them. It’s better that way.  
 
Kukpog 
Idana Samali, Guinea worm eradication chairman 
Community meeting 30/03/06 
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Population: 75 
No. of compounds: 8 
No. of clans and names: one, Binamo 
Rep. to town council: no 
Education: one child at school 
Last case of Guinea worm: more than 10 years 
Other health problems: diarrhea, convulsion (related to Malaria), high fever 
No. of people with health insurance: none 
No. of latrines: none 
Overview of wells: none 
No. of traditional wells: 5 
Water sources 
Rainy season: Traditional wells 
Dry season: Nawuhugu dam (small holes at the edge for drinking) (1 hour 35 
minutes if fast, 2 hours if slow to go and come) 
Politics 
All adults vote 
Political parties: NDC and NPP 
Reasons: NDC is the mother party, so they stay with her. NPP offered a positive 
change from NDC, so some voted to see the difference. Under NPP they now 
have a town area council in Nawuhugu, there is a clinic and school, some 
communities even have classes. The NPP also promised them water, but they 
have not seen it, have they forgotten them? They have sent gifts like yams and 
guinea fowl, but nothing happened. They also sent elderly to DCE. 
 Proverb of the chief 
Priorities: 
 Help for farmers, micro-credits 
 
Interview with chairman, Idana Samali 19/04/06 
(While all the women are away fetching water, only a few men are in town. The rest 
are away at their farm. It rained the night before, the first semi-big rain in the season) 
There is only one chairman. He was selected during the Guinea worm eradication 
program. It is his role to educate his people on polio and guinea worm. He was 
selected twelve years ago. There is a contact in Nawuhugu. 
 
There is no chief. The regent is acting as chief, and Dinyogu will enskin him maybe 
next year. They don’t have any contact person for development, and there is no 
development yet. 
 
(I tell him that I’ve heard of their problems, that they quarrel and need to get the 
assemblyman to assist in bringing peace, I don’t tell him that I’ve heard from other 
communities that Kukpok is known for having poor leadership) 
 
There’s no unity. If there were unity, they would be able to get a borehole.  
 
Why is the regent not able to bring the people together? 
He believes the regent is strong enough to bring unity. 
 
He denies that there is fighting or conflict, but says that when they get water, it will 
mean that there will be unity without suffering. 
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(After trying numerous ways to ask about the causes of the conflict, he finally he 
opens up a little) 
Some of the people here were overdrinking and had problems. They still brew pito, 
but they don’t drink as much. Alcohol is a disease because it makes your blood thin. 
But pito is a part of their life. 
 
(The women are all away fetching water, so it’s not possible to interview the 
Mangazia) 
They picked the Mangazia for SfL to lead the women. The Mangazia meets with the 
mothers to know why the children aren’t in school. He denies problems with women 
over water. He knows that the problem is the disunity among the men. 
 
Kulikpang 
Kokona chief 
Tizeibor chief 
Nakoli Borkum, Mangazia 
 
Population: 282 Community register 
No. of compounds: 11 and one Fulani 
No. of clans and names: one Binamop 
Unit committee: one 
Education: 12 children go to school, all boys. It’s too far for the girls and other 
children. The girls over the age of 9 or 10 all have future husbands, so they 
can’t go. There is non-formal education at night where some children are 
learning Dagbani, and they will try to change it to English in the future. 
Religion: Muslims, Christians, traditionalists 
Last case of Guinea worm: 2003 (they don’t know how it’s spread) 
Other health problems: snake bite, malaria, diarrhea, contraction, waist pains, back 
pains, dizziness, running nose headache (they don’t know why) 
No. of people with health insurance: none 
No. of latrines: none 
Overview of wells: In 2005 WV drilled the borehole and it’s been completed since 
three months now. If it was only for them, the water would be enough water, but 
Bosum, Dinyogu, Tandogu, Kuduli also fetch water. The average wait is about 1 hour. 
But they don’t fight about it because they are all related. The payments were made 
according to the number of people in the house. It cost 6 million for one borehole!!!! 
No. of traditional wells: none 
Ownership of wells: chief, because when there’s one owner, it’s easier to take care of 
the well, so he can delegate people to take care of it. 
Water sources 
Rainy season: riverside 
Dry season: Nawuhugu dam and Gmanicheri borehole 
Politics 
Everyone votes. The chief first voted in 1976 for Busia, the others joined in 
1992. NDC is dominant because they were doing good. They were digging 
boreholes even if it was World Vision (?) Others vote for NPP because there’s 
now a clinic near Katani. No politicians have come here, and WV is the only 
NGO. They don’t know if they trust the government or not, but they trust 
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NGOs. They don’t know why there’s no communication between them and the 
government. 
Priorities 
Clinic, school 
 
Notes on community 
One woman is expresses her happiness that I can write and says she wishes too, that 
women here are just pressed up against the wall stirring TZ. In general, there seemed 
to be general silence from the women except for this comment. As with other 
communities, the men dominated the talking, and even those questions regarding 
water, and the time it took to fetch water, were answered by the men. There was some 
underlying sensible hostility between the groups, and in the end, the community 
decided to have two pictures, one of the men and one of the women. 
 
Interview with Tizeibor (the other chief of Kulikpang, there are two subchiefs 
and they are brothers) 19/04/06 
There are five chairmen: Guinea worm, WV boreholes, NDC, NPP, unit committee 
The chairmen are children and brothers of the chief. 
 
Do they have a friend in Gusheigu? 
Yes, they have friend. He’s the Guinea worm coordinator for Gusheigu subdistrict. 
He’s the one who brought them WV. They have applied for a school, toilets, and a 
clinic, but nothing has happened. They give him guinea fowl, eggs, and yams. They 
need more support from him, they have known him for ten years. So far he’s only 
given them water. 
 
World Vision first came and drilled three times. This is the fourth time they drilled to 
get, but the community has only paid once. There are two Boreholes, but only one has 
a pump. They can’t force them to come back. They have bank account open, but they 
will wait until they come, hopefully next year.  
 
Five communities are using the borehole. They have to beg before they use it. He’s 
never refused anyone. (He points over to a herd of sheep being herded by some boys) 
These sheep come from Dinyogu and are taken here to drink. 
 
What are some of the changes in your life since the wells? 
So many 
• Before, the women couldn’t go for firewood or go to farming 
• For the animals, they were bringing animals to Nawuhugu and they would die 
on the way 
• When they go to bed, they can think about going to the farm instead of going 
for water 
• They used to quarrel with their wives and they used to not come to their 
husbands at night because of water 
 
Where will you fetch water in the rainy season? 
The borehole is closer than the stream, they will use it in the rainy season. But they 
also have traditional wells, but now that it’s dry and that the borehole has water, they 
probably won’t be going there anymore. They will also collect rainwater during the 
rainy reason. 
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Who owns the wells? 
The chief owns all of them, but everyone can use them. They don’t have names.  
 
Interview with Mangazia, Nakoli Borkum 
She has been Mangazia for four years. When they were looking for a borehole they 
were told to open a bank account and have a mangazia. The women met and selected 
her to be a leader. They can ask her to go to a meeting at Nawuhugu or Gusheigu and 
if she goes she will represent the community. 
 
What kind of meetings has she gone to? 
They have trained her how to make soap for washing. A pastor came from Gushegu to 
do this. They also trained them in how to avoid AIDS. If they are to meet a friend, 
they should use condoms, that injections from needles and sharing blades can be 
dangerous. But lately, the men are refusing the women to go to these meetings 
because here they are NDC supporters and the town is mostly NPP.  
 
When they meet, what do the women discuss? 
Mostly contributions to send to bank account to deposit. There are many problems 
faced by women. It’s good that both men and women have to pay for children to go to 
school. It used to be just the man, but they are often unable to, so it’s good to 
contribute. 
 
What are some changes in your life since having the borehole? 
So many changes 
• There was guinea worm before. NGOs were coming out and giving filters. 
They don’t know what kind of thanks they can give to the NGOs at this time 
all of them would have guinea worm. The Ghana government is poor. The 
government should be doing this, but it’s too poor.  
Are NGOs trying to help the government be better? 
They are trying to make the government strong by supporting the people. 
• After supper they would think about how to fetch water be safe. Spirits are 
moging at night and you may become mad, but now you can relax and they are 
free of being chased or beaten by other women. The other women at the 
borehole would dig small holes and claim it as theirs and sack you if you used 
it. So the women here used to go at night. 
Are other communities free to fetch water from your well? 
• Other communities will come and beg (the men come), but they don’t have to 
pay. They don’t pay because maybe the next time it will be you who needs 
something. 
Were there any conflicts between men and women before? 
They were exchanging words. It was because they would leave at night and wouldn’t 
be able to satisfy their husbands. This was the problem. 
 
The borehole water here is good for brewing pito. Sometimes the borehole water will 
spoil the pito, but theirs is usually ok. With some borehole water, even the TZ 
changes color, it turns red! But there’s no problem here. 
 
 
Nachem 
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Jirjiri Jakpali, chief of Nachem 
Makoni Jirjiri, Mangazia 
Moses T.Kojo, volunteer teacher and secretary for Nawuhugu TAC and Abdulai Kojo 
 
Population: unknown 
No. of compounds: unknown 
No. of clans and names: 2 clans Jijab and Kpanjib 
Rep. to town council: There is no representative to the town council from Nachem 
Religion: 
Last case of Guinea worm: long time ago 
Other health problems: stomach problems (especially during first rains) 
No. of people with health insurance: 
No. of latrines: none 
Overview of wells:  
CLIP built the well in 2003, not finished  
WV built the BH in 2006 and there is little water. WV told them they would 
come back. They purchased cement two times, 20 bags each time. The first 
time it rained, so the cement spoiled. They spent 2 million cedis total on the 
cement. They sold cows the first time to raise money, and the second time 
other foodstuffs.  
Surrounding communities that use the water include: Bambuli, Gula, Jagrado. 
  
Through intermarriage they are all related, and Bambuli men are brothers to 
Nachem. 
 
There is no conflict between the people fetching. Whoever gets to the well 
first may use it, and if people come from far away, they are allowed to use it 
first (not verified by women). 
 
If the BH in Nachem is empty the people come to the BG in Gmanicheri. 
 
Bambuli: WV tried to dig for water, but there was none 
Gula: no wells 
Jagrado: no wells 
 
 
No. of traditional wells: 25-30 (but the water has worms, so we cook it before 
drinking) 
Ownership of wells: As far as he knows there is no WATSAN. 
Water sources 
Rainy season: traditional wells, WV borehole 
Dry season: WV borehole, Gmanicheri Borehole  
Payment of wells: chief contributed more money, but everyone contributed some. 
NGOs in the community: School for Life, CLIP, WV and CBO network (but haven’t 
received any help from them. They have a chairman, secretary and treasurer 
who are supposed to collect needs and send these to the area council) 
Politics 
Mainly NPP. During NPP time they built the dam in 2005, but the water is full 
of sand and polluted, so they can’t use it. When they came to Nachem they 
promised to give water, medicine and health facilities. They built a clinic in 
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Katami. They were registered voters before NPP came to power. We in 
Nachem are not affected by DCC except the children who go to school in 
those places. CIDA and OIC are working more with Dagomba because their 
leaders are Dagombas, but they help Konkombas a little just to oil your mouth. 
OIC is in Gmanicheri and Nawuhugu. 
 
Interview with Nachembor, chief of Nachem, Jirjiri Jakpali 
There are six chairmen, SfL/CLIP, WV, Town Development Committee, formal 
school/NPP, NDC, guinea worm. The chief authorized the chairmen when they were 
picked. Except for the parties, they picked their own chairmen, but with NGOs the 
chief picks them. 
 
(It becomes clear though that he doesn’t know the term NGO, the translator has to tell 
him the SfL, CLIP, and WV are NGOs) 
 
How did WV come here? 
They sent reports to the DA through a contact person in Gusheigu, a friend. 
Unii ubini tiwan na aa gma tuu,k uwandean ke agan mala 
(If you are sick you have to go to the clinic, but the treater wont be looking for sick 
person to treat.) 
 
What do you give to the contact person to help you? 
Saa kpa kidabuk kan saa gma ku uchin 
(Without a gun you can’t kill a lion) 
The send gifts to the contact person. It’s one person that contacts the NGO, and this 
friend has a relationship to the DA. 
 
They heard that WV was in the surrounding communities, so they asked their friend to 
approach the NGO. The friend told them what to do, such as form groups and open 
bank accounts. 
 
Do they share this friend with other communities? 
They have their own friend, not everyone can have the same friend. 
 
They need more water, school books, they wrote through the contact person to the 
DA. 
 
How long have they had this contact person? 
7 years. They were looking for a friend. 
 
How did WV choose the location of the well? 
The Borehole was fixed, but there’s no floor and no plaster. The CLIP well isen’t 
working, in their mind maybe CLIP saw that there’s not enough water, so they didn’t 
fix the well. They didn’t ask them to pay. 
 
They don’t have any names for the wells. 
 
Who is responsible for the wells? 
The chief, but they belong to the whole community 
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They fetch from the borehole, but the wait is long. Four other communities use the 
borehole and some ask permission from the chief. They just come and beg. It’s not a 
problem, they are all related, your brother cannot come and you say no. It might be 
you the next time who needs to beg. 
 
What are some of the changes in your life since having the well? 
• Before, they were sacked from the community nearby (Gmanicheri borehole 
side) 
• There’s still not enough water, but the suffering has reduced. 
• Before, they would wake up at 3, 4, 5 in the morning, and something might 
happen like a snake biting the women or another accident. But now they will 
be in bed til 6 so now the accidents are reduced. 
• When their children went to school, their teacher would beat the children if 
they weren’t bathed and had clean clothes 
• If you’re a farmer, and you don’t get water to get breakfast, you can’t go to 
farm, or you go later, or you go weak. 
• Before, they wouldn’t go to farm until it rained, now they have finished 
clearing the land, so they have more time to farm. 
 
During the rainy season, where do they fetch water? 
They have 25-30 traditional wells. They will prepare them and use them still.  
 
Who owns the traditional wells? 
The whole community 
 
They don’t have names except for the Koja well (cock-well). When they were farming 
on that side, and had some fowl around, and sometimes the fowl jumps into the well, 
so that’s why they call it koja. 
 
If they go and catch fish, they belong to the chief. Every three years there are fish. 
They come from a big stream when it overflows, but they let the fish multiply first 
before catching them. 
 
Do you collect rainwater from the foors? 
Yes, but we still have to fetch. 
 
Interview with Mangazia, Makoni Jirjiri 18/04/06 
When they were to get SfL, the men formed a chairman, and they needed a Mangazia, 
so the chief and elders selected her. She’s been the women’s leader for seven years 
now. 
 
In terms of water, the women use traditional well water for pito. Now that it’s the dry 
season and they usually fetch from borehole, they have reduced because the water 
from the borehole has a scent, like some chemicals. It’s better than at first when it was 
very strong. They will still get water from the holes around the dam to make pito. It’s 
boiled and strained, and the taste is better. 
 
What are some other changes since the borehole? 
• There were so many confusions before they had water between men and 
women. Men wanted women to go to the farm. The women blame the men 
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because men should try to get water so they can go to the farm instead of 
going to water. It’s the men’s responsibility to provide a water source for the 
women. The fighting was with words, there was no beating. 
CRS was giving schools food. And the World Food organization was also here, giving 
take-home rations of food for girls. One of the main problems here is that there isn’t 
enough food due to low land fertility. During this season it’s hard, they even eat dawa 
dawa and sell it. It’s takes a lot of work and the food doesn’t give much energy. When 
they sell it, it’s at the markets in Nawuhugu and Gmanicheri.  
 
What else do the women sell? 
If they have enough water they brew pito or make charcoal or make shea butter when 
it’s time to sell. 
 
Are they able to save money? 
No, they can’t get enough to save, but they’ve been able to contribute to things, also 
for water. It’s the chief who organizes this. 
 
What is her role as Mangazia? 
To organize communal labour and collect contributions from the women. If there’s a 
need, like water, they were pressing the men, or this food problem, she’s passing it on 
to the chairman. 
 
Tandogu 
Community group, mostly men answer 
Bakam Manyiman, Mangazia 
 
Community group 
This community consists of 2 compounds. The husband has recently died, leaving 
behind 4 widows, their children, and grandchildren. The husband was the leader, and 
now they will select one of his sons to be the new leader. The Mangazia is one of the 
widows.  
 
Population: 55 (community register) 
No. of compounds: 2 
No. of clans and names: one Binaasub 
Rep. to town council: no 
Education: 3 boys to Gmanicheri school. Some girls tried to go but started crying 
because the distance was too great. 
Religion: mostly animists. Some of the younger ones are Muslim 
Last case of Guinea worm: 2 years ago 
Other health problems: headache, diarrhea, Malaria 
No. of people with health insurance: no 
No. of latrines: no 
Overview of wells: there is a CLIP well currently being built. When they saw the 
CLIP well in Gmanicheri, one man asked his senior brother in Gmanicheri to 
help him write an application, so they applied through Mr. Birima. Because 
it’s all one family they don’t charge each other. Whoever can help contributes 
some. The total cost is 600,000. They applied to WV for a borehole 2 years 
ago with no reply. 
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No. of traditional wells: 1 (but it’s not considered a traditional well, it’s just a hole in 
the ground) 
Ownership of wells: one man built it, but the community shares it. With the CLIP 
well, they expect a hand-over, but if there’s a problem afterwards they will contact 
CLIP. 
Water sources 
Rainy season: the hole in the ground mentioned above and  
Dry season: Nawuhugu dam (2 hours there and back) 
Payment of wells: 
Politics 
Everyone started voting in 2000. NDC was the 1st ruling democratic government and 
when there was an election, NPP promised to bring schools, water, health facilities. 
NDC didn’t come here, so that’s why everyone voted NPP. The government doesn’t 
fulfill promises, they have no idea why. The NGOs will be honest, even if WV never 
came back. 
Priorities: water, micro-credit assistance to women (and men asked if it was possible 
for them to get micro-credits as well, they heard it was) 
 
Interview with Bakam Manyiman, Mangazia, 18/04/06 
The husband chose her to be the women’s leader. If they need any development, if 
they call a meeting, she will represent the women. 
 
CLIP people came in to say they needed a group consisting of a Mangazia and a 
chairman. The existing NPP chairman was chosen as the CLIP chairman. This is the 
only chairman in the community.  
 
They have a contact in Gmanicheri who is a son of the late husband. He is the one 
who passes on information regarding development, in this case CLIP. He is the link 
between Tandogu and Gushegu because he knows someone in Gushegu who is his 
friend. 
 
Before the CLIP well, they had to ask Kulikpang for permission and had to pay before 
fetching. It cost 2,000 each, and they were never chased away. 
 
What are the changes in your life since the well? 
• Before, they couldn’t just go and fetch water, they would have to beg and wait 
for the owners of the well to fetch first. 
 
Did the water problem ever cause problems between the men and women? 
The men were aware of the problem, so there was no beating.  
 
Does the CLIP well have a name? 
(laughs) No. 
 
Where do the women fetch water during the rainy season? Do they collect from the tin 
roofs? 
She’s afraid that I’m asking because of the CLIP well and isn’t sure how to answer, 
but then says that yes, they will probably collect from the roofs during the rainy 
season. Right now, the water from the CLIP well isn’t enough, so they still go to 
Kulikpang to beg for water, but they don’t have to pay anymore. 
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Why don’t they have to pay? 
Because now they also have a well, and maybe in the future the Kulikpang people 
might come to them, but she isn’t sure if this is why. 
 
Do communities have more power or status with more development? 
Yes, they have more power. 
 
Why? 
It’s through good leadership that you get your needs. 
 
Saa gma bee unii aa do aa bor ke saah nye aa do yaar pu na 
(You can’t know somebody’s hut-problems like you know your own hut-problems) 
In other words, she knows that good leadership means that the leader is aware of what 
problems are there within the community, and that the leader knows how to work with 
these problems, but she can’t say why another community has less development and 
others more. Good leadership makes a community more powerful. 
 
What kind of development does she wish for in the future? 
She hopes that NGOs will come for micro-credits. Apart from the water, the 
community has never benefited from the assemblyman. They applied to get a school 
but didn’t get it.  
 
After the interview, she tells me that they brew pito and make shea butter, then asks 
me if it would be possible for the women to get micro-credits. I told her that I didn’t 
represent or work with an NGO, but that she should ask her contact person for 
assistance in writing an application to an NGO or to the assemblyman. 
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Appendix K: List of Formal Interviews 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interview #  Date  Contact  Organization 
1.  January 17th Annette Habber 
Ihle 
CLIP Board Member 
Copenhagen 
2.  February 3rd Mr. Justice  ICED researcher and Instructor 
Ghalebon Hotel 
Accra 
3.  February 3rd Mr. Patrick Executive Secretary – Coniwas 
CONIWAS headquarters - Accra 
 
4.  February 9th Nancy Cosway Canadian Team Leader -NORWASP Project 
Community Water & Sanitation Agency - Regional 
office 
Tamale 
4B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
February 28th 
 
 
 
 
 
Nancy Cosway 
 
Canadian Team Leader -NORWASP Project 
Community Water & Sanitation Agency - Regional 
office 
Tamale 
5.  February 9th Nashiru Bawa CLIP Water Co-ordinating Engineer 
CLIP head office 
Tamale 
6.  February 9th Rikke Pedersen CLIP’s previous Liaison Co-ordinator  
CLIP head office 
Tamale 
7.  February 15th Hameratu Tani 
Abudulai 
 
CLIP District Coordinator 
Gusheigu District 
8.  February 21/22 Steven Adongo - 
Consultant 
PHAST training seminar – Sponsored by CLIP – 
Yendi Township 
9.  February 22nd General 
Stakeholder 
Meeting 
District Assembly  
Gusheigu District Assembly office 
 
10.  February 22nd Elizabeth Darko 
(Mrs.) 
Christian Co-ordinator and Water liaison 
World Vision Gusheigu District. 
 
11.  February 23rd  Ben Atim Environmental Officer – Gusheigu District 
12.  February 24th Mahama 
Abueari 
District Coordinating Executive (DCE) – Gusheigu 
District 
13.  February 24th  Braimah 
Chentiwuni 
DWST Team Leader – Gusheigu District 
14.  February 24th  Iddmissir 
Alhassan Nadmo 
Programs Officer – RUDA Gusheigu  
15.  February 24th I.B. Basimtale District Co-ordinating Director (DCD) 
Gusheigu District Assembly 
16.  March 2nd Patrick Opoku Water and Sanitation Officer - 
Opportunities Industrialization Centers (OIC) – 
Tamale 
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17.  March 2nd Coleman 
Agyeyomah 
Programmes Co-ordinator Institute for Policy 
Alternatives (IPA) - Tamale 
18.  March 20th Mohamad 
Nashiru 
WaterAid Advocacy Manager 
WaterAid head office 
Accra 
19.  March 31st Salifu Tahiru National Peoples Party organizer – regional 
secretariat 
Tamale 
20.  April 3rd Thomas 
Sayibu Imora 
Programs Director 
New Energy Head Office 
Tamale 
21.  April 17th Anne 
Thompson 
Canadian International Food Security 
(CIFS) Project Team Leader  
 
22.  April 25th Al Hassan 
Ibrahim 
District Planning Officer – Gusheigu 
District - Gusheigu 
23.  April 26th O.B. Alhassan Program Officer, Water and Sanitation 
Sponsorship Program 
World Vision  
Tamale 
24.  April 27th I.B. Basimtale District Co-ordinating Director (DCD) 
Gusheigu District Assembly 
25.  April 27th  Cathy Durand District Capacity Building Project 
(DISCAP) Associate Team Leader/ Senior 
Training Specialist. 
26. 
 
March 21st  Charles 
Owiredu 
 
Senior Research Officer  
NPP secretariat  
Accra 
27. 
 
April 3rd  Sulemana 
Inusah 
Damba 
Secretary  
Town Area Council 
Nawuhugu 
28. 
 
April 12th  Ben Anamoh Program Manager 
OIC  
Tamale 
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Interview # 1 
 
Meeting with Annette Habber Ihle – January 17th - 06 
 
- Pushing work of unskilled labour to local NGO’s  
- Different NGO’s within GV do there own structuring 
 Not one approach for all of organization 
 CLIP underlying importance for news 
 
- Serves on a silver plate what we have been asking for 
- CLIP in Denmark conducting proposal for DANIDA in DK 
- Member of GDCA also highly political influence as he is using his position 
with GV in Tamale.  
GV 
 
 
            GDCA CLIP DK 
 
  CLIP Tamale 
     
 
- Must be critical against the current structure 
- DANIDA becoming very critical of the membership issue in Denmark. 
- Ideology of GV must change 
- Critical of the civil society strategy 
- No baseline studies conducted with GV when starting, and very little 
information now.  
- Nash’s role – 
o What is Nash’s power relation? More in Kokumba villages etc.  
o Nash in a Dogumba office and he is Kokumba – Nash muslim but 
kokumbas are Christian. 
 
- How do we know more than DANIDA if we have no information about the 
local level.  
- GV needs a research approach towards data but what happens with the data 
afterwards? 
- What will an NGO do vs a consultant from ex. DANIDA etc. Trend in the last 
few years that DANIDA funds are cut therefore some employees are then 
quiting or let go and form consulting companies etc. 
- What is a Friendship approach. 
- What is the GV – IBIS power relation? How are they positioning themselves – 
by always taking part in projects with each other? 
- The GIFT Approach ? What can they give back? 
- Kokumbas are more democratic and organized than the dogombas  
- Dogomba villages very much heiarchical (this may have an effect on Watsans 
and District assemblies). Organized religiously – organized in relation to 
islam. 
- Kokumbas have been farming for years and are used the market approach 
- Kokumbas will surpass the Dogombas in the future. 
- Women have more to say on the kokumba side than a dogumba village. 
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- Who is sitting in the elder council? 
- What religion? 
- What positions are there in the villages? 
- What is democracy?  
- WatSans are superficial. 
- Are we offering water to smuggle in democracy? 
- We have the opinion that democracy is good for everyone but chieftancy is so 
incorporated into the social structure. 
- The vulnerable in the community are the most attacked – it will be easy to see. 
- Define poverty in relation to admittance 
- Recommended books 
o Bernhard Bierlich – The power of medicines 
o Sard and Jullaman Mason work. 
 
Interview # 2   
 
Mr. Justice  02-03 
ICED researcher and instructor – Place Accra: Ghalebon hotel 
 
- Talking about policy supposed to be bottom – up. 
- 5% of Ghana revenue goes to district assemblies 
- There exists a D.A. common fund 
- Workers at District level still paid by central government 
-  5 criteria – 5% of revenue shared in Ghana 
o Need – poor is supposed to get more 
o Equalizer factor – before start people get equal amount 
o Responsive factor – generate more you get more 
o Service Pressure – Based on population, sparsley populated get less 
o Contingency factor – for emergencies  
 
- District Assembly 30% appointed by president – 70 % elected  
- 30% is consulted by traditional leaders, NGO’s , works and expertise etc. 
- The 30% is supposed to be non-partisan but majority is actually involved in 
political party. 
- D.C.D. – administrative head – manage people 
- District Assembly – political head 
- D.A. has several committees, social , water etc…. 
- District responsible to the region 
- Regional executive supervises district 
- National Development plan commission overseas all. 
  
 
- Hybrid system 
o The political system  
o Cheiftancy actually has control over resources 
 
- If GWC instills water they take a tariff for the service 
- If CWSA instills water with the committess then they collect tariffs. 
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- NGO’s have identified with their own studies that there  is a need for projects 
– based on their indicators. 
 
- All NGO’s are supposed to be registered with social welfare department in 
Accra (ministry of manpower) 
 
- If you register with this agency you then have to register with the sector. You 
are then supposed to register with the District Assembly. 
- D.A. development plan – developed by the D.A. planning unit within the D.A. 
have short, medium and long term plans. 
- Some D.A. may not have a plan. 
- So if D.A. have no plan then the CWSA comes in. If they have money then 
most likely the GWCL will be involved. 
- In Ghana you cannot refuse gifts. Problem to fight corruption. 
- Moral issue of wanting back 
- Recommends CSIR – Water resources research institute 
- IWMI – recommended by justice 
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Interview # 3  
 
Mr. Patrick 02-03 
Patrick – Executive Secretary – Coniwas 
 
- NGO program and plans 
- Duplicating efforts 
- Coniwas best practices 
o Code of ethics 
o Danida initiated environmental assessment for water policy – coniwas 
building code of ethics under framework of the policy. 
 
- 2 types of membership: 
o Associated members  
o 2 tiers – financial agreement based on size of the organization  
 1 million cedis for the base fee for largest tier but looking to 
increase the fees. 
 Not sure what it is for the CBO’s 
 
- NGO’s are supposed to meet three times a year but only met once a year at the 
MOLE conference. 
- Drafting of current policy is what has resulted in Coniwas. 
 
- FLAWS 
 
- There are flaws in 2 ways. 
 
- #1 
 
o DRA – Idea of things for free 
 Payment of Cash involving widespread involvement in the poor 
 Cash sealed as the only way of facilitating demand 
 
 
 
- #2 
o Expectations of the private sector 
 Once again the services can only go to the people that can 
afford it. 
 
- Path of dependence 
o Problem does the work hinder/constrain its work? Yes or No 
 
- Need a mechanism, to keep research 
- Harmonization of approaches, trying to initiate standard procedure 
- There is very limited cross-sectoral linkages between ministries – doesn’t exist 
in Ghana. 
- In the bubble of land reform, chieftancy. 
- In the new land reform process what comes out means it will supercede the 
chiefs decision, therefore if a person wants a borehole, the chiefs will lose 
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power. This means that the land will be privatized and the power goes to the 
person owning the plot.  
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Interview # 4 
 
 Nancy Cosway  CDN team leader NORWASP  
09-02 - Place CWSA regional office: Tamale 
 
- Wanted to make clear that Gusheigu and Karaga are separate districts now. 
- Nancy is thoroughly and is adamant that she is not a fan of the hand-dug wells 
- The community is locked into the hand-dug well scheme 
- CWSA goes into villages and digs wells. 
- D.A. in the Yendi district says no to hand –dug wells but clip and other ngo’s 
insist on using this technique. 
- NGO’s are not testing water quality at all – notes that there is no testing 
specifically for fluoride and other water diseases 
- There is no mandate for monitoring and no one is in charge of water quality 
testing in the region – local governments do not have a mandate 
- Notes a major lack of collaboration at the district level  
o Invited us to a sit in at the district level!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
o Next meeting in the next couple of months 
- no one really knows whats happening at the district level 
- Biggest problem is training and capacity building – none of this is happening 
on the political side at all – thinks it may be a good idea. 
- No registry of training at the district level 
- Per diems paid from civil sponsors who organize local meetings – say for 
example if Unicef is supporting a D.A. meeting the per diem is very high 
where by if the perdiem is lower then the attendance may be lower. 
- P.O.’s use CBO’s find out these acronyms!!!!  
- Has own baseline information and targets and has conducted its own studies 
- She is an advocate for the 5% base fee 
- Referred to the community operation and management concept 
- National policy is not enforceable 
- World vision not charging 5% whereby some other NGO’s are 
- Advocates public private partnership 
- CWSA not very active and proactive. But notes because sometimes the 
employees are going to so many trainings and meetings that their actual work 
tasks are not being performed. 
- Feels as though if private came into play that the cost would actually be 
cheaper to buy water for example in accra then it is currently costing. 
o Questions to ponder?????? 
 
- Why are so many communities asking for hand dug wells??? 
- Is there water in the wells right now? 
- Question the hierarchical structure in Ghana? 
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Interview: 4B 
 
Nancy Cosway 
Feb 28th. 
CWSA Tamale  
 
 
Recap from today’s meeting: 
 
We discussed a plethora of issues that stem within the realm of the Gusheigu district.  
 
- She noted that the DCE and the district assembly has there own motives and 
power relations. 
- Key notes: 
- Ghana water company takes 2% levy out of every tax bill and supposed to in 
turn give that back to the government in accra whereby the 2% is supposed to 
go into a fund that would be used as a rural development fund. Nancy 
questions where that money is going and if it is being used for this plan. This 
though has been an issue stemming even before the previous elections and 
before the CWSA even existed but still the 2% is being levied.  
- As well, the 2.1 million cedis that is to be charged for the community 
contribution is sitting in a bank account in tamale and the regional office does 
not know what to do with it. Whether it is to go back into providing drilling 
when the boreholes have no water or for some other purposes. 
- Admits that the lists have changed by the D.A. from the DCD to the DCE and 
went back to the D.A. to ask why the villages have been changed. But 
acknowledges that the lists do get changed.   
- She did acknowledge that the Kokomba’s are marginalized and are the ones 
who need most of the resources.  
- Thinks the DWST is lacking resources as the 20% from the common fund may 
be going into other peoples pockets. Doesn’t know where the money is going.  
- CWSA doesn’t have an ethnic map of where the kokomba’s are compared to 
the dogomba’s. 
- Admits that the bureaucratic process in the district assemblies is very slow and 
sometimes takes 6-8 months to make decisions on certain issues. This is why 
some the of the NGOs make decisions on their own and bypass the process.  
- There is no auditing system of contracts after they are awarded by CIDA as 
compared to the auditing mechanism put in place by DANIDA on all contract 
awards.   
- Nancy notes that a lot of the contracts now are not guaranteeing funds until the 
project has been completed due to the fact that contractors would just leave the 
job after they have collected ¾ of the money. There fore the work would never 
get finished.  
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Interview # 5  
 
Nashiru Bawa – CLIP Water Engineer 
09-02-06 
Place: Tamale  
 
- There are 3 levels of membership that CLIP is associated with 
o CONIWAS = national level  
o WaSnet = Meso level 
o KUGA0 = Local level 
- CONIWAS – idea is to slowly reduce funding by Danida down from 100% to 
30% in the future. Notes that DANIDA confirmed this plan at the last MOLE 
Conference. 
- CONIWAS supports the rational with common language filtered throughout 
the system to the local level 
- Sees a vision and a positive step forward that the D.A. and political powers 
would all have a common language all the way down to the local level. Would 
like to see the private sector buy into the same language. 
- Nash’s wishes:  
 priority of rural water from the government 
 GWC is 100% controlled by the GoG 
 People fearing water will become to expensive  
 Thinks it will be bad to privatize 
 Increase investment in rural water sector 
 Can’t do anything without investment 
 People in the village are the producers and need investment and 
development as they are the prime contributers to local food, 
farming etc.. 
 Looks at technical solutions for future – very focused in the 
investment of money and resources to farmers.  
 Would like to see some farmers who has many cows in the 
village to sell one to pay for well 
 
- GWC – 52% of water is lost to people getting money and giving water and 
pipes are too old and not fixed, so government has to subsidize. 
- Funds that are supposed to go into CWSA are being diverted to GWC – 
therefore  the gov’t needs to get money from donors like World Bank, whether 
it be in the way of services or money. 
 
 
- Key points: 
o Fetish Priest – mostly found in  areas of Yendi but can be found in 
Gusheigu and Karaga. Holds much respect in the villages but is not 
consulted with when entering the villages. Has direct influence with 
chief 
o Healer – mostly found in all villages and when there is sicknes like 
guinea worm etc. has much influence in village, nash notes that these 
people are involved in some watsans but are rarely consulted 
o Went into drawing of chief and sub chief setting and who reports to 
who.  
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o 3 members of village sign contract for well-the mazama or woman’s 
leader the chief and the chairman.  
o Nash says he’s subconsciously aware of village customs based on 
visual representation entering the village such as a stone on hay with 
blood on top would indicate a fetish priest or healer is in the village 
etc… Nash would then accustom his presentation 
o Would rely on local customs to find water essentially asking where the 
water sources are existing or using a divine healer. Lets see how this 
happens. NGO’s use little science to find water, why is this. Then why 
do projects? 
o CWSA says that this is bad due to the fact of so many dry wells. 
o Notes that Kokumba’s and Dogomba’s still live in communities 
together but some kokumba’s have moved out. 
 
Expansion of interview with Nash on: 
February 19th. 
 
Quick points – 
- Clip actually contracts out workers for the teams to perform construction to 
the villages does not have the capacity to do the work themselves. 
- Comments on the Christian organization – notes that he denies that they are a 
Christian organization as he has heard nothing to say that they are one. 
Doesn’t want to admit that they are building Christian schools. Ask about the 
meals and he notes that they do this but feels it is good luck or charm to do so.  
- Notes that World Vision is apart of the west Africa network which has 6 
members in the network but notes it is not working. Therefore this is a good 
opportunity for World Vision to adopt the WaSnet concept.  
- Nash has not called World Vision once but has relied on the District Co-
ordinator to conduct all of the work within the district itself. May not be the 
best strategy as the head office is 27km north of hear.  
-  
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Interview # 6  
 
Rikke Pedersen,   
02-09-06 
Place: CLIP office Tamale 
 
Chairman of CLIP Dr. Abu Car Allabas 
 
- Does hire private firms to dig wells when CLIP is at its capacity. 2 wells at 
one time is the capacity. 
- Now that phase 3 is accepted there will be capacity of 3 wells. 
- One of the main criteria Rikke mentions is the peoples need for water- they 
assess under their own criteria. 
- When the selected villages are animated the decision is made by the 
committee if the village will be selected. 
- Supposed to pay 500,000 cedis but wait to pay until the well is built and water 
is in the well. 
o Illyasu 
- When Illyasu goes to the village he accepts gifts from them such as lunch or 
food so he accepts their gifts. If that village is selected he will go back to the 
village and give 50,000 cedis towards the well. Its not every community that 
gives gifts but most.  
- CLIP sometime uses food or labour to valuate the money that may not be 
afforded. 
- 25 million cedis for one well so 5% is not actually 500,000 cedis but this is 
where the value and food comes in. 
- The actual payment should come from the district assemblies who should pay 
the 500,000 cedis for the well for the rural areas but priorities are somewhere 
else.  
- 5 year plans are supposed to be co-ordinated with CLIP. 
- Illyasu and Rikke note that D.A. are not functional or doing what they are 
supposed to do.  
- CLIP has made a budget to support the D.A. where they think the weakness is. 
- CLIP does not coordinate with the other NGO’s when giving resources. 
o Rikke 
- Say’s its difficult to co-ordinate with other NGO’s but doesn’t know why. 
- This is the reason for the WaSnet concept so duplication will not occur. 
- Has seen it that 3-4 commitees are providing the same facilities to one 
community. 
- D.A. are supposed to provide a list of communities then CLIP picks the 
communities to go and sends the list back to the D.A.. Ideally al the NGO’s 
are supposed to do this. 
o Illyasu 
 
- Some NGO’s have head offices at National level and conduct projects in 
regions but simply come from head office and do not co-ordinate with D.A. at 
all. 
- Policy does not reflect formal law. 
- No formal law for NGO’s to follow – some NGO’s refuse to attend meetings 
and collaborations to try and follow some sort of format. 
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o Rikke 
- Rikke feels it would be great to take some ngo funding away and funnel it to 
the district assembly – she feels this is the direct route to build capacity. She 
notes this would provide extra funds but would undermine the ultimate goal of 
an NGO. 
- Likes the idea of having their own baseline reports but says who is going to do 
it and with what money? 
- When asked about indigenous knowledge she notes that it isn’t her 
responsibility to formally involve herself with this as she sees her role as a 
support to people such as nash, micro credit person. 
- Notes that it is more important to concentrate at the micro and meso adovacy 
levels than at the national level.  
- No other collaborative projects with other NGO’s but nash is to confirm 
- If school for life has a project in the village then it will be considered in higher 
priority than others without school for life. 
o Illyasu 
- Uses Unicef baseline reports for formal policy 
- If you concentrated on one village and not the others then there would be some 
sort of migration. 
- D.C. in Yendi district is very co-operative – one who represents the D.A. 
- D.C. in Gusheigu/Karaga is very  co-operative as well. 
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Interview # 7 
 
CLIP District Co-ordinator – February 15th -06 
Hameratu Tani Abudulai 
Gushiegu – Karaga District 
 
D.A. has uses a general development plan 2004-2005 
 
- not specifically water sector plan but general medium term plan (5 years) 
- Give CLIP communities – villages from list at D.A. 
- If CLIP D.C. gets copy she records it and sends the application to CLIP. 
- If DWST is doing work for CLIP, CLIP will give fuel or resources to help the 
DWST. 
- When asked if other NGO’s do this she didn’t know but assumed that it does 
happen with the NGO’s that co-ordinate via the D.A. 
- Little if any money at the District Assembly level. 
- In Gusheigu/Karaga – CLIP and world vision have duplicated 
- Some NGO’ have a bigger budget than the D.A. and do not bother to co-
ordinate via the D.A. as they feel things will move faster. Some NGO’s have 
more capacity 
- Some NGO’ are providing the District Assembly itself the same resources to 
help supplement the lack of funds from the D.A.. 
- Funds are going to Administration and Motorcycles etc….Declines corruption 
but I was expecting that answer…… 
- Norwasp and Cida have contracts to locally based NGO’s as indicated on the 
WaSnet list. 
- 3 local NGO’s are contracted to conduct animation and training via Norwasp 
- When animation is conducted – then there is money collection of the 5% for 
boreholes and training for WatSan – then contract to regional construction 
firms come in that are hired to dig. Most likely from Tamale. 
- Local NGO’s apply for contract supplied by CIDA/ NORWASP to conduct 
this process.  
- Sometimes boreholes do not have water but results have been locating water 
(?) 
- Communities pay 2.1 million cedis if there is no water then the money is given 
back. This directly contradicts works foreman  comments who has said that the 
community generally loses the money 
- WaSnet – looks at communication instead of aligning approaches as a more 
realistic approach. 
- There are targets to meet from donors which effects project duplication 
especially with World Vision. 
- Wants CIDA plans to be aligned with D.A. 
- The reason why CIDA and NORWASP has not attended WaSnet meetings is 
because they expect the 3 contracted NGO’s to represent them at these 
meetings. 
 
- Once hand dug wells are built there is migration close to or near these 
communities. Hence the demand for hand dug wells in the area. 
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- If the wells are not functional or breaking down it means the village persons 
think the NGO’s are supposed to replace the well for them. It’s very tough 
though because once the wells are dug the NGO’s have other priorities to 
construct other wells rather than focus on existing village wells. 
- Kokumba’s are more organized than the Dogumba’s. Feels the Dogumba’s are 
not ready to receive help but maybe are becoming aware of development 
issues. 
- World Vision has very much interaction with Christian villages (Kokumba’s) 
more than the muslim dogumba villages. 
- Does not know how many communities ie, world vision or other ngos have in 
their plans or what communities they work in.  
- When hand dug wells break down the women go to the traditional sources as 
the wells are generally not fixed. 
- She has a theory that one of the reasons why the wells are not fixed is because 
the men think the women have overused the well, thus the reason why it broke 
down therefore going to the traditional source is a type of punishment.  
- Some villages think borehole is a status symbol. The village still request a 
borehole even though water doesn’t flow – the borehole is just a status symbol 
- It’s still a status symbol if a village has a hand dug well compared to villages 
who do not. 
- The problem is the villages do not see the true reason for the wells, or vice 
versa the ngos do not see the true value of local traditions. 
- When asked about the “Gift” is familiar with the concept and does not feel this 
is the issue in the communities.  
- CLIP still valuates animals, labour, grains etc.. if the communities do not have 
money to construct. But this then leads into the micro – credit scheme.  
 
WatSan’s 
- In some communities the women are more active than other communities as 
compared to the activities of the men.  
- In some villages the women have more power than the men whereas it is 
opposite in other villages. 
- The villages are heavily consulted in the animation about identifying the 
characteristics of the WatSans and how to form them. 
- Charmers are specifically dealing with development issues but if there are 
different ngos that have approached the community there will be different 
charmers for each of the ngos. This also depends on the sector involved. 
- If there is no charmer then you have to look for a linguist. 
- If there is a contact in the contract then you have to contact that person in the 
village whoever it may be. 
IKS 
- Would like to see some conflict resolution tools incorporated into local policy 
- The policy itself does not reflect the grassroots events – thus somewhat 
superficial 
- Area councils not existing or have very limited capacity. 
- Unit committees/Elected Assemblies members/Town area councils have very 
limited capacity. 
- A lot of NGO’s are focused on administration. 
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Interview # 8  
 
PHAST training seminar Yendi:  
Tuesday/Wednesday – February 21/22-06 
Facilitator’s name: Steven Adongo – Consultant - CLIP. 
 
PHAST 
- builds on peoples ability to address and resolve problems 
- every community has its own ability to solve problems 
 
Health awareness and understanding to provide lasting change in behaviour  
- try to get villagers to understand the implications of bad hygiene  
- when people understand why improved hygiene and sanitation is to their 
advantage, they will act. 
- People will solve their own problems best in a participatory process. 
o People share ideas in a democratic way. 
- The participatory process will work only if there exists respect for peoples 
knowledge and ideas, with clear recognition of their individual and 
collective inputs and a commitment to creating opportunities for people to 
express themselves. 
 
The best way to achieve sustainable development is to take an incremental approach. 
- incremental approach 
o take tiny steps and build on what is already available. 
 
- Improvement in hygiene behavior alone has been shown to have a positive 
health impact 
- ( THOUGHT- Behavior change must come before the facility is built?) 
- (What happens with firms with priorities from above)  
 
Intro of PHAST 
- PHAST uses initiatives derived from SARAR – which develops human 
capacities. 
- S = Self Esteem  
o Self confidence  
 
- A = Associative strengths  
o Group dynamics or associative force 
o Power in the group in community is a larger force than single 
strengths 
 
- A = Action Planning  
- R = Assuming responsibility 
o Once the SARA has been intiated then he feels the community will 
respond positively. 
 
 
GROUP EXERCISE (comments) 
Factors Restraining Community Participation: 
- The women and children do not want to talk in front of the men 
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- Lack of transparency  
- Dictatorship 
- Lack of confidence of field workers  
- Fear of change (the unknown) 
- No initial involvement in decision 
- Political and ethnic differences – development workers go to communities 
with political shirts – the communities associate the shirt with ethnic ties 
within the political party. If a community does not recognize that ethnicity 
or is not affiliated with that party or ethnic background the community will 
run away from the NGO or party coming to the village. 
 
SOLUTIONS: 
1. Focus groups and communication 
2. a). Create a MISU (Management Information Systems Unit) a central place 
to store data that all communities and stakeholders can trust. 
b). Effective communication 
3. Decentralize community leadership 
      a). enhance under participation 
4. Build capacity of extension officers/Staff conducting trips out to the field 
5. Information Dissemenation: 
      a). Exchange programs for villages 
      b). Conduct joint animation programs with other villages 
6). Involve all stakeholders at all stages – active in policy transformation and  
participation. 
7). Constant diologue amongst stakeholders. 
 
JOHARI WINDOW: 
 
Know to Self    Not 
Known to self 
 
Known to      
Others 
 
 
 
Not Known  
To others  
 
  
 
 
- Promote good interpersonal relationship there is a need to open some of 
these windows 
o Trust 
o Transparency 
o Etc….. See notes and handouts 
Factors to address within the JOHARI window above and how the broker can issues 
that the broker can identify and use the window to help mediate. 
 
 
The Public Self 
(Open) 
 
The Blind Self 
 
 
The Private Self 
(Hidden) 
 
 
The Unkown 
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- Immoral Conduct 
- Dissapointment – if you don’t come to an appointment scheduled with the 
village then they will not trust you. 
- Deciet 
- Pride – for example, chiefs palace, using left hand to point is not a good 
thing. 
- Loose talks – “ Do you have manners at all” 
- Unguided Language – be nice “shutup” 
- Ethnic differences – if a Christian person goes to village of muslim and 
notes “what can they do for me” 
- Bad Habits – Drunkeness and other illicit drugs. 
- Demanding gifts from the community at the end of the work period – for 
example worker asks for a guinea fowl or lamb at the end of a work week ( 
if they are digging a well in the community). Next time the community 
members will just run away. 
 
PHAST STEPS: 
1. Problem Identification 
2. Problem Analysis 
3. Planning for Solutions 
4. Selecting Options 
5. Planning for facilities and behavior change 
6. Planning for Monitoring and Evaluation 
7. Participatory 
 
Notes from Day 1:  
- We used the JOHARI window yesterday but we could spin it around 
regarding the development worker questioning and trying to be aware of 
the framework that surrounds themselves. This could be a key tool for 
application of the broker.  
- The JOHARI itself if a brokerage mechanism 
- Today the consultant was wearing a CLIP t-shirt in front of all the gov’t 
workers.  
- CLIP also paid per diems to Gushiegu and Yendi employees (50,000 for 
Yendi and 100,000 for Gushiegu. Good positioning for broker. 
- Consultant gave comments on roles of facilitation but did not give 
handouts or programming material about how to do this.  
- This is more of a teaching course about issues in the field and not 
programming and timing blocks (for example) about teaching WatSan’s. 
- Consultant gave handouts about how to advise and learn from community 
but does not give programming handouts how to learn about policy alone 
and translation and issues to work with stakeholders and ways of educating 
not only WatSan’s but other stakeholders as well, such as what CLIP is 
doing here. 
 
Notes for project: 
- Villages visited from Gusheigu – in all 11 villages there were no women 
who were consulted from the WatSan. 
- In the 15 villages for Handover only 1 woman was present to be advised in 
the WatSan for handover.  
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- Out of the 26 villages 1 woman was consulted for water issues – policy 
does not recognize this motive.  
- Nothing in development plan to recognize and enforce.  
- In the 11 villages in Gusheigu no chiefs were present (for siting) 
- In the 15 villages there was 4 chiefs that signed the piece of paper – all 
Kokumba who have no land rights therefore the whole process is 
superficial. None of the ceremonies is protected by law except in the 
Dogumba villages 
- If this is the case the whole process is strictly a priority of the NGO and 
not abiding by country law.  
 
Must remember Names of villages in handover: 
- Who signed it  
- Role in the community 
- Did a Dogomba chief sign a hand over in smaller Kokumba villages? 
- Were there any women involved, if so which village? 
 
More Comments: 
 
Facilitator commented to all district people that “when you apply to CLIP” for a well. 
Very nice strategy for CLIP to distribute wells throughout the District Process – 
especially if district has no money. The first choice would be CLIP. Positioning????? 
 
Why was the district split without any consultation at the local level??? Is it 
political???? 
 
The consultant used for the seminar was hired by CLIP therefore promoting the CLIP 
process would in fact help advocate positioning for CLIP itself.   
 
NOTES FROM PROJECT BOOK 2. 
 
- The problem is NGOs and politicians are giving facilities first either for 
political reasons (CWSA) for votes or NGOs to get numbers for Donor 
purposes, to fulfill funding. Have to ask Nancy about this.  
- This could be the gift idea. 
- The PHAST project is an interesting tool used by brokers to train brokers 
themselves. Provides somewhat of a methodology for the process. 
- Facilitator says its difficult to envision yourself as community members, 
Why??? No baseline data or they just don’t care….  
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Interview # 9  
 
District Assembly – Gusheigu District 
General Stakeholder Meeting 10:30 am.  
February 22nd/06 
 
Attendance: 
 CWSA regional director 
 DWST  
 Community members from villages 
 CLIP  
 World Vision (who was late, not Elizabeth and left in 20 minuites) 
 Local NGO’s  
  RUDA 
  SANIDA 
 Area Mechanic 
 
Key Notes for this is general observation about issues stemming in the village. 
It was an interactive process whereby the stakeholders have an open forum to ask 
questions and recive comments about what is happening at the district and regional 
level.  
 
- Discussion and Issues in general 
o Flouride levels in the district are very high at the moment and people 
are looking at CWSA and the larger NGOs to figure out how to tackle 
this problem 
o Latrines – Looking for D.A. to fulfill their commitments and abide by 
their promises.  
o Water projects such as incomplete boreholes and payment of services 
are not enforced and or not adhered to. This is on many levels – 
completion of boreholes and hand dug wells by ngos;  payment of fees 
for commitments made by CWSA, D.A. and CIDA. 
Area  Mechanic: 
- Does the area mechanic have the ability to fix wells not only for CWSA, but 
for other NGO’s in the area as well. 
- Answer: W.V. says yes we are all one happy family and would encourage area 
mechanic in consulation with W.V. to do so. Boreholes are for the community 
and do not belong to W.V. (load of political bullshit) 
- CLIP reiterated the same. 
 
Facilitator (CWSA regional director) 
- All wells and boreholes could be fixed by the area mechanic and the D.A. 
should be held accountable for the cost (social cost whereby funds would be 
distributed via tax.) 
  
CLIP D.C. 
- Notes that all CLIP wells that have been handed over would then have the 
ability to be serviced by the area mechanic but not before hand.  
 
BEN (Environmental officer) 
250  
- mentions that W.V. focuses more on water at the source but not hygiene 
education or how to store the water. So what has been happening is the project 
is completed but W.V. may move onto other priorities in the village and not 
continue education on the water storage aspect.  
 
W.V. Rep 
- World Vision would be interested in consulting with the Environmental Health 
Officer when dealing with health and sanitation issues.  
 
Breimah Notes (DWST team leader)  
- Even boreholes that have been drilled 4 years ago haven’t received hand-
pumps because they haven’t been able to pay for the pump itself. Not sure 
what to make of this.  
Facilitator notes: 
- Some communities import guinea worm to their own village from another 
water source then report to the D.A. or Donor that they have been infected. 
This then moves that village up on the list of priorities for the selection 
process.  
- There are other problems that are intertwined with this strategy. He feels that 
if this trend builds that communities are doing this then the guinea worm will 
become uncontrollable again as the number of villages will grow with the 
infected water source. This of course is an issue that needs to be addressed 
asap as there are more cases of this occuring in the Gusheigu district.  
- Concept of paying 
o It is a delicate issue when a borehole is installed and the community 
doesn’t pay. Should the pump be locked????? Gives an example in 
Mamprusi where the pump was locked and then turned into a politicial 
issue in accra as the village then advocated the issue under political 
injustice in the area.  
 
- He feels the problem lays in some ngo’s are not requesting the 5% cost for the 
construction of the wells, therefore it undermines the whole DRA approach 
adopted by the government and supportive ngo policy.  
 
Breimah Notes: 
- Boreholes have stopped most of the guinea worm issues to this point. But now 
sees some trends that latrines that are being built are located near water 
sources and begin to contaminate the water. So the people realized this and 
stopped using the latrine and started to defecate indiscriminately in the 
surrounding area.  
- Says this is a classic case of a project moving into a community without 
education before hand. The private contractor – or latrine artisan – who was 
hired by the CWSA to construct the latrine stood up and mentioned that this 
was the area where the elders wanted the latrine and not in another spot. So he 
felt obliged to construct their.  
 
 
Community WatSan Member: 
- issue of a hand-dug well that was constructed in a community where the 
previous water source (dam) has been filling with “shit”.  
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- The Hand dug well was constructed but for most of the dry season the well is 
empty forcing the villagers to use the pre-existing water source from the dam. 
- So a borehole was then constructed via the CWSA and the quality of the water 
was very poor as there are very high levels of fluoride.  
 
P.O. Member: 
- In Phase 2 of the NORWASP program ( it is now in phase 4) communities 
who have paid and the borehole was drilled three years ago do not have a 
pump installed. Why? 
 
Facilitator Notes that: 
 
- Some communities who have been selected for drilling actually have moved away 
from the original spot where the borehole was to be drilled. Another community 
(community B) will move to the place where the previous village (community A) was 
located and therefore the drilling will still take place. The problem is the borehole 
drilling company doesn’t know or care that this is not the selected village (as they 
have relocated) and continue to drill in that spot. Once the contract is over and the 
CWSA figures out this is the wrong village, the pump is not given to that village as 
they have not applied and were not on the list. The catch is the community (B) paid 
the drilling company the money for the borehole so they actually do own the borehole 
but community A who has moved is out of luck as they have nothing. So what 
happens is Community A is bumped up on the list of communities for the next 
contracts therefore they will be attended to. Meanwhile community B has to wait for 
the pump or pay full price for the pump from a private vendor.  
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Interview # 10  
 
World Vision Office 
Interview – Elizabeth Darko (Mrs.) Christian Co-ordinator and Water liason Gusheigu 
District. 
February 22nd/06 
 
World vision Objectives: 
- Objectives from the international objectives are filtered down from the top. 
Head office in USA. 
- Main donor sponsors are from USA, CANADA, AUSTRALIA. 
- World Vision has their own ADP’s Area Development Plans – which provide 
a localized set of objectives in accordance to international objectives.  
- World Vision is funded by its own membership and by private individuals 
from inside Ghana and internationally. Couldn’t get from here the sponors 
from within Ghana. 
- Notes that Gusheigu is mostly muslim.  
- Feels its important to introduce the children and general population to Christ 
even if they are members of the Muslim tradition. 
- She feels this is the only route for the future of the children in the area. They 
are deprived and starving, have no education and need the word of god to help 
them out of this scenario. 
- Church of Christ not an ngo in the area, but I have heard different stories. 
- W.V. uses Drama, fun shows and education to introduce the word of god 
especially in the schools in which they operate.  
- After this introduction to god via the above examples. 
- Built Nazareth schools then the children can proceed to the primary W.V. 
schools or if they can to the normal public schools. Even if the children decide 
to attend the non-christian schools they still would have been introduced to the 
works of god.  
- In various circumstances donors (private) will donate food and medical 
supplies to pass on to the people via world vision. W.V. then decides how they 
wan to distribute these goods, whether it be through the schools (which is the 
most popular route) or through the office.  
- Notes she doesn’t see the component of Christianity with the other NGOs so 
why would W.V. want to collaborate if they do not share the same common 
goals. 
- It would be easier to collaborate with the other NGOs if they too decided to 
spread the word of god.  
- Strategy to move into areas begins with the commitment to stay in the area for 
many years. This gives time to personally sponsor children and have them 
grow up along with World Vision.  
- The above is considered a programme version of projects initiated by W.V. 
meanwhile the water component of the Area Development Plan has a project 
concept (which has a shorter time span)  
- The water project component is sponsored by the Cornard Hilton Foundation – 
which is the main sponsor of the drilling teams and water animation 
components.  
- W.V. doesn’t charge money for water projects and includes the ownership 
concept in the ability of the communities to conduct labour tasks associated 
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with the project. It is when pumps or repairs are needed that the community is 
supposed to pay. 
- Notes that if other communities are using the borehole world vision advises 
communities to charge 500 cedis per usage of the pump. This in turn is to help 
raise funds to fix the pumps etc… but also notes that if the community cannot 
afford to fix the pumps they (W.V.) will come anyways to fix it, but doesn’t 
know when. 
- Relationship with the CWSA is very corgial. Acknowledges the efforts of 
organizations such as clip to start an ngo network but she couldn’t even 
remember the name of it and noted that they prefere to network with other ngo 
who prefer to spread the word of god. For example they belong to a Christian 
network called the Great Commission Network. 
- W.V. donors dictate what to do with the money and resources and how it is 
spent according to international objectives therefore Elizabeth says directly 
that they completely bypass the GPRS and local formal systematic processes 
set by regulated institutions here in Ghana. This includes the Water supply 
policy. 
Community Strategy 
- I posed the questions of tactic and objectives trying to break into communities 
and also trying to find how what is the priority of W.V. in the local area  
- Elizabeth notes that in a community you cannot have all muslims in one 
community, when you enter a community for the first time they always look 
for the person in the group that has leadership qualities such as open voice, 
and if people listen to him/her or not, then target that person to either start 
introducing the word of god via water projects, school for the children etc… 
and build from that.  
- Notes that it is easier to work with the Kokumba villages and that there aren’t 
many projects at all in dogumba villages but they are proactively trying to find 
ways to enter dogumba communites. Some villages are easy to find the key or 
person to enter and in some villages it is quite hard to find these people.  
- Admits they do use development projects to enter the villages. It is the type of 
project they determine to use which will be the most effective in that 
community, wether it be a school or water project, etc..   
- Then I posed the question about wether communities have to apply or not for 
projects if W.V. is so aggressive in promoting the word of god. Elizabeth 
noted that not all villages are applying for projects. The NGOs are 
approaching some villages for entrance into the village itself. 
- Admits that they do have their own WatSan’s and also acknowledges that 
CLIP has there own WatSan’s. there is a few motives for this – the WatSan’s 
that W.V. picks also are supposed to help spread the word of god, also they are 
people who have expertise in the field of water management. Notes that 
CLIP’s watsan’s are trained differently for different tasks. (That is the most I 
could get out of her on that note for now as Tanni the D.C. for CLIP is 
walking into the office.  
o Must go back for another interview.  
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Interview # 11 
 
Gusheigu District Office  
Interview: Ben Atim  
Environmental Officer – District of Gusheigu 
Location: Gusheigu – February 23rd. 
 
 
Our initial conversation began with the role of the district assembly in a formal sense 
just to ease into the conversation and what Ben’s Role is. We then moved into D.A. 
role how he sees it. After talking with Ben after a while I realized that he was not 
dogumba or kokomba and felt passionate about other issues associated to the area. So 
this was a point that I knew if there was going to be anyone that may not be biased in 
this case as much as any other government worker it would be him. Thus we talked 
politics and undermining issues in the district.  
 
D.A. – Ideal roles  
 - Collaborate  
- Role of the D.A. must provide fuel and resources to go out and educate the 
communities before projects are to occur no matter from which 
organization.  
- If the D.A. cannot do this the efforts of the NGOs become very tough as 
they have to do this on their own and in most cases it is not happening as 
there aren’t enough resources from most of the NGOs in the district.  
- He mentions that it is imperative that the NGOs in Gusheigu has to inform 
the D.A. of their actions. Notes that nothing is enforceable on a formal 
sense within the district assembly and it is somewhat useless to try and 
spend the resources on doing so (enforcement), basically the ngos can do 
what they want. Some collaborate and try and build capacity of the D.A. 
and some don’t bother.  
- Notes that the first issue and is well know in the district that the D.A. must 
try to find a way to enforce local policy on the formal level. It is the only 
way that collaboration will exist.  
- Lots of latrines and wells that are constructed are constructed with 
materials that are not local, either from tamale or Accra. So when the 
projects leave communities, the communities themselves have a hard time 
to fix the pumps for example as replacements cost too much money. 
Another example is the tin roofs instead of thatch, the only way people can 
fix the tin roofs is if the material comes from tamale. This is the same for 
pump issues.  
- His role is to try and educate the communities about environmental issues 
such as water, hygiene, pollution etc… as well he is to report to the D.C.D. 
about issues stemming within the planning of District plans and regional 
policy that may effect the district itself. As well, he is to co-ordinate with 
the planning officer regarding which villages are on the list of selection. 
This is in regards to their capacity to conduct tasks.  
- The D.A. has no money to perform most of the tasks mentioned above. If 
they have a motorbike there would be no money for fuel, so either the 
funds come the pocket of the employee or the bike remains idol.  
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- Notes that the D.A is only limited to the Gusheigu town itself and has 
absolutely no capacity to extend into the rural area. This is where the role 
of the CWSA must come into play, but explains that there is limited if no 
funding transfers from the CWSA. ( To support this comment, Patricia at 
the CWSA – mentioned that the CWSA itself is supposed to allocated 
5.5% of funds from accra to the regional districts. This is not happening – 
the only funds coming from accra to the regional office is the money from 
the 5% common fund.  
 
We then moved into issues undermining the local area: 
- There is a sub-culture in the town and district that does not formally rule 
the area but informally has control.  
- It is very political in the area and many issues are prevalent that stem 
beyond general policy. 
o Development workers move to the field to conduct work wearing 
local political shirts and advocating political issues.  
o If the community is not supporting that party then the community 
itself runs away. After this happens you will not see that 
development agency whoever it may be return to that village with a 
project in mind.  
o Another Example: People in Gusheigu refuse to use the HIPC 
logoed bathrooms that are in the villages. The people will decide to 
deficate beside the bathroom itself. This is because HIPC is 
government sponsored and the people refuse to use that bathroom. 
This is relvant for a majority of Kokomba’s and the Abudi gate of 
the Dogomba’s. 
o He agrees that there is underlying/undermining principles within 
some of the NGOs as the Kokomba’s are heavily outcasted and 
chastised. The NGO being the contract lists from CWSA 
determined at the District Level.  
o It was proposed in the district to allow the Kokomba’s their own 
area council but it was denied by the political wing of the D.A. in 
Gusheigu as the members themselves are appointed by government 
and therefore are suppressing the Kokomba’s. 
o This is confirmed for example the Kokomba farmers, when coming 
to market, are levied a tax when trying to sell their goods, 
meanwhile the dogumba’s are not charged a tax.  
o This flows into the political system. In the Dogomba/kokomba 
areas the land rights are superficial as the traditional right holders 
are the Dogomba’s so when a handover is taken place to a 
Kokomba chief, its actually the dogumba chief who has the land 
right.  
 
He took a sight tour in the northern part of the district near the East Mamprusi boarder 
and to his horror he found kokomba villages totally sick and poor – had to wald 7-10 
km for water alone. Down the road there was a dogumba village with a CWSA 
installed borehole and Pump. I asked why the Kokomba’s do not visit this borehole 
then. He mentioned that the dogumba community charges too much money for them 
to use and in the dry season they do not allow any kokomba farmers to visit the pump. 
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Visual note, he was almost crying. And mentioned that he did cry when he went back 
to talk to the Kokomba village.  
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Interview # 12  
 
District Assembly Office – Gusheigu  
Interview: Mahama Abueari - District Coordinating Executive (DCE) 
February 24th/06 
 
Political wing of the District Assembly. Reports to the D.A. itself on all issues.  
 
Political: 
- Responsible for development progress in the district.  
- Ideally to represent the people of Gusheigu in Tamale and Accra. 
- Notes that the D.A. is the largest organizing body in the district and has good 
relations with all NGOs 
- D.A. conducts meetings with the D.C.D. to collaborate with the administrative 
side of D.A. Generally meetings happen once a month or quarterly pending on 
the urgency of the issue.  
- When asked if the meetings are open to the public? No, any meetings the D.A. 
has only members such as the Public heads or local departments are invited. 
None of the meetings are open to the general public. When asked Why? He 
mentioned that is the role of the body’s beneath to represent the people.  
- Any issues that stem from the local level are dealt with at sub-committee 
meetings which are supposed to deal with sectoral issues that directly relate to 
D.A. general processes. The issues presented by the Sub-commitees to the 
D.A. Executive Committee are then reviewed by the district assembly and 
decisions are made.  
- Elected Members:  
o 30% are gov’t appointed  
o If 100 members are elected gov’t can appoint 30 to make the total of 
130 as a total D.A. 
o In Gusheigu before the split with Karaga there were 42 people that 
were elected and 18 appointed.  
o He thinks that Gusheigu now has 18 elected individuals and 10 
appointed which isn’t in line with the 30% but there is elections 
coming in June. This is when the 30 % will be adhered to. He was not 
sure of the numbers now which is strange, but I have them from the 
next interview. 
- Any information stemming from local knowledge is supposed to be advocated 
via the Unit committees through the area town council and into the district 
system. 
- In development projects such as water projects when the CWSA is involved 
the D.A. is supposed to provide:  
 15% of the cost stemming from the community 
 10% from the community itself 
 75% from the NGO 
 
- He notes that the D.A. usually ends up paying 25% of the cost to cover the 
community contribution process. This is supposed to be within all water 
projects in the district. 
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- In the case that the D.A. can’t pay the community contribution, the D.A. 
demands the money from the P.O. via the contract process in case the farmers 
also cannot pay.   
- Some NGOs have a bigger budget than the district assembly itself such as 
w.v.. He thinks this is ok that they go out on their own to provide projects. 
Doesn’t feel that this is a problem.  
- Local ngos do involve themselves in local politics and some ngos are funded 
via contracts from the D.A. – therefore they do involve themselves in local 
politics in some way or another. Political affairs are prevalent.  
- Local NGOs/P.O. are cautious about issues in the area because it could effect 
their business.  
- NPP follows law and if they find out that some ngos take alliances the D.A. 
will cancel contracts. But notes that Ghana is a free country and political 
people can speak freely if they want and move around the streets as they wish. 
He notes in a chuckle that especially if they are NPP supporters.  
- When asked about the issue that the Kokomba’s were denied the right to an 
area council to the north east of the district. He adimently denies any 
favourtism to certain groups. Says there are: 
o 8 area councils 
 4 kokomba area councils 
 4 dogumba area councils – 2 town councils and 2 area councils  
- Gusheigu district 
o Kokomba don’t have land rights as it stands in the regional land policy. 
o The Kokomba have paid loyalties to the traditional Dogumba chief and 
still happens today.  
o At a point in time the Dogumba chief let the Kokumba settle on the 
land. This was to expand the agricultural market of the area and have 
the Kokumbas work the land, thus pay royalties to the Dogumba Chief.  
o At a point the Kokumba chief himself was subletting his settled area 
and not reporting this to the dogumba chief therefore the kokomba 
would in fact make more money at the market.  
o Over time the Kokumba children who settled on this land didn’t 
recognize the traditional loyalty of the dogumba chief and this was 
how war broke out. 
 
He wanted to move out of this issue so we did. We moved back into the political 
process. 
- Admited that he himself was a NPP sympathizer and this also comprises a 
large % of the members of the D.A. 
- He reports to tamale on certain issues but in sensitive issues reports directly to 
Accra. I asked what were sensitive issues but he sidetracked saying key 
demographic issues and of if there is conflict such as the recent cheiftancy 
issue. He didn’t want to talk about more and moved off the topic in a 
politically smooth way.  
 
If he wanted to change anything in his district he includes education and water to all 
the people.  
He notes that the majority of Kokumba’s in the area do not take education seriously 
while the dogumba population does. Feels the Kokumba will always be left behind 
due to their lack of motivation towards education and development in general. He 
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notes that the Kokumba really need focus and drive. Notes that with education the 
people of the area will resort to talking during sensitive issues as they will be able to 
read local formal policy and realize that killing others is against the law. In some of 
the communities in the region they are not aware that killing people and breaking the 
local laws is a bad thing as they have been practicing these ways for a long period of 
time.  
 
He advocates for all NGOs to come to the district as sees no issues in letting them do 
whatever they want in the area. No boarders – total deregulation.  
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Interview # 13 
 
District Office – Gusheigu  
Braimah Chentiwuni 
DWST team leader – Gusheigu District  
February 24th-06 
 
Braimah is the DWST team leader in Gusheigu. It is his responsibility to help select 
and pick the communities to be submitted to the D.C.D. thus then approved by the 
district assembly.  
 
- DWST has 3 members: 
o 1 hygiene educator 
o 1 water technician (gives technical advice) 
o 1 community mobilizer (suppose to teach how to mobilize meetings). 
 
- They are supposed to work together as a team.  
- The team basically goes after the latrines or wells that have been built. 
- Team Leaders role is to supervise which NGO’s are registered in the district 
for water and sanitation services. If they are not registered or are not adhereing 
to policy he is supposed to be the one who asks why and to approach the NGO 
in question.  
- Once the NGO has registered the D.C.D. will invite the NGO to collaborate 
with the DWST. 
- DWST is the main body who chooses the villages/communities because they 
are the ones who know the communities best meaning the ones who need 
water, and services.  
- When communities apply the DWST will verify the community actually needs 
water or if they are denied.  
- Top priority is his mind is: 
o How far to the water source 
o Distance from water 
o Type of water 
o Though distance is one of the big indicators. ( I asked about disease 
and he mentioned they are supposed to investigate each community 
about which disease, the source and how it got there. Acknowledged 
that some communities use import strategies to bump themselves on 
the list for a borehole. 
 
- When asked about the efficiency of the borehole to the hand-dug well. He 
notes that most of the hand-dug wells dry up in the rainy season especially 
with low rains. But acknowledges that the hand –dug wells are less expensive 
pending on who is providing the well.  
- Capital cost for a borehole is 2.1 million cedis, capital cost for hand-dug well 
is 500,000 cedis est.. 
- Notes that the boreholes have a higher success rate than the hand-dug wells in 
regards to water retention but if he were to chose the hand dug well is easier to 
maintain than that of the borehole.  
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- The only difference is the Hand Dug Wells involves to much manpower and 
take longer to build than the boreholes, as the boreholes themselves do not 
include much labour. Hand Dug Wells take much more time to construct.  
- Feels the wells payment concept is working in some villages but with the 
variance of pricing from different stakeholders there is no consistency and is 
causing a problem. 
- Makes note that Hand –Dug wells are intended to service 75-100 people and a 
borehole is intended to service 150-300 people. The community then has the 
right to apply for another.  
- Brings up the issue again of the guinea worm import from other villages. And 
feels the villages know the numbers as mentioned in the previous line and will 
also have some fulani in their village to increase the number of the village 
itself so it falls under the criteria slection. Meaning that if the fulani increase 
the population above the 300 mark the village will use this in their criteria 
selection.  
- The relationship with the NGOs is give and take relationship as ngos 
sometimes need the help of the D.A. and the D.A, receives help from the 
NGOs. Ie.. cash contribution, fuel. Inturn when a project is initiated in the 
field there is supposed to be a cash contribution from the D.A. itself. I have 
details of the relationship in this sense in the next interview with the D.C.E. 
 
We moved into the tactic of the villages and local politic. 
- Note that there is issues stemming when the Kokomba chief pays money to the 
Gusheigu chief. He didn’t want to talk about this anymore. “no more 
comments” 
- There are other problems relating to local politic when in the rural area the 
village who receives a borehole will mention that it was provided by the 
CWSA. If another village nearby hears this (it has applied as well and not 
received a well) they assume it is government motivated and will sabotage the 
borehole by putting rocks in the well itself, which renders the pump useless. 
There is no way of getting the rocks or the pipe out of the ground. I felt it was 
a good time to start digging more into local politic – he provided the issue of 
the Abudi and Abdani gates in Gusheigu and reverted back to the killing of the 
chief in Yendi. We were just about to talk about it and he decided to end the 
interview as he was tired. But offered for me to come back another time. 
Interview cut short.  
-  
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Interview # 14 
 
Iddmissr Alhassan Nadmo 
Program Officer D.A. Disaster Response 
Field Officer RUDA (Rural Development Agenda)  
February, 24th/06 
 
This interview was located at Alhassan’s house.  
 
- RUDA itself would not exist if they were not being awarded contracts from 
NORWASP. They only specialize in contracts with the CIFS project and the 
NORWASP project thus bidding within competitions for its existence. 
- The funding allocation of contracts as it stands when a contract is awarded 
comprises of: 
o 60% funding from CIDA  
o 35% from the District Assembly via the NORWASP project as well, 
noting that the DA does not have money most of the time to cover the 
project itself. 
o 5% included within the community contribution.  
 
- It is the role of the DWST to select the communities that the contracts would 
be targeted to then the contractor is obliged to carry out the contract under the 
supervision of the “list” that they were given. 
- The P.O doesn’t always include siting for wells within the contracts as 
generally they are used for drilling purposes alone. There are separate siting 
teams that are supposed to go out and find a designated sight that they deem 
will secure water. This is supposed to include the members of the DWST and 
whatever support they need from the CWSA to determine this. It is only the 
job of the P.O. to conduct the drilling. 
- The P.O. is supposed to help with the sensitization process and train the 
villages after the during and after the borehole has been installed until the 
contract has been fulfilled.  
- Notes that the community itself is supposed to select the WatSan’s and not the 
P.O. but this sometimes does not happen as he feels the communities aren’t 
sure what kind of individuals to select for the committees. This meaning that 
some of the sensitization involves selecting certain persons who would be an 
active member on the WatSan committee.  
- RUDA itself is made of two teams. 
o Food Security teams (CIFS contracts) 
 8 members on the team 
o Water & Sanitation teams (NORWASP contracts) 
 4 members on the team – drilling purposes. 
 
- There are three board members or directors: 
 1. Francis Andani (School for life employee) 
 2. Alisia Abdulia (Retired teacher9 
 3. Awabu Mahama ( currently a teacher in GSS) 
 
- The process of awarding contracts flows through the D.A. meaning that the 
D.A. selects the contractor for the job and then is suppose to advise the 
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CWSA and NORWASP co-ordinator who the winner of the contract is. 
NORWASP and CWSA then provide the funding of the contract and the 
operations to help implement if the P.O. cannot provide this.  
- The NORWASP project is into its fourth phase and the number of boreholes 
in each phase that is allocated for contract/tender is decided by CWSA.  
o Phase 1 – 20 communities were selected for borehole tenders 
o Phase 2 – 30 communities were selected for borehole tenders 
o Phase 3 – 30 communities were selected for borehole tenders. 
o Phase 4 – 40 communities were selected for borehole tenders, the 
NORWASP project itself is its 4rth stage now and will be ending in 
April of this year. 
 
- Bidding process: each NGO is informed that a bidding process will be 
upcoming via the D.A.. The NGO then submits a proposal for the tender to 
NORWASP, District Assembly and within the NGO,  based on the expertise 
and ability to conduct the tasks. Once the NGO have submitted their 
proposals for the bids the finalists (there are only 3 NGOs that are working in 
bids within Gusheigu and always make it to the interview) are informed to 
attend a personal interview with the DCD. During the interview and the 
submission of bid process there is a criteria sheet that the D.A. has to analyze 
the competencies of the bidders.  
- The criteria is local knowledge, ability to conduct tasks, what they know 
about the donor and regional politic, and the capital assets to complete the 
tasks at hand and of course the right price for the contract.  
- Once the interview process is over it is the DCD and the DCPU who decides 
which contracts go to who. This then needs its approval from the DCE. One 
contract consists of 20 communities.  
 
- When I asked if he feels there is problems in the bidding process, he kind of 
ran around the subject stating that there are minimal problems and that most 
of the contracts that he knows have been awarded fairly. But I think my 
approach to that question may have been to blunt.  
 
- He did mention that there is some problems within the communities in a 
political sense as there are persons in each community who may not 
sympathize with the same political party as the rest of the community. 
Nobody really knows who these people are. They may be the most active of 
individuals in the community advocating for projects etc… but deep in their 
hearts they try to sabotage the projects trying to undermine not only the 
community thinking that the award process is government affiliated but also 
they are simply discouraged about development projects in general and 
therefore take matters in their own hands. To some extents they physically 
sabotage the boreholes when no one is looking or are influential members in 
the community and start to shape peoples minds about projects over time.  
 
- It is hard to know these people and the P.O.s and DWST’s do not have the 
resources to constantly go out and try to educate the people about what they 
perceive as the way forward out of disease and poverty.  
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Interview # 15  
 
I.B. Basimtale – February 24th.  
District Co-ordinating Director  
Gusheigu District Assembly. 
 
 
We started the interview going over the complete role of his position and the formal 
structure of the institutions from the D.A. level all the way to the creation of the 
DWST. The institutional drawing of the decentralized departments was different than 
the one given by Mr. Illyasu earlier in the trip. The Gusheigu institutional makeup is 
more heiarchical and the political wing has much more power than the administrative 
especially at the district level. I will start by drawing the institutions as was drawn by 
I.B. Basimtale.  
 
 
Inter-relationship between the Political and Administrative Wings of the Gusheigu 
District Assembly 
 
     
 
 
DCPU – District Coordinating Planning Unit 
 
 
 
District Assembly – The D.A. in the Gusheigu district is comprised of 18 elected 
members and 10 appointed members from Accra. The D.A. has a presiding member 
District Assembly 
Exectutive Commitee 
District Chief Executive  
District Co-ordinating Director 
Sub - 
Commitee 
DCPU 
Planning 
Department 
Budget 
Department 
Assitant’s 
Office 
Finance 
Department 
Works 
Department 
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who chairs all meetings and sits to create agenda etc… The D.A. selects the presiding 
member who has a 2 year office position. After the two years he can attest for another 
two years which then must be voted on by the D.A. itself.  
 
 
Executive Committee – Responsible for the day to day running of the District 
Assembly. Implied as the administrative support of the Appointed and Voted 
members. The members of the District Assembly generally have other jobs such as 
farming etc… the E.C. is the formal representation of the D.A. 
 
Sub-committee- Made up of assembly members. There are 6 ministerial 
representative bodies in the sub-committee. They are: 
7. Education sub-committee 
8. Finance and Administration sub-committee 
9. Economic Development Planning sub-committee 
10. Works sub-committee 
11. Justice and Security sub-committee 
12. Social Services sub-committee 
 
These representatives conduct studies and create reports in representation of each’s 
sector. The reports are submitted to the district assembly for review of certain issues 
in the district itself. There are 28 members total in the Sub-committee. They are 
represented by the 10 appointed politicians and the 18 elected members. Sub 
committee reports will be made and handed into the D.A.. Each sub-committee will 
compile reports and discuss issues during meeting with the E.C. and submit issues to 
the D.A.. Note these are all the same people! 
The E.C. reports from the sub-committee is presented to D.A. for discussion and 
approval. 
 
District Chief Executive – The chairman of the executive committee. This is an 
appointed full-time position by the president of the country. When the Executive 
Committee makes a decision the DCE administers this report and reports back to the 
E.C. about implementation issues and the progress of the ie.. project in hand. 
 
  
District Coordinating Director – The head of all decentralized departments in an 
administrative capacity. This person directly reports to the District Chief Executive. 
His role is as a representative of the administrative wing at the district level.  
 
District Planning and Coordination Unit – This unit is made up of representatives 
of all the decentralized departments and its task is similar as the Sub-committees but 
at a localized level and within direct administrative tasks. The D.C.D. is the chairman 
of the unit and guides meetings and sets agenda’s which are initiated from above.  For 
example the unit would outline and perform complete analysis of the DWST within 
the works department. This meaning forming budgets, timelines, operations etc… 
This then would be compiled in a report within the DPCU and ís submitted to the 
District Coordinating Director. He then would submit this to the D.C.E. 
The complete representation within the Unit is as follows: 
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       Member     
 Role of Member 
 
 
11. District Coordinating Director   Chairman 
12. District Planning Officer   Secretary 
13. District Budget Officer   Member 
14. District Finance Officer   Member 
15. District Agricultural Officer   Member 
16. District Education Officer   Member 
17. District Health Officer   Member 
18. District Community Develop. Officer  Member 
19. District Social Welfare Officer  Member 
20. Head of Works Department   Member 
 
There is a secretariat that runs the day to day issues that arise which comprises of two 
planning officers, budget officer, a secretariat and the District Coordinating Director.  
 
After this breakdown we discussed which NGOs and large donors were conducting 
water based projects within the district and a list was compiled as follows: 
 
Partner Organizations: 
- RUDA 
- SUNIDA 
- New Energy 
- Tistangtua 
 
International NGOs conducting water and sanitation projects in the area consist of: 
- OIC ( United states funded by the Carter foundation). 
- World Vision (many donating partners from around the world but water 
projects   are funded by the Cornard Hilton Foundation). 
- CLIP (Funded by Danida, Denmark) 
 
International Donor funded organizations with water projects in Gusheigu: 
- NORWASP – Northern Region Water and Supply Project funded by CIDA 
(Canadian International Development Agency) 
- DISCAP – District Area Capacity building project, although almost completed 
if not already. Funded by CIDA 
 
Regional Partner  
- CWSA – Community Water and Sanitation Agency – Government of Ghana. 
 
Major political parties in the region: 
- N.P.P. – National Peoples Party (Current party in power both in Accra and the 
Northern Region. 
- N.D.C. – National Democratic Committee  
 
Continued notes from the interview: 
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- I continued the interview asking his opinion about the decentralization process 
and its relative issues as he is the head of the administrative wing in the 
district. There were two issues in which he brought up that were of utmost 
importance in the formal sense. These issues were: 
o Funding – allocative funding is not enough and there is little if not any 
resources that are able to trickle down to the decentralized 
departments. This puts a major strain on every issue from operations to 
education for employees, to paying the bills for the offices themselves 
such as lights, electricity etc….  
o Employee issues – Inadequate level of education for employees in the 
DWST. There is not one engineer or technician employed within the 
water and sanitation teams therefore the level of knowledge is very 
low. To combat this there is no funding to send them on courses or 
bring people to Gusheigu. It’s not the most desirable place to live.  
 
- There is a big problem with education within the area. According to the latest 
district report which he pulled from his desk (from 2000)  
- 84.3% of the total population in Gusheigu have never been to 
school above the age of 6 years old. 
- 79.3% of males 
- 89% of females. 
 
At this point in the interview I felt it was time to try and dig a little deeper into the 
local political situation. This is another person who is not a Dogumba or Kokumba. 
He originally is situated from the upper west region. 
- He noted that out of the 7 GSS schools in the region: 
o 1 school was in a Kokumba inhabited area 
o 6 schools were in the Dogumba inhabited areas 
 
- All 10 of the  members in the D.A. are NPP sympathizers.  
- Out of the 18 elected officials within the D.A.  
o 7 only belong to the N.D.C.  
o 11 are N.P.P. sympathizers  
 
- This means on any vote within the D.A. the N.P.P. will always have majority 
in any issues stemming within the district.  
- 70% of Kokumba’s are sympathizers with the N.D.C. 
- 30% who are mixed with the Dobumba’s are sympathetic to the N.P.P. 
 
 
- If a list is made by the DWST for communities to be selected the D.A. will 
change the formal list to benefit N.P.P. supporters.  
- Notes that the two political parties in Gusheigu district are divided by family 
gates: 
o Abudu gate is sympathetic to the N.P.P. 
o Abdani gate is sympathetic to the N.D.C. 
 
- If 70% of the Kokumba’s support the N.D.C. and the Abdani gate is also 
supporting and the N.P.P. is in power within the district assembly no wonder 
projects and wells are being diverted to certain villages.  
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- Gives example of the contracts awarded by CIFS that is supposed to go to 
RUDA but went to the NGO Sunida instead although RUDA won the 
contract fairly via testing, applying, etc….The criteria stems from the 
knowledge and education of the employees within the P.O. to the equipment 
that is owned to knowledge of scientific and baseline knowledge of the 
communities. As well the winner is supposed to be upstanding business 
persons in the community.  
- Highly political area – people will put rocks down boreholes of villages who 
say they are supported by other villages. 
- He goes back to the Kokumba traditional right mixed with majority support 
of N.D.C. by the Abdani gate.  
- His final comments were, once he gets off of work he will not go into 
Gusheigu or make friends in the area because it may seem that he is 
favouring one party or another, every person in the town has some sort of 
affiliation not matter what. He goes to his house and continues his evenings 
by himself.  
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Interview # 16 
 
Patrick Opoku - March 2nd/06 
Water and Sanitation Officer 
Opportunities Industrialization centers (OIC) 
Tamale office, Ghana 
 
OIC – USAid funded 
 
- Deals in issues such as food security 
- Agricultural post harvest 
- Micro-Finance 
- Water & Sanitation 
- Dry Food Rations 
 
Strictly construct boreholes in all of its water related districts in Ghana. 
 
- The water and sanitation component is strictly funded by USaid. 
- Have just initiated another water project phase from 2005-2009 in the water 
sector. 
- OIC conducts its own drilling, sensitization, animation, health and sanitation 
education in the area.  
- There main criteria for selection of the communities is under some guidelines 
such as: 
o Closeness to potable water 
o If they are water deficient 
o Do they have previous boreholes or water source from other projects if 
so the communities who do not have this would be prioritized. 
 
- OIC does follow the national strategy, in regards to the community 
contribution, and the DRA approach instilled as a common philosophy.  
- The cost for a borehole that they charge is 2.1 million cedis. 
- If there is no water that has been drilled OIC will absorb the cost.  
- OIC has 80 boreholes to drill over the next five years but can decide which 
districts they want to complete this in. If they have allocated 10 boreholes for 
Gusheigu but only 5 have water or can be dug – they can move the remaining 
5 over to another district where their chances of success is higher. 
- USaid does have targets that have to be met in accordance to OIC work in 
Ghana therefore the set objectives are from the US and must be translated into 
performance.  
- Patrick says that OIC does submit a report to the D.A. if the communities that 
have been drilled have no water. We can ask the D.A. if they have received 
this.  
- Admitted that villages are approached by OIC first then sensitized and then the 
application is created and sent to OIC not the district assembly.  
- They do have some affiliation with another NGO called ADRA but ADRA 
itself does not go out and conduct projects in Gusheigu that we know of. 
Mentions that they do have some affiliation with W.V. but not much. Must 
research more about this.  
271  
- There are two OIC institutions here in Ghana, OIC international and OIC 
Ghana. OIC Ghana directly handles the office in Tamale, where OIC 
international is funded by the ministry of Manpower in Accra and works in 
offices throught the Kumasi, Accra and Takradori regions.  
- Patrick mentioned that their priority is to reach out to the most vulnerable of 
people. Then the question is posed that if there is one group who is noticeably 
marginalized then they will try and target that group.  
- He was carefull to point out that they strictly try and focus on neutrality, as it 
is very tough and sensitive in these areas as there are ethnic and political 
forces in the area that are at work within the D.A.  
- They do not want to be portrayed as taking sides or alliances. Therefore in the 
sensitization process they quickly note that they are not affiliated to any 
government agency or political institution.  
- OICs mandate is it pretends not to hear or see the political misgivings or 
ethnic divide in a certain area. He does admit they do their research though.  
- Word then spreads in the local area and villagers speak to other communities 
hence the word of OIC moves about into other areas.  
 
- Notes that they do not have much contact with other NGOs or synergies as 
there is no money in their budget to do so. Therefore it is not a priority to join 
a water network such as WaSnet. In fact it was not even mentioned in the 
interview that they were interested to noting the importance of having this 
relationship.  
 
- In an advocacy sense, there is no money to spread the word out to the world to 
advocate for the rights of the people outside of the local area to the district, 
regional, national and international levels.  
 
- The list of communities is an interesting concept as it seems the NGOs have 
their own lists according to their own criteria. Of course they have their own 
international donor objectives to meet therefore they will bypass the D.A. list 
process in order to meet the needs of their donors.  
 
- Definition of Vulnerability 
 
o People who are left out of the economic divide.  
o Neglected over the years.  
o No assistance to any source. 
o Not being rich – Economically disadvantaged.  
 
He took a very political stance in this interview as the whole concept of neutrality was 
put into play several times throughout the interview and it seems that he represent a 
neutral ngo. Although it doesn’t seem that he has an opinion in the villages I think 
there is something brewing in that we are aren’t being privy to. This meaning that we 
have to go out and sak some more question in the field. He did mention to us that he is 
able to see another time, in fact any time if we have some more questions that we wa 
nt to ask.  
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Interview # 17  
 
Coleman Agyeyomah 
Programmes Coordinator: IPA (Institute for Policy Alternatives) 
Tamale, March 2nd 
 
 
 
- The IPA was initially formed as a consultant service which was named Gariba 
consulting, based in Tamale. 
- The philosophy was and is – thinking globally and acting locally. 
 
- The original concept was a consulting service because the concept of the IPA 
needed funding and this was the alternative route. This was because the 
agency didn’t want direct funding from any agency but needed revenue to 
establish its concept. As much independence as possible was the key. 
 
- Questions posed from Coleman was in Ghana when major donors come into 
play and even ngos who have lots of money and work on their own we ask 
who dictates the agenda? Is it the Government, is it the ngo, major donors 
etc…. 
 
- The public in Ghana ie.(rural communities) make partnerships because they 
know they have to survive, because if they don’t they will fall behind the rest 
of the group, it is when the people start forming project and programming 
initiatives is when development is really made for the people no matter what 
objectives are lingering for donors. It’s an ideal but when it happens who 
knows. 
 
- Gariba/IPA has been contracted or partnered with CIDA / Wardrop consulting 
for 7 years and has conducted projects in 32 towns in the capacity of 
developing and consulting small business development units.  
 
- The mandate is to identify locally based P.O. or C.O.s which can be trained to 
enhance the capacity of the people in the villages.  
 
- We moved into the history of CIDA development in Northern Ghana and the 
history of the CWSD and GWCL, then moved into the mandate of the CWSA 
from the CWSD to the CWSA. 
 
- CWSA came out with a sub-sector policy to standardize many technical issues 
within the directorship, and one of those things being the types of pumps 
which were to be used in Ghana. To this point four pumps have been 
standardized, to be used in Ghana. If companies or NGOs are not using these 
types of pumps in the communities it is illegal. The four pumps are: 
 
o Mach pump   India 
o African pump  India 
o NIRA pump  Finland 
o VIREN pump  France 
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- Why standardize the pumps and why these four? Sustainability issues – one 
the parts for the pumps can be manufactured in Ghana, second it stops from 
any company coming in and installing new pumps therefore when it come 
time to fix there is a uniform parts process or supply chain that handles pump 
parts.  
 
Mandate of the IPA for the communities: 
o Train communities the DRA community ownership concept. 
o Train to fix pumps 
o Train how to select WatSan members from the community.  
 
- Each community has a water and sanitation development board. 
 
- IPA – moved to research, the consulting is to finance the research.  
 
- Looking for training of individuals and also policy alternatives. 
 
- There is no policy at the moment that reflects social or public accountability.  
 
- We went through his scoring and ranking tool for villages and how much 
members of the communities know about policy issues and the rights they are 
afforded in the communities. 
 
Moving into the Gusheigu District. 
 
- Three categories of analysis within the districts  
o Policy 
o Operation 
o Implementation of plans 
 
- We went straight into corruption issues as they seem to be the topic of 
discussion surrounding issues in the Gusheigu district.  
o We discussed corruption issues from government workers awarding 
contracts to unqualified contractors (NGO) and then asking for 
kickbacks. 
o Also When the DWST goes out to communities to collect money for 
the boreholes they request more than the 2.1 million cedis and put the 
extra amount in their pockets.  
o It is expected that if any contracts are awarded that kickbacks be 
associated with the contracts.  
o In Gusheigu if you don’t belong to the political party you will not get 
contracts.  
o Once again notes that some DWST members will collect more than the 
5 % for the boreholes.  
 
o Talks about W.V. being a big elephant and the D.A. has to take control 
but cannot, doesn’t have the capacity. 
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NGOs such as W.V. will drill a borehole above the CWSA borehole and call it a 
success meanwhile the CWSA borehole goes dry because the W.V. borehole is in the 
same aquifer. Auquifers are linear in nature. 
 
Regarding the lists from the DWST.  
 The communities who are selected from the lists will not be considered 
under the normal criteria such as distance from a potable source, disease etc… they 
will be selected via the electoral area and who voted for who. These are the 
communities that will receive the boreholes. 
 
Regarding the divide between the parties. It was the killing of the YAA NAA that 
really divided the families and the two political parties are representing the two 
families.  
 
It is here where actually the struggle with the Kokomba’s may be becoming side 
tracked as there is an internal fight with the dogomba’s themselves.  
 
Back to the D.A the worst people regarding payments in the villages is the D.A. itself. 
They are advocating that people pay their bills but yet the D.A. itself is not paying its 
own bills.  
 
Respects the role of the traditional beliefs in regards to respecting your elders and 
respect of your mother but is very critical of the chieftaincy issues because he feels 
these issues are not reflective to progression in the society.  
 
In Gusheigu, if it looks like you are favoring one group then the people in the 
community will favor that group.  
 
Notes a good person to talk to is James AYKADE – who studied traditional 
knowledge systems in IPA. 
 
Feels as though the way through the corruption in the Gusheigu District is to get rid of 
the appointed individuals in the D.A. and have the whole process focusing on 
elections within a fair context. This also includes the mayor of the community who is 
also appointed by the government. If you are a civil servant in the community the 
mayor himself will blacklist you and your tasks in the community is finished, 
meaning he will find a way to fire the worker or the worker will not advance and will 
stay in Gusheigu for all of time.  
 
In this matter the mayor is not accountable to the people.  
 
So when is there a point when the NGO is to provide the voice of the people. All the 
NGO have noted that there is no budget for it, thus not important. This is the 
consensus for all the NGOs. NGO mainly focusing on personal objectives from the 
donors.   
Interview # 18  
 
Meeting with Mohamad Nashiru 
WaterAid Advocacy Manager 
March 20th – 06 
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WaterAid Head office Accra. 
 
We move straight into the decentralization process – more specifically into issues in 
Gusheigu we then move into the ownership concept. Mr. Nash has worked for the 
Institute for Policy Alternatives and moved to Accra with WaterAid. 
 
- Notes the lack of decentralization in the district assemblies 
- Decentralization doesn’t go far enough into the assembly itself 
- For example the CWSA doesn’t have decentralized offices in the districts and 
have been relying on the DWST’s to often to perform tasks. The DWST’s 
have very little capacity if any to conduct tasks. 
- Decentralization can only be accomplished and completed when the DCE and 
the D.A. itself are not appointed but elected.  
- It is a bad mix for democracy for the people in the districts to have a DCE and 
an MP in accra that are very close. To many angles for corruption and unequal 
playing field for people who wish to see democracy.  Powerful DCE use this 
to advocate for their causes specifically for national elections. The incentive is 
the personal relationships within the parties are continued and strengthened. 
This undermines the advocacy for the people but favors interests of the local 
politicians.  
 
- NORWASP is over ambitious  
o Struggling with a clear capacity impact. Focuses on capacity issues that 
you can see but does not focus so much on issues of strengthening 
decentralization in the sense of courses, things we cannot see. 
o It has benefited the P.O.’s and CBO’s  
 
- Currently W&S is driven by donors which is not productive  
o 5% contribution by the government and 75% by donors in the water 
sector in Ghana.  
o Gov’t spending towards poverty reduction in W&San, equaled 3.5% of 
total capacity and infrastructure. 
 
o International NGO’s haven’t done enough to establish accountability to 
the CBO networks and single cbo’s conducting projects. Bad quality of 
construction, lack of professionality etc..No enforcement by the NGO’s 
themselves. 
 
The NGO’s need to build capacity to hold secure providers for the future of w&s 
partnerships.  
 
CONIWAS doesn’t have the competence to hold NGO’s accountable for their actions. 
In fact it is only used as a greet forum to say hi once a year and discuss generalized 
issues.  
 
Critiques the CONIWAS concept and notes that the moment you compromise a stand 
to the gov’t and or donors – you lose.  
 
NGO’s must focus on: 
 Transparency 
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 Accountability 
 Empowerment 
 
Had to end interview due to Mr. Nash having another meeting but offered a follow up 
meeting at any time.  
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Interview # 19 
 
Salifu Tahiru 
NPP organizer – regional secretariat  
Tamale : March 31st /06 
 
During the time period of the interview there is a bi-election on the Tuesday 
afterwards so the political climate is very intense therefore it was easy to stimulate 
provocative questions about ridings in the northern region. This included questions 
about political motivations from an NPP perspective specifically within the Gusheigu 
district. 
 
(direct notes from the interview) Tape player has distintigrated due to the battery acid 
leaking into player. 
 
 
- In Gusheigu or any district: If you want to win in the districts it is very 
important that the DCE is on your side,  this gives leverage to represent the 
party in an authoritative role when entering communities. Meaning if the 
people in the villages sees the DCE they associate this with government which 
somewhat legitimizes the reason why they are here. In the case of Gusheigu 
the DCE are active in going out to the communities and promising projects 
etc… to “buy” the votes of the farmers. The previous DCE rita tanni was very 
good at this thus the conversion of Konkumba’s to vote for the NPP instead of 
NDC. 
- If the executives are hard working it is great for the parties.  
- Previously there were many NDC supporters including abudu’s – mixed with 
the death of the Ya Naa and a hard working DCE the tables turned in 
Gusheigu. I don’t know if rita tanni actually delivered but NPP won the 
regional area.  
- When Gusheigu/Karaga was together there were majority andanies but when 
they split there were majority Abudu’s in Gusheigu. Could have been one of 
the motivations to split.  
- See list of Gusheigu district communities who are NPP in project book # 2 
 
- Feels there is a decline in the northern region especially with the npp because 
the national body is ignoring the youth of the party in the north. No investment 
into the youth movement. Not helping the npp with small loans for party 
support etc….feels npp should promote more small loans for farmers.  
 
- Says forget about andani’s they do not appreciate any effort of the abudu’s if 
they give the andani’s something so he says forget about them and concentrate 
on the NPP youth. Note mixing politics with ethnicity.  
 
- Feels burial is not going to happen: 
 
 Security 
 No abudu’s will recognize it.  
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- Every northerner is proud of his father therefore you are born into a party. 
Whether it be the andani’s or the abudu’s  
- Your born into it because the children lack the education etc… to understand 
the real issues, so it is assumed that your child will be of that party and grow 
into it. It is one of the only things he feels to hang on to.  
- Parties should grab the people – that’s what rita tanni did with her promises in 
Gusheigu. Especially towards the konkumba’s.  
- Feels without the dogumba’s there is no konkumba’s and vice versa. 
- Notes this statement because the konkumba’a are hard working harder thant he 
dogumba’s but the konkumba’s have no land right therefore each needs each 
other. But the real fight is intertwined within the dogumba’s themselves.  
- Feels it is getting harder and harder to recognize the npp politics as it is easier 
for the business man to approach the party leaders than the normal npp person 
(farmer etc…)  
- Says that the dogumba’s no longer collect from the Konkumba’s but the 
Gonja’s do collect from the Konkumba’s.  
- Feels the Konkumba’s are not marginalized but actually are very rich because 
they work so hard and know how to farm Yams and maize therefore it reflects 
in the way they do business.  
-  
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Interview # 20 
 
Thomas Sayibu Imora 
Programs Director  
New Energy 
April 3rd – 06 Tamale. 
 
Started very Macro regarding Coniwas, the role of the NGO and where it fits into 
society. Legitimizing NGO’s and moving into the Wasnet concept at the regional and 
district levels. We then moved into Community ownership and policy interpretation. 
Then decentralization in the districts along with examples from Konkumba’s and 
Dogumba’s in the Gushiegu area.  
 
 
- Believes in the CONIWAS vision as a framework to join NGO’s together.  
- Wants to create rooted advocacy at the national to local levels via Coniwas 
and associate it to a form of advocacy. 
- Doesn’t feel that CONIWAS is trying to form an institutional of NGO 
monopoly just a strong  voice to government.  
- See’s Ghana as a country with one vision but many different realities. 
Therefore believes that CONIWAS an have one vision but exist with many 
different realities from its members.  
- What stimulated CONIWAS was bi-lateral and the GoG wanted one voice that 
they could talk to about issues within the civil society spectrum. This was the 
entry of DANIDA to fund the CONIWAS movement even though it has 
existed in the MOLE conference for many years. The CONIWAS would 
represent this collaborative body in a different sense or ideal than the mole 
conferece which happens only once a year. Policy formation and strategy 
doesn’t just happen once a year at the mole conference thus the stimulus for 
CONIWAS . This undermined the Directorate and CONIWAS was born.  
- In these times of NGO work and all the different interests involved it is hard to 
say the NGO now solely represents the voice of the people. This meaning that 
there are formal objectives to meet within the market rational and the bigger 
picture within  the context of relationships with other stakeholder. The NGO 
may no longer see itself as a representative but a translator or agent to take 
these objectives and priorities back to the people and translate in a softer tone. 
This is todays realities in Ghana. 
- WASNET is intended to be the regional representative of CONIWAS and also 
the pilot district representative in Gusheigu. Clip has also taken on an active 
role in this field. There are some that feel wasnet functions effectively but 
others who may not buy in to the concept such as world vision etc… 
- The aim of wasnet and the role of the NGO is to demystify the role of 
government and formal policy in regards to information sharing to the people.  
- He starts to get moral and says he prefers to submit himself to the people and 
not the will of governments if he felt issues would not be productive to 
society.  
- Takes a due process in the communities because of high illiteracy rates. Feels 
even as a local it is very difficult to translate or interperet issues of policy or 
governance to the people specifically if they cannot read or write etc… 
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- He says there is nothing wrong with being funded by bi-laterals or 
governmental agencies but it is how the money is distributed based on the 
morals of the NGO within the rationale of the current development paradigm. 
- In a personal perspective he must convince himself that the money he is 
receiving from the donors is going to a use that they know will help the 
people.  
- Doesn’t believe in the track record of DANIDA per say… but will take the 
money if given from them if he believes it will contribute to the sector in the 
way of helping the people in his terminology. Meaning proper coverage – 
building capacity in the district assemblies etc.. 
- At the moment organizations are very much into implementation. But the 
implementation is no where near the current need. CWSA objectives will not 
be met in time to meet the MDG’s. 
- Doesn’t believ in the 5% ownership scheme and thinks it is absolutely useless. 
They do not collect if the community doesn’t have the money. They (New 
Energy) will take into consideration work or animals etc..Says communities 
make a contribution for everything in their lives.  
- Doesn’t think that the GWC should be the only provider for water in urban 
areas, has started urban supply as well in coordination with the D.A. How does 
this contradict the current reform process especially policy. Once again no 
enforcement. It says in the policy specifically that no other provider in an 
urban setting shall provide supply water source.  
- Feels gov’t believes in poverty reduction but they make legislations that 
actually enhance poverty.  
- So many people depend on the faithfulness of the NGO as the representative 
but one has to question the role of some NGO’s. This is the last line of civil 
representation but we have to remember that it is up to the government to 
develop not the NGO’s they are only providers. You cannot have donors in 
place to develop a country it is not ethically moral!!! 
 
- Moving into decentralization.  
 
- The powers in Accra have not decentralized the money process in fact it is 
quite centralized meaning decisions are still being made in accra and there is a 
freeze in the D:A. meaning they cannot make decisions until accra says so. 
This is totally dysfunctional as it sends mixed messages to administrators 
about the concept of decentralization. In the D.A. the hiring process is frozen 
until someone says its ok in Accra, this is in all sectors. Common fund never 
arrives on time therefore leaving the D.A.’s to administer whatever money 
they have (in their own interests). 
 
- So Shaibu says – you have to know how to play the game at the regional and 
local levels. This includes the capacity building and synergies with the D.A.’s 
as they know they lack resources and welcome NGO resources for support. 
This then builds synergies etc.. if you are blacklisted in the D.A. then you have 
no chance of getting contracts or being transferred out of the D.A. itself if you 
start to ask questions. For the NGO it is somewhat the same way.  
 
- This leaves then the NGO’s with wealth intimidate the D.A. by their wealth as 
a power mechanism. The higher the synergy with the D.A. in certain areas the 
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more the benefit for the NGO. In the World Vision example. The D.A. offered 
them office space etc… while it was hard for someone like New Energy, but 
the spinnoff comes when it is time for the NGO to distribute resources into the 
communities.  Must research more here.  
 
- About the DWST using the AGRIC’s extension officers. Notes that the D.A. at 
the moment do not have enough vision or flexibility. They are very narrow 
minded at times and cannot see past their own vision. Would be great in theory 
and could work well in a training perspective but would have to research 
more.  
 
- Says there is not enough resources in collaboration to stimulate the D.A. to 
intensify is advocacy for collaboration. If more money was to be pumped in 
the D.A. in its wisdom may be interested. AS of now the DCE just wants more 
large NGO’s to come into the district itself. No real rules. There is nothing to 
enforce the NGO, no law or policy etc.. so the NGO’s do it their own way.  
 
- About Konkumba’s and Dogumba’s. 
 
- Feels no one is human if they do not have feelings against Dogumba’s or 
Konkumba’s. Shaibu lost family against the Konkumba’s and still does feel 
emotion about it to this day. But he tries not to cloud this over the ultimate 
goal of poverty reduction and potable water, but does not that it does play a 
role in today’s District Assemblies in regards to project allocation. Example 
CLIP world vision in Gushiegu, vs some DA boreholes etc… 
 
- There will always be an ethnic divide, but doesn’t understand why people hide 
it. It is culturally embedded into the society and cannot be taken out, even if 
someone says they are neutral. This is part of establishing the real “rules of the 
game”. 
- New Energy receives funding from: 
 
o WaterAID 
o African Development Bank 
o Energy used to be DANIDA 
o Livelihoods program from DFID 
o UNICEF 
o Cornard Hilton Foundation 
o UNDP – LPG program 
o Contracts for hand dug wells and urban systems from D.A. and CWSA 
o Tamale – 200 latrines from the World Bank – PPP for urban 
environment.  
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Interview # 21 
 
Anne Thompson 
Canadian International Food Security (CIFS) Project Team Leader  
April 17th/06 
 
Unicef and CIFS is running a parallel Community Action Planning process and Area 
Level Planning process. Both processes are not in conjunction with each other. 
 
Anne’s feeling is the Unicef approach doesn’t work. Totally bypasses the Local 
Government act as it doesn’t focus on institutionalizing community action planning. It 
doesn’t collect community information via baseline planning –strictly moves in 
without collaboration and because they have so much power people take notice in 
their projects. But anne notes that the CAP process by UNICEF is only empowering 
UNICEF and legitimizing their role in Northern Ghana. Doesn’t involve empowering 
the DA.  
 
Key note from Anne was UNICEF started its project within the communities but this 
was also a project of CIFS therefore competition occurred. CIFS backed off UNICEF 
left and everyone figured MOFA would continue the planning process. It never 
happened.  
 
Feels UNICEF is slowing the process of community action planning as some 
community action plans have been completed but in communities already used in 
CIFS projects. 
 
Acknowledges that it is the role of the DA to build area councils of which none have 
been completed in Gusheigu.  
 
Feels some underlying problems exist within a cultural sense in that members of 
power within the district and local NGO’s look after themselves then their immediate 
family then take the responsibility of others. This is in the way of hiring for positions, 
and resource for projects.  
 
Power comes from being middle class on the edge of pure poverty who have 
experienced of going from nothing to something.  
 
Has heard that Area Councils and Unit committees will be disbanded due to too much 
decentralization.  
 
Extended DPCU supposed to plan a cross sectoral approach ie., MOFA and cross-
sectoral approach but the DPCU is not functioning.  
MOFA is horrendously territorial.  
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Interview #22 
 
Al- Hassan Ibrahim  
Planning officer District Assembly 
Gusheigu District Assembly – April 25th 
 
District Capacity Building Teams 
- Planning officer 
- Community development officer 
- Ghana education service 
- Ghana Health Care service 
- Ministry of Agric. 
 
DCD  
- Trained to conduct community action planning 
- Unicef has created community planning teams 
- This team is to train the community action teams 
 
Essentially the community members who are involved in the WatSans are the same 
members involved in the community planning action teams. Says this is one of the 
reasons why the action teams are very slow in reacting is because the community 
members belong to too many teams.  
 
Unicef has collected information from some of the communities this is to include 
Nawugu but we have not seen nor does the planning officer know if the information is 
in the District Assembly as yet. When asked why he doesn’t know – is because 
UNICEF has the information. What use is it to have a planning officer then? 
 
Unicef has 50 communities 
CBRDP has 20 communities.  
 
In all area councils a minimum of 6 communities are supposed to be included in this 
process. To our knowledge none in our area are involved. 
 
Support for decentralization process has been very limited due to central government 
restrictions. DA has no exit strategy from NGO’s meaning total reliance as there is no 
funding from the central government.  
 
 Problem – human factor in DA 
- Corruption – some members outwit the DA this is including why  
   revenue is slow in coming to the DA from 
central government and     from 
the communities.  
- Says there is a parallel system of authority for three reasons: 
-  NGO’s are closer to the people 
-  Lack of resources from and to the DA 
-  Human factor – corruption/lack of trust within the DA and from external 
 agencies. 
 
Feels that the communities are gift giving for cultural reasons (the gift) 
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Corruption again – goes into example of projects in the district in which he has to 
certify from the consultants before money is released to contractors when for example 
a well or project is to commence. The quality of the project based on completion for 
example, need to be signed by the Planning officer for release of these funds to the 
contractor etc… This is not happening anymore as the DCE is just releasing funds 
whenever.  
 
It is possible to collaborate with AGRIC for example but not happening (we know this 
already due to ministry line structure and decision making processes) The DWST and 
agrics relationship is distant this is also indicated in the district capacity building 
teams – there are very limited meetings between all members due to funding and 
interest. Thus the planning process has become sector related without a multi-sectoral 
approach. 
 
End of interview.  
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Interview # 23  
 
O.B. Alhassan 
Program Officer – Water and Sanitation/ Sponsorship Program 
Wednesday 26th April/06 
 
 
This is a general overview of the interview with world vision  
 
Religion and culture: 
 
 
Generally speaking the northern region Muslims do not like Christianity or feel it is a 
lesser religion than the muslim religion. This is because the muslim religion 
encompasses all other religions and no god is higher than the muslim god.  
 
Feels though that the Christian religion is more conducive to the dogumba culture and 
not the muslim religion in the sense that some traditional marriage practices such as a 
priest with the man and women together at the ceremony have more Christian 
tendancies, burials of the dead, and some family values. He mentions specifically 
within the area of corruption as corruption is a dogomba cultural trait and not a 
muslim ideal. This meaning that in the muslim religion if you are caught stealing, 
gambling or other infractions that is a characteristic of corruption you will be severly 
punished possibly by losing a limb (arm) or worse. Where as in the Christian religion 
(unfortunately) the level of forgiveness is higher thus taking somewhat of a more 
supportive role towards the culture practice itself (level of corruption talked about 
later). 
 
This then provides strategic tools for himself when he enters the village in regards to 
applying muslim culture into entry strategy. It is easier for him to penetrate the 
villages when he can utilize some Christian culture into language of dogumba cultural 
practices.  
He reiterates that the W.V. worker must bring himself down to the level of the 
community, such as type of language, muslim traditions etc….then afterward time to 
penetrate. Once a worker penetrates then your success rate is higher given the ability 
to succeed with applying projects. 
 
Barriers are still there between kokumba’s and dogumba’s. Muslim Dogomba’s feel it 
to be very difficult to find common ground in with Kok. Because they feel that they 
will strike again. Feels there has established a partial trust with the two tribes but is 
very superficial in lieu of the recent war.  
Finds it difficult to work sometimes and is caught in somewhat of a trap as he himself 
is a converted muslim to Christian but living in Gusheigu with a muslim family. 
Saying this he still does not trust the Kok as when bringing up the previous topic he 
noted “they” as kok, “we” cannot trust them. Still very embedded into psyche.  
 
He is sometime torn between priorities of his NGO and his normal localized Gushiegu 
life. There are two worlds, the one I work in World Vision and the one I live in, in 
Gusheigu. The reality is people are poor and look for things to grasp on to, when they 
see a local representative who works for an NGO may be conducting activities that 
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does benefit or not benefit his neighbors life he is immediately effected. For him 
working for world vision is a job but for the people where he lives these projects are 
effecting lives.  
 
District Assembly: 
 
Perception of Assembly 
 Low capacity – Human resource and lack of technical capacity in all 
sectors not only water. 
 
DWST not comprised of water persons per say, especially trained persons  
 
World Vision has policy of 3 million cedis in account for communities, this is in an 
account of choice made by communities. Later found out that World Vision helps 
them select the account in the banking facility. Not sure after that. 
 
World Vision no charge for wells but community is supposed to pay for parts and 
upkeep. Sometimes prices vary due to the estimated capacity of the village itself. 
Basically who can pay and who can’t.  Admitted that there is a problem at the moment 
with some communities wells not working and have paid. Problems exist in the ability 
of the workers to go the communities and actually fix the wells (not only in World 
Vision). This is contributed to many types of issues such as corruption, too many 
broken, sabotaged or unfinished wells, and objectives to take the manpower to 
continue digging other wells in other villages. The problems are village specific based 
mostly under the above examples.  
 
World Vision has been accused several times as not being a neutral NGO. This is 
specifically evident in the Gush district and one of the accussee’s is the DCE who has 
accussed W.V. of giving more to Kok than dogomba’s. He agree’s as W.V. policy 
also states that they are to provide for the deprived, and less fortunate.  
 
Reiterates that the D.A. still doesn’t recognize Konkomba geographical area as their 
own although there exists some town councils, this meaning that kok representation 
ends superficially at the Unit committee because town council are also the same 
representatives who speak with the  D.A.. Currently there are no formal mechanisms 
in place that represent the Kok. People such as community action plans or unit 
committee plans. (he got a little bit philosophical and noted) Every thing is superficial 
if there is only policy and no law therefore decisions are based upon loose ideas and 
up to ones judgement. This is why some the NGO’s, not only world vision, interest 
shifted towards konkomba’s and is construed as favourtism in the idealogy of the 
DCE and majority of localized Dogomba’s.   
 
The District Assembly takes too long and has far too much bureaucracy for the liking 
of W.V. decision making as his NGO’s activities are timebound with objectives 
needed to be achieved from the North. The D.A. is timebound but not to external 
NGO’s so he quotes is “African Timebound”. 
 
Specifically is frustrated with some W.V. objectives. It has no recognition of the 
priorities of the assembly itself. Therefore they are almost forced, at the local level, to 
not co-ordinate. This is very evident in the borehole construction and style of 
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animation. In borehole construction it was required last year that they dig double the 
amount of boreholes allocated by the D.A. and under a one year span. He gets 
frustrated because this bypasses any forms of governance institutional building and 
disregards the actual time spent with the communities. Says some pumps or wells 
aren’t completed because, if the well is dug it counts as a dug well in objectives but 
there is nothing in World Vision objectives that says the well needs to be essentially 
functioning (We witnessed this in some communities) and in the meantime must also 
include the word of god into the entire process not only in the animation. This 
meaning any discussion during digging also is supposed to lead into the word of god.  
If a well has the stem and the pipes into the well itself along with the cement platform 
then, in his opinion, it fulfills the completion objective within w.v. project documents. 
 
He himself believes in the development agenda. Understands the good and bad parts 
of the general development agenda but feels that god will have a path for all people 
and will be defined as events unfold. When I asked what this meant he says that if you 
feel in your heart that you are doing something good either for your family or another 
person then the power of god has helped those people within the events that you have 
helped unfold, like a borehole etc…  
 
When asked about the communities information of their rights as citizens not only 
under the water policy but formal acts as law he says that community sensitization is 
very important but is not the role of the NGO to inform the people of the development 
agenda. When asked why he thinks this – there is a need to empower the people to 
feel belongingness to there region or the country itself. It is very hard sometimes 
when you are working for an international NGO who’s priorities may not include 
these issues into their project documents (world vision) thus the result is fairly top 
down and hierarchical in some ways but he reiterates is for the good of the people, 
because these are the only representatives who are providing water, and food to the 
people himself. Feels that it is the role of the district assembly to empower the people 
and inform them about the development agenda and should be the criteria in 
stabilizing or at least building formal institutional capacity building. But admits this 
isn’t happening at the pace needed. Feels there really isn’t time for NGO’s to 
incorporate this due to the pace projects need to be completed.  
 
Agrees that this does contribute to a parallel system because, it is true, the NGO’s do 
hold the power at the district and regional levels. How can they not if they are the 
ones providing the essential services to the people who need it most. In the water 
sector it is the role of World vision to supply water, in the agricultural sector is the 
role of World vision to supply food security. It isn’t the role of world vision to supply 
enforcement of district policy and law or provide incentives to district employees to 
go out to the field and monitor activities.  
 
Does acknowledge that it is important to collaborate with other NGO’ but the other 
ngos have other northern objectives in the water sector which may or may not 
compare with world visions objectives. Admits that they are essentially the only 
Christian organization in the district who incorporates the word of god into its 
personal objectives. Other NGOs to his knowledge doesn’t incorporate this within the 
Gusheigu district therefore why should we co-ordinate our activities. Admits as well 
that the other NGO do not have the same capacity to co-ordinate, this includes the DA 
at the level of which the World Vision objectives require. Specifically in completion 
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of boreholes within a year of the project phase and number of villages approached to 
be animated.  
 
Does acknowledge that he knows most of the people in the other NGOs and the DA 
but when talking with them on a informal social level, the concept of work doesn’t 
appear. When asked why - feels it is a cultural aspect as why would we want to talk 
about work when we are not at work (fair enough). 
 
Being the largest of the NGO in the water sector in gusheigu they have the ability to 
somewhat set the water development agenda because he knows that the district 
assembly itself requires the needs of the NGO to supply projects to the people. This 
may contribute to the lack of co-ordination (as mentioned) the NGO’s in the district 
have different priorities.  
 
Corruption: 
 
Compares level of corruption to the culture of the people. Agrees corruption is very 
high inside and out of NGO’s. In fact it is an everyday part of the culture. This 
meaning that within the dogomba culture if you needed to seek a favour or help from 
a chief or a member of his family you as a peasant would lay gifts or money on the 
skin of the chief. This example alone he says is the backbone of corruption, not only 
in Northern Ghana but all over Ghana itself. It is the way of exchange for goods 
which the formal system doesn’t recognize. He mentions this is an embedded practice 
that may never be forgotten as long as chiefs still hold power in the communities and 
also in NGO’s or any institution for that matter.  
 
When asked about the changing role of chieftancy in Ghana, he thinks that cheiftancy 
will become outdated, as we see it now, in possible one or two generations, but you 
cannot simply take the power of cheiftancy away especially if the formal institution 
doesn’t have the capacity nor the trust of the people to govern. Who else will govern 
if the formal institution can’t?   He notes that as we define corruption, it tends to lose 
the development agenda’s of agencies and puts personal “illegal” agenda’s into the 
forefront. There is a problem with this in some world vision departments and knows 
of other NGO’s representatives who have this problem especially at local level 
interaction with communities (examples in other interviews as well). Says people 
have a choice – we can either shift from the cultural practices and accept todays 
development agenda or continue this path as we are going. His opinion is to change 
the role of chieftancy to more ceremonial such as the monarchies of England, etc… 
Feels that cheiftancy itself has caused more conflict in the past and could in the future, 
especially in the northern region, than what it may have if the role of the chief had 
been changed previously. But once again reiterates that with a region of the country 
with illiteracy of 86% and people starving for water and food, they need something to 
believe in and cheiftancy is one of those topics.  
 
General perceptions: 
 
People who are schooled perceive religion, culture and development differently than 
peoples who are not. Although people who are schooled may be more objective about 
development initiatives they may also be tougher to convert to Christianity for 
example. Or (admitingly) why some dogomba communities are harder to enter than 
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konkomba communities (ie level of education, religion etc..) This could be a reason 
why communities have different projects and initiatives - communities may become 
harder to penetrate - because individuals or persons are not receptive to the word of 
god for example, or ask why, how questions which may be different than communities 
who necessarily aren’t as educated or objective about issues. In an animation sense it 
is easier to penetrate communities with projects when communities who are in need 
are open to the word of god.  
(remember to expand based from previous w.v. interviews). 
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Interview # 24  
 
I.B. Basimtale DCD Gushiegu 
April 27th, Gusheigu District 
 
Ministry of Agric. Is the only sector integrated into the DA for funding reasons also 
has very much foods security support from donors.  
 
DA and CWSA are in a joint funding scenario meanwhile MOFA is centralized from 
ACCRA. 
 
Very difficult as MOFA is centralized and some sectors are not.  
 
Admits that some NGO’s slow down the decentralization process by bypassing the 
DA in terms of resources and project planning issues.  
 
Some NGO’s have channled resources into the DA previously but results have proven 
to slow and non-accountable. 
 
DANIDA and DA collaborate closely in projects to the point where the DA must have 
approval from DANIDA before some projects are implemented.  
 
Researchers have to look at amended acts that stall funding from Accra to Gusheigu – 
for example Health takes much of the DA’s resources but is not under the direct 
authority of the DA itself. The DA should be responsible for budget, tax, politics 
etc… 
 
Ones in Accra have the power and do not want to let go – this could be for personal 
reasons. CWSA is also autonomous therefore there is no ability for the DA to control 
funding. 
 
Dual allegance to regional and national offices  - No complete physical 
decentralization apart from the common fund.  
 
Had to end interview due to time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
292  
Interview # 25  
  
Cathy Durand 
Discap Associate Team Leader 
April 17th/06 
 
Ministries not telling DA what resources they have but expects district to pay for 
services.  
 
CIDA team leaders informally discuss issues but not in a formal nature 
 
Budget support is a good idea but not in a weak state. 
 
Decentralization process stalls in an office in Accra. Only 2 people sitting in the office 
administering 8million US dollars. Do not know what to do with it.  
 
The RPCU is the most important of the planning units for the districts. Policies 
especially water have no backing – no resources or mechanism to force people to 
accept its terms. Ie., no official mechanism to meet.  
 
DISCAP only goal is to support the DCPU system.  
 
RPCU under ministry of local government – couldn’t even meet all districts within the 
fiscal year which included Gusheigu. 
 
She questions if we need Unit committees – 16,000 unit committees in Ghana, 
supposed to be 15 people in these units – to much bureaucracy.  
 
Basically all other issues discussed were reiterated by other team leaders and officials 
in Gusheigu. Interview cont. but the same issues about power, authority 
representation, donor co-ordination, decentralization etc.. were brought with no new 
revalations.  
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Interview # 26   
 
Charles Owiredu 
Senior Research Officer  
NPP secretariat  
Accra: March 21st-06 
 
 
Once again the big topic within the assemblies and the representation of NGO’s in the 
communities was the decentralization concept or lack thereof. 
 
- Decentralization has been slower than expected 
- Personally advocates that the party provision move to the officials in the 
district assembly be elected in the D.A.’s. Everyone is supposed to be partners 
in development. When asked why he votes for this as it would take away 
power from the NPP in Gusheigu for example, he notes that it may if the 
people see that the NPP are focusing more on democracy and not favourtism 
to its party officials 
- Notes that one of the reasons why the common fund has been slow in 
distribution tot eh assemblies, he noted that the central government has other 
priorities at times especially after it had declared bankruptcy (HIPC). 
Therefore some funds are earmarked for debt repayment.  
- Notes that people in the villages may not see the rationale of voting in the 
D.A. this is somewhat also been talked about in accra. 
- D.A. at the national level must follow anti-corruption agencies.  
- Acceptance of gifts and hampers is normal in the custom but it’s the intention 
of a service implied afterwards that is the problem.  
 
Went into northern marginalization and one of the reasons for instability is dating 
back to colonialism and also the instability of the ethnic conflict. 
 
The problem with NGO’s conducting work in the country is a majority of them have 
no agenda regarding collaboration or even some respect of the government and its 
people.  
 
Then the interview took a turn and he wanted to talk about the political and ethnic 
issues in the north. Went into conspiracy theories about the ndc and how the country 
needs to change its ideology in order to move forward. Feels the concept of socialism 
has been embedded into the society for too long and notes this may be a problem in 
the next election. Thus meaning the NPP may have trouble being voted in.  
 
Noted that the NDC does have a platform to use the Ya Naa for political and ethnic 
purposes. But the NPP does not have a political motive therefore they just want peace 
in the region.  
 
I would have been surprised if he admitted the NPP were strictly abudu’s which 
would tie him to the conflict itself.  
 
We only had 1 hour to talk and this was the one hour. Barely scratched the surface for 
interview sake. But offered phone number and contact details to come back anytime.  
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Interview # 27 
 
3/4/06 
Town Area Council Nawuhugu 
Michael Kwabena Njom- chairman 
Sulemana Inusah Damba- secretary 
Ligmin Bilagam Godfred- treasurer 
 
The three positions above are employed, but no one has received salary yet. 18 total in 
Town Area Council representing 78 communities, but only 7 communities are 
represented with unit committees.  
 
The Town Area Council was founded on 7. April 2005 and nothing has happened yet. 
Before they were under Gusheigu. Their budget is 20 million cedis over four years. 
The current development plan is just about to start, and it’s the first one they have 
had. They are getting support from Danida with a TSPS Phase 2 (Transport Support 
Program Sector) which consists of a road network for farmers to bring their foodstuff 
to markets. This involves all 8 area councils in Gusheigu. Next week Tues-Friday all 
problems will be identified and given to the DA. They are focusing only on road 
transport because they’ve been sensitized to the issue. There was a 6 day workshop 
where people went to communities to raise awareness and sensitize the people that 
Danida would come and support the sector. 
 
The main problems in the area are water, education, and health 
 
They said that the DA doesn’t have adequate resources to support the TAC. They 
blame it in part on the DCC because money that was supposed to come to them was 
spend on maintaining peace in the district. They say that the Konkombas aren’t 
treated the same, they are different people over there (Dagombas). In communities 
that aren’t Konkombas you see a lot of development. 
 
The DA has no data. 
 
The NPP is dominant in the area because they are now getting education and health 
facilities, before they had nothing. While most Konkomba don’t care about Abudu or 
Andani, the stereotype is that they support the Abudu, but actually they feel neutral.  
 
Nawuhugu population is 477. There are 2 HDW, 2 dams, 1 primary school, 1 JSS, 1 
latrine 
 
 
Gmanicheri Unit committee 
 
Made up of Dinyogu, Bosum, what other places? 
 
10 candidates from each community, and only one is voted for 4 year term 
12 reps from Gmanicheri unit committee (only communities who have candidates get 
a representative), but only 3 go to Town Area Council 
• How do people contest? Why? How do they see their roles? 
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Town area council needs assessment is made up of Dikpong, Jaten, Gingina, Toog, 
Lomb, Katinbugli 
At the last meeting, roads to the communities were discussed and they talked about 
how to reduce the carrying of goods on heads 
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Interview # 28  
 
Ben Anamoh, OIC Tamale 
April 12, 2006 
 
“Information carriers” are usually adventurous young men from a community who go 
around on their bikes or by foot and see other development projects.  
• They ask about it and how the community got it. 
• He finds out that the NGO wants certain things: existing groups (and that these 
groups should be in existence for a few years), leaders, and demand-approach 
• So then he goes and gets his contact person. Most communities have a contact 
person in town. The contact person will help in getting the NGO to come out, 
or bring the application to the NGO. The Contact person is either someone 
from the community or someone who has interest in the community (cattle, 
etc.) 
• When the NGO comes, it might be this same information carrier and if he’s 
respected for what he’s doing, he will be the contact. From then on, he might 
be the contact for all future NGOs… 
• It’s everything, a huge status, if an NGO pulls up in the big van in front of 
your house, before even going to the chief. 
 
He says that when an NGO goes back to the community, one of the most important 
questions to ask is how the BH has impacted the community. 
 
“Donors just want a report in a certain format- 5 pages, so and so many words. I 
understand they’re just trying to do their work. But if they’re really trying to change 
lives for the better, they have to know the local culture and be interested in it” 
 
He gives an example of how he tried once to include another few pages on some of 
the social aspects at the community level, and how the donor didn’t want to see it. 
They didn’t know what to do with it and told him so.  
 
Sections. Most communities have different sections, either according to clan or other 
forms of relationships. Siting the BH is very important in terms of which section 
considers it in their area, and not being aware of this might cause conflict. Most 
NGOs and agencies overlook this.  
 
Inter-community relations. That was one example, but there are other local issues, 
such as how many communities will be able to use this well? Does that number serve 
the number the BH is meant for? And if not, will the increased number of users allow 
the water to have as much quantity and will it break down with too much use? 
 
Leadership. There are sections in communities. NGOs need to know a little about the 
community, who the leaders are. It’s not only about who the chief is, because in some 
cases the chief isn’t as respected as the chairman Imam or Ilaji. Thus, it’s important to 
figure out if the leader is a good leader first, because if not, you’re going to have 
problems that you should address with the community members as a whole. If an 
NGO just approaches the first person they see making huge gestures with their arms, 
and there is a man sitting nearby, the NGO might think that the first one is hard-
working and active while the second one is lazy. If the NGO approaches the gesturing 
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man first and makes contact with him, this is an indication to the rest that he is the 
connection between the NGO and the community, and when he goes into a compound 
to discuss things with the NGO, others know this. They know, just as you and I are 
sitting in here talking, and the other office staff is out there, they know that we talk 
about many things. When you come out, the staff will look at you and know that you 
know things that they might not. This gives you power over them because it’s up to 
you how much you want to tell them and over what period of time. And they know 
this, so it’s justified power.   
 
Leaders are leaders for life. A chairman of the local development committee is 
chairman for life. 
 
Impact. 
What donors are looking for can’t be captured by what is really going on. 
Example of mill and corn. 
Before the intervention, women stored their corn in such a fashion that little mites 
would come into the granary and eat some of the corn, making lots of powder. After 
the intervention of a new storage facility, the amount of powder was supposed to 
decrease. When the donor asked the women about the impacts of the intervention, the 
women noted that: 
• When they were sifting the corn out of the bowl, there was less powder, and 
the clouds in the sky decreased, and there was less coughing. The donor 
wasn’t interested in this. He didn’t even note it. 
• Before, the women sold their corn at the market at the very end after everyone 
else had sold theirs. Now, customers came to them first, and they were able to 
go home and do other things.  
• The donor was interested in quantity, an amount that the women were able to 
produce more of. 
 
Another example of a BH. The community mentioned the following impact 
• Another example was a BH between two communities, but that one of the 
communities didn’t end up using it and walked long distances to another 
source due to some conflicts over payment of the well. 
• He has also seen cases of structures that have caused problems aren’t used 
• Some benefits include: 
o Cost of bicycle repairs went down 
o Saves time 
o School enrollment- formerly, girls had to wake up at 3 or 4 in the 
morning to fetch water before coming to school. They would be 
sleeping in classes. Now they are more awake. It’s still a problem, but 
it has decreased. 
o School retention- before, many girls dropped out because of having to 
work too much, especially if the water was far away and they would 
have to fetch 3 or 4 times in the day. It’s still a problem, but it has 
decreased with closer water sources. 
o Before, they had been quarreling over a dam with another community. 
They were even going to courts and hiring lawyers to hear the cases. 
The BH resolved some conflicts. Resolving conflict and prevailing 
peace is the most important part of an NGOs work, because if there is 
no peace the intervention won’t be sustainable. 
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The donors weren’t interested in these quality assessments or want to know about 
their role as peacekeepers. They wanted to hear about decreased cases of guinea worm 
and diarrhea, the rate of flow in a BH, they have standards. They will only refer to 
these impacts through leading questions, but it obviously isn’t their priority. These are 
some of the unintended impacts that donors don’t want to hear about but which make 
a well sustainable or not in their own eyes. 
 
Most donors are not in total touch with project. They are sitting in the plane or in a 
lounge, circling some documents, circling some words. They are not down to earch 
with the project.  
 
Most projects have been cancelled because of new people coming in and not 
understanding the local context. Their bosses don’t see the need. 
 
Transparency and honestly should be allowed for NGOs. One shouldn’t have to hide 
failures or mistakes, because we learn from every mistake. But we know that if the 
donor hears of this mistake, he might refuse to fund us again. I once tried to revise a 
strategy because I thought it would be better, but you’re not supposed to revise a 
strategy half-way through a project that’s already been approved. You’re supposed to 
meet your objectives, and the strategy to do so is what’s been approved. 
 
An example of the Demand Driven approach. We had a target of 50 people receiving 
plow loans, but only 25 demanded it. So we needed to meet our target, but the only 
way of doing so was through questioning the people before, animating them a little to 
demand the loan. In the end, we had 50. But then we noticed that some of these 
people lied to us, that they didn’t really need the plows, and that this was causing 
conflicts among the farmers, because those who needed it saw the others and thought 
the NGO was a joke. So we also had to maintain our respect towards the community, 
and we ended up going in a repossessing 25 of the plows! The people were shocked, 
the donors were shocked, but in the end, we had to do it. I told the donor, if it’s 
Demand-driven approach, don’t give me targets. I haven’t heard back from them yet, 
but I think they will have to accept this. 
 
An example of Equity-orientation. It shouldn’t be about equity, it should be about 
how we can effectively introduce portable water. If it’s about equity, we’re supposed 
to distribute let’s say 20 BH in 4 districts, where each district gets 5. But we know 
that in one district the success rate of BH is 20%, but we have to continue drilling 
because that’s what the objectives state. It would be better to drill in places that would 
be effective, it’s a waste of resources otherwise. 
 
But then, how do we get water to those people in districts with low water levels? How 
to reach equity? 
 
There have to be alternatives to just boreholes and HDW. There should be dams, but 
they’re too expensive and complex to maintain. There was one dam built with a 
filtration gallery from the center because the guinea worm Cyclops only stay at the 
edges. The filtration gallery had to be fitted with all types of screens, sand, chemicals. 
The dam had to be fenced to keep animals from drinking and defecating into it, and 
another pool had to be built just for the animals. So, you see, it was very complex and 
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expensive. And then there was no education for the women using the water, so they 
were fetching water from the same place as the animals.  
 
Rain harvesting, there needs to be research in how to keep all that water that comes in 
the rainy season from evaporating. I know there’s research on this, why can’t we do 
some ourselves and change policy? That should be the role of a place like IPA 
(Institute for Policy alternatives). 
 
NGOs should tackle survival versus livelihood. What to communities is a normal 
livelihood? What are the ingredients of survival in this community? You will notice 
that survival is much more important than things like quality. You need to know why 
they have certain priorities. What is their concept of water? Development is thinking 
of safety, they are thinking of survival. Once you understand this, you understand why 
some things work and why some don’t. 
“We are preaching something which to them is distant” 
 
US Aid has left Ghana along with other countries based on national averages of 
malnutrition. Most of the people in the North went to school because of US Aid. 
Schools survived because of food. If they didn’t give food in schools, children 
wouldn’t come. They were even giving food to those who didn’t go to school, but 
sooner or later many of those started coming to school too. Food aid strengthens 
mental capability in education. But here in Ghana, the S. doesn’t understand the North 
and the North doesn’t understand the South. They put a question on the internet to ask 
if Ghana was benefiting/how they would respond to taking away food aid. Comments 
only came from the South, you can tell by their names. How many people in the North 
have access to the internet? 
 
Give background to why rice farming collapsed in Ghana.  
• Loans were given to farmers claiming to farm 50 acres and in reality only had 
10. Banks never checked, and farmers couldn’t repay 
• No knowledge about pesticides. Many many farmers got sick in their nervous 
system, this discouraged others. 
 
Organizations and cooperatives were hijacked by government. Government societies 
and associations’ executives will change hands with party. Politics are killing the 
farming industry. Those institutions supporting rice industry were crippled. Marketing 
aspect was crippled because everyone wanted polished American rice, not unpolished 
Ghanaian rice that has more vitamins. Local rice is seen for rural consumption. 
Gusheigu field study trip 09/02-11/02  
 
Taken From recording – tape 1 Gusheigu  
 
- shoshana in village  
- Kokumba village – settlements are spread apart 
- Observe diviner – works foreman, driver 
- Diviner uses this cord to detect water source in the ground 
- Pain in elbow where water source is 
- 5 villages on Friday – 5 kokumba – 1 dogumba 
- villages have already been selected for CLIP projects and signed contract 
- Fee payment has not been made, villages waiting until projects are finished 
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- Diviner is respected from very old traditions from hundreds of years – very 
embedded into culture 
- Villages all had boreholes dug by CWSA of which communities where 
charged 1.5 million cedies 
- All boreholes were dry, hence why village wants water 
- Village hestiante because they paid all this money for boreholes and no water 
now a new project is coming. 
- Refered to animation 
- Why would a community want to hire another water project? This is the whole 
question. 
- CLIP using diviner to give a sense of confidence to the village people that 
water will be located – do not necessarily have to use a diviner though 
especially scientifically as the diviner has no previous knowledge of 
hydrology etc… 
- Works foreman notes that hand dug wells may be better because than 
boreholes because the boreholes are only 6 inches wide meanwhile a borehole 
is 1.5 meters wide therefore it will be easier to hit the “veins” of water in the 
ground. 
- The diviner uses this technique, but both d and WF admitted that they use a 
type of tree and ant hills this is a representation that water is nearby, they use 
this to locate water, the village people do not know this as they assume that all 
species of trees are the same. 
- Village people highly uneducated – so this is definitely a tactic used by CLIP. 
And as well all villages where a borehole was dug there was located a hand 
dug well in the same area so the diviner and works foreman use this 
knowledge as well in their ritualistic water procedure. 
- Some villages had their own wells called shallow wells which were not as 
deep as the hand dug wells. The village people believe there is water in the 
area – when the rains come they use these wells to store water.  
- In one village they had a dry borehole and a shallow well. They had told the 
diviner to try near the shallow well and not the borehole as the village thought 
there was water. So of course a hand dug well was marked in indication of 
water directly beside the shallow well.  
- Fee payment – payment as noted from the works foreman. In order for the 
pumps to be installed the village has to have 150,000 cedis in their bank 
account. This is to be sure that they have enough money for parts. 
- Nash and works foremand reiterated that there was water quality testing done 
every 6 months both at the Gwatercompany lab and the CSIR research station. 
- Diviner has no knowledge of geology or scientific background regarding the 
local characterstics of village geography. 
 
Continuation from notes in project book 1. 
  
- Also CWSA (works foreman) says they are now advocating for hand dug 
wells – refers to nancy’s comments that Yendi is saying no to hand dug wells, 
works foreman says she is lying as Yendi is advocating hand dug wells. 
- Works foreman would like to see people only use the water for drinking and 
not for washing, should use another means of water source for laundry etc.. 
 
- Stages of animation: 
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o Stage 1: Community identifies need for water. How? Other villages 
talk to each other, local CBO’s affiliated with CLIP talk to other 
villages then word spreads around. Good positioning for CLIP – 
question – how do other NGO’s do this. 
o Stage 2: Village creates application and submissions via a secretary 
representing the villages submits the applications. These are then 
evaluated by either the NGO that they submitted the application to or 
the D.A. if they have the capacity. This is strictly for hand dug wells. 
o Stage 3: The villages are then selected and animation begins by the 
District Co-ordinator, DWST team leader and Water Co-ordinator.  
o Stage 4: Site selection for water which in CLIP’s case is including a 
diviner (moses) and works foreman or water co-ordinator 
o Stage 5: Construction is supposed to be performed 3-6 months through 
the months of October to March. Some wells are being constructed 
after but it depends on the location and or the amount of rainfall as the 
wells will cave in during construction when the rains come. 
 
Notes from Day 2 
- Went to a village with healer. I have noticed that the communities are just 
being introduced to the diviner therefore the characteristics of the works 
foreman as in this case, is very approachable, friendly, and charismatic who 
knows how to talk to these people about the importance of the diviner.  
- It is he (works foreman) in this case who the broker convincing the village of 
the importance of the diviner.  
- Works foreman would like to see people only use wells for drinking not for 
other uses such as washing, drying etc..this contradicts Nash’s statements 
where he would like to see people use the water for everything. 
- One of the concepts of animation is to inform the benefits of the well, this 
means that there would be a change in livelihoods – tactics used to convince 
the villages is the fact that, currently families have to wait to eat a meal in the 
morning until the women come back for water as the men and children do not 
cook, this means that the family wouldn’t eat until late morning or afternoon.  
- Quick note that contract is already signed when the diviner comes but group is 
animated about the diviner. I question this and look forward to attending an 
animation. 
 
Kokumba vs. Dogumba villages 
 
- Kokumba village: when digging wells they are more organized and efficient 
when it comes time to dig a well as the communities in the village all 
participate and rotate when it comes to construction itself. This is also the 
same when picking watSans in this case all people work and participate. 
- Dogumba village: have all people living in one village or compound therefore 
only one or two workers would be dedicated to work on the well (meaning the 
same people) but the rest of the village will not work – meaning- there is a big 
difference in livelihoods between the two systems. 
- This relates into other issues outside of water such as which animals belong to 
who, which guinea fowel eggs belong to who etc…. much different type of 
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conflict management. This is not a problem in the kokumba villages as the 
compounds in a community are separated.  
 
- I must make it a point to investigate the approaches between the two – as there 
is much different livelihoods strategies – this could also lead into the the 
strategies the GDCA advocates its strategies with other local CBO’s in the 
community etc…each of the programs does networking with local CBO’s for 
its uses  
 
- In this case Nash would join the GDCA to advocate with local CBO’s this in 
turn forms the strategies of animation in the villages. 
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Appendix L: Vocabulary, Proverbs and other customs (combined) in Likpakpaln 
with translations 
 
Modernization  Dandanwei (Life nowadays) 
Development Ininween (your eyes are open) 
Guinea worm  Inaan 
Latrine   Banjeradiuk (where people go to free 
themselves) 
Politics  Parteparte a bor (party politics) 
Friend/contact person Njo 
NGO   Sumba Aani Fob (They are on their own) 
   Simi Ni Fob (White people who come out to 
help) 
Diseases  Iwuee 
Convulsion  Kinong 
Needs   Wamba wann 
Demand  M-bingm 
Gift   Ipiin 
Tijikar   Food 
Ukpaan  Guinea fowl 
Linugil   Yam 
 
Water   N-nyim 
Drinking water Nyunyukam 
Bathing water  Nyinsiikam 
Washing water Nyimgmunkam 
Hand-dug well  Kinyimbung (water digging) 
Borehole  Wanawana (pedal) 
Traditional well Libon (well) 
Stream water  Nyenbun (down water) 
Drawing water  Njamalunim 
Rainy season  kusheg 
Dry season  Lipel 
Traditional clay pot Libunbol 
Barrel   Kigungong 
Basin   Chabsi 
 
 
Fetish priest  Uwadaan 
Traditional healer Unyog daan 
Chief   Ubor 
 
 
 
Fukpem “you are greeting the person and the person has gone for water” 
 
Bijil lipokbgl ma ki legin lipokpoin 
We cut an old sack to patch a new one 
 
Wodo kini u male nyi lumma 
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The person who sleeps inside the room knows where it leaks 
(It is only the person who lives in the place who knows the source of the problem) 
 
Tinyin joki junni nmee 
Dirty water can quench fire 
(If you don’t have anything better, make it do) 
 
Aa bo lon yaa nnu ka ta yaar ki way binni foibi 
If your armpit is smelling, you shouldn’t raise it in public 
(If you have something to be ashamed of, or if you have something to hide, don’t 
reveal it) 
 
Fuu noi fo kain fa toll u mba aa yaa aa toil 
If you have a long arm, don’t try to distribute in another household 
(You don’t know other peoples’ problems) 
 
Futau u piichan kaa fa yin lipikpegli 
If you marry a new wife you don’t have to reject the old one 
 
U bor ba ni u li sifi ka sifi kau, ke u-wolan jo ki li si fi kan fu li u nnim ma 
If a chief promises to give you something and never fulfills the promise and the elders 
can do it , you go to the elders for it. 
 
Saa kpa Kidabuk kan saa gma ku uchin 
Without a gun you can’t kill a lion 
 
Saa kpa litakpal kan saa gma ku unyuun 
Without a stone you can’t kill a bird 
 
U nii u bun na u ma le ban dot ache 
The sick person has to look for the doctor 
 
Ba gain ubun aa nyogim kin gun 
You can’t give sick person’s medicide to a healthy person 
 
Unii ubini tiwan na aa gma tuuk uwandan ke ugan mala 
If you are a beggar you have no choice 
 
Saa gma bee unii aa do aa bor kep saah nye aa do yaar pu na. 
You can’t know somebody’s hut-problems you you know your own hut-problems. 
 
Some Konkomba customs 
 
 
Worship of stones, trees, water 
There are spirits in the water and if they worship the spirits, the spirits will multiply to 
make plenty. They are called Nyimbupeig. According to Issufu, it works, now they 
don’t do it because there are boreholes there and they don’t need water any longer. 
But generally, performing sacrifices and worshiping is very common, even small 
children know how the traditional healer calls for rain. He takes a killed fowl wraps 
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leaves around it. He then burns the leaves on firewood and look at how the smoke 
goes up. If the smoke turns north, it’s a sign that rain will come. Whenever rain gives 
thunder, the juju people can tell whether it will bring rain or not. They still do this and 
it works. It costs money, something like ? for him to do this. Another example of a 
sacrifice was that Khadija used to have another cat. A sick man went to the healer and 
was asked to bring a cat for a sacrifice in order to be cured. So Khadija gave him the 
cat, the cat was killed, and the man was healed. So there you go. 
 
In Nawuhugu there was a crocodile, but they don’t come out anymore because they 
think they’re being killed. Before it was possible to go there and ask for things such as 
more money or better harvest. You would go there with a guinea fowl and say certain 
words and then the crocodile will move a certain way and it’s possible to read if the 
wish comes true or not. 
 
Avenging death 
If your father was killed by someone else, you take his leg and put it in clay and make 
a cast. When you grow and your leg fits the cast, you must get up and avenge the 
death.  
 
 
 
 
